Same Rock, New Rush: Why a South African Climate Superfund Should Fund the Just Transition, Not Just Repair the Damage

05 Nov 2026 | By Tayla Cooper
Credit: istock
05 Nov 2026 | By Tayla Cooper
Unearthed | law.uct.ac.za

South Africa is about to do something it has done before: pull a resource from the ground, sell it to the world, and watch the wealth flow elsewhere. Only this time the rock is lithium, manganese and platinum-group metals instead of coal. Replacing coal with transition minerals is not, on its own, transformation. Whether a coal worker retrenched in Mpumalanga gets a stake in the battery-metal economy replacing his job, or merely a retrenchment letter, is a policy choice. We legislated coal’s inequalities into being. This is South Africa’s opportunity to legislate something else.

What are transition minerals?

Transition minerals are the essential raw material inputs required to manufacture clean technologies. While these minerals enable the global shift away from fossil fuels, the transition risks creating complex socio-economic risks across the African continent.

In South Africa, the inevitable demise of a high-carbon coal industry poses a socio-economic threat to coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga, where 80% of national coal production is concentrated. To cushion vulnerable workers and communities from bearing the sole burden of this shift while private and foreign capital capture the benefits, South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) puts the total capital requirement at roughly $250 billion over the next three decades. This massive funding requirement is distributed across electricity infrastructure, municipal capacity, skills development, and targeted economy diversification to ensure that frontline communities are not left behind. Although the financial ambitions of the JET-IP are laudable, serious concerns have been raised about whether the required investment can realistically be secured, and consequently, whether its broader socio-economic objectives can be achieved.

The funding gap

Against the above figure, the flagship international response (the Just Energy Transition Partnership) pledged just $8.5 billion. However, in early 2025 the US pulled out of the International Partners Group entirely. The withdrawal exposed exactly what critics have warned: this is voluntary, bilateral, politically contingent finance, not a legal entitlement. And it can be withdrawn the moment a donor government’s priorities shift.

The structure of what remains compounds the problem. Of the original JETP pledge, only around $6 billion was earmarked as grants or concessional loans; the rest was market-rate financing and equity investment, debt South Africa must eventually repay. A financing architecture that leaves South Africa more indebted rather than more sovereign over our own energy transition, echoes exactly the extractive dynamics this transition is supposed to end.

Polluter pays: a principle South African law has already accepted.

Section 2(4)(p) of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) states plainly that the costs of remedying environmental degradation must be borne by those responsible for causing it, and courts have given the aspiration real force through section 28, NEMA’s duty of care provision. The provision has been read as imposing strict, and possibly absolute, liability on polluters, with no ceiling on the amount owed. Moreover, Parliament has confirmed the duty of care applies retrospectively.

In other words, South African law is already comfortable with polluter-pays liability. What we lack is a mechanism that applies that logic at the scale of an entire industry, rather than one contaminated site at a time.

A statutory alternative: the American climate superfund model.

In 2024, two American states, Vermont and New York, passed “climate superfund” laws declaring that any fossil fuel company responsible for extracting above a defined threshold of historic greenhouse gas emissions is a “responsible party”, strictly liable to pay into a state fund. The same underlying logic is what already sits inside NEMA’s section 28.

Nowhere else has gone this far. Most climate finance still takes the form of voluntary pledges from donor governments and development banks, the same model that left South Africa exposed when Washington walked away. Developing countries have built the vessel but not the revenue: Indonesia’s Climate Change Trust Fund, widely regarded as the world’s first national climate fund, has remained a minor player because it depends on the state budget and foreign donors and lacks the legal independence to raise money elsewhere.

Yet calls to make polluters pay are spreading. In Australia, another major coal exporter, researchers estimate a levy on fossil fuel production could have raised A$44 billion in a single year. What is missing is not a legal theory but political will. South Africa is unusually well placed to supply it: our law already accepts that polluters should pay.

The fossil fuel industry generates profits so vast that its largest players collectively earn several billion dollars a day and have known since at least 1965 that its own product was on track to cause global “catastrophe”. The industry then spent the following six decades and untold sums burying that knowledge under manufactured doubt, while the planet kept warming regardless.

Our own president has told the world that developing economies are calling on history’s polluters to meet the financial obligations required for the Just Transition. A superfund answers that call in the one register that doesn’t ask permission. It requires only that parliament decide the bill for seventy years of knowing.

What the money should actually do

Proceeds should be legally ring-fenced for South Africa’s own Just Transition Financing Mechanism, which is starved of the reliable capital it needs to retrain coal workers entering the mineral economy, genuine equity stakes, and communities hosting the next generation of mines.

The Government’s own Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy, approved in 2025, shows why this cannot be left to existing policy. The Strategy admits that mining has historically brought environmental damaged, displaced communities, and entrenched inequality. Yet every financial tool it proposes flows towards industry: tax breaks, royalty reductions and cheaper electricity for investors. It even proposes reviewing carbon taxes on smelters. Nowhere does it ask those who profited from coal to pay for the move away from it. A superfund would supply the missing half of the bargain: if the state is willing to subsidise the new rush, the old one should help pay for it.

We know how to build extractive systems that serve a narrow few, we have done it for over a century. The only real question is whether we are willing to legislate a different one now.