African Yearbook of Rhetoric

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πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον πρῶτα μὲν οὔνομα
πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην

During my lifetime I have dedicated my life
to this struggle of the African people. I
have fought against white domination, and I
have fought against black domination. I have
cherished the ideal of a democratic and free
society in which all persons will live
together in harmony and with equal
opportunities. It is an ideal for which I
hope to live for and to see realized. But my
lord, if it needs be, it is an ideal for
which I am prepared to die

Foundations & Projections

AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF RHETORIC

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Vol. 7   2016-2017

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and copy-edited by Raphael Helman.

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FOUNDATIONS & PROJECTIONS

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Foreword

Volume 7 of the African Yearbook of Rhetoric brings together an array of analyses from diverse perspectives concerning foundation and forecast.

As is our practice, senior writers and PhD candidates have joined forces to produce what we hope to be an interesting read.

The Editor and the Board are grateful to Dr Justin Snell, A W Mellon-UCT Fellow in Rhetoric Studies, for having taken on the Guest Editing of Volume 7, and we recognise the A W Mellon Foundation of New York for their support to Rhetoric Studies.

Last but not least this issue marks a new foundation, and a casting forward of the Journal, as we salute the Department of Private Law, at the University of Cape Town (UCT), for having taken rhetoric in its fold.

Philippe-Joseph Salazar
Editor

Rhetoric and urbanism:
foundational speeches, deliberation and scenarios of space engagement

Justin Snell

The notion of *isonomy* created for sixth century Athens by a man like Cleisthenes, is a truly structural conception by which the centre alone is privileged. Since all the citizens have relations with it which at the same time are symmetrical and reversible. At this period the conception of the city was exclusively a signifying one.
Roland Barthes

In 1967 Barthes addressed a colloquium at the University of Naples under the title of *Sémiologie et Urbanisme*. Propelled by the *double amour* of 'signs and cities' he sought, with precautions, to open the 'possibility of a semiotics of the city'.[1] In the same year civic unrest and the rise of black militancy in America signalled further resistance to segregation, discrimination, police brutality and economic inequality, and heralded the political and rhetorical power of the mobilisation of mass action. In South Africa, as medals were being stamped to solemnify the assassination of President Verwoed the previous year in 1966, existing Apartheid legislation around population registration, racial segregation and control of black labour was re-codified. Significantly, a new law was instituted in the growing war against the urban unrest and the African National Congress' armed liberation struggle. *The Terrorism Act (General Laws Amendment Act No 83)* of 1967 in which that 'designed to combat terrorism[ ]itself became an instrument of terror' resulted in the many of the atrocities, instances of torture and deaths in detention committed under Apartheid.[2]

Barthes' address covered a host of topics, analyses and representations from Herodotean cartography and Cleisthenes' '*isonomy*'

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[1]Barthes' *Sémiologie et Urbanisme* was first published in 1967 in *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui* and subsequently in 1972 in Rykwert J. Silver N. *Le sens de la ville*, (Paris, 1972). Barthes, R "Semiology and Urbanism" in *The Semiotic Challenge*, (Trans. Howard, R. Oxford, 1988). From the extensive literature on the topic see, Claval, Paul "Geographie et sémiologie" in *Espace geographique* 1974 Volume 3 No. 2 pp. 113-119. Barthes' urban semiotics appears to bear affinities with his analysis three years later of Balzac's *Sarazine*, S/Z where analogously codes create a spatial topos or network.
[2]Dugard, J *Human rights and the South African legal order,* (Princeton, 1978) p. 136.

© *African Yearbook of Rhetoric* 7, 2016-7, Online ISSN 2305-7785:
Justin Snell, "Rhetoric and urbanism", pp. 1-10.

to Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris*, Levi Straus' *Triste Tropiques* and contemporary theoretical works such Lynch's *The Image of the City*. Through propositions like 'human space in general (not only urban space) has always been a signifying space' and 'the city as a writing', it would seem the city would ultimately reveal its deep [tropic] structures and yield to becoming a readable and legible signifying entity.[3] While an analysis of the semiotic project in relation to hermeneutics, phenomenology and urbanism is beyond the scope of this paper, the city as a symbolic form is, as evidenced in the scope of his references, an idea of extreme antiquity.[4] What concerns us here is rather an omission or lacuna. On the fiftieth anniversary of Barthes' address it is perhaps instructive to enquire what his view on *isonomia* and form of questioning would have been, had the colloquium been held after 'the [re]turn to Rhetoric'.[5]

Often rendered as 'equality of political' rights *isonomia* was also one of the terms used by Herodotus as 'periphrasis for democracy'.[6] Thus we find, "The rule of the multitude has in the first place the loveliest name of all, equality (*isonomia*), and does in the second place none of the things that a monarch does. It determines offices by lot, and holds power accountable, and conducts all deliberating publicly."[7] Earlier in the decade Vernant had undertaken in detailed form the same task with regards to the differentiation of sacred rulership in the *polis*, defining the *agora* as "a spatial image to express the self-awareness that a human group has acquired" noting further "those who shared in the world of the polis were *homoioi* – men who were alike, and later more abstractedly *isoi* – equals [ ] In the six century this image of the human world was precisely expressed in the concept of *isonomia* – that is the equal participation all citizens in the exercise of power"[8]

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[3]In the same year Gadamer acknowledged that 'the ubiquity of Rhetoric is indeed unlimited [and] the rhetorical and hermeneutical aspects of human linguisticality interpenetrate each other' in "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" [1967] in Gadamer, H.G, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, (Linge, D.E. [Ed] California, 1977).

[4]On the antiquity of this relationship see Carl, P "Were cities design as images" in *The Cambridge Archaeological Journal* 10:2 2000, pp. 326-65

[5]See Gaonkar, D, "Rhetoric and Its Double Reflections on the Rhetoric turn in the Human Sciences" in Simons, H. W. [Ed] *The Rhetorical Turn*: *Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry,* (Chicago, 1990). On Barthes 'allusive and somewhat ambiguous recourse to "Ancient Rhetoric", Salazar, P.J "The Unspeakable Origin : Rhetoric and the Social Sciences. A re-assessment of the French Tradition" in *The Recovery of Rhetoric: Persuasive Discourse and Disciplinarity in the Human Sciences,* (Virginia, 1993). P. 101 ff.

[6] Ober, J. "The original meaning of "democracy": capacity to do things, not majority rule", *Princeton/StandfordWorking Papers in Classics*, V1, Sept 2007; M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy,* Oxford, 1969. Pp. 155-60.

[7]Herodotus, *The Histories* Bk 3.80.6*, (*Trans. Godley A. D. Harvard, 1920).

[8]Vernant, J-P *The Origins of Greek Thought*, (Cornell, 1984), p. 47 and pp. 60-61

With the caveat that I am neither a classicist nor a specialist in Greek thought, what appears noteworthy is the paucity of references and that in Aristotle's sustained mediation on politics and the *polis* it is not mentioned at all. This apparent contradiction between the lack of attestation and its possible symbolic significance raises the question of its purpose.[9] Here Garver's distinction between 'guiding and given ends' is instructive, "Every polis, like every art and virtue, has both a given end and an internal, constitutive end. [ ] The guiding, internal, or constitutive end is a means to the given end".[10] To frame the question in these terms we may ask, was *isonomia* a guiding or a given end? To begin, what appears to be common to Aristotle and Herodotus is the key significance of deliberation.[11] Alongside forensic and deliberative [political] rhetoric, *epideixis* understood not only as display but also as demonstration of values, is integral to institutional, ritual and political life.[12] Although deliberative rhetoric is assigned by Aristotle to the register of future, e*pideixis* is connected to the theme of future through its aspirational dimension. Indeed this 'working out' of values would seem to indicate the centrality of rhetoric and the performative dimension with respect to urban life.[13] It also raises question of rhetoric in relation to the *polis* whether, in Heideggerian terms, it is not 'a theory of practice of public speaking but as the unveiling of logos in Greek politics.'[14]

As an interpretive vehicle, in the context of South Africa, deliberation, foundational speeches and what may be termed *rhetorical*

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[9]On the complexities of this issue Lombardini notes, 'Both the exact meaning of the concept, which originated in the late sixth century BC, and its precise relationship with *dêmokratia*, however, remain unclear. [ ] The fact that the term is attested only twenty times in a period of nearly two hundred years exacerbates the difficulties of interpretation. Despite the scarcity of its attestation, the term *isonomia* appears to signal an important conceptual shift in how political regimes were evaluated in the ancient Greek world. *Lombardini, J.* "Isonomia and the public sphere in Democratic Athens" *in HoPT*, Vol. XXXIV.No. 3. Autumn 2013

[10]Garver, R. *Aristotle's Rhetoric – An Art of Character, (*Chicago, 1995), p. 29

[11]"There is a tight verbal parallel between ordinary citizens' entitlement to enter into that "element" of the city that "deliberates concerning the advantageous things and judges concerning the just things" (1329a2-4) Wilson, JL. **"**Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle's *Politics",* APSR *vol*105, Issue 2 May 2011, pp. 259-274

[12]"To praise a "city" [*laus civitatis*] rests on an act of persuasion aimed at political exercise itself; [ ] Quintilian claims that beyond the pleasure of epideictic demonstrations of oratorical prowess (if one agrees with his rendering of *epideictic* as a show, a recital, a performance), there is, in the working of values "demonstrated" by the recital itself, a "pragmatic" force that operates on public affairs." Salazar, P-J. *An African Athens : Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa*, (New Jersey, London, 2002), p. 132.

[13] See Cassin, B. *Sophistical Practice: Toward a Consistent Relativism, (*Fordham University, 2014), *pp. 114-135.*

[14]Salazar, P-J."Review of *Heidegger and Rhetoric"* in *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2008), Penn State University Press P. 307

scenarios of space engagement have played a central role in the instauration of a new democratic political landscape. Studies on oratory an instrument of resistance during Apartheid, and then in dialogue with secular rhetoric have demonstrated the key role rhetoric exerted in the transformation-conversion to democracy. As the legacy of Apartheid segregationist policies persists, emphasis has often been placed on demonstrating how urban environments might be able to redress former injustices, whilst solving urban and social problems.[15] Alongside urgent concerns of housing, land restitution and equitable access to resources, "public space" has emerged as a central focus. Of key importance has been attempting to understand the deep structural continuities and challenges arising from policies and planning implemented under Apartheid.[16]

Derived from Dutch dual *etymon* signifying 'apart-ness' or the 'state of being separate' Apartheid became the universally derided epitome and synonym for racism described by Derrida as *La Dernier Mot.*[17] The a-historicity of Derrida's rendering was contested by McClintock and Nixon who note that, inaugurated by General Smuts in 1917, usage of the term thus pre-dates the regime as indeed did the legislation that preceded it.[18]After 1948, *Apartheid* became indelibly linked with the policies, racist ideology and segregationist planning of the National Party. Extant principles of colonial segregation and labour laws were inaugurated and codified into the extensive apparatus of *Apartheid* legislation. Building on Colonial laws such as the *Natives Land Act* of 1913, the *Group Areas Act* promulgated in 1950 effected separation whilst restricting tenure and habitation on the basis of race.[19] The origins of Afrikaner attitudes towards place and race have traditionally been ascribed to an isolationist 'frontier tradition', forged in combination with a legacy of religious persecution and steeped in Calvinist theology.[20]

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[15]From the extensive body of literature see Dewar & Uytenbogaardt, *South African Cities : A Manifesto for Change*: Urban Problems Research Unit, UCT, 1991, and Southworth, B. "City Squares in Cape Town's Townships-Public Space as an Instrument of Urban Transformation: CoCT UD, , *www.treasury.gov.za*

[16]Morris, M. "Continuity or Rupture: The City, Post-Apartheid" in *Social Research*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (WINTER 1998), pp. 759-775 Published by *The New School*

[17]Derrida, J. "*La Dernier Mot du Racisme*" [Racism's Last Word, 1983], re-published in Derrida,J. *Psyché: Inventions del'autre*, (Paris, 1987),pp. 353–362.

[18]McClintock, A & Nixon, R. "No Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida's "Le Dernier Mot du Racisme"" *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Chicago Press, Autumn, 1986), p. 140

[19]Keegan, T. *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of Racial Order,* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1996).

[20]Du Toit, A."No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology", *AMHR* Vol. 88, No. 4, Oct, 1983, pp. 920-952.

By the early twentieth century, alongside ideas such the rejection of *gelykstelling*(equalisation with 'Blacks'), neo-Calvinist and nationalist ideals notions had been fused with Chosen People rhetoric to lay the groundwork for an emerging Afrikaner National identity. Under the aegis of the reformed Afrikaner Church (*GereformeerdeKerk),* revisionist Afrikaner history and theology was reconstituted in 'Dr Verwoerd's ideological vision of an apartheid order as the divine mission of Afrikanerdom'.[21] In Verwoed we are able to discern the role played by rhetoric and foundational speeches in dialogue with segregationist policies and spatial strategies. While his dissertation on Apartheid in 1948 brought of the *Minister of Native Affairs* to prominence, it was in his immediate response to Macmillan's "Winds of Change" speech in Parliament and subsequent strategizing as President that his political and rhetorical abilities came to the fore.[22] To divert growing international rejection and disavowal of *Apartheid*, Verwoed effected the rhetorical mutation of MacMillian's 'National Consciousness', into 'Separate Development'[23]

Rendered as the 'tendency in Africa for nations to become independent', the *homelands* and *bantustans* of Verwoed's Separate Development were predicated on a pretence of 'self-determination' and born of fear of degeneracy from 'intermingling' [*bloedvergmening*] and 'Out-Breeding' [*Uitbastering*].[24] Arising primarily, it was believed, from spatial proximity and collective co-habitation Cronje wrote, "Mixed living is one of the prime social causes of blood-mixing. Whites in mixed areas lose their ties with the volk. Unconsciously a gradual process of feeling equal (*gelykvoeling*) [with nonwhites] begins to take place in them."[25] Although he disavowed any relationship with National Socialism, the contradictory relationship is clearly embodied in the character, rhetoric and anti-semitic policies of Verwoed's performative leadership. The

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[21]Ibid. P. 951

[22]Verwoerd, H.F *The Policy of Apartheid*, (Parliament, September 3, 1948). Macmillan's Speech on Feb. 3rd 1960 heralded independence for British protectorates and territories.

[23] McClintock & Nixon note, "References in the official discourse of the regime to the inferiority of blacks to whites started to be phased out, and the country was no longer referred to as "multiracial" (which would imply a single political entity) but as "multinational." Op cit. p. 142

[24]"That is why we adopt the policy that the Bantu, wherever he may live in various areas of his own, must be given political control and domination or dominion over his own areas and people. Just as the Italians in France retain their vote in Italy, so the Bantu, who are living temporarily in our urban areas, must have a say in their homelands." Verwoerd, H.F. Speech on the policy of separate development, (April 14, 1961).

[25]Du Toit's alternative 'degeneracy paradigm' has bearing Op cit. Coetzee, J.M. "The Mind of Apartheid : Geoffrey Cronje (1907-), in *Social Dynamics* 17(1) 1-35 1991, pp.9-10

thematics of '*Blut und Boden*' as persuasion directed at re-founding society through biology-social engineering whilst maintaining recourse to the land as repository of values can be noted as background.[26]

Analogously the Apartheid state and urban landscape was mapped, drawn-up and configured in accordance with patterns of racial homogeneity requiring physical and cultural separation. The evolution of this spatial planning model has been located within the context of the growth of South African cities, proposed as the product of three paradigms: earlier colonial or Bastidal, Later Colonial, and finally Modern Town-planning.[27] Within the latter, the following have bearing: The *Garden City Movement* predicated on separation of living and working allied to 'Neighbourhood' social theories, land-use control and zoning; functionalist and reductionist *tabula rasa* style planning; and finally mobility, movement and the ascendency of vehicular or traffic oriented planning models. Of key import is the influence of Le Corbusier's utopian vision codified at the *Congrès International d'ArchitectureModerne* (CIAM) as 'The Functional City' from the Athens Charter.[28] *La Ville Radieuse*, designed to alleviate problems of urban pollution and overcrowding often involved totalizing planning solutions for the large-scale demolition of towns cities replaced with super-blocks.

Le Corbusier's 'radiant' urban planning, despite polemics to the contrary, has been shown to be indebted to Renaissance models he consciously eschewed. Carl notes, 'it is Vignola who first recognizes the possibilities of a conception of architectural ordering which is fundamental to Le Corbusier: the reciprocity of architectural fragments and a structured landscape."[29] In the late-Renaissance within the context of the Counter-Reformation and mobilisation of the confraternities, epideictic oratory deployed to expound upon the moral reform of the city becomes allied to what might be termed the perspectivisation or 'optical transformation' of urban phenomena.[30] These developments constitute the deeper background to the evolution of surveillance and the forms of

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[26] On Darre's '*Neuadal aus Blut und Boden*' (Munich, 1930) see Lane, B.M. *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918*-1945, 1968.pp. 147 -155. On Verwoed and Nationalism see Shain, M.*A Perfect Storm, Antisemitism in South Africa* 1930-1948, (Jonathan Ball, 2015).

[27]Todeschini, F. "Cape Town: Physical Planning Traditions of a Settlement in Transition", *Architecture SA*, 1994 March/April, p. 3.

[28] See Herwitz, D "The Genealogy of Modern Architecture in South African Architecture", *Race and Reconciliation; Essays from the New South Africa, (*Minneapolis, 2003).

[29]Carl, P "Architecture and Time : A Prologomena" AA Files, 22 (Autumn, 1991) pp 48-65.

[30] "It becomes possible to regard city and garden as aspects of a single representational continuum mediated by rhetoric and perspective." Ibid. p51. See also Guest, C.L. *Figural Cities: Bruni's Laudatio Urbis Florentinae and its Greek Sources in Rhetoric, Theatre and the Arts of Design*, (Oslo, Novus, 2008).

scopic and social control one finds in Modernism.[31]   The notion of 'Separate Development' as ideological fragments within the structured field of the Apartheid political landscape, may be understood as both as a rhetorical scenario of space engagement and example of the 'dramatic' possibilities of 'picturing' culture.

Through *Le Group Transvaal*, in the 1930's modernism began to influence architecture and planning in South Africa.[32] Pearse and Hanson created the programmatic elements of 'township' underscored by reductionist and functionalist models allied to rhetorical tropes such as 'community' whilst 'efficiency' one of the key tenets of Modernism, became a watchword.[33] Under the aegis of South African architects and planners, modernist rhetoric and principles was welded to Apartheid ideology to forge a model or spatial planning paradigm for the enforcement of segregationist legislation. Key rhetorical tropes such as 'separation living and working' and 'land-use and zoning' underpinned the foundation of new segregated urban settlements and the re-configuration of existing towns and cities. Often requiring demolition and 'forced removals', townships were established for different race groups removed from cities whilst arterial roads were used for transport, policing and surveillance. 'Buffer zones' [taking a variety of forms from roads to natural landscapes to golf courses] were deployed to effect segregation of neighbourhoods along racial lines.

In 1955, the same year the *Group Areas Development Act*, South Africa's defining moment of civil resistance and founding of its future democracy took place - the *Congress of the People*. On an open piece of land in Kliptown, Johannesburg delegates from diverse backgrounds and cultures debated and contributed to the creation of a unified common vision - the *Freedom Charter* inaugurating the Declaration of the Human Rights for South Africa.[34] The Congress followed a traditional form of protest and rhetoric - a body of citizens assembled to create through deliberation the template of democracy, a Charter. In 1964 in *The Speech from the Dock* Mandela invoked the Freedom Charter and its origins:

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[31]Jay, M. "Scopic Regimes of Modernity" in Foster, H. *Vision and Visuality*, (San Francisco, Bay Press, 1988. Japha, D. "The Social programme of the South African Modern Movement", Africa Seminar paper, *Centre for African Studies*, University of Cape Town, 1985; Briggs, G. 'Facilitating Control : An Examination of The Emergence of the Neighbourhood Planning Theory in South Africa and its relationship to Apartheid', UCT, 1994.

[32]Karol, E. "The Architect and the Social System: Kurt Jonas and the development of the Modern Movement in South Africa", *Architecture SA*, Nov/Dec. 1983.

[33]Pearse, G. E., "National Planning, with particular reference to Regional Planning, Town Planning and Housing" , SAAR, December, 1942, p 366.

[34]Noble J. A. "Memorialising the Freedom Charter: contested imaginations for the development of Freedom Square at Kliptown", 1991-2006, *SAJAH*, Vol 23, No. 1, 2008;

The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter [ ] The *Magna Carta*, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.[35]

As background to the task that faced Mandela, we may invoke Kant's *On The Moral Law, in particular* the two sections on the 'Motive of Duty '[*The Formal Principle of Duty* and *Reverence for the Law*] which immediately precede 'The Categorial Imperative'. Here Kant articulates two potentially contradictory dimensions of aspects of the question of duty: firstly where the 'moral worth' of an action resides not in 'the purpose attained by but in the *maxim* according which it is decided upon' and secondly 'that duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the Law'.[36] For Mandela as a 'man of the law', the question was how to engage with, and act out of reverence, for South Africa and its laws, whilst at same time being obeying his own convictions and conscience.[37] Mandela's rhetorical strategy at the Rivonia Trial, where "We were faced with this conflict between the law and our conscience" was both in dialogue with, and the counterpart to, the *Congress of the People*. Reflecting on the *Charter* itself Mandela uses conscience and reverence to create a space of reflection in which the mirror of democracy was held up to South Africa.

Derrida notes, "There is no law without mirror. And in this properly reversible structure, we will never avoid the moment of admiration."[38] Mandela's speech also addresses the question of future. Derrida continues, 'We will never stop admiring him, him and his

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[35]Nelson Mandela "Statement from the dock", *The Rivonia Trial*, Palace of Justice, Pretoria Supreme Court, Pretoria South Africa, Monday, April 20, 1964

[36]Kant, I. *On The Moral Law- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* 1785, Translation, Paton, H.J. London New York, 1948, pp. 68-73.

[37]Agozino notes analogously that Mandela was "convicted in 1964 before being sentenced to a life in prison just as Martin Luther King Jr was penning his famous letter from Birmingham City Jail in which he proclaimed that disobedience to unjust laws is an obedience to God" Agozino, B. "The Criminology of Madiba Mandela: A Tribute" in *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS*, Vol.7, #s1 &2 November 2013 ISSN 1554-3897. P.141

[38]Derrida, J. *The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration*"*Admiration de Nelson Mandela ou Les lois de le réflexion,*" (first published in *Pour Nelson Mandela*, collective volume, Paris : Gallimard, 1986), pp. 453–475.

admiration. But we not yet know whom to admire in him, the one who, in the past, will have been captive of his admiration or the one who, in a *futur anterior*, will always have been free for having had the patience of his admiration and having known passionately, what he had to admire. Going so far as to refuse, again yesterday, a conditional freedom?'[39] Derrida's argument around *futur antérieur* is that Mandela as a lawyer trained in British law, was calling on a foundation to inaugurate what was already there, in the Law, namely preceding the law. By recalling and invoking the *Freedom Charter*, as a 'founding' moment, Mandela's rhetoric drew upon the 'force of reflection' to instaurate South Africa's future democracy.

Mandela's "*Speech from the Dock*" in the manner in which it opened up a 'space of discourse' could also be understood as spatial, a rhetorical scenario engaging with the Apartheid regime and its unjust Laws, whilst laying the foundation for the founding templates of South Africa's future democracy: The *South African Constitution* and *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* [TRC].[40] Forty years on from the *Congress* in 1995, inaugurating the *South African Constitutional Court* Mandela address the question of the relation between an institution and its embodiment, "It is not just a building that we inaugurate [ ] It is an institution that we establish.[41] In 2002 a competition was held to commemorate the *Congress of the People* and inauguration of the Freedom Charter. One of the principal motifs of the winning entry was the grid representing *isonomia* and symbolising equality, equal distribution, equilibrium, balance, equality of political rights.[42] Whilst the symbol and meaning of equality was subsequently retained, in their report the *South African Heritage Resources Agency* noted:

> The use of the ancient Greek symbolism for the concept of democracy in the design is not considered relevant to the national identity of South Africans.[43]

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[39]Ibid. p. 85.

[40] Salazar, P-J, *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. The Fundamental Document*s, with Erik Doxtader, (Cape Town, 2008) cited in Cassin, B. "Enough of the Truth For" - On the Truth and Reconciliation Commission", Op cit. p.264.

[41] Speech by President Nelson Mandela at the inauguration of the Constitutional Court, 14 February 1995, Johannesburg

[42] *Isonomia* was first communicated to me by Professor Dalibor Vesely in 1998. cf "Walter Sisulu Square-the winner's design" http://www.jda.org.za/

[43]Nobel notes,' Criticism of the reliance upon 'Greek symbolism', was presumably made with respect to architects competition drawings, which elaborates upon their choice of a square grid motif for the paving of the Old and the New Square. [ ] And possibly, this criticism also refers, in a more general sense, to the neo-classical like geometry that underpins this design."

~ Justin Snell ~

The rejection of *isonomia* and retention of equality as a symbolic motif, while related to the [in]appropriateness of colonial or neo-classical models, may also indicate we are in the presence of democracy's inner workings. The performative dimension of urban life and central role of rhetoric in urban discourse creates and sustains communicative civic order and justice. Here, on the 'amnestying of Apartheid' we may note that the transaction between a speech-act and amnestying of vengeance is a foundational moment in the evolution of law and institutionalisation of conflict. Rather than settings, background or instruments of persuasion-social transformation, urban environments as locations for public deliberation point to the idea that it is the *agon* of debate in transaction with symbolic motifs or images which constitutes its 'guiding end'.[44] This nexus is essential to establishing the common ground [of differences], conditions for dialogue and founding the endless task of democratic discursivity, deliberation and forgiveness.[45]

~ A W Mellon-UCT Postdoctoral Fellow in Rhetoric Studies, Centre for Rhetoric Studies, University of Cape Town ~

Ibid p. 31. *"Proposal for the Development of the Freedom Square (Walter Sisulu) Precinct, Kliptown, Soweto: Comments by the SAHRA Advisory Committee."* SAHRA. 2002. Nobel, Op cit. pp. 24-25. [44]See Ricoeur, P "Between Rhetoric and Poetics : Aristotle" in *The rule of Metaphor*, (London and New York, 1975), p.9 ff; and Fleming, D "The Space of Argumentation: Urban Design, Civic Discourse, and the Dream of the Good City" in *Argumentation* 12 (2):147-166 (1998)

See my forthcoming, 'The Rhetoric of the Image of the City : Future founding for deliberation'

La refundación de la democracia argentina. La retórica constitutiva del discurso inaugural del Presidente Raúl Alfonsín

Mariano Dagatti

Summary:

Any construction of democracy involves the play of multilayered dimensions, political, economic, social, and cultural. Executive oratory in the presidential political regimes also has had a decisive role in shaping the imaginary of these kinds of democracies. This papers considers, from the standpoint of Constitutive Rhetoric (Charland, 1987), the Inaugural Address of Argentine President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín, December 10, 1983, delivered before the National Assembly in the National Congress. With the help of rhetoric and discourse analysis, I have offered an interpretation of how this historical speech 'constitutes' a democratic constituency after seven years of military rule and dictatorship (1976-1983). The hypothesis is that this piece of speech sought to offer a viable performance of the Argentine people as a democratic subject. This operation involves different rhetorical devices. We consider here one of them in particular: the foundational topic (Charaudeau, 2009). It belongs in the series of governmental strategies which seek to draw a clear-cut political frontier between a recent (but repudiated) past and an affluent society of the future, the obverse of that unfair social order left behind. The opposition between a democratic people and the authoritarian elites is the key rhetorical device here. Some effects of the 'constitutive procedure' are still working in Argentine politics, where 'democracy' has become a fetish, the common political horizon of our time.

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La flamante democracia argentina tenía a fines de 1983, y después de siete años de una dictadura genocida, el desafío de construir en los años venideros un consenso que abarcase, entre múltiples aristas, la definición de las condiciones institucionales de funcionamiento del régimen yla de los parámetros del proceso de reconstrucción de la acumulación de capital

en el país.[1] El tratamiento del pasado reciente merecía también un aparte, que incluía de manera central los mecanismos de inserción de las Fuerzas Armadas en el nuevo escenario político.La tramitación de cada una de estas problemáticas exigía del gobierno electo una capacidad sutil para hacer equilibrios entre la necesidad de instituir rotundos cortes con la experiencia dictatorial y la de convocar al conjunto de los argentinos a la aventura de una democracia que distaba de generar las empatías unánimes que hoy despierta en los países de Occidente.[2]

Construir una Argentina democrática demandaba en el rigor de aquella transición decisiones, convicciones y fortalezas que no encontraban en la tierra aún yerma de la posdictadura circunstancias propicias de desarrollo. La oratoria presidencial tendría en este contexto un papel decisivo para *constituir* el imaginario de una república democrática, ajena como sociedad a las atrocidades recientes del terrorismo de Estado.

Este artículo analiza entonces, desde la perspectiva de la retórica constitutiva[3], el discurso inaugural del Presidente argentino Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín, pronunciado el 10 de diciembre de 1983 ante el Congreso de la Nación (en adelante, DAL). La hipótesis es que esta pieza oratoria procuró*performar* al pueblo argentino como *sujeto democrático,*en un contexto de"democratización por colapso" (O'Donnell, 1993)[4] que exponía crudamente la distancia entre las representaciones eufóricas del nuevo gobierno respecto de la sociedad y el papel que esa misma sociedad había tenido durante los años oscuros.

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[1] Véase De Riz, Liliana (1989): *La Argentina de Alfonsín: la renovación de los partidos y el Parlamento*. Buenos Aires: CEDES.

[2] Véase Rosanvallon, Pierre (2007): *La contra democracia. La política en la era de la desconfianza*. Buenos Aires: Manantial; y Rosanvallon, Pierre (2009): *La legitimidad democrática. Imparcialidad, reflexividad, proximidad*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.

[3] El término "Retórica constitutiva" fue acuñado por el académico canadiense Maurice Charland (1987), quien focaliza la noción de identificaciónde K. Burke como término clave para la retórica. La noción de identificación permite repensar el efecto retórico a la vez que rechaza la idea de un sujeto trascendental que ocuparía el lugar de la audiencia, que existiría antes, de modo independiente del discurso. La idea central de la retórica constitutiva es que las audiencias existen por el discurso, en el sentido en que son construidas por él, lo que implica examinar como efecto retórico lo que Louis Althusser ubica como el proceso clave de la ideología: la constitución de un sujeto. Véase Charland, Maurice (1987): "Constitutive Rhetoric: the case of the *peuble québécois*", en *Quarterley Journal of Speech*, vol. 73 (2), pp. 133-150.

[4] Véase O'Donnell, Guillermo (1993): "Estado, democratización y ciudadanía", en *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 128. Disponible online en :
http://www.fcpolit.unr.edu.ar/teoriapolitica/files/2014/03/ODonnell.Estado-democratizaci%C3%B3n-y-ciudan%C3%ADa.pdf

La constitución de la Argentina democrática en el DAL

El objetivo específico de este artículo es indagar el carácter *constitutivo* del DAL: cómo Alfonsín *constituye* la democracia por la vía de la retórica; cómo *performa* un auditorio heterogéneo, compuesto por diversas filiaciones políticas e ideológicas, en un sujeto democrático *tout court*, aglutinado en torno a una ética cívica. La respuesta involucra diferentes dimensiones. Consideraremos por razones de espacio una de ellas: el gesto fundacional del DAL, que postula, en la situación de posdictadura, a la democracia como solución integral de las múltiples demandas sociales.

Este gesto fundacional[5] puede ser inscripto en una larga serie de estrategias de gobierno que han intentado definir una frontera política entre un pasado reciente repudiado, que se requiere aún visible y presente, y la construcción de un futuro auspicioso, que emerge como el anverso de ese orden injusto que ha de ser abandonado. Se sabe que, en el plano discursivo, estas estrategias de ruptura apelan con frecuencia a la puesta en escena de un *tópico fundacional* (Charaudeau, 2009), que consiste en la representación esquemática de una situación juzgada desastrosa (y sus víctimas), una fuente del mal (y sus responsables), y una solución (y su garante).[6] El DAL no constituye una excepción, y el siguiente extracto lo sintetiza:

(1) El país atraviesa un momento crucial de su historia nacional: la línea divisoria que separa una etapa de decadencia y disgregación de un porvenir de progreso y bienestar en el marco de la democracia. El restablecimiento del imperio de la ley debe redoblar nuestros esfuerzos para enfrentar creativamente los problemas del ahora. El desafío que tenemos por delante es grande; convertir la emergencia en la que nos

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[5] El ánimo fundacional del DAL ha sido señalado por diferentes autores: entre otros, Zoppi Fontana, Mónica (1993): "Sonhando a Pátria: Os fundamentos de repetidas fundações", en Orlandi, Eni (org.): *Discurso fundador*. Campinas: Pontes; Aboy Carlés, Gerardo (2001): *Las dos fronteras de la democracia argentina: la reformulación de las identidades políticas de Alfonsín a Menem*. Rosario: Homo Sapiens; y Barros, Sebastián (2002): *Orden, democracia y estabilidad. Discurso y política en la Argentina entre 1976 y 1991*. Córdoba: Alción.

[6] Véase, a este respecto, el artículo de Patrick Charaudeau "Reflexiones para el análisis del discurso populista", publicado en la revista *Discurso & Sociedad*, vol. 3 (2), 2009, pp. 253-279. Allí Charaudeau plantea la presencia de este tópico en el discurso populista y pone el acento en la auto-representación del líder como garante de la solución anunciada. Creemos que la presencia del tópico excede a la cuestión del populismo y que, por lo tanto, puede hablarse de un tópico fundacional en discursos políticos de variada índole. La única salvedad es que, entendido en esta perspectiva más amplia, el líder puede no ser el único garante de la solución anunciada.

> encontramos en la oportunidad para reanimar las potencialidades de la sociedad, durante tanto tiempo sofocadas bajo el peso del autoritarismo. (DAL, p. 10)

La enunciación presidencial, reglada institucionalmente por el género epidíctico, plantea una "línea divisoria" que corta en dos la "historia nacional": "una etapa de decadencia y disgregación", la "emergencia en la que nos encontramos", y "un porvenir de progreso y bienestar en el marco de la democracia", que brinde la "oportunidad para reanimar las potencialidades de la sociedad, durante tanto tiempo sofocadas bajo el peso del autoritarismo". El uso de la primera persona del plural en forma inclusiva ("nuestros esfuerzos", "El desafío que tenemos por delante", "la emergencia en la que nos encontramos") coloca al orador y a su auditorio en un presente de cara al futuro, dejando indeterminada la relación del colectivo con el pasado. La situación liminar, "la línea divisoria", delinea, asimismo, la disyunción central a partir de la oposición entre la "democracia" y el "autoritarismo": la primera como condición *sine qua non* del porvenir; el segundo como signo del pasado de opresión.

La representación de esta situación de "emergencia" o de "decadencia y disgregación" combina en el DAL una retórica de la acumulación con procedimientos de evidencia pre-discursiva.[7] El siguiente párrafo es, al respecto, significativo:

> (2) El estado en que las autoridades nacionales reciben el país deplorable y, en algunos aspectos, catastrófico, con la economía desarticulada y deformada, con vastos sectores de la población acosados por las más duras manifestaciones del empobrecimiento, con situaciones sociales que reflejan crudamente el impacto de la miseria, con un endeudamiento de insólito volumen y de origen muchas veces inexplicable, que compromete gran parte de los recursos nacionales para un largo futuro, con una inflación desbordada cuyos efectos son una verdadera afrenta para los hombres que producen y

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[7] Para M. A. Paveau, lospre-discursos "não são os discursos produzidos antes, mas sim as anterioridades do discurso. Eles derivam, com efeito, de quadros de saber e de crença que informam diretamente os discursos produzidos (informações de natureza enciclopédica ou estereotípica) e pertencem a essa "instância pré-lingüística" [...] (2013: 20). Entre las manifestaciones de los pre-discursos, la autora enumera, entre otros, la etimología, la enunciación patrimonial, los nombres propios; ciertos usos de la modalidad epistémica, subrayados por marcadores de evidencialidad, integran este listado. VéasePaveau, Marie-Anne (2013): *Os pré-discursos: sentido, memória, cognição*. Campinas, São Paulo: Pontes Editores.

trabajan, con un clima de arbitrariedad, atropello e incertidumbre creado por la absurda pretensión de gobernar por el miedo y la prepotencia, con la cultura postergada y perseguida en muchas de sus expresiones, con la educación y la salud relegadas a un segundo plano y consiguientemente convertidas en privilegio de los menos, con una situación internacional agravada por decisiones irresponsables cuyas consecuencias se transfirieron imprudentemente a un futuro y que ahora vienen a depositarse en nuestras manos; con la carga afligente de todos esos males, cuya cuenta precisa y detallada puede ser excusada aquí por ser bien conocida, tendremos que enfrentarnos, a partir de hoy, no sólo a la tarea de corregirlos y eliminarlos para siempre, sino a la de echar los cimientos de la Argentina libre, grande, próspera, fraterna y generosa que queremos. Y lo hacemos, desde luego, juntos y unidos en esa decisión reparadora que todos compartimos. (DAL, p. 5)

La descripción del "país deplorable" y "catastrófico" que realiza el DAL apuesta a una enumeración acumulativa de fenómenos calificados de manera disfórica, sin agentes responsables determinados, que disuelve las causas y los efectos en un *ethos* autoritario de época: "un clima de arbitrariedad, atropello e incertidumbre creado por la absurda pretensión de gobernar por el miedo y la prepotencia". La indeterminación de los responsables encuentra en las nominalizaciones ("las más duras manifestaciones del empobrecimiento", "el impacto de la miseria", "endeudamiento", "la absurda pretensión de gobernar") y en los participios calificativos ("una economía desarticulada y deformada", "vastos sectores de la población acosados", "una inflación desbordada", "la cultura postergada y perseguida", "la educación y la salud relegadas… convertidas en privilegio", "una situación internacional agravada") formas de mitigación que refuerzan su carácter impersonal, poniendo el acento en una situación, en un estado antes que en los efectos de las prácticas de un conjunto de actores definidos.

La enumeración acumulativa y la indeterminación confluyencon procedimientos pre-discursivos que garantizan, bajo la apelación a un saber colectivo, un acuerdo universal sobre "la grave situación del país" (p. 25) que el nuevo gobierno debe enfrentar: "Esas dificultades son múltiples e inmensas, bien lo sabemos, pero vamos a salir adelante (…)" (p. 4), o bien: "Mucha gente no sabe qué significa vivir bajo el imperio de la Constitución y la ley, pero ya todos saben qué significa vivir fuera del

marco de la Constitución y la ley" (p. 4). Entre la enumeración y la evidencia de los pre-discursos, el DAL trata de regular una tensión entre la ostentación de una situación crítica, que se pretende evidente a los ojos de todos los argentinos, y la mitigación de sus agentes responsables, cuya responsabilidad resulta disuelta en un clima inmoral de época.

Con estos elementos sobre la mesa, parece pertinente preguntarse ahora cuál ha sido, desde la perspectiva del DAL, la fuente del mal; es decir, quiénes condujeron a los argentinos a esta situación crítica juzgada evidente. Señalemos, pues, que una oposición axiológica de índole ética se constituye en eje rector del gesto refundacional, la de la "rectitud de los procedimientos" contra "la inmoralidad pública":

> (3) Venimos a exponer a vuestra honorabilidad cuáles son los principales objetivos del gobierno en los diversos terrenos en que debe actuar (…) Pero queremos decir, también, que entre todas las áreas habrá un enlace profundo y fundamental: que una savia común alimentará la vida de cada uno de los actos del gobierno democrático que hoy se inicia: la rectitud de los procedimientos.
> Hay muchos problemas que no podrán solucionarse de inmediato, pero hoy ha terminado la inmoralidad pública. Vamos a hacer un gobierno decente.
>
> Ayer pudo existir un país desesperanzado, lúgubre y descreído: hoy convocamos a los argentinos, no solamente en nombre de la legitimidad de origen del gobierno democrático, sino también del sentimiento ético que sostiene a esa legitimidad. (DAL, p. 1)

El gesto fundacional establece una frontera entre el "autoritarismo" del pasado reciente, "el clima de arbitrariedad, atropello e incertidumbre", y la "democracia" como "marco" de "progreso y bienestar". Esta frontera simbólica cobra también la forma, como adelantamos, de una división entre "la inmoralidad pública" y la "rectitud de los procedimientos". El énfasis en la condición temporal de la deixis del fragmento 3 no hace más que confirmarla: "el gobierno democrático que hoy se inicia", y también: "Ayer pudo existir un país desesperanzado, lúgubre y descreído: hoy convocamos a los argentinos…". El aspecto de las formas verbales contribuye: el presente simple ("se inicia", "convocamos") contrasta con el pasado perfecto ("pudo").

Alfonsín afirma que "El ciudadano común percibirá, de la mañana a la noche, la diferencia entre el autoritarismo y la democracia" (p. 10), y apuesta por un "gobierno decente", basado en la "ética". Promotor de un

corte absoluto, el DAL dispone, de un lado, arbitrariedad, atropello, incertidumbre, inmoralidad, desesperanza, descreimiento; del otro, progreso, bienestar, rectitud, sentimiento ético. Se trataría de dos atmósferas forjadas, en fin, por dos filosofías antitéticas: una "filosofía de la subversión" de raíz totalitaria y una "ética política" de raíz pluralista. Nos permitimos citar *in extenso* un extracto que sintetiza la lógica descrita:

> (4) Históricamente nos opusimos a que una pequeña minoría de la población considerada a sí misma como población combatiente, eligiera al gobierno en reemplazo del pueblo. Por eso luchamos para defender el derecho a elegir el gobierno, pero sólo para defender el derecho del pueblo a elegirlo. Esa distinción rechaza desde siempre a la filosofía de la subversión. Pero debe tenerse en cuenta que la Constitución y las leyes son subvertidas, también, por minorías armadas, que reemplazan la ley por las balas, tanto a través del guerrillerismo, como a través del golpismo. Por eso, señalamos categóricamente que combatimos el método violento de las élites, derechistas o izquierdistas. […]
>
> El método violento de las élites de derecha o de izquierda se justifica a sí mismo con el triunfo definitivo y final, absoluto, de una ideología sobre otra y de una clase sobre otra.
>
> La democracia aspira a la coexistencia de las diversas clases y actores sociales, de las diversas ideologías y de diferentes concepciones de la vida. Es pluralista, lo que presupone la aceptación de un sistema que deja cierto espacio a cada uno de los factores y hace posible así la renovación de los partidos y la transformación progresiva de la sociedad. (DAL, pp. 3-4)

El locutor opondrá el "derecho del pueblo" a "elegir el gobierno" al "método violento de las élites de derecha o de izquierda", que pretende reemplazar "la ley por las balas, tanto a través del guerrillerismo, como a través del golpismo":de un lado, entonces, la democracia y el pueblo; del otro, la violencia y las elites. Las conclusiones que se derivan de este reparto de las nociones conducen a una mutua implicación de los pares que estaba lejos de ser evidente en el momento de asunción del nuevo presidente. La oposición antitética no sólo sostiene el gesto fundacional del DAL sino que *constituye* como inescindible las relaciones entre democracia y pueblo, y entre violencia y elites.

Así, el DAL postula que la violencia expresa a las elites, debido a que el autoritarismo constituiría el único modo posible que tienen de gobernar y de vivir; más importante aún, y decisivo para la perspectiva de

una retórica constitutiva, establece que la democracia, como régimen de gobierno y como forma de vida, expresa al pueblo argentino, porque el pueblo argentino tiene una *personalidad*[8]democrática. Este aparejamiento de democracia y pueblo es una novedad fundamental del DAL en la formación ideológica de la política argentina.

Conclusiones

La oratoria política del presidente Alfonsínha jugado un rol importante en la construcción de la imagen *democrática* de la sociedad argentina. Este artículo se ocupó de una de las grandes operaciones *constitutivas* de su retórica: la de definir al pueblo argentino como *esencialmente* democrático, opuesto a las inclinaciones autoritarias de las elites de derecha o de izquierda, a cuyo fuego cruzado habría quedado sometido durante el septenio dictatorial. Nuestro análisis focalizó uno de los procedimientos centrales: la apelación a un tópico fundacional, marcado por una oposición axiológica de naturaleza ética.Hubo otros: la apelación a la democracia como forma más legítima de resolución de problemas y conflictos, su significación como valor en sí mismo, la relación discursiva entre democracia y vida. En la Argentina de la transición, estas representacionesse volvieron parte de un sentido común que durante décadas había denostado –como señala Gabriel Vommaro(2006: 262[9])– la formalidad democrática en nombre de otros principios trascendentes como la justicia social, el socialismo, el orden o la modernización.

La ilusión democrática tuvo distintas consecuencias en la Argentina de la transición. Quizás ninguna fue tan importante como el hecho de que ocultó –como señala Catalina Smulovitz (2010: 9)[10]– que "el pueblo

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[8]Usamos el término "personalidad" debido a las connotaciones krausistas del término en la tradición radical. Como es sabido, la teoría krausista sobre la personalidad moral de las naciones influyó de manera notable sobre Hipólito Yrigoyen y no menos sobre Alfonsín. Podríamos haber dicho, de manera sinonímica: porque el pueblo argentino es *esencialmente* o *por naturaleza* democrático. El sentido es marcar el contraste entre la cultura autoritaria de las elites y la cultura democrática del pueblo. Véase Biagini, Hugo (comp.) (1989): *Orígenes de la democracia argentina. El trasfondo krausista*. Buenos Aires: Legasa; y Aboy Carlés, Gerardo (2001): *Las dos fronteras de la democracia argentina: la reformulación de las identidades políticas de Alfonsín a Menem*. Rosario: Homo Sapiens

[9] Véase Vommaro, Gabriel: "Cuando el pasado es superado por el presente: las elecciones presidenciales de 1983 y la construcción de un nuevo tiempo político en la Argentina", en Pucciarelli, Alfredo (coord.) (2006): *Los años de Alfonsín. ¿El poder de la democracia o la democracia del poder?* Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, pp. 245-268.

[10] Véase Smulovitz, Catalina, "La ilusión del momento fundante", en Gargarella, Roberto; Murillo, Ma. Victoria y Pecheny, Mario (comps.) (2010): *Discutir Alfonsín*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, pp. 9-11.

argentino había llegado a 1983 sin haber tomado la Bastilla". Esta percepciónincompleta impidió notar que se había arribado a la democracia sin haber neutralizado a los actores, ni alterado gran parte de los factores que hasta ese momento había dificultado su estabilización.

Cercado por fuerzas corporativas de diversa índole e inserción nacional, esta apelación presidenciala la democracia como sistema de gobierno y como forma de vida dejará pronto paso a una conciencia de sus limitaciones para solucionar los problemas sociales existentes.En el epílogo de su extenso discurso inaugural, Alfonsín apelaba al recurso de la preterición para excusarse de "palabras sobreabundantes", debido a la evidencia de una "emoción cívica" "compartida y unánime" (p. 47). A continuación, afirmaría que "La circunstancia no es propicia para la retórica", ya que era "la hora de la acción y de la acción fecunda, decidida, comprometida e inmediata. Es la hora de hacer, de hacer bien, de hacer lo que la República reclama y el pueblo espera" (p. 47). No deja de resultar paradójico, entonces, que su presidencia haya sido calificada por un "exceso de predicación" (Hilb, en Pucciarelli, 2006: 118)[11]; esto es, porelaborar un repertorio de promeses sobre las aspiraciones postergadas de la gente, cuya concreción no tuvo en cuenta el estado de la relación de fuerzas existentes entre las distintas formas de poder en disputa, ni el conjunto de obstáculos estructurales generados durante el período dictatorial.

La democraciaen la Argentina condensa desde entonces un abanico amplio de reclamos, que incluyen el respeto por los derechos humanos, la redistribución de la riqueza, la justicia social, la valoración de la diversidad. Hoy, más de tres décadas después, el entusiasmo democrático, pese a los vaivenes políticos y económicos, no ha cejado, aun cuando conviva con la injusticia y la desigualdad. Este artículo ha tenido el propósito de indagar un momento *constitutivo* de este entusiasmo y analizarlo críticamente.¿Qué significa una real democracia?, ¿para qué sirve?, ¿cómo podemos vivir en democracia? Las respuestas a estas preguntas nos presentandía a día nuevas luchas, nuevos desafíos.

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[11] "La República no tiene Ejército. El poder gubernamental y la movilización popular durante el levantamiento militar de Semana Santa", en Pucciarelli, Alfredo (coord.) (2006): *Los años de Alfonsín. ¿El poder de la democracia o la democracia del poder?* Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, pp. 115-151

Collective memory, merging enemies, consistency of word and place: Nkrumah's rhetorical artefacts in the "Positive Action" protest

Eric Opoku Mensah

Introduction

The 1950 riots in the Gold Coast which prefaced the first general elections under the British Colonial Government were called forth by a plethora of rhetorical performances of Kwame Nkrumah. On the 8th of January, 1950, Kwame Nkrumah, the Leader of the CPP, declared 'Positive Action' in the Gold Coast. After the aftermath of the 28th February 1948 riots which shook the colony, the Watson Commission[1] was set up by the Colonial Government to examine the causes of the nationwide unrest. Amongst its proposals, the Commission indicated the need for a constitutional review of the present Gold Coast constitution. In response to the latter proposal, the Coussey Commission was set up in December 1948 to review the constitution accordingly[2]. When it finally published its report in October 1949, it indicated an increase in African (referring to black Gold Coasters) representation in colonial governance but did not indicate a time frame for the independence of the Gold Coast.

On the 20th of November 1949, being disconsolate with the silence of the Coussey Commission's report on the country's independence date, Nkrumah organised a meeting of Gold Coast People's Representatives Assembly to put forward an arrangement of a Constituent Assembly in order to demand self-government[3]. On the 15th of December 1949, Nkrumah made three significant rhetorical moves, which were suggestive of his unrelenting decision to press on with his intention for a civil protest within the Gold Coast. First, he wrote a letter to the Governor expressing the CPP's intentions of calling for a nationwide protest if the CPP's

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[1]The four-member committee, chaired by Mr. Aiken Watson, K.C., started its work in April 1948 and submitted its report to the Gold Coast Colonial Government in June 1948. See K. Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957): 84-85.

[2]See D. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and tragedy*. (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2007).

[3]*Ibid*. 81.

recommendations for immediate self-government were declined by the Colonial Government[4]. Secondly, on this same day, even before the Colonial Government could respond, Nkrumah personally wrote an editorial of the CPP's newspaper, *The Evening News*, with a title "the Era of Positive Action Draws Nigh." In this editorial, Nkrumah inveighed, "too long have we left the destiny of our country to be toyed with. We shall no longer wait for freedom to 'come' to us, we shall march forward to demand our right ourselves."[5] With respect to the third move, the CPP held a rally at the West End Arena in Accra where Nkrumah explicated 'Positive Action' to the masses[6].

At this rally, he sought to indicate the failure of all the key institutions in advancing the freedom of the Gold Coast. He noted:

> Get ready, people of the Gold Coast … The Coussey Committee has failed to grant the people of this country full self-government for the country; the Legislative Council has failed to demand self-government for the country; the Chief's Territorial Councils have failed to demand self-government for the country; and the British Government has tactfully refused to grant the country its true and legitimate demand for self-government. The people of the Gold Coast now emphatically refuse to remain any longer under Colonial status; they demand Dominion Status Now.[7]

Nkrumah ended the 15th December rally with a two-week ultimatum, demanding the setting up of a Constituent Assembly within the territory.[8] These rapid and consistent rhetorical performances increased the momentum and altered the mood for protest in Accra, thereby, heightening the moral pressure for freedom on the Colonial Government. True to its posture, the government failed to respond positively to Nkrumah's demands for self-government but rather decided to enter into negotiation with Nkrumah after the New Year of 1950.[9] However, on 8th of December 1950, before a mass gathering of CPP supporters at the West End Arena in Accra, Nkrumah declared 'Positive Action' in the entire colony, the Gold Coast.

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[4]*Ibid.*
[5]See speech in B. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963): 86.
[6]Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 81.
[7] Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 87.
[8]*Ibid.*87.
[9]*Ibid*. 88.

My purpose in this paper is to consider a number of issues. First, I argue that Nkrumah purposefully employed the collective memory of his audience to establish the foundation of his argumentation in his address. Further, I examine Nkrumah's strategy in merging two different "enemies" into a single element of "opposition" to the independence of the Gold Coast. Secondly, I will explore the Speech's strategy of blame and accusation on one side as against praise and defence on the other side. I will conclude by looking at Nkrumah's rhetorical consistency in his use of words and place within this key protest address.

Since Nkrumah's address on 8th January 1950 is premised on both his declamation at the West End Arena and his article three weeks earlier on the 15th December 1949, they inform very much the rhetorical effect of the 8th January address. In fact, I intend to present my analysis of 8th January speech as a final sequel to the subject of 'Positive Action' which received rhetorical force as a result of the two activities (Accra Evening News article and speech) which occurred on 15th December 1949.

Merging the enemies

One of the key strategies of Nkrumah in this address was his reliance on the collective memory of his audience in order to effect what Gregg refers to as "rhetorical transaction."[10] Palmer-Mehta notes that "collective memory is a rhetorical, cultural process arbitrarily connected to official historical discourses (which are themselves arbitrarily constructed) and personal memories, and utilized by rhetors and audiences to mutually constitute a public for particular purposes."[11] For the speaker's successful application of his audience sense of collective memory, we can agree with Perelman who argues that the good speaker is the one who is "animated by the very mind of his audience."[12] That is, through the application of collective memory, Nkrumah sought to make the audience appreciate the

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[10]Gregg defines "rhetorical transaction" as "a situation wherein a speaker undertakes to produce a message for the purpose of affecting the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of a listener or group of listeners … the end goals of such discourse are seen as pragmatic in some sense, and the speaker is successful insofar as he can maneuver his listener to assent to the point of view, claims, or actions proposed by the speaker" (72). See R. B. Gregg, "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest",in *Philosophy & Rhetoric*," 4, 2(1971): 72.

[11]See definition of collective memory in Valerie Palmer-Mehta, "Aung San SuuKyi and the Rhetoric of Social Protest in Burma," in *Women's Studies in Communication*, 32, 2 (2009): 157.

[12]In reference to 'audience,' I rely on Perelman's view of the audience: that it is not the people whom the rhetor addresses directly (in this case the CPP members) but also the colonial administration. See C. Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, W. Klubark, trans. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982): 14.

efficacy of civil protest which served to build the ego of the masses for future action. Gregg further argues that "as the result of attacking enemies, protestors appear to experience and express feelings of ego-enhancement, ego-affirmation, and even ego-superiority."[13] This is affirmed in Nkrumah's rhetoric. He noted:

> Nothing strikes so much terror into the hearts of the Imperialists and their agents than the term Positive Action. This is especially so because of their fear of the masses responding to the call to apply this final form of resistance in case the British Government failed to grant us our freedom consequent on the publication of the Coussey Committee Report.

Nkrumah indirectly reminded the audience of the effects of the 28th February 1948 riots on the British colonial administration which necessitated the present constitutional review which had been presented by the Coussey Committee. The 28th February riots were carried out by the masses all over the Gold Coast and it shook the colonial administration to the extent that the then Governor, Sir Gerald Creasy, who had only been at post for less than two years, had to be immediately replaced by Whitehall with Sir Charles Arden-Clarke as a result of Governor Creasy's inability to manage the nationwide riots within the colony.

The effect of the 28th February civil protest on the colonial administration was undeniable. During the riots, mobs attacked shops and office belonging to the United African Company (UAC). In addition, European and Syrian traders all over the Gold Coast were also not spared of the loot.[14] This situation certainly disrupted economic activities and interest of the Colonial Government. The masses became the heroes and martyrs of the riots. Nkrumah strategically avoided referring to the benefits of the commotion of the 28th February civil unrest since it may have been suggestive of his call for a violent protest which he directly wanted to avoid. However, reminding his audience of that collective memory – the success of the February riots – was key to his present call for action. He therefore alluded to it in the 15th December editorial of the Accra Evening News. He cried out:

> Shall the blood of our beloved brethren who were shot at the Christiansborg Crossroads in February last year be shared in vain? These are the questions that confront us today in our present

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[13]Gregg, "*The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest*," 84.
[14]Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 64.

struggle to free this nation from the grip of Colonial misrule and misgovernment.[15]

In effect, Nkrumah argued for a continuation of the effective sacrifices which had begun and had become a source of hope for the present protest which was the object of his present address. Thus, memory, according to Palmer-Mehta, "can be a powerful source of rhetorical invention."[16] Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles in arguing in support of collective memory, indicate that "unlike individual memory, which is often only present in thought or confined to documents reserved for private consumption, collective memory is public; it is the publicity of collective memory that establishes its political/rhetorical power."[17] Nkrumah, therefore, used collective memory of the previous civil protest to boost the ego of the audience as a means of soliciting for their full participation in the 8th January civil protest.

Nkrumah resorted to a move of association. By the process of association, Perelman posits that the speaker is able to bring together differing elements by ensuring consonance in them.[18] Nkrumah tried to rhetorically merge the Colonial Government and the then opposition party, the UGCC, as a single force of resistance against self-rule, whilst on the other hand, he sought to build legitimacy for the CPP's protest movement by courting the support of the traditional authority within the Gold Coast. The former association becomes what Perelman regards as a negative association whereas the latter becomes a positive one. The prime purpose of this rhetorical act was to arouse the anger and the frustrations of the masses against the Colonial Government whilst at the same time ensuring a massive support for the nationwide civil disobedience. Nkrumah presented himself and the CPP as victims of the manipulative acts of the Colonial Government and the opposing UGCC. He inveighed:

> The term Positive Action has been erroneously and maliciously publicised, no doubt by the Imperialists and their conceiled agent-provocateurs and stooges. These political renegades, enemies of the Convention People's Party and for that matter Ghana's freedom, have diabolically publicised that the C.P.P.'s programme

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[15]The version of the speech for this work is the published version Timothy's work. All. See Timothy, 88 – 92.

[16]See Palmer-Mehta, "*Aung San SuuKyi and the Rhetoric of Social Protest in Burma*,"157.

[17]Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles "Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia, and the Rhetorical Presidency: Bill Clinton's Commemoration of the March on Washington, August 28, 1998,"in *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 86, 4(2000): 418.

[18]Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 190.

of positive action means riot, looting and disturbances, in a word, violence.

By these words, Nkrumah placed the Colonial Government and the U.G.C.C., which he indirectly referred to as "concealed agent-provocateurs," as standing in opposition to the freedom which the C.P.P. was fighting for. In a sense, he presented the two groups as "enemies" before his audience.

In furtherance of the above rhetoric move, Nkrumah went ahead and presented a narrative of his meeting with the Ga Traditional Council, the authority which had traditional jurisdiction in Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast. This detailed narration was meant to provide first-hand information as to what took place at that important meeting. White argues that "narrating/storytelling is one of the most effective means of public speech."[19] The narrative which Nkrumah provided in the speech lends credence to the negative association of the opposition party and the Colonial Government. As a rhetorical strategy, the narration was employed by Nkrumah not only to disclose the sinister motives of the opposition against his course for freedom but also to get the audience to empathise with him as a victim of the opposition's attack. Foss defines a narrative as a "way of ordering and presenting a view of the world through description of a situation involving characters, action, and settings."[20]

Defending and praising whilst accusing and blaming detractors

The term 'Positive Action' was an invocation of Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence. 'Positive Action', therefore, became the underlying principle during the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945. Nkrumah was personally inspired by Gandhi's philosophy.[21]

The 1945 Manchester Conference was mostly attended by Africans, both in Europe and from mainland Africa. Most of the

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[19]For the rhetorical function of narration see Shauntae Brown White, "Telling the Story: Kansas City Mayor and the United Methodist Pastor Emmanuel Cleaver's Use of Storytelling to Transcend Rhetorical Barriers," in *Journal of African American Studies*, 9, 4 (2006): 37.

[20]See S. Foss, *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice (2nd ed.)*, (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1996): 400.

[21]The Manchester Congress in 1945 was influenced by Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence. Read the proceedings of the conference in G.Padmore, (ed.). *Colonial and Coloured Unity: A Programme of Action; History of the Pan African Congress (2nd ed.)*,(S.I.: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1963): 27-70. Aside the spirit of the 1945 Conference, Nkrumah had also been personally inspired by Gandhi. See Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah,* 52.

participants at this conference later became part of the first generation freedom fighters in the emancipation of Africa from colonial rule. Nkrumah's call for a nonviolent protest brings to the fore the spirit of the Manchester meeting out of which the architecture of the African freedom liberation was drawn. As co-secretary with the Trinidadian George Padmore at this conference, Nkrumah enacted his authority and commitment to the values and core principle for African liberation. Calling for Positive Action, therefore, was not a personal call for civil disobedience but it was an obedient enactment of the anti-colonial mandate which had emerged from the deliberation of the 1945 Pan-African Conference. By so doing, Nkrumah brought to bear, five year later in 1950, the memory, authority and nostalgia of the conference on the current struggle in the Gold Coast.

Mahatma Gandhi, a man who successfully led India's struggle for independence, employed the principle of nonviolence throughout India's struggle for independence.[22] Rhetorically, Nkrumah's invocation of Gandhi's philosophy was an indirect appeal to the Gandhi's authority. In this type of argument, the speaker "uses the acts or opinions of a person … as a means of proof in support of a thesis."[23] Nkrumah, therefore, sought to rub unto himself the prestige of Gandhi and to situate the Gold Coast's struggle within a similar situation as India's. In other words, Nkrumah had perceived the parallels in the struggles of India and the Gold Coast since both countries were former colonies of Britain. Nkrumah sought to replicate Gandhi's success in India in the Gold Coast.

By and large, Nkrumah repeatedly indicated through the speech's rhetoric that in principle the country's quest for independence had been duly acknowledged nationwide. He said:

> It is a comforting fact to observe that we have cleared the major obstacle to the realisation to our national goal in that ideologically the people of this country and their chiefs have accepted the idea of self-government even now.

This argument and direction of his rhetoric indirectly referred to the nationwide participation in the 28th February 1948 riots, a key protest movement that shook the foundations of the Gold Coast Colonial Government. The speech goes ahead to argue for "strategy and the intensity and earnestness of our demand." Nkrumah, therefore, called for

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[22]For details of Gandhi's moral philosophy of non-violence, see M. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance – Satyagraha*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1961): 1-400.
[23]See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 305.

a consistent application of the strategy of nonviolence which is expressed in 'Positive Action.' The legitimacy for 'Positive Action' which the speech argues for is not only expressed on behalf of the native and traditional authority but it is further extended to the British Colonial Government as well. Nkrumah argued:

> The British Government and the people of Britain, with the exception of die-hard Imperialists, acknowledge the legitimacy of our demand for Self-government. However, it is and must be by our own exertion and pressure that the British Government can relinquish its authority and hand over the control of affairs, that is the Government, to the people of this country and their Chiefs.

In a sense, he argued that the quest for the freedom of the people of the Gold Coast was a universal fact which, strangely enough, is acknowledged and shared by both the colonized and the colonizer. However, this acknowledgement by the colonizer could only materialise into reality through the pursuit of civil disobedience action, which Nkrumah called 'Positive Action.' Nkrumah now only needed a coordinated and a consistent strategy and that was what he called the people of the Gold Coast to adopt. Knowing that the Colonial Government could employ different strategies to brake the front of the masses for 'Positive Action,' Nkrumah used the speech to establish several rhetoric layers of legitimacy for his call for civil disobedience as a means of further strengthening the support of the people of the Gold Coast. He went ahead to wrap his argument in a moral rhetoric to establish a deeper justification. But as Nkrumah pursued this moral rhetoric of justification, he tried to indirectly display his practical wisdom in the course which he was calling the whole nation to join him to pursue. He explained:

> There are two ways to achieve Self-government: either by armed revolution and violent overthrow of the existing regime, or by constitutional and legitimate non-violent methods. In other words: either by armed might or by moral pressure. For instance, Britain prevented the two German attempts to enslave her by armed might, while India liquidated British Imperialism there by moral pressure. We believe that we can achieve Self-government even now by constitutional means without resort to any violence.

There is no doubt that Nkrumah's immediate audience comprised Second World War veterans who had largely led the 1948 riots. This is probable because Nkrumah and J.B. Danquah had addressed the war

veterans shortly before these ex-servicemen embarked on the landmark riots. The veterans after the two World Wars had come back home feeling despondent and disillusioned with the colonial situation back home in the Gold Coast. Three World War veterans were shot dead during the protest of veterans on 28th February 1948 on their way to present a petition to the Governor. This was upon the order of Superintendent Colin Imray, a British Colonial police officer. The anger, which was sparked among these veterans, escalated the fire of nationalism within the Gold Coast, thereby propelling the veterans to naturally support any movement that was working to seek the freedom of the Gold Coast. Naturally, they were, therefore, ready to support 'Positive Action.'

The speech's perfect rhetorical example from the World Wars was appropriate as Nkrumah sought the judgment and assent of the veterans who formed a key constituency for the success of his call for civil disobedience. The rhetorical effectiveness of Nkrumah's call for 'Positive Action' was heightened by the fact that these veterans had returned from a war which had only ended half a decade ago in the year 1945, knowing very well that the memories of the War was still fresh not only in the minds of the 63,000 ex-servicemen who had fought mostly in the Middle East and Burma[24] but also for the numerous black families who had in one way or the other lost a relation in the military campaign which had nothing to do with their own freedom back home in the Gold Coast.

In citing the examples of British and the Indians, Nkrumah makes some key rhetorical moves. Nkrumah in a forensic move provided a defence for his choice of "moral pressure" as against an "armed revolution." Whilst the two methods work, placing them side by side presented the military choice as opposite to the "non-violent method," thereby making the military option appear to his audience as immoral. Therefore, whilst Nkrumah pursued freedom from a legitimate and moral standpoint, Britain, when its own freedom was under threat made a violent and a seemingly immoral choice. A violent choice whose consequence can in no measure be compared to the current choice being made by the people of the Gold Coast. The speech, therefore, in an ironical twist, provided a rhetorical mirror for the British Colonial Government to weigh its own past actions vis-à-vis the legitimate and the "moral" choice being made by a people in search for their own freedom. Nkrumah presented a firm defence for the choice of nonviolence and rather accused the Colonial Government of being a culprit of the violent acts which the government accused the CPP of having committed.

Nkrumah used the rhetorical example of India's success story as a

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[24]See D. Rooney for details.

means to praise the CPP's choice of nonviolence which he made as a legitimate strategy for the fight for independence. He used India's example to create "presence"[25] in the minds of the audience to show the hope of expected freedom. India, among the former British colonial territories, had become a unique example of a colony which pursued freedom non-violently and prevailed. The strong moral undertone which under laid the successful work of Gandhi is selected for praise and Nkrumah appropriated for himself and the people of the Gold Coast, the moral authority and conduct which he perceived as a "constitutional means." If the strategy of nonviolence is within the legitimate and constitutional rights of the people of the Gold Coast, then rhetorically, any call for the curtailment of "Positive Action" remained unconstitutional, illegitimate and immoral. The speech praises the course of nonviolence whilst blaming political elements and soliciting the wrath of the audience against them for calling for the annulment of 'Positive Action.'

Rhetorical consistency of words and place

Beyond the confines of militant and coercive strategies, Nkrumah's protest rhetoric cannot be complete without a look at Nkrumah's consistent rhetorical approach which led to the climax of the 8th January invention. Nkrumah's first use of 'Positive Action' occurred in June 1949, more than 6 months before it was actually called into being in January 1950. The use of temporal space provided him the opportunity to build a gradual momentum which ensured the masses' accepted the ultimate purpose of his call for a civil protest in the colony. The consistent protest rhetoric increased the confidence and willingness of the masses who were being summoned for participation in the protest. Simons argues that leaders of social movements are expected to be consistent and they "must nevertheless be prepared to renounce previously championed positions.[26] Thus, the consistent appeal for 'Positive Action' inundated the minds of the masses for the protest act; thus rendering Nkrumah's declaration of 'Positive Action' on 8th January as a mere performative act. He noted:

> As already explained, Positive Action has already begun, by our political education, by our newspaper agitation and platform

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[25]According to Perelman, it is only when "presence" is created in the consciousness of an audience does one create the desired emotions. See detailed discussion of "presence" in Perelman, *The New Rhetoric*, 34-37.

[26]See H. W. Simons "Requirements, Problems and Strategies: A theory of Persuasion for Social Movements,"*Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56, 1 (1970): 6.

speeches and also by the establishment of the Ghana schools and Colleges as well as the fearless and legitimate activities of the C.P.P.

The 8th January declaration rather began as a physical protest movement which served to continue, what can be termed as, a psychological movement which had been in operation long before the present declaration of *'Positive Action'*. Nkrumah's consistent rhetorical invention marked the effective continuation if not the beginning of 'Positive Action.' Beyond the consistency in words and action, the success of Nkrumah's protest rhetoric was highly augmented by his consistent use of physical space. On the rhetoric of place in protest, Endres and Senda-Cook posit that "social protest is not just about what is said. It is often just as important where the event occurs because of the meanings places hold and the particular memories and feelings these places evoke for the attendees."[27] The West End Sports Arena in Accra became a physical place of colonial resistance and this was particularly evident during the series of public deliberations which took place up till the call for 'Positive Action' in the Gold Coast. Beginning from Nkrumah's initial explanation of the meaning of 'Positive Action;' the declaration for the final protest in January 1950, Nkrumah repeatedly engaged the masses with his protest rhetoric at the West End Arena, giving the audience a new rhetorical meaning and association of the place as a symbol of protest.

Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) further argue that "during a protest event, human bodies interact with the physical structures to change allowing it to take on significance that might otherwise remain unrealised" (p. 263). The large audiences which gathered at the West End on the different occasions to listen to Nkrumah symbolically became associated with the strength and might of the resistance against the Colonial Government. The consistent physical response of Nkrumah's audience to meet at the West End Arena, in a rhetorical sense, was not only a constant warning to the Colonial Government but also, they gave indication to the Colonial Government of what the final outcome of 'Positive Action' might be, if Nkrumah finally called it into being in the Gold Coast.

For the masses, Nkrumah's consistent engagement with them at that physical space as regards the state of affairs on the protest, allowed them to own the protest movement. The physical connection which they had associated with the West End was extended to the protest, making

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[27]See the relevance of place and rhetoric. D. Endres and S.Senda-Cook. "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 97, 3 (2011): 268.

their own; they were also ready to ensure continuity and to effect the protest to its logical end. Since 'Positive Action' was an idea which was hatched out of a continuous deliberation at West End Arena, it was appropriate for the final call for the civil disobedience in January 1950 to be made at the symbolic ground for colonial protest in the Gold Coast.

The West End, as a place for protest rhetoric, provided a triangular semiotic connection between Nkrumah, his supporters and the Colonial Government which ultimately evoked different feelings toward the call for the civil protest. Nkrumah's repeated engagement with the masses at this physical place hallowed it as a place of protest in the Gold Coast. So on 8th January 1950, when he summoned the masses to the West End to declare 'Positive Action' at around 5 o'clock,[28] the masses responded accordingly because they could duly identify themselves with the place and purpose of the meeting. In other words, Nkrumah, the audience and the West End Arena had merged into a single symbolic rhetorical meaning, the protest against colonial domination in the Gold Coast.

~ University of Cape Coast, Ghana ~

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[28]Nkrumah, *The Autobiography*, 1957.

Former President Thabo Mbeki and the racism debate in South Africa: through the rhetorical lens

S'fiso Eric Ngesi

1. Introduction

Thabo Mbeki was elected President of the African National Congress (ANC) on 18 December 1997 at the ANC's 50th Congress, and that of South Africa on 14 *June 1999.In both these capacities, Mbeki's predecessor was Nelson Mandela – someone on whom a "saintly status had been conferred. While Mandela's presidency was predicated on nation-building and reconciliation, Mbeki's was, in large measure, underpinned by South Africa's socio-economic transformation. He believed that the greatest threat to attaining this goal was* racism. Mbeki was therefore of the view that it had to be extirpated. As the country's President, he had to be at the forefront of this struggle.Racism then became a common thread that ran through Mbeki's speeches. He seemed to have grasped that – as Mamdani aptly puts it – "[i]f the country needed reconciliation, it also needed social justice".[1]

This paper endeavours to give a rhetorical analysis of what, in my view, may be regarded as Mbeki's foundational speeches that quintessentially characterise the prevailing racism debate in South Africa. I will confine my analysis to Mbeki's speeches in his capacities as President of both the ANC and South Africa, and not delve into his views on racism prior and subsequent to these epochs.

Section 83 of South Africa's Constitution asserts that the President is the "Head of State and head of the national executive". In addition, section 83(b) enjoins the President to "[…] uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic", while section 83(c) entrusts the President with promoting "the unity of the nation and that which will advance the Republic".[2] Part of the President's responsibilities to "uphold, defend and respect the Constitution" is, as per the founding provisions of the Constitution, to promote "non-racialism".[3] It may be contended that Mbeki demonstrated the appreciation of what was expected of him as President, in terms of the Constitution, as he paid

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[1]Mahmood Mamdani, "Foreword" in *The Thabo Mbeki I know*. Edited by Sifiso Ndlovu and Miranda Strydom (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016): xx
[2]*The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (1996): 53.
[3]*The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, *ibid,* 3.

particular attention to the creation of a non-racial South Africa. Rhetorically speaking, the arguments that he would advance as he sought to achieve this objective, through persuasion, would derive from the argument of authority (*argumentum ad verecundiam*).[4]

2. Mbeki's acceptance speech as President of South Africa – 14 June 1999

The first reference to racism by Mbeki as President of South Africa can be traced back to his acceptance speech. On this occasion, Mbeki posited:[5]

> And yet all of us are aware that our country continues to be divided along *racial* [my italics] and other lines and is, therefore, that much more difficult to unite around common objectives.

Constrained by the occasion – Mbeki was merely accepting his election as President – it sufficed for him to give his audience merely a glimpse of what would be central to his socio-economic transformation agenda. He could not be expected to expatiate on racism, but would do so at an opportune time (*kairos*).

3. Address at the Opening of Parliament – 25 June 1999

Mbeki accordingly elaborated on racism in his first State of the Nation Address (SONA). In this regard, Mbeki talked about, *inter alia*, building a caring society "[…] without regard to race […]".[6]He also made reference to a system (apartheid) that had treated certain South Africans "[…] as sub-humans […]". In addition, Mbeki raised "[…] the need to end racial […] imbalances within the Police Service".[7]

Having recourse to the argument from authority, Mbeki cited the findings of the study conducted by the Coordination and Implementation Unit in the Office of the Deputy President that had confirmed "[…] the

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[4]Chaïm Perelman,*The realm of rhetoric* – Translation by Kluback W. Notre Dame (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1982): 94.

[5]Thabo Mbeki, "Speech on accepting his election as President of the Republic of South Africa" (14 June 1999): http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2561. (Accessed 8 June 2016).

[6]Thabo Mbeki, "Address at the opening of Parliament (25 June 1999): http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/tm1999/tm062509.pdf. (Accessed 13 June 2016).

[7]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

correlation between poverty, crime and race", with "[…] areas of high crime concentration […] being "[…] black and poor areas of our country".[8] Mbeki delineated as he contended that all South Africans had to be treated equally and no race had to be treated as superior to others. Accordingly, he maintained:[9]

> The promotion and protection of the cultural, linguistic and religious rights of all our people must occupy a central place in the work of Government.
> […] We consider the work of restoring the pride and identity of all our people of vital importance to the task of advancing the human dignity of all our citizens and ensuring the success of our efforts towards national reconciliation and nation building [*sic*].
>
> We will work for the speedy implementation of the constitutional requirement to establish a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Language, Cultural and Religious Rights.
>
> […] This will be an important contribution to the effort we must sustain to wipe out the legacies of *racism*[emphasis added] and sexism, which continue to afflict our society.

Probably, what was on Mbeki's mind as he couched this argument was the imperative to give expression, using "the authority at [his] command", to the preamble to South Africa's Constitution which makes the following solemn undertaking:[10]

> We, the people of South Africa,
> Recognise the injustices of our past;
> Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;
> Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
> Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.
> We therefore […] adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic, so as to –
>
> Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on

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[8]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.
[9]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.
[10]*The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (1996): 1.

democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.

Racial discrimination, dating back to colonialism and culminating in its institutionalisation by the apartheid regime, propagated the false notion that the white race was superior to other races. One of the consequences of this sad and sorry state of affairs was racialized wealth inequality. The apartheid government exacerbated the situation by creating the so-called "bantustans" or homelands that were organised along ethnic lines. The infamous divide and rule strategy, in turn, led to some ethnic groups erroneously believing that they were superior to others.

The democratic dispensation therefore – as Mbeki believed and which is still believed by those South Africans who may be regarded as "progressive" – seeks to redress the "injustices of the past". It also inculcates a culture whichholds that"South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity", as well as "improve the quality of life of all the citizens and free the potential of each person".[11]

4. **Second National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) Oliver Tambo Lecture – 11 August 2000**

Delivering the Second Oliver Tambo Lecture, organised by the NIEP, Mbeki took a swipe at the then leader of the Democratic Alliance[12], Tony Leon, for having challenged his (Mbeki's) views on the HIV and AIDS pandemic.[13] Prior to him focusing on the business of the day, Mbeki digressed and tore into Leon (argument *ad hominem*), asserting that the remarks that he had made had racial undertones as they exhibited "disdain and contempt for African solutions".[14] In this regard, Mbeki posited:[15]

> According to the newspaper, the white politician accused the President of suffering from a "near obsession" with finding African solutions to every problem, even if, for instance, this

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[11]*The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, *ibid*.

[12]The official opposition.

[13]"HIV/AIDS: Thabo Mbeki vs Tony Leon", *Politicsweb* (2000): http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/hivaids-thabo-mbeki-vs-tony-leon. (Accessed 15 June 2016).

[14]Thabo Mbeki, "Second National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) Oliver Tambo Lecture" (11 August 2000): http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2650. (Accessed 15 June 2016).

[15]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

meant flouting scientific facts about AIDS, in favour of "snake-oil cures and quackery." […]

Mbeki proceeded with deriding Leon (*schesis*) as he maintained:[16]

> Our own absolute Milan [Tony Leon], the white politician, makes bold to speak openly of his disdain and contempt for African solutions to the challenges that face the peoples of the Continent.
>
> According to him – who is a politician who practices his craft on the African continent – these solutions, because they are African, could not but consist of the pagan, savage, superstitious and unscientific responses typical of the African people, described by the white politician as resort to "snake-oil cures and quackery".

Mbeki became more scathing as he intimated:[17]

> By his statements, our own absolute Milan, the white politician, demonstrates that he is willing to enunciate an entrenched white racism that is a millennium old.
>
> This racism has defined us who are African and black as primitive, pagan, slaves to the most irrational superstitions and inherently prone to brute violence. It has left us with the legacy that compels us to fight, in a continuing and difficult struggle, for the transformation of ours into a non-racial society.
>
> Such crimes against humanity as slavery, colonialism and apartheid would never have occurred unless those who perpetrated them, knew it as a matter of fact that their victims were not as human as they.

It is evident that Mbeki had not taken kindly to what Leon had said. He therefore deemed it fit to digress (*ecbole*) with a view to fighting back, as it were.

It became commonplace, especially from the opposition parties, to accuse Mbeki of "playing the race card". This was, so it was argued, a strategy on Mbeki's part to mask the incompetence of his presidency.

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[16]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

[17]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

Indeed, Durrheim, Mtose and Brown aver:[18]

> Tony Leon, then leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition, suggested that Mbeki's 'litany of racist caricatures bordered on the pornographic'. The DA health spokesperson, Ryan Coetzee, accused Mbeki of playing the race card, turning a health issue into a race issue and of refusing that rape was pervasive in the country and was partly responsible for the spread of AIDS.

5. Speech at the Opening Session of the National Conference on Racism – 30 August 2000

Notwithstanding the "race card" charge, Mbeki remained undeterred arguing that not enough progress had been made to induce the non-racial South Africa that the Constitution envisioned. His address to the Opening Session of the National Conference on Racism, held on 30 August 2000, bore testimony to this. Mbeki started off his speech by giving a synopsis of the views that had been expressed on racism at the time, arguing that from that exercise he had drawn a conclusion that racism was, indeed, a "contentious" subject. Mbeki pointed out:[19]

> The public discussion that has taken place in our country in the last few months on the issue of racism, demonstrates the point unequivocally that in this area, *we are faced with one of the most contentious issues on our national agenda* [emphasis added].

Mbeki delineated:[20]

> Its discussion does not lead to the national feel-good atmosphere we all experience whenever our national sports teams score a victory over a foreign competitor or when other benign events occur that help us to forget the persisting racial divisions in our society.

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[18]Kevin Durrheim, XoliswaMtose and Lindsay Brown, *Race trouble: Race, identity, and inequality in post-apartheid South Africa* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011): 195.

[19]Thabo Mbeki, "Speech at the opening session of the national conference on racism" (30 August 2000): http://www.racism.gov.za/substance/speeches/mbeki000830.htm. (Accessed 20 June 2016).

[20]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

Arguments are advanced honestly that such a discussion, about racism, can only lead to the division of our country into mutually antagonistic racial camps.

It is also said that it might very well encourage racial conflict, destroying the progress we have achieved towards national reconciliation, towards the birth of a happy rainbow nation.

It stands to reason that dealing with racial discourse in South Africa was so vexed. There were both protagonists, as well as antagonists of the racism debate. Mbeki proceeded to present the arguments that were put forth by these dichotomous forces. Pertaining to the antagonists, Mbeki postulated:[21]

It has been argued that those who point to the persistence of racism in our country are themselves racist. Those who propagate affirmative action are accused of seeking to introduce reverse racism, or, more directly, of resort to anti-white racism.

Some assert that the description 'racist' is merely an epithet used by bad people to insult others, as well as a means of intimidating and silencing those who hold views critical of the government. Alternatively, it is said that the issue of racism is brought up by unscrupulous politicians, in an effort to mobilise black constituencies to support them. After all, so it is said, we ended apartheid and therefore racism, when we became a non-racial democracy in 1994.

Juxtaposing the aforementioned arguments with the views espoused by those who may be depicted as pro-racism debate, Mbeki told his interlocutors:[22]

On the other hand, others within our society argue that those who are most vocal in seeking to suppress discussion on this issue are those who benefited from centuries of colonial and apartheid racial domination.

These will go on to say that the privileged do not want this discussion because they want to maintain their privileged

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[21] Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.
[22] Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.

positions at all costs.

It is also said that in order to achieve this result, the privileged work hard to convince both themselves as well as the rest of society, that what is being complained of does not, in fact, exist, except for isolated incidents.

This is categorised as the denial mode, in terms of which the dominant instruments of propaganda, which, by definition, are at the disposal of the privileged, are used to obstruct the recognition of reality.
The aggrieved will go further to argue that the privileged sectors of our society, accustomed to setting the national agenda, continue in the effort to set the national agenda, regardless of what the majority of our citizens might desire.

Of course, by this time, the latter have been empowered by the establishment of the democratic system to believe that they have the democratic right, openly and legitimately, to set this national agenda.

The point is also made that our process of national reconciliation has been somewhat of a charade. In this regard, it is said that only the victims of racism have responded to the call to forgive and to let bygones be bygones.

The charge is made that the perpetrators and beneficiaries of racial oppression have acted merely to defend their interests, refusing to extend their own hand towards the victim, in a true spirit of reconciliation.
The same can be said of the initial response of sections of the media to the decision of the Human Rights Commission to hold hearings on the issue of racism in the media.

As he presented arguments for and against – giving both sides of the story – on the race question in South Africa, Mbeki assumed the role of an educator. Instead of giving his standpoint on the subject matter, at least up to this point, Mbeki embarked on a journey of informing his audience of the prevailing views on racism. Commenting on the role of an educator, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out:[23]

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[23]Chaïm Perelman & LucieOlbrechts-Tyteca, *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation* –

In education, whatever its object, it is assumed that if the speaker's discourse does not always express truths, that is, theses accepted by everyone, it will at least defend values that are not a matter of controversy in the group which commissioned him.

True to his conviction that one could not talk about "South Africanness" until and/or unless racism had been debated, Mbeki made six "propositions" as the premises of his argument[24]:

First, the practice of racism is both anti-human and constitutes a gross violation of human rights.

Second: as it has been practised through the centuries, the black people have been the victims of racism rather than the perpetrators.

Accordingly, what we have to deal with is white, anti-black racism, while giving no quarter to any tendency towards black, anti-white racism, whether actual or potential, as well as anti-Semitism.

Third: racism is manifested in a variety of ways, these being the ideological, existing in the world of ideas, and the socio-economic, describing the social, political, economic and cultural power relations of domination of and discrimination against the victims of racism.

Fourth, for many centuries racism has been a fundamental defining feature of the relations between black and white, a directive principle informing the structuring of these relations.

Fifth, the legacy of racism is so deeply entrenched that no country anywhere in the world has succeeded to create a non-racial society. […]

Translated by Jon Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1969): 53.

[24]Thabo Mbeki, "Speech at the opening session of the national conference on racism" (30 August 2000): http://www.racism.gov.za/substance/speeches/mbeki000830.htm. (Accessed 20 June 2016).

Sixth: global experience stretching over a long period of time, demonstrates that the creation of a constitutional and legal framework for the suppression of racism is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to end this violation of human rights.

Commenting on the use of propositions in argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe:[25]

The premises in argument consist of propositions accepted by the hearers. When the hearers are not bound by the exact rules that compel them to recognize certain propositions, the whole structure raised by the speaker has no other basis than a factor of psychological nature, the adherence of the hearers. And more often than not, the speaker only presumes that his adherence exists. When his interlocutors disagree with the speaker's conclusions, they can, if they see fit, challenge the presumed agreement on the premises with a denial which will determine the whole argument at its base.

While the other "propositions" that Mbeki made might have been refutable, the first one, it may be argued, was less contentious. His interlocutors might have readily concurred with him that "racism is both anti-human and constitutes a gross violation of human rights". Mbeki did not therefore have to try harder to gain the adherence of his interlocutors. It might have been accepted as a "self-evident truth".

Conversely, Mbeki had to put a lot of effort into winning over his interlocutors, as regards the other "propositions". Notwithstanding this, some in Mbeki's audience would have taken comfort in the contention that racism was not peculiar to South Africa. The logical question would have been therefore what had been/was being done elsewhere to address the race issue. Were there lessons to be drawn from other parts of the world?

Employing the commonplace of antecedent and consequence, Mbeki attributed the skewed power relations with regard to the socio-economic conditions between black and white South Africans to racism which had come about thanks to colonialism and apartheid. This may be viewed as a fallacy that is rhetorically referred to as *the post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, which, when loosely translated, denotes "after this, therefore because of this".[26] This fallacy derives from the assumption that because

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[25]Chaïm Perelman &LucieOlbrechts-Tyteca, *ibid*. 104.
[26]Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, *Classical rhetoric for the modern student* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 69.

there is a relationship between events, something happening after something else, there is also a causal relationship. It qualifies as what Corbett and Connors term "faulty causal generalisations".[27]

Mbeki opined that despite arguments by some that the transition to democracy had altered race relations in South Africa, in effect, the status quo persisted. He argued that what was required was for South Africans across racial lines to join hands in an effort to "defeat the demon of racism". Adumbrating what needed to be done, Mbeki counselled his audience:[28]

> The first step we must take towards the realisation of this goal is the common recognition by all of us, black and white, that racism exists and that it is indeed a very serious problem, without whose solution it is idle to speak of a new South Africa.

> Secondly, we must abandon the notion that the problem of racism has nothing to do with me and is the responsibility of another. We have to treat racism as a problem that challenges the black people. We must treat racism as a problem that challenges white people.

> It is obvious that it makes no sense whatsoever to argue that the responsibility to end racism resides with the victims of racism.

> Another step we have to take is to make the common determination that, precisely because this issue is so fundamental to our future, we have to ensure that it is discussed frankly, freely and openly. We must be ready to take the pain that will be an inevitable part of this open discourse.

> None among us should seek to suppress this discussion. To suppress it is to guarantee the perpetuation of racism, with the destructive consequences of which all of us must surely be aware.

A closer examination of this passage makes one to deduce that Mbeki sought to create an environment conducive to deliberative rhetoric. He seemed to subscribe to the Kantian view that holds that humans are equal and autonomous beings capable of judgement.[29] Granting his interlocutors a blank cheque, as it were, created an impression that every

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[27]Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, *ibid*. 68-69.
[28]Thabo Mbeki, *ibid*.
[29]See James Rachels, *The elements of moral philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1986).

South African was qualified to speak about racism or that racism was everyone's business. This would have legitimised the discourse on racism and hopefully consensus would have been reached, even if it meant agreeing to disagree. Indeed, Habermas opines that consensus achieved in an inclusive discursive process is the ultimate legitimacy criterion of public decisions.[30]

6. Conclusion

One could be forgiven for thinking that almost 22 years into South Africa's democracy, racism would be a thing of the past. Lo and behold, some recent racial incidents in the country unequivocally and poignantly point to the fact that South Africa still has some "unfinished business" to attend to. Racism has again reared its ugly head. While the country has anti-discriminatory laws on its statute book, it is evident that something extra is needed. The views that were held by Mbeki when he asserted, among other things, that racism was the "problem" that needed to be discussed "frankly, freely and openly" have therefore proven predictive. As Mbeki averred almost 16 years ago, South Africans cannot rest on their laurels and pretend that the "new South Africa" has been attained. Indeed, it seems that Tutu's "rainbow nation" remains elusive. Once again, all South Africans are being called upon to tackle – to borrow Mbeki's words – "the demon of racism" head-on.

~ Parliament of South Africa, Research, Portfolio Committee on Transport ~

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[30]Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, Ma: The MIT Press, 1996): 110.

President Hage Geingob's rhetoric on "Harambee Prosperity Plan" and the shaping of Namibia's future

Frieda Nanyeni

Introduction

This paper attempts to examine President Hage Geingob's rhetoric on the adoption of "Harambee Prosperity Plan" (HPP). The paper will analyse how the President's discourse shape Namibia's future. This analysis is largely drawn from the document "*Namibian Government's Action Plan towards Prosperity for All*". The content of HPP can also be found in paragraph 32-61 of President Hage Geingob's second State of the Nation Address. It is important to note that discourse does not need to be major or universal in scope to produce effects.[1] As part of the role of rhetorical critic of public discourse, the analysis and assessment concentrate on Geingob's HPP in his position as the president of the Republic of Namibia.[2]

1. Hage Geingob's Presidency and Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP)

The free and fair elections held in Namibia since the first UN supervised elections in 1989 culminated in the peaceful transfer of power done in a credible and transparent manner from one president to another and so far, this was done three times, with three presidents democratically elected. Thus, President Geingob's transition to power was through a relatively peaceful process. This is how rhetorical genres may be passed on in Namibian context.

Hage Geingob is the current and the third president of Namibia. His term of office began on the 21 March 2015. Geingob was also the first

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[1] Cathcart, R. S. (1981). Post-communication: rhetorical analysis and evaluation. Bobbs-Merrill Educational Pub.
[2] Cathcart, R. S. (1981). Post-communication: rhetorical analysis and evaluation.Bobbs-Merrill Educational Pub.

Prime Minister of Namibia from 21 March 1990 to 28 August 2002.[3] During and after the liberation struggle, Sam Nujoma identified Geingob's leadership capacity and entrusted him with some important leadership roles including the top ministerial position as the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia. This enabled Geingob to be part and parcel of the first government machineries to build democracy and continue shaping democracy in Namibia.

Upon his commencement of his presidency, the Namibia third democratically elected president, Hage Geingob presented a body framework that aims at guiding his leadership towards prosperity. This development map is called Harambee Prosperity Plans (HPP). It is through his rhetoric of this policy as articulated in his second State of the Nation Address that Geingob shaped the future of Namibia.

The plan was presented a year after the beginning of Geingob's presidency. He was still in a position of envisioning the country's future, and to try to set the tone for his remaining four years of his first term. He rehearsed traditional values of the Namibian presidency. By rehearsed shared values that are drawn from the past, Geingob's word shows how he joined the present moment with the past by building on the foundation established by the founding president, father of the Namibian nation, who is also the founder of democratic society, Dr. Sam Nujoma. Geingob clearly pinpoints the most important areas in his targeted action plan to work on the development of the country in order to plan its future. This is equally more or less the same as Nujoma's vision 2030. Nujoma persuaded the future by implementing "Vision 2030", a national vision with a perception of the future. The Harambee Prosperity Plan complements the country's long term development goal as they are reflected in Nujoma's Vision 2030. In addition, some elements of flexibility in the Namibian planning system, where progress was observed to be slow were part of Harambee. Geingob stresses that "the HPP does not replace any national development roadmap but aims to complement the long-term national goal for prosperity". He adds that the plan seeks to ensure effective implementation of already budgeted for programmes and to accelerate the reform processes with a new approach.

2. Definition of "Harambee Prosperity Plan"

The word "Harambee" is a Kiswahili word which means "Pull together in the same direction". Its aim is to call for unity and encourage

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[3] Geingob, H. G.(2004). State formation in Namibia :Promoting Democracy and Good Governance, University of Leeds.

all Namibians to work hard in order to reach their common purpose.

President Geingob's rhetoric in this plan is symbolic. The non-English word "Harambee" in the phrase plays a major role. Although it is not in Namibian languages, it emphasises the meaning and the promising of the plan to the future of Namibia. One might be tempted to think that the word "Prosperity" would have been used alone, but then by only using this word "prosperous" Geingob thinks that it might be too vague and do not clearly stipulates the meaning of the plan, therefore, Geingob deliberately names this plan "HARAMBEE PROSPERITY PLAN" [HPP] to reflect on the English meaning of the word Harambee "Pull together in the same direction" which emphasises his principle decision and stand that "No Namibian should feel left out".

3. Geingob's rhetoric as deliberative

Of the other two kinds of rhetoric described by Aristotle(1991) such as, forensic rhetoric- an orientation towards the past which is either accusing or in defence; and epideictic rhetoric- an orientation to the present time which can be acclaiming or condemning.[4] Geingob's rhetoric of HPP falls under deliberative rhetoric as his discourse advises about the future. Deliberative rhetoric is future oriented and it either encourages or is dissuasive. Geingob continually refers to the future and so uses deliberative rhetoric. This approach is appropriate for Geingob's discourse in the HPP as the beginning of his presidency with the implementation of the HPP will likely to bring changes. In his foreword of HPP document, President Geingob indicated how Namibians have overcome tremendous historical obstacles in the past and affirmed his confidence that through the HPP, the challenges of the present will be raised and those that will be encountered in the future. The plan ushers Namibia into the era of prosperity for all.[5]

A small minority populace of the Namibian people enjoyed an affluent standard of living and quality of life, while the vast majority lived under conditions which were barely above the subsistence level. The constitution of the Republic of Namibia Chapter 11, Article 95 states that the state required to actively promote and maintain the welfare of people and in particular a life of human dignity and prosperity for all Namibians.[6] This is another way the Namibian government committed

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[4] Aristotle. (1991). Rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. Translated by George Kennedy. New York: Oxford.

[5]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President Hage Geingob [For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

[6]Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (2nd ed) (2010). Windhoek: Ministry Information

itself to national reconciliation and its duty to unite the country and not allow divisions of any kind to threaten democracy and the rights of its citizens, especially vulnerable minority groups. This is supported by the rhetoric of Hage Geingob when he underlines the impact of poverty and how his leadership is willing to reduce this big challenge. He said:[7]

> I am acutely aware of the burning desire of the Namibian people to inhabit a Namibian House where there is no poverty. Namibians want a house where everyone feels a sense of belonging, where everyone is presented with a fair opportunity to prosper in an inclusive manner and by so doing, ensure that no one feels left out.

4. HPP an element of social transformation

After more than two decades when Namibia attained its independence, the country is still in transition to a bold social transformation. New institutions are being created, fundamental new laws are being passed, new policies are being designed as well as being implemented, and new spending priorities are being identified. Some of these changes are necessary in all areas of government activities and transition therefore forms a common theme throughout the plan such as HPP.

The main thrust of Geingob's rhetoric in HPP highlights human development. It is meant to provide a short term framework within which his first term of office would seek to complete ongoing projects which were initiated by his predecessors. In a democratic political system and indeed as part of modern presidency, it is vital through presidential rhetoric that government shows the people how it intends to improve their situation and for the people who elect them into power to be aware of the resource being spent.

However, it is also important to note that in a democratic political system, where most of the productive assets are not owned by government, there are also very clear limits to what government can achieve. In his rhetoric, Hage Geingob made this clear when he stipulated that:[8]

The HPP is not presented as the panacea that will resolve the

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Communication and Technology.

[7]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President Hage Geingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

[8]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

myriad causes of poverty and deliver absolute prosperity within a four-year period. This plan aims to identify goals that can be pursued with vigour in the short-term implementation period (2016/17 – 2019/20) and lay a solid base to attain prosperity in subsequent planning phases.

5. Five pillars of Harambee Prosperity Plan

President Geingob's foreword in the document "*Namibian Government's Action Plan towards Prosperity for All*" employs rhetorical element of his own ethos by referring to what is entitled of him to do in his endeavour and the priority areas, which need future prosperity. "On 21 March 2015, I was inaugurated as the third democratically elected president of our republic and assumed the mantle to deliver prosperity for all our people". He further used ethos of the two former Namibian presidents, on the important role they played on paving and sustaining of democracy in the country as follows:[9]

> Former president, Comrade Hifikepunye Pohamba, cemented our democracy and stabilised the country by building on the firm foundation established by our founding father, Comrade Sam Nujoma. Spurred on by these giants of our revolution, and building on their legacy, I have declared all-out war against poverty and embarked upon the path towards prosperity.

In Geingob's Harambee Prosperity Plan, poverty eradication is one of the key factors of the HPP five pillars. These five pillars are stated in the Harambee Prosperity Plan document as follows: Effective Governance, Economic Advancement, Social Progression, Infrastructure Development and International Relations and Cooperation.

Each of these pillars brings the promise of the plan that of "deliver prosperity for all people" closer as they improve the quality of his governance. The five pillars also unravel Geingob's rhetoric of inclusiveness, his spirit of seeing transparent Namibia. "A Namibia where no one dies because of lack of food, and a Namibia where all have decent shelter and access to basic amenities".

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[9]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President Hage Geingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

6. The Plan

The three crucial issues that Geingob rhetoric highlights under the pillar "Effective Governance" are as follows: "Accountability", "Performance management" and "Enhanced service delivery".

6.1   Effective governance

The implementation of these issues follows with the directive which President Geingob gave for all ministries to sign a performance contracts. He tackled issues of social evil such as corruption by making it compulsory for all ministers to declare their assets. He urged all public servants to exercise self-discipline and individual accountability at their work places.

In order for his persuasion to be successful, Geingob's rhetoric appealed to the audiences' emotions, he expressed his concerns and the government's commitment to improve the well-being of the nation, when he stressed the issue of eradication of poverty. With this, Geingob declared war on corruption. He asserts that sustainable must address the issue of poverty and aim to satisfy the essential needs and aspiration of all people without compromising the resources and option for future generations.[10]

Geingob relates democracy with restoring dignity to all Namibians. In order to restore dignity within the country, the notion of poverty needs to be addressed. With this, the president used appeal of reasoning in the deductive form. A probable argument[11], as Geingob's main argument stress that all of the social problems in the country cannot be addressed outside the context of job creation and eradicating poverty.

Moreover, Geingob associates corruption with poverty. In order to reach the people, President Geingob deals with corruption, an issue that can easily strike the mind of people. An orator has to arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to modify our judgments and the success of the persuasive efforts depends on the emotional dispositions of the audience, for we do not judge in the same way when we grieve and rejoice or when we are friendly and hostile.[12]

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[10]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

[11] Kennedy, G.A. (1991). "On Rhetoric a Theory of Civil Discourse/ Aristotle: Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes and Appendixes" New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[12] Aristotle. (1991). Rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. Translated by George Kennedy. New York: Oxford

Furthermore, Geingob's rhetoric indicated how the "Effective Governance" can be achieved as the plan recognises that corruption has many facets. With this the following areas are covered:

- Increasing the level of political accountability;
- Preventing corruption in government offices, ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises;
- Strengthening efforts to deter corruption;
- Conducting extensive anti-corruption education;
- Preventing corruption in the private sector; and
- Engaging civil society and the media in combating corruption.

Although Geingob made acknowledgement of the good progress made on the areas of democratic governance, he sees some "critical social imbalance" in the country. Which include income disparity, poverty and unemployment. It is against this background that the government has declared a full-scale war against poverty, committing itself to address and reduce the challenge of unequal income distribution. By addressing these needs, among other basic amenities, it is another way that the President appeals to the emotions of his citizen.

6.2   Economic advancement

Geingob shapes the future of Namibia by focusing on the advancement of the economy, as his second pillar of his Harambee Prosperity Plan. Equally with other pillars, "Economic Advancement" focuses on the importance of the economy in the fight against poverty. Geingob stresses that wealth creation is the most effective way to address poverty. This can be done by growing economy in a sustainable and inclusive manner. This include creation of decent employment opportunities. In order to achieve these, there are four critical areas that will be addressed. They are as follows:[13]

- Macro-Economic Stability;
- Economic Transformation;
- Youth Enterprise Development; and
- Economic Competitiveness.

Geingob's discourse on these four sub-pillars of "Economic Advancement" highlights the reduction of the debt to GDP ratio to less

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[13]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

than 30 percent by the end of Harambee period. A range of expenditure, revenue and structural measures will be introduced.

Moreover, Geingob, rhetoric emphasises some measures that can be taken to strengthen the fiscal position which include the adoption of "Public-Private Partnership legislation" by December 2016.This is to enable the private sector to play a key role in the construction of government infrastructure. Geingob used metaphoric language when he referred to large worthy in the country's public sector which is yet undiscovered. His presidency therefore, promised to "investigate on how to better leverage the assets of SOEs to reduce the burden on the National budget."

Geingob clarifies government position on the economic empowerment. He began with the draft of the "Namibian Equitable Economic Empowerment Bill" that was released as well as the land reform.

Geingob appealed to the emotions of his audience when he expressed his disappointment on the development of this bill."

He however used the rhetoric of inclusiveness when reminding a number of communities to join hand in hand in the provision of the basic service to their employees.

> I would like to reiterate my call of last year to the farming, fishing and business community to join hands in the provision of decent housing for workers, particularly seasonal workers at the coastal town of Walvis Bay and in Southern Namibia.

As is of concern in other pillars, Geingob mentioned two of the crucial issues "quality education and health care" on poverty reduction that can also be used to empower Namibians.

"Youth Enterprise Development" is an appeal of happiness to those with the passion of entrepreneurship. It targets Namibian youth especially those that live in rural areas. In his rhetoric, Geingob made it clear that this sub-pillar addresses issues such as "access to finance and information."

The fourth sub-pillar "Economic Competitiveness" target is for Namibia to become the most competitive economy in Africa by the year 2020. This can be achieved by addressing a number of constraints in the business environment.

6.3   Social progression

The third pillar of Harambee's plan emphasised one of the important responsibility that the government has that of taking care of the "most needy citizens and to create an environment where those with ability can prosper". Geingob clarifies this by referring to the Marxian dictum that, says "Each according to their means, each according to their abilities." As characterises by the four critical issues that will be outlined below, the development is people-centre and inclusive. The four critical issues are as follows:[14]

- Hunger and Poverty;
- Land Servicing, Housing and Sanitation;
- Infant and Maternal Mortality; and
- Vocational Education Training.

With Geingob's declaration of war against poverty, his rhetoric in this pillar made it clear as he stated "no Namibian should die of hunger during and after the Harambee period." Furthermore, Geingob reiterated that in the true spirit of Harambee, those targets that were set in this pillar will be achieved, with the full support and collaboration of the private sector, the Government Institutions Pension Fund and Development Finance Institutions that have pledged to support government's housing efforts.

Housing and land have been issues of concern in Namibia, Geingob used the appeal to emotions when expressing his concern about the "housing and land availability shortages" in the country. Moreover, he used reasoning appeal by referring to the recent incident in Walvis Bay of the land grabs. He urges that:[15]

> Government will never condone illegal land grabs but in the same vein, we will no longer tolerate the slow implementation of agreed upon strategies to resolve these issues. It is the concern we observe the opportunistic attempts to hijack the genuine and valid land concerns of Namibians in order to incite violence and disorder.

This situation leads Geingob to ask a rhetorical question "What purpose does violence and vandalisation serve?"

In his HPP, Geingob made some promises to shape the future of the country by reducing some social evil. On the "Infant and Maternal Mortality" his governance promised to implement the following action in

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[14]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.
[15]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

order to reduce this notion.[16]

- Provision of essential drugs;
- Deployment of community health workers, including midwives;
- Introduction of a dedicated maternal/neonatal ambulance system;
- Increased training in obstetrics and gynaecology; and
- The construction of maternal shelters for remote expectant mothers.

Strong Vocational Education is also emphasised in the "Social Progression pillar". This can be achieved by expanding VET opportunities and by increasing the intake number per annum. Furthermore, Geingob spoke rhetoric of promising which shape the future of the country, "we will also introduce, to the extent possible, apprenticeship, mentoring, coaching and equipment aid, including financial assistance to enable VET graduates to start own businesses".

6.4   Infrastructure development

The fourth pillar "Infrastructure development" focuses on the modern and reliable infrastructure, as this important for the sustained growth of the economy in the country. Geingob mentioned a number of important areas that need to be addressed urgently. Geingob asserts that:

> These include: shortage of locally generated electricity; an aging rail network, especially the stretch between Walvis Bay and Tsumeb and an underdeveloped water infrastructure in the North and Central areas of the country. These infrastructural challenges will, therefore be tackled head-on, during the Harambee period.

These are basic needs of human beings, therefore by using the rhetoric of urgency to address these needs implies bright future for Namibian people. It also shows that Geingob is concern with the future of the citizen. That is another way the president appeals to the emotions of the people

Moreover, in his rhetoric, several times Geingob establishes commonplaces with his audience by using the term "we", mostly when referring to his government, but in paragraph 61 line 8 and 12 he used the

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[16]Geingob, G. H (2016). State of the Nation Address by his Excellency President HageGeingob[For his second term of office] Parliament: Windhoek.

pronoun "I". This shows how his rhetoric of power that can shape and map the future of Namibia.

6.5   International relations and cooperation.

In the fifth and final pillar of the Harambee Plan, the "International relations and cooperation" Geingob used his own ethos as he spoke about his standing position on the implementation of this plan as well as wrapped up the plan of action for Harambee. Ethos is the most important constituent of any speech, even before any words are uttered. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character, is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken to make people think about his credibility. Geingob's ethos was one of his greatest assets as he is the current president of the country. Audience can easily be persuaded by his rhetoric that shapes the country's future. He stated that:

> As you are aware, I have declared the year 2016, as the year of implementation. To ensure a high level of implementation, key deliverables of this Plan will be incorporated into the Performance Agreements of each of the Ministers responsible for implementation. Execution will be tracked on a quarterly reporting basis and assessed annually.

Conclusion

By virtue of its concern for the people of Namibia, Hage Geingob's rhetoric in the document of Harambee Prosperity Plan is determined to meet the challenges faced by Namibian people. He asserts that the discipline imposed by a planned approach to many challenges offers the most realistic likelihood of success.

Several times President Geingob's discourse in HPP appealed to the audiences' emotions, he expressed his concerns and the government's commitment to improve the well-being of the nation, in his declaration of war against poverty.

Geingob's rhetorical performance in the HPP improved the quality of his governance and his rhetoric helps his readers to understand the future of Namibia. Furthermore, this paper concludes the important role presidential rhetoric plays in nation-building and in shaping the future of their countries. So Geingob's rhetoric on Harambee Prosperity Plan helps to understand the future of Namibia.

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Populism *per se*, its founts

Philippe-Joseph Salazar

"Populism" in Argentina usually refers to Peronism, but in South Africa the media uses the term to refer to the far-left margins like the *Economic Freedom Fighters* and the student "Rhodes Must Fall" collective. The two countries on the whole share a basic "populist" speech pattern[1]. The following essay attempts to provide a theoretical framework, a hypothesis, which analytical study will still have to validate.

The whole tenor of public discussion, both in political and media terms, actually seeks to mask the issue of the very existence of a people in a state of insurrection under apartheid and, in the second republic from 1994, of a troublesome people - a "people" radically different in political terms from the "rainbow nation". This "people" appears constantly in the second republic in violent one-off events - strikes and demonstrations that are fomented by a vocabulary that is correspondingly violent. The conceptual framework is straightforward: terrorism/the liberation struggle was the consistent underpinning phenomenon, which was both discursive and political under the first republic, but has become a phenomenon of specificity while its "populist" violence also ceased being consistent and became sporadic. But the principle remains the same.

No-one could grasp, either under apartheid or in the second republic, that this phenomenon comprises the political awareness of the individual expressed as an action, an action which plays out in the political sphere; and which, in concert with the acts of other individuals, takes on the form of a "people".

Thus, a voluntary, semi-insurrectional action, although still a personal action, weaves into the initiation of a human group collective which shares the same goals, the same methods and the same ethical sentiments. So, a "chain of populist justification" arose which now operatesas a dialectic in the inner cities and the suburbs, just as it operated in the segregated townships before 1994.

This chain is made up of individuals who can and want to act and whose willingness and capacity to act becomes what is conveniently

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[1] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, New York, Verso 2007.

labelled "terrorism" and, bracketed under a political creed, forms a kind of revolutionary avant-garde: it is doctrinaire in its vocabulary, organized without constrictive committees, combat-ready, prepared to take the fight to the "class" enemy and promoting the message of a global revolution.

The most common line the media takes in encapsulating the phenomenon, even if, and especially because, it is not explicit, is the assertion that the "terrorists" of yesteryear and the "protesters" of today, are influenced or manipulated and are not representative of the "true people". Thus, any conscious political will is disregarded.

This public rhetoric will not accept that populism *per se*, in the precise meaning of the term, is the radical manifestation of what politics is based on, namely "differend"[2], in this case the refusal to enter into debate with the race enemy before 1994, and reprised in the declarations of the EFF and the "Rhodes must fall" types of today, and particularly with the class enemy or "post-colonials" after 1994. This differend manifests itself in rejecting any "dispute" dialogue, viz. refusing to speak the language and use the speech codes (whether of the media, of politics or of jurisprudence) of the opponents of populism that they are attacking.

All of *per se* populism's propaganda therefore aims at creating a linguistic demarcation which operates in parallel with the current political world so as to subvert, and ultimately supplant it. The use of the internet should not mislead us: the internet is a practico-inert tool, of no use in and of itself, in contrast to the political language we practise. Populism can thus give rise to a linguistic demarcation which represents its "people", using tools which aregenerally considered as "capitalist", such as the social networks of Web 2.0, and characteristic of their adversary.

This appropriation of tools is an insurrectional technique on the communication terrain itself. The trivial reaction is: "They protest against the 'haves' but they all have iPads" is dangerous because it hides the reality that these tools are only inert "utensils" as defined by Sartre[3], until such time as their use gives them a strategic and tactical dynamism.

Populism *per se* has four characteristics.

Firstly, it divides political society dramatically in two in any conceivable formulation: rich and poor, the legal state and the real country. In the case of South Africa, the pre-1994 basic division was black/white, and was narrowed down to a residue, in Pareto's meaning of

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[2] Jean-François Lyotard, The *Differend*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
[3] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, NLB, 1976.

the term[4], as either quasi-mythological, like the Liberation Struggle, or profoundly and irrationally emotional (pathos in rhetorical terms). This residue thus imbues and becomes part of the debate as a pseudo-logical derivation (once again in terms of Pareto's conceptualisation) to adapt itself seamlessly and malleably to political circumstances: the residue is rooted in emotionally charged poles like "rich/poor", "enfranchised/disenfranchised", "powerful/powerless".

These derivations, above and beyond the residue, provide the opportunity to verbalise them by clothing them in words and arguments. The purpose of derivations is actually to present arguments that appear logical or ethical, while the residue gives them an emotional, mythical, reckless aura.

Derivations, rooted in a residue, thus account for the potential for populist violence stemming at once from individual will and from a social movement which are both linked to a "transcendence" viz. the residue. Populist movements over and over again play out the primitive, mythical scenario, transcending the racial divide, in disregard of political reality.

Secondly, populist discourse produces another rhetorical form, the favourite theme of the treachery of the elite. The dichotomy is no longer between the "haves" and the "have-nots", but, from the point of view of the majority who watchfrom the side-lines the sparking of populist discourse and violence, between "know" and "know not". Nevertheless, it is better to be wary of the following: the rhetorical workings in play are dialectic and not simply binary, since, in a second phase the contestation can be reversed: those who are oppressed "know better" than the oppressors. There follows a third phase– the growth of social wisdom which challenges the initial perspectives reduced, through populist debate, to useless concepts, outdated, oppressive, vertical: a fake perspective.

It can be argued that populist groups actually construct a horizontal outlook, assisted by Web 2.0 which, through its dynamic content, has the result of supplanting the original vertical perspective. The criticism frequently used by the press and the man in the street like "these protesters know nothing about (Rhodes, for example)" is strategically misplaced because, in fact, populism creates a horizontal perspective which is more persuasivethan the "normal" or expert perspective (in this case, anhistoric perspective).

Clearly, for those who want to, it is in the field of this social-cognitive reversal of perspective that combat by argumentation should be

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[4]Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale* [*Treatise of General Sociology*]

pursued, and not from an external perspective which, from the outset, is decried as "oppressive".

Populism has a third characteristic which is to designate the "Other" as the enemy. Naming it thus is all-powerful.

It is essential to denounce, unmask and destroy those who collaborate in the enslavement of the "true people". Populism has to caricature its adversary so as to delineate its salient features. That is why in South Africa, extreme left-wing populism takes aim at enemy symbols - symbols named directly (urban place names) or indirectly (monuments): it is the nomenclature that is the target. Pre-1994, the assault was physical. After 1994, it metamorphosed into a symbolic guerrilla war waged in its turn, with sanitised violence, what is referred to as "weaponizing speech"[5]. This is a populist insurrection pursued by other means, but now protected or tolerated in the name of the right to free speech.

A fourth element of populist rhetoric is the exclusion argument. In populist terms, it is recognised that the claims made by "the people" from those who are decried as "bad" have their genesis in,and bear the marks of, "exclusion". Those "excluded" make their demands from their excluded position. By dialectic reversal, the excluded position becomes thesuperior position: a sense of powerless outrage confronting the power of the "corrupt" and a sense of amplified injustice, transformed into anaffirmation of glorious isolation. These are the new "damned of the earth" who assert that a new but corrupt political order has excluded them and therefore the excluded must rally together as an expressive force.

These four elements form a logical chain.

Muscular populism thus refers simultaneously to a coalescing group and to individual spontaneity. The theory of populism goes so far as to assert that "the people" takes on its true form and its real existencethrough this double linkage. The terrorism debate prior to 1994 and the vocabulary of populist violence after 1994 in South Africa reveals both the ideal of a people in the making, and individualist action.

In Sartre's analysis, this would be defined as a Fraternity of Terror[6]: in populist activities, the foot-soldier acts without receiving specific orders "from on high" only on the basis of slogans, and in the Web 2.0 era, on the basis of the watchwords of a discursive and horizontal

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[5]Roger Stahl, "Weaponizing Speech", *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 102/4, 2016, pp. 376-395
[6] Jean-Paul Sartre, *op. cit.*

fraternity. Violent populism consists of a dialectic between the willing individual and a social formation in motion which weaves them into a chain of action.

As this movement grows, it becomes the warp and weft constituting "the true, good people", it is a sudden emergence of the "people", which takes on irresistible political form and which manifests a radical hostility towards those designated as the enemy.

How can the rise of this populist chain be explained?

It should be kept in mind that populism, as it has been conceived here, is defined as a rationale, or chain, of individual equality and not as a rationale or chain of substitutions[7]. Here is an elucidation: a population governed by codes and political management (governance) operates, when it is making demands, as a social logic by substitutionto manifestsectoral discontent. By contrast, human groups in an insurrectional phase operate by deploying the group consciousness of persons of equal volition.

So, in non-populist politics, the management of social demands is rooted in a mechanism of dialogue (hence the expression: "social dialogue")[8] which consists of separating one demand from another, meaning that differing appeals do not become tangled together in one massive and unmanageable demand. The process advances by the substitution of one demand after the other, each one subject to variable sectoral dialogue.

By contrast, the creation of a populist chain of logic springs from a series of discursive equivalences where the single individual,linking his own situation with those in similar situations, creates chain of equivalences between him and his struggle comrades. Reading blogs and messages of violent populist networks in South Africa confirms this.

In analysing the basic arguments of a populist nature in South Africa and Argentina, we shall need to concentrate on these two rationales or chains, rather than adopting an Aristotelian approach.

Translated from the French by Babrius Translation Services.

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[7]Ernesto Laclau, "Populism: What's in a name?" pp. 32-49, in Francisco Panizza (Ed.), *Populism and the mirror of democracy*, London, Verso, London, 2005.
[8] Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *L'Hyperpolitique*, Paris, Klincksieck, 2009, Ch. IV.

¿Cuál es el rol del sacerdote? Discurso religioso y discurso político en el padre Carlos Mugica

María Alejandra Vitale

Summary:

Carlos Mugica (1930-1974) was one of the 270 Argentine priests who supported the Message of the 18 Bishops of the Third World on December 31st 1967. This gave birth to the Movement of Priests for the Third World. Mugica was killed in 1974 allegedly by an ultra-right organization known as the "Triple A". He had supported the Peronism and had established an unstable relationship with the armed organization Montoneros.

In this article, I analyze the speech entitled "The role of the priest", that Mugica gave in 1971 in front of the authorities and students of the Institute for Integral Psychology. This speech is important because Mugica lays out with absolute clarity his position about the role that a priest must play regarding politics in the society of his time. From a rhetorical point of view, the aim of the speech is to persuade the audience that in the conjunction of 1971 religion and politics cannot be divided and that the Christians in general and the priests in particular must accept this truth. Indeed, the priest's role is making the disadvantaged people comprehend that they are God's children and therefore they must fight for their dignity and rights. Mugica considers that this could only be warranted by a socialist system which answers to Christianity and the true Argentine traditions. In order to achieve his objective, Mugica uses a wide range of rhetorical strategies: the dissociation of notions of revolution and sin; the explanatory reformulation of fragments of the Bible, particularly the episode of Zacchaeus; the refutation of the ones that try to distance religion from politics or the ones that diminish the figure of Christ to a guerrilla warrior; and authority quotes of the protestant theologian Oscar Cullmann and of father Pedro Arrupe, the general of the Society of Jesus. Furthermore, Mugica presents an expert ethos, by showing the specialized knowledge of a priest, and positioning himself as someone who explains, who makes didactic questions, and introduces definitions and intradiscursive reformulations. Mugica also legitimizes his position by mentioning his previous ethos as a "cura villero" (shantytown priest).

Carlos Mugica (1930-1974) fue uno de los 270 sacerdotes de Argentina que el 31 de diciembre de 1967 adhirieron al Mensaje de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo,[1] lo que dio pie al nacimiento del Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo.[2]Asesinado en 1974por, seguramente, una organización de ultraderecha conocida como "La Triple A", Mugica había adherido al peronismo y había entablado vínculos con la organización armada Montoneros, con la que mantuvo una inestable relación.[3]

Este artículo analizala disertación titulada"El rol del sacerdote", que Carlos Mugica pronunció en 1971 ante las autoridades y estudiantes del Instituto de Psicología Integral.La importancia del discurso radica en que en él Mugica formula con rotunda claridad su posición respecto del papel que el sacerdote debe cumplir en la sociedad de su tiempo en relación con la política. Desde una mirada retórica, la finalidad de la alocución es persuadir a la audiencia de que en la coyunturade 1971 lo religioso y lo político no pueden disociarse y que los cristianos en general y el sacerdote en particular deben asumir esta verdad desde una postura abierta al marxismo.

Para ello, utiliza una variada gama de estrategias retóricas. Una consiste en la disociación de las nociones[4] de revolución y de pecado. De esta manera, Mugica afirma:

> Es muy importante el valor que le da el cristianismo al aporte de la revolución interior. Y tenemos que entrar en eso. Yo personalmente, como miembro del movimiento del Tercer Mundo, estoy convencido que en la Argentina solo hay salida a través de una revolución, pero una revolución verdadera, es decir

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[1] Este documento constituyó una aplicación del Concilio Vaticano II y de la encíclica Populorum Progressio, promulgada en 1967 por el Papa Pablo VI, a los países de Asia, África y América Latina.

[2]Ver Mónica Mangione, *El movimiento de sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo* (Rosario: Kolektivo Editorial "Último Recurso", 2004) y Fortunato Mallimaci; Luis Miguel Donatello y Humberto Cucchetti,"Religión y política: discursos sobre el trabajo en la Argentina del siglo XX" (*Estudios Sociológicos*, 2006: 423-449).

[3]Ver Claudia Touris, "Sociabilidad e identidad político-religiosa de los grupos católicos tercermundistas en la Argentina (1966-1976)" (La Falda – Córdoba, Primeras Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Social, 2007, 30, 31 de mayo y 1 de junio) y Luis Miguel Donatello, "Religión y política: las redes sociales del catolicismo post-conciliar y los Montoneros, 1966-1973" (*Estudios sociales* 24, 2003: 89-112).

[4]Sobre el argumento de la disociación de las nociones, ver Chaïm Perelman y Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Tratado de la argumentación. La Nueva Retórica*(Madrid: Gredos, 1989).

simultánea: cambio de estructuras y cambio de estructuras internas.

La noción de revolución es disociada, por un lado, en falsa y verdadera y, por el otro, en exterior e interior. La revolución falsa es asociada de modo implícito a una mera revolución exterior; la revolución verdadera, en cambio, conjuga la revolución exterior, el cambio de las estructuras, con la revolución interior. En la disertación de Mugica, esa revolución interior es la aceptación de que todos los hombres son hijos de Dios y en cuanto tales deben vivir dignamente. En este sentido, la categoría de "hombre nuevo" planteada por el Che Guevara es para Mugica netamente cristiana:

> Yo me opongo violentamente a todos los que pretenden reducir a Cristo al papel de un guerrillero, de un reformador social. Jesucristo es mucho más ambicioso. No pretende crear una sociedad nueva, pretende crear un hombre nuevo y la categoría de hombre nuevo que asume el Che, sobre todo en su trabajo El socialismo y el Hombre, es una categoría netamente cristiana que San Pablo usa mucho.

La asimilación de personajesmarxistas con posiciones cristianas, como sucede entre el Che y San Pablo, se repite cuando Mugica afirma que "Marx y Lenin al postular la comunidad de bienes no hicieron más que parafrasear, copiar el Evangelio" y que "cuando Lenin dice: 'El que no trabaja no come' repite lo que dijo San Pablo en el siglo I".

En cuanto a la noción de pecado, Mugica la disocia en un pecado individual o personal yun pecado colectivo o estructural y atribuye esta disociación a "la nueva visión del pecado que tiene el cristiano". Mugica sostiene:

> Hay un pecado personal, fundamental, que es el pecado del egoísmo. ¿Qué es pecar? Es tratar a una persona como si fuera una cosa (…) Pero está el pecado colectivo o estructural, que es fundamental, que significa romper, cambiar o destruir todas las estructuras que liberan a los hombres. ¿Cuáles son las estructuras opresoras? Aquellas que establecen un tipo de dominación de unos hombres por otros. Yo pienso que el sistema capitalista liberal que nosotros padecemos es un sistema netamente opresivo, precisamente por eso. No solo porque hay muy pocos hombres que se aprovechan del fruto del trabajo de la mayoría, sino porque

además las relaciones que se establecen son relaciones de dominación. Relaciones despóticas. Por eso pensamos que entra perfecta y totalmente dentro de nuestra misión sacerdotal esa lucha (…) Por eso como movimiento los sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo propugnamos el socialismo en la Argentina como único sistema en el cual se pueden dar relaciones de fraternidad entre los hombres.

La disociación de la noción de pecado, que postula la existencia del pecado colectivo o estructural, permite a Mugicajustificar la lucha contra el sistema capitalista como parte de la misión del sacerdote y, de modo implícito, orientar a favor de que un cristiano, para no caer en aquel pecado colectivo, luche también contra ese sistema. Mugica se vuelve a integrar en el colectivo "sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo" y explicita su promoción del socialismo como único modo de evitar el pecado colectivo. Religión y política quedan así identificadas.

Al mismo tiempo, Mugica reformula ese socialismo como "Un socialismo que responda a nuestras auténticas tradiciones argentinas, que sea cristiano, un socialismo con rostro humano, que respete la libertad del hombre". De este modo, la noción de socialismo es disociada y se vislumbra un discurso-otro, que impulsa un socialismo que Mugica rechaza, un socialismo queimplícitamente adquiere el sentido de no responder a las auténticas tradiciones argentinas, que es ateo, que no tiene rostro humano y que no respeta la libertad del hombre. Este socialismo, se sobreentiende, es aquel quecorresponde al que fue denominado "marxismo liberal", de tradición antiperonista, por la llamada "izquierda nacional", antiliberal, en la que se ubica Mugica.[5] El antiliberalismo de Mugica se expresa, asimismo, cuando califica de "liberal" al capitalismo que impugna.

Otra estrategia que emplea Mugica para persuadir a su audiencia sobre su posición en torno al rol del sacerdotees la reformulación explicativa del Evangelio,[6] mediante la cual se centra en el presente de enunciación, de modo que adapta el texto sagrado al "signo de los tiempos".[7] Se destaca así el comentario que hace del episodio de Zaqueo, incluido en el cap. XIX de San Lucas:

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[5]Sobre la izquierda liberal y antiliberal en Argentina, ver Oscar Terán, *Historia de las ideas en Argentina. Diez lecciones iniciales, 1810-1980* (Buenos Aires/México: Siglo XXI, 2008).

[6]Ver Catherine Fuchs, *Paraphrase et énonciation*(París: Ophrys, 1994).

[7]Sobre el concepto de "signo de los tiempos" y su vínculo con la imbricación de lo político y lo religioso, ver Philippe-Joseph Salazar, "Une conversion politique du religieux", en Barbara Cassin, Olivier Cayla y Philippe-Joseph Salazar, dirs., *Vérité, Réconciliation, Réparation* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil).

Zaqueo era un sinvergüenza, un explotador, que se había enriquecido explotando al pueblo judío al servicio del imperialismo romano. Zaqueo era un publicano. Los publicanos eran recaudadores de impuestos; se los cobraban a los judíos para entregárselos a los romanos (…) Zaqueo era jefe de publicanos y ricos, trataba de ver a Jesús pero a causa de la muchedumbre no podía, porque era de poca estatura. Se adelantó corriendo y se subió a un sicómoro para verlo, porque Jesús iba a pasar por allí. Es decir, Zaqueo se sube, no le importa el qué dirán, aunque es un funcionario, un tipo importante (…) Dijo Jesús: "Zaqueo, baja pronto, porque hoy me hospedaré en tu casa. Él bajó corriendo y lo recibió con alegría", dice el Evangelio (…) Al ver esto todos murmuraban por qué Jesús habría ido a comer a la casa de un hombre tan pecador. Pero a Cristo le importó un pito el qué dirán. A él le interesaba esa persona. Zaqueo, de pie, le dijo al Señor: "Señor, doy la mitad de mis bienes a los pobres. Y si a alguien he defraudado en algo, le devolveré cuatro veces esa cantidad". De modo que el rico se hace pobre. Jesús no le dijo nada. Pero Zaqueo, simplemente, comprende que no puede haber amistad con Cristo si no es en el cambio radical de vida.

Gracias al empleo de un registro informal y coloquial ("sinvergüenza", "tipo", "le importa un pito"), Mugica se aproxima a su audiencia y adecua la palabra evangélica al modo de hablar del momento. La palabra del Evangelio es reinterpretada con una de las entidades explicativas propia del discurso político,[8] "el imperialismo", a la vez que "el cambio radical de vida" de Zaqueo es entendido tanto en su dimensión religiosa (primero un "sinvergüenza", Zaqueo se convierte en un amigo de Cristo) como política (de "explotador" se hace pobre).

Esta articulación inseparable entre lo religioso y lo político que defiende Mugica lo lleva a enfrentarse a dos posiciones antagónicas con la suya y entre ellas. Se trata, por un lado, de los llamados de modo despectivo "chupacirios" (otro término informal y usado por Mugica):

"No el que me dice Señor, Señor, entrará en el Reino de los

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[8]Sobre las entidades características del discurso político, ver Eliseo Verón, "La palabra adversativa. Observaciones sobre la enunciación política", en Verón, E. *et al.*, *El discurso político. Lenguajes y acontecimientos*(Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1986).

Cielos". No el "chupacirios" sino el que hace la voluntad de mi Padre. Aquel que realmente con los hechos, con su compromiso, hace la voluntad del Padre. ¿Cuál es la voluntad del Padre? El amor de los hermanos. Aquel que se juega por sus hermanos, se está adhiriendo a Cristo aunque no lo sepa. Y aquel que no se juega por sus hermanos, así pertenezca a cuarenta y cinco congregaciones, así tenga familiares curas y monjas por todos lados, ése, aunque le ponga cualquier cantidad de velas a San Cayetano, no es cristiano".

Mugica parte de la palabra bíblica para refutar a quienes conciben la religión como alejada de la política, de allí que interprete el amor de los hermanos en tanto voluntad de Dios como compromiso y jugarse por ellos. Y en relación con este compromiso explicita: "un sacerdote realiza su rol sacerdotal en la medida en que se compromete hasta los tuétanos con los hombres. Hoy el compromiso de amor con los hombres es un compromiso político".

Pero a la vez Mugica rechaza la postura de quienes apartan la política de la religión y reducen la figura de Cristo a la de un guerrillero ("Yo me opongo violentamente a todos los que pretenden reducir a Cristo al papel de un guerrillero, de un reformador social"), de aquellos que solo pregonan la revolución que él llama externa, el cambio de las estructuras, pero olvidan la revolución interna, la dimensión divina del hombre y del propio Cristo.

Mugica apoya esta posición mediante una cita de autoridad del teólogo protestante Oscar Cullmann:

> Añade Jesús: "No piensen que he venido a traer la paz a la tierra; no he venido a traer la paz sino la espada". Esto no hay que interpretarlo como pretenden algunos, como si Cristo viniera a invitarlos a la lucha armada. Este problema lo trata Cullmann que es un gran exégeta protestante, quizás el más grande exégeta que tiene el protestantismo y uno de los más grandes del cristianismo (…) Es uno de los exégetas -intérpretes de la Sagrada Escritura que se mueve con pautas científicas- observador del Concilio Vaticano II y amigo personal de Paulo VI. En su libro *Jesucristo y los revolucionarios de su tiempo*, Cullmann señala que Cristo rechaza como satánica la tentación de erigirse en líder guerrillero, en líder político, tentación a la que lo quieren llevar algunos de sus seguidores. Tres de ellos, por lo menos, según Cullmann, eran ex guerrilleros: Pedro, el primer Papa, que en la noche de Getsemaní saca rápidamente la espada y con toda precisión le corta la oreja a Maleo y muestra así que está acostumbrado a usar las armas;

Simón, llamado el Zelote, y Judas Iscariote. Por lo menos esos tres, dice Cullmann, habían formado parte del ejército de Liberación Palestino de la época, los zelotes, que luchaban contra el imperio romano. Cristo rechaza como satánica la tentación de ponerse al frente de ese ejército de liberación para liberar política y socialmente a su pueblo. Todo esto está simbolizado en las tentaciones del demonio en el desierto. Jesús pretende crear un nuevo tipo de relación entre los hombres, pretende crear un nuevo tipo de hombre que va a llevar a una profunda revolución de las estructuras.

Mediante la negación polémica [9]("esto no hay que interpretarlo …"), Mugica refuta a quienes separan la política de la religión e interpretan la palabra de Jesús como una mera invitación a la lucha armada. Desde su lugar de sacerdote, interpreta el sentido del texto bíblico acorde a su posición, que justifica con el discurso de Cullmann. La actualización del mensaje de la Biblia según "el signo de los tiempos" se repite al usar el término "ejército de liberación de Palestina", del discurso público de su presente de enunciación, para referirse al accionar de Pedro, Simón y Judas en la época de Cristo. Nuevamente, Mugica rechaza a quienes propician solamente un cambio de estructuras despreciando la construcción de "un nuevo tipo de hombre", el "hombre nuevo" que Mugica rescata del Che.

Si la cita de Cullmann sirve para refutar a quienes desligan la política de la religión, otra cita, la del padre Pedro Arrupe,[10]refuta a quienes separan la religión de la política y legitima la postura de Mugica de que el sacerdote y los cristianos en general deben unificarlas:

El padre Arrupe, en el documento que ya señalé, sobre cuál debe ser el compromiso del jesuita hoy, del sacerdote en general, señala al referirse a esa radical exigencia de Cristo: "Cuando más verdaderamente viva la Iglesia el misterio de Jesucristo, perfecto Dios y perfecto hombre, mejor sabrá la Iglesia cómo su Señor da su vida por la vida del mundo, renunciando a los poderes malignos que defienden nuestra existencia social". Hoy a esos poderes malignos los podemos llamar imperialismo internacional del

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[9]Sobre la negación polémica, ver María Marta García Negroni, "La negación metalingüística: argumentación, gradualidad y reinterpretación"(*Signo y Seña*9, 1998).

[10]Pedro Arrupe, elegido general de la Compañía de Jesús en 1965, participó de las sesiones del Concilio Vaticano II desde el grupo más progresista. Su propuesta de acercamiento a las clases pobres y desheredadas del Tercer Mundo fue apoyada por el papa Pablo VI.

dinero y oligarquías nativas que son las que le chupan la sangre al pueblo.

La imbricación de la religión y la política se manifiesta así en calificar de "malignos" a los poderes condenados por el padre Arrupe, cuya referencia es explicitada por Mugica con entidades propias del discurso político: "imperialismo internacional del dinero" y "oligarquías nativas".

Por último, Mugica apoya su posición mediante una imagen de sí, un êthos experto, con un saber especializado ligado a su condición de sacerdote. De allí que se posicione en el lugar de un explicador y emplee recursos del discurso explicativo[11] que se pueden identificar en las citas anteriores, como preguntas didácticas("Qué es el pecado?", "¿Cuáles son las estructuras opresoras?, "¿Cuál es la voluntad del padre?"), definiciones (de pecado, de publicano, de exégetas) y reformulaciones parafrásticas intradiscursivas("pero una revolución verdadera, es decir simultánea").

Mugica legitima su posición, asimismo, con la activación de su êthos previo[12] de "cura villero";[13] en efecto, él fue uno de los fundadores de la rama sacerdotal que trabajó en las villas miserias de Argentina:

> El hombre tiene un destino divino. Por eso cada ser humano aunque esté borracho o sea ladrón, es un ser con potencialidad divina. Y si es un desheredado, si vive en una Villa Miseria lo tengo que amar mucho más, me tengo que preocupar mucho más para que deje de vivir en un tugurio y pueda vivir con un trabajo que sea creador, para que pueda participar efectivamente en el poder, para que gobierne a través de aquellos que realmente lo representan, porque es hijo de Dios no es un cualquiera. Para mí, cristiano, ésta es una experiencia importantísima. En la villa, aparte de que estoy con mis hermanos y estoy dispuesto, con la ayuda de Dios, a luchar por ellos, les puedo decir: "Ustedes están liberados, porque en la medida en que creen que son hijos de Dios

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[11]Sobre el discurso explicativo, ver Bertha Zamudio y Ana Atorresi, *La explicación*(Bs. As.: EUDEBA, 2000).

[12]Ruth Amossy llama êthos previo a la imagen que la audiencia tiene del orador antes de que este tome la palabra, conformada por su posición social, actividades previas y otros discursos sociales. Ver Ruth Amossy, *La présentation de soi. Ethos et identité verbale*(París: PUF, 2010).

[13]Sobre los curas que trabajan en las villas miserias, también llamadas villas de emergencia o simplemente villas (asentamientos urbanos caracterizados por una densa población de viviendas precarias), ver Silvina Premat, *Curas villeros: de Mugica al padre Pepe, historias de lucha y esperanza.* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2010).

empiezan a tomar conciencia, ya mismo, de su tremenda dignidad".

En este tramo de la disertación de Mugica, se repite la tesis de la coexistencia de la dimensión religiosa y de la política en el rol del sacerdote, dado que cuando ayuda a que los habitantes de las villas tomen conciencia de que son hijos de Dios "ya mismo" toman conciencia de su dignidad.

Para finalizar, es pertinente puntualizar que la articulación entre religión y política conformó en Argentina una construcción ideológica antiliberal que el historiador Loris Zanatta denomina "mito de la nación católica", que no ubica ala religión en el ámbito de lo privado sino propicia la identificación del orden religioso con el temporal para orientar la organización de la sociedad y de las prácticas políticas. Esta construcción ideológica fue compartida en aquel país por ciertos sectores de izquierda como de derecha y conforma parte –sea residual o no según las coyunturas- de su cultura política.[14]

~ University of Buenos Aires ~

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[14]Para profundizar sobre el mito de la nación católica y su presencia tanto en ciertos sectores de izquierda como de derecha en Argentina, ver Roberto Di Stefano y Loris Zanatta,*Historia de la Iglesia Argentina. Desde la Conquista hasta fines del siglo XX.*(Bs. As.: Argent, 2000) y Loris Zanatta,*Perón y el mito de la nación católica. Iglesia y Ejército en los orígenes del peronismo. 1943-1946* (Bs. As.: Editorial Sudamericana, 1999).

La "hora de la acción": análisis del Compromiso de Natividad del Movimiento Sacerdotes para el tercer mundo

Florencia Magnanego

Summary:

The Movement of Priests for the Third World (MSTM) was created in Argentina in 1967 as a result of the priests' embrace of the "Manifest of the 18 bishops for the Third World", subscribed by the bishops of several countries in all five continents, which urges the oppressed peoples in the Third World to "raise their heads and stand on their feet" in their struggle for liberation. In this article, we analyse the "Christmas Commitment", a document that accompanied the fasting of the priests during the 1968 Christmas Eve. As a result of the spreading of this article, the Movement became publicly known.

In the said document new conditions are set to identify the subject to which statements are addressed: the politically mobilised Christian people. The new pastoral approach resumes issues that had appeared in the "Manifest of the 18 Bishops for the Third World", such as the geopolitical approach of the International system, on one hand, and the commitment to active struggle for liberation of the oppressed peoples in the Third World, on the other.

The first part of the Christmas statement is basically descriptive. The movement reports the inequalities between rich and poor. Several issues–starvation, analphabetism, endemic diseases, housing, weapons, land distribution, unemployment- are approached from the same argumentative schematization: a very powerful minority oppressing a multitude of exploited individuals. This takes place in the framework of two opposing groups: the "international imperialism of money" against the "undeveloped countries". Thus, inequalities between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak are projected from the sphere of individuals to the sphere of nations. Asymmetries reported in the analysis of the international system evoke the theories of dependence which describe the world from the point of view of a polarization between developed countries - exporters of manufactures and external debt creditors - on the one hand, and undeveloped countries - exporters of raw materials, dependant on debtor, core countries - on the other hand. This

way, the capitalism / socialism division is displaced by the core / periphery division, the periphery being identified as the "Third World".

As regards the re-positioning of the ongoing social transformations, the "Christmas Commitment" echoes the popular ideological imprint using expressions making direct reference to Marxism and which produce an immediate effect of intelligibility in the political subject with whom priests identify themselves. For instance, there appear expressions such as "Capitalist social structure", "private property in the means of production", "national capitalism", "imperialism", "large foreign monopolies", etc. In the same way, it clearly embraces the revolutionary process, the radical and urgent need to change structures of the capitalist system and of the economic, political and cultural imperialism, but subordinating such changes to the inner spiritual one. Thus, man's liberation process is conceived in a two-way direction: political-social and spiritual, while the figure of Christ legitimates the revolutionary path chosen.

In short, the MSTM statement sutures the political with the religious sphere, thus, configuring a new revolutionary Christian imaginary.

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El 31 de diciembre de 1967, un grupo de sacerdotes argentinos en vía una carta de adhesiónal Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo[1]en la que sostiene:

> Ad herimos plenamente al texto del Mensaje de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo, nos comprometemos a trabajar con todas nuestras fuerzas para poneren práctica, aquíen nuestro país, el contenido evangélico y profético de este documento.
>
> A través de este compromiso, acto de habla con la fuerza

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[1] El manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo se dio a conocer el 15 de agosto de 1967. Este documento fuefirmadoporobispos de diferentes países de los cinco continentes, como Brasil, Yugoslavia, Laos, Líbano, Singapur, Argelia, Colombia, entre otros. Uno de losfirmantes de mayor reconocimientofue Monseñor Helder Câmaraarzobispo de Olinda y Recife (Brasil).

performativa de transformar la realidad, queda fundado el Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo (MSTM). El padre Miguel Ramondetti, que firma la carta como representante del Comité organizador del movimiento, habíasi douno de los primeros religiosos en recibir el Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos y el encargado, junto con Rodolfo Ricciardelli, y un sacerdote francés, André Lanzón, de traducirlo al castellano y di fundirlo entre sus pares.

Con el objetivo de relevar las estrategias retóricasen la construcción de subjetividad política del Movimiento de los Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo, analizamosen este artículo uno de los primeros mensajes que el movimiento di funde entre los fieles envísperas de la Navidad de 1968. Junto con el acto de protestapor el modo de la erradicación de las villas de emergencia a finales de eseaño, el ayuno de Navidad y el documento que lo acompaña son las primeras acciones que hacen que el movimiento tome estado público. Nos proponemos darcuenta de la configuración de nuevas condiciones de identificación para la audiencia del comunicado, en primer término, a través del retome de tópicos que aparecenen el Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del TercerMundo y que construyen una visión pastoral novedosa; ensegundo término, a partir de la organización de la identidad del movimiento y del sujeto político al que interpelaentorno a la mirada geopolítica del sistema internacional, por un lado, y al compromiso con la lucha activa por la liberación de los pueblos oprimidos del TercerMundo, por el otro. Finalmente, analizamos los cruces entre las discursividades política y religiosa que legitiman la intervención del movimiento en acciones políticas concretas, como movilizaciones, huelgas, tomas, difusión de actividades de protesta, etc.

El trabajo se enmarcaen el proyecto *Discursos fundacionales e identidades nacionalesen Argentina y Sudáfrica* que se proponea bordar comparativamente los discursos fundacionales que configuran la identidad nacional (Mercieca, 2010) enambasnaciones en el período comprendido entre 1912 y 1994. El análisis se inscribe en el marco teórico de la Retórica constitutiva (Charland, 1987), por lo tanto, el acento está puestoen lo discursivo como constitutivo de las identidades y encómo se despliega retóricamente la configuración de los imaginarios nacionales que transforman el sentido de la identidad de la audiencia.

El movimiento de sacerdotes argentinos surge comores puesta al llamamiento de los 18 obisposen un contextoen el que la Iglesia católica, primero lideradapor Juan XXIII, conocidocomo el Papa Bueno, y luego por susucesor Paulo VI, autor de la encíclica Populorum Progressio, empieza a denunciar las injustas condiciones de los pueblos pobres del

mundo. La carta enviada por los sacerdotes al Obispo de Olinda y Recife se hace eco del momento de quiebre que está atravesando la institución a nivel mundial y regional y, en particular, de la necesida durgente de rever la actitud de la Iglesiafrente al liberalismo económico y el autoritarismo político aplicadopor el gobierno de facto del general Onganía[2] en la Argentina:

> Estamos convencidos que nuestra Iglesia Latinoa mericana vive una hora de definiciones concretas muy urgente, frente a los acontecimientos actuales. Al adherirnos al documento publicado por Uds. tenemos conciencia de haber dado, como sacerdotes, un primer paso para comprometer nos dentro del proceso de transformación de América Latina.

Una nueva identidad comienza a configurarseen el grupo de sacerdotes a partir de dos ejes: la mirada geopolítica sobre los problemas del Tercer Mundo y el compromiso político activo con las transformaciones sociales de fines de la década del 60. Ambas dimensiones yaestán presentesen el Manifiesto de las 18 Obispos que delimita con precisión tres espacios geopolíticos: las potencias centrales capitalistas, China y la Unión Soviética como países comunistas y, porfuera de esta bipolaridad propia de la Guerra Fría, los pueblos y las Iglesias del Tercer Mundo. Enefecto, describe:

> Nuestras Iglesias situadas en el Tercer Mundo se ven mezcladas en el conflicto en el que se enfrentan ahora no sólo Oriente y Occidente, sino los tres grandes grupos de pueblos: las potencias occidentales enriquecidas en el siglo pasado, dos grandes países comunistas transformados en grandes que buscan todavía cómo escapar del dominio de los grandes y desarrollarse libremente.

El manifiesto se enfrenta a las asimetrías en el sistema mundial. Según denuncia, algunos países poderosos someten y explotan a los países más pobres. En la división internacional del trabajo las potencias industriales lideran y Latinoamérica es el proletariado:

> Los pueblos del Tercer Mundo forman el proletariado de la humanidad actual, explotados por los grandes y amenazados en su existencia misma por los que, solo por ser los más fuertes, se

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[2]El gobierno de facto del general Onganía (1966-1970) forma parte del ciclo de quiebres de la democracia durante el período 1930- 1976 en Argentina.

arrogan el derecho de ser los jueces y los policías de los pueblos materialmente menos ricos.

La crítica geopolítica, porotra parte, se manifiesta en un paralelismo entre la desigualdad/igualdaden el plano social, tópico tradicionalen el discurso eclesiástico, y la desigualdad/igualdad geopolítica, desde el punto de vista del Tercer Mundo:

> Lo que es verdadero para los individuos lo es para las naciones. (…) El sistema económico en vigor actualmente permite a las naciones ricas seguir enriqueciéndose aunque incluso ayuden un poco a las naciones pobres, que proporcionalmente se empobrecen.

El comunicado "Compromiso de Navidad" del MSTM que analizaremos resulta particularmente interesante porque, a diferencia de otros destinados a consolidar la organización interna o a resumirlos resultados de los encuentros entre los sacerdotes de las diferentes diócesis, se dirige tanto a los miembros de la Iglesia como a los cristianosen general. Enefecto, esleído por los sacerdotes adherentes ante sus congregaciones en el espacio de cadatemplo, envísperas de Navidad. De estamanera, a través de la asignación de significados aentidades y procesos, crearealidades de naturaleza textual con el potencial de movilizar y activar a suaudiencia. Los sujetos interpeladosasumen una posición discursiva determinada. Las articulaciones producidas poreste discurso constituyentere posicionan a los fieles en relación la Iglesia, con el "imperialismo del dinero", con la región, etc. Se observa, así, de quémanera la imagen del MSTM se recorta en relación con el sujeto al que, por un lado, exhorta a pasar a la acción, y por el otro, al que los sacerdotes quieren integrarse: el pueblo cristiano políticamente movilizado.

La primera parte del comunicado de Navidades principalmente descriptiva. El movimiento denuncia las desigualdades entre ricos y pobres. Distintostemas – el hambre, el analfabetismo, las enfermedadesendémicas, el problema habitacional, el armamentismo, la distribución de tierras, la desocupación- son abordados a través de la mismaes quematización argumentativa: una minoría de poderosossomete a una multitud de explotadosen un contexto – designado alternativamente como "estructura social capitalista", "sistema social basadoen el privilegio", "sociedad estructura da sobre bases falsas"- que enfrenta al "imperialismo internacional del dinero" con los "países subdesarrollados".

Así, la desigualdad entre sujetosricos y pobres, entre poderosos y débiles, se proyecta delámbito individual al de las naciones. Las asimetrías denunciadasen el análisis del sistema internacional evocan las teorías de la dependencia que describen al mundo a partir de la polarización entre países desarrollados, exportadores de manufacturas y acreedores de la deuda externa; y países subdesarrollados, exportadores de materiasprimas, dependientes de las economías de los paísescentrales y deudores. Esdesplazada, de esta forma, la división capitalismo-socialismo por la división centro- periferia, esta última identificada como "Tercer Mundo".

La mirada geopolítica del MSTM se completa con la articulación de las denunciassiempreentres dimensiones espaciales concéntricas: lo global, lo regional y lo nacional. Asícomo el movimiento argentino legitima sus reflexiones y sus actos a partir de los principiose nuncia dosen el Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo, las problemáticas analizadas son concebidasentérminos que exceden las fronteras de nuestropaís y se proyectanhacia Latino américa y el mundo:

En el mundo, en nuestro continente y en nuestra propia patria, estos abusos han llegado al colmo y sus consecuencias se han convertido en tragedia colectiva.

El hambre, que destruye cada año cuarenta millones de vidas humanas en el mundo, en Latinoamérica y también en nuestra patria es, casi siempre, efecto del egoísmo de una minoría

Encuanto a la nuevavisión pastoral sobre las transformaciones sociales en curso, desdesu constitución, el MSTM se propone comprometerse políticamente con al pueblo organizado y movilizado, sin dejar de lado su condición clerical. En este sentido, el comunicado de Navidad se hace eco de la impronta ideológica popular retomando expresiones que remiten directamente al marxismo y que producen un efecto inmediato de inteligibilidad por parte del sujeto político con el que se identifican los sacerdotes. Por ejemplo, aparecen expresiones como "estructura social capitalista", "propiedad privada de los medios de producción", "capitalismo nacional", "imperialismo", "grandes monopolios extranjeros", etc. En este marco, el cliché "hombre nuevo" característico del discurso pastoral, se resignifica en relación con la concepción de "hombre nuevo" del Che Guevara, asesinado en Bolivia un año antes:

TODOS ESTOS MALES QUE DENUNCIAMOS son la consecuencia lógica de una sociedad estructurada sobre bases falsas. Ellos constituyen un impedimento para que surja el "hombre nuevo" al que los cristianos debemos aspirar.

Espiritualmente, por otra parte, el movimiento asume la formación de las conciencias de los cristianos y de los hombres de buena voluntad a los que interpela a través de reflexiones públicas (homilías y comunicados) y gestos, como la convocatoria a ayunar en la víspera de Navidad:

> Este gesto (el ayuno) aunque humilde en sí mismo, quiere expresar, además, un llamado a los obispos de nuestra patria, a nuestros hermanos sacerdotes, a los cristianos en general y a todos los hombres de buena voluntad. Creemos que la "hora de la acción" supone también la "hora de las definiciones". Nadie que reflexione con sinceridad la Palabra de Dios y haya conocido las declaraciones de los Obispos en Medellín puede dejar de escuchar el "clamor de los pobres" que exigen justicia y enrolarse en las filas de los que luchan por su causa.

La exhortación a actuar, como se observa en el fragmento anterior, es contundente. No solo se trata de escuchar la voz de los pobres silenciada por el imperialismo y por la propia Iglesia durante tanto tiempo, sino de "enrolarse en las filas de los que luchan por su causa". El "Compromiso de Navidad" enuncia con claridad la adhesión al proceso revolucionario, de cambio radical y urgente de las estructuras del sistema capitalista y del imperialismo económico, político y cultural, pero lo subordina al cambio interior espiritual, esdecir, a que "todos los hombres puedan aspirar a la plenitud en Cristo, querida por el Creador". Así, el proceso de liberación del hombre es concebido en un doble sentido – político/social y espiritual - y la figura de Cristo legitima el camino revolucionario elegido[3]:

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[3] El tópico de la conversión social y espiritual del hombre ya aparece en el Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo:

> Desde el punto de vista doctrinal, la Iglesia sabe que el Evangelio exige la primera y radical revolución: la conversión, la transformación total del pecado en la gracia, del egoísmo en amor, del orgullo en servicio humilde. Y esta conversión no es solamente interior y espiritual, sino que se dirige a todo el hombre, corpóreo y social al mismo tiempo que espiritual y personal. Tiene un aspecto comunitario lleno de consecuencias para la sociedad entera, no sólo para la vida terrenal, sino sobre todo para la vida eterna en Cristo, quien, desde las alturas, atrae hacia El a toda la humanidad. Tal es a los ojos del cristianismo el desarrollo integral del hombre. De esta manera, el Evangelio ha sido siempre, visible o invisiblemente, por

Creemos ingenuo pensar que ese "hombre nuevo" surgirá sólo por el hecho de un cambio de las estructuras sociales, políticas y económicas. Sostenemos, sin embargo, que un cambio radical en esas estructuras es una bendición previa fundamental para que todos los hombres puedan aspirar a la plenitud en Cristo, querida por el Creador.

Como hemos visto, el MSTM se caracteriza por suturar, discursivamente y mediante las acciones concretas que lleva adelante o promueve, las esferas política y religiosa. Se configura, así, un imaginario revolucionario cristiano. Los modos de decir de la homilía, género de predicación propio de la celebración litúrgica que "parte de una lectura establecida y produce un texto cuya función es tanto interpretarla como actualizarla, es decir, mostrar cómo el texto bíblico nos habla a nosotros en nuestro aquí y ahora" (Arnoux, 2004) permiten vincular las fuentes bíblicas con el campo político. El comunicado de Navidad, por ejemplo, combina elementos e intercala conceptos vigentes propios del campo de la teoría socialista ("bienes de la cultura, de la alimentación, de la vivienda", "minoría", "mayoría") con conceptos propios de la doctrina cristiana ("egoísmo personal o colectivo", "privilegiados", "desamparo del Señor recién nacido"):

No se trata del mero recuerdo de un hecho pasado; la historia se repite: Cristo nace hoy en miles de hombres. Como sucedió en Belén hace veinte siglos, también hoy es rechazado violentamente por una sociedad pensada y construida para beneficiar a una minoría de privilegiados. Son todos aquellos que con su egoísmo personal o colectivo impiden que la mayoría tenga acceso a los bienes de la cultura, de la alimentación, de la vivienda… A esos bienes que "Dios ha creado para el uso de todos los hombres" y que una minoría, los ricos, se los han apropiado injustamente. Para responder al llamado de nuestros Obispos reunidos en Medellín y ante millones de hermano nuestros, cuyo dolor renueva hoy para nosotros el desamparo del Señor recién nacido.

Las discursividades que se entrecruzan funcionan, entonces, como

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la Iglesia o fuera de ellas, el más poderoso fermento de las mutaciones profundas de la humanidad desde hace veinte siglos.

generadoras de nuevos sentidos que acompañan y promueven la puesta en acción política del pueblo argentino explotado. El balance de situación planteadoen el comunicado justifica la conclusión, que convoca tanto a sacerdotes como a fielesensu condición de cristianos, de que ha llegado el tiempo de la acción[4]:

> Sus palabras (las de los Obispos latinoamericanos) golpean nuestra conciencia de cristianos: "esta se ha tornado ya, con dramática urgencia, la hora de la acción…"

Con la convicción de que la liberación será llevada adelante por los pueblos pobres que guían y son guiados por los sacerdotes comprometidos; el "Compromiso de Navidad" finaliza poniendo en texto un desplazamiento espacial de gran contenido simbólico: salir del templo para insertarse cada vez más en la sociedad:

> Nos retiramos del templo expresando comunitariamente nuestro arrepentimiento como miembros de una sociedad que está habitualmente en pecado.

En conclusión, los cruces entre el discurso religioso y el político son centrales en la construcción de la nueva identidad política – el pueblo cristiano políticamente movilizado- en un momento histórico, fines de la década del 60, en el que en Argentina y en la región el activismo político se radicaliza y comienzan a surgir grupos guerrilleros con objetivos revolucionarios. El discurso del Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo -y el de otros grupos clericales, como los 18 Obispos del Tercer Mundo- se inscribe en dos tradiciones, la cristiana y la revolucionaria, que se funden con la meta de conseguir la liberación de los pueblos pobres sometidos del Tercer Mundo.

El "Compromiso de Navidad", uno de los primeros comunicados del MSTM, a través de una mirada geopolítica que posiciona al movimiento en el Tercer Mundo, lugar simbólico cristiano, anticapitalista

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[4]El Manifiesto de los 18 Obispos del tercer mundo también concluye con una interpelación directa que incluye tanto al clerocomo a los laicoscristianos del Tercer Mundo:

> De esta manera dirigimos a todos esta frase del Evangelio que algunos de entre nosotros dirigieron el año pasado a su pueblo con esta misma inquietud y animados por esta misma esperanza de todos los pueblos del Tercer Mundo: "Nosotros os exhortamos a permanecer firmes e intrépidos, como fermento evangélico en el mundo del trabajo, confiados en la palabra de Cristo: "Poneos de pie y levantad la cabeza, pues vuestra liberación está próxima". (Luc. 21-28)".

y antiimperialista, interpela polifónicamente a los sujetos que se reconocen en este entramado de discursividades. Por otra parte, tópicos del marxismo y del cristianismo son combinados y resignificados a partir de la orientación argumentativa cuyo objetivo es la interiorización de nuevos valores y el llamado a la acción. Finalmente, la actualización y puesta en relación de motivos bíblicos con situaciones coyunturales y estructurales del Tercer Mundo, a la vez que genera nuevos sentidos y reposiciona a los sujetos interpelados, legitima la acción política del movimiento y del pueblo cristiano.

La construcción de una nueva subjetividad política, tanto clerical como laica, en torno a una comunidad de valores y al llamamiento a movilizarse, surge - como hemos visto - de una síntesis englobadora de las dimensiones religiosa y política que legitiman la nueva doctrina y autorizan la participación delos sacerdotes junto al pueblo en situaciones de conflictividad social.

~ CONICET/University of Buenos Aires ~

The Chinese Dream as deliberative slogan for rejuvenation

Klaus Kotzé

The Chinese Dream (Dream) is a deliberative concept towards national rejuvenation. As the latest slogan of the Chinese Communist Party (Party), the Dream is the popularising activation concept that seeks to persuade the Chinese public to ascribe to the course and goals set out by the Party. Rejuvenation, the expanded strategic concept wherein development resides, is a restored state of great power, a return to perceived legitimate ascendency. In order to achieve this goal the populace, as central strategic means, are encouraged to personally adopt the national Dream and thereby align to the Party guidance of path and end. The Dream while sold as personal is finally a persuasive Party concept to assure stability and progress under its continued leadership.

Development, towards reviving national ascendance, has been the central concept of strategic thought of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As it fed Mao's Socialist utopianism, it has also subsequently driven forward the infrastructural, industrial boom. Development has diffused into all aspects and channels of state and civil function. China's firm conviction is that its development is not akin to developing countries, it is instead restorative. During its time of relative weakness it maintained the view of self as status quo power; its weaknesses seen as temporary aberration of its greatness. It is this previous and even mythified projection, as global superpower, that it is aspiring to revive. This foundation to develop is finally to overcome. Its rejuvenation is both the achievement of teleological communist end state, as well as regaining the power compiled over its 2000 year central tributary system. This system was disseminated through internal structural dilapidation as well as infiltration and conquest by imperialist forces. This *century of humiliation* (1840-1949) serves as basis for China's modern identity. Rejuvenation goes even further back, dating to at least the 8th century B.C., from the poem "Flowing Spring", which deals with regaining greatness and prosperity[1]. The poem later became part of the bedrock of Confucian thinking when

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[1] Ryan Mitchell, "Clearing up some misconceptions about Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream", *Huffington Post*, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-mitchell/clearing-up-some-misconce_b_8012152.html

compiled into the *Shijing* or Classic of Poetry by Confucius.

Restoring pride and power has come to form a central part of the Chinese civilisational state's historical psyche. Following the fall of the dynastic China, "the past century", according to then General Secretary Jiang Zemin, "has witnessed the Chinese people undergoing three historic changes on the road of advancement and the birth of San Yat-sen, Mao-Zedong and Deng Xioaping", with Sun Yat-sen being "the first man who raised the slogan of 'rejuvenating China'"[2]. Sun's opposition to the incapacitated autocratic Qing Dynasty led to the 1911 revolution opening up towards re-constructing the civilisational edifice. The slow rate of progress spurred Mao's vindication to structurally destroy all systems of the past order. To Mao history was a drag on modernisation and development, all the moulds of the old had to be cleared out in order for new story to be written. When master strategist Deng Xioaping entered core leadership in 1978 he made modernising development (*fazhan*), through his reform and open up policies, central. Diametrically opposed the insular precedent in Chinese history, he instructed all Chinese to learn and take from international best practice. Deng developed China's fundamental strategy for the future, his *Three Step Plan*. Herein it was projected that systematic, incremental development would over time culminate to modernisation of the level of developed countries; thereby achieving rejuvenation, by middle of the 21st century. In 2002, five years after Deng's death, the Party constitution was changed to project forward toward Deng's goals. This inculcation is of great significance as the constitution forms the fundamental text of principles and precedents of Party (and by implication state) governance. In 2002 development was re-invigorated, beyond procedural encouragement, towards systematically planning and ensuring the achievement of set goals at the auspicious time of the Party and then State's centenary respectively.

The relevant modification from the constitution reads: "Development is our Party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country… The strategic objectives of economic and social development at the new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the well-off standard of living initially attained, bring China into a well-off society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the Party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the

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[2] Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics' Into the 21st Century", *BJ Review*, 2011. http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/25/content_363499.htm

level of moderately developed countries and realize modernisation in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China"[3].

This definitive point in time brings targets a distinct future orientation, requiring the necessary policy tools for respective achievement. Adoption of the two centenaries offers grand markers in time. As with surmounting its subjugation, the Party has chosen to invoke grandeur through the centennial moment, to significantly trounce humiliation and replace it with success and strength. The displacement of the memory of one centennial with another is a strategic and influential endeavour. The temporal specification projects a scenario in which Party members and by extension the entire populace is united in striving towards a future state of affairs. Fixing rejuvenation onto the scalar of time impresses meaning, direction and specification.

Rejuvenation itself is equated here through comparison to developed societies, suggesting a developed condition to be China's natural state before dilapidation. The compounding of great scale and distant time affords proposed rejuvenation great psychological power. It persuades towards the building of the future state, based upon selected evidence and modelled on idealist projection. The destruction of great many edifices through various wars and phases of revolution has left in place selected grand projections and imaginations of crafted grandeur and even greater space to fill. Though much is idealistic and imposed, Chinese rejuvenation is centrally bound in a timeframe of specific dates.

The amendment to the constitution puts to task the leadership structure to actualise the strategies necessary towards achieving the prescribed objectives. What followed 2002, under the new leadership of Hu Jintao, was a concerted effort to shift the strategic means from concentrated government operations towards the populace. Hu recognised the unsustainability of the continued state led growth, under his leadership the Party moved to expand the socio-economic capacity of a broader cross-section of the Chinese populace. His ideology of *Scientific Outlook on Development* sought to re-balance the increasing socio-economic imbalances caused by unchecked economic growth, achieving the aspired 'moderately prosperous society' through increased social welfare and the Party doctrine of scientific socialism.

The 11th official 5 Year Programme (2006-2010), the policy backbone of China, for the first time shifted from being a central plan, focused on quotas and central funding, to adopt a social orientation, where

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[3] Chinese Communist Party, Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2002. http://fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/const.html

the citizen is the central development component. This Programme indicated a shift from quantitative, material targets towards qualitative objectives aimed at sustainable development and social harmony, targeting the key concepts within *Scientific Outlook on Development,* where the people are the basis and development that is comprehensive[4]. Xi has actively followed; his comprehensive reform, rivalling the magnitude of Deng's, is set to totally change the face of China. As premise it transcends the state's investment driven development through manufacturing of the previous 35 years. This economic miracle, which ensured great social progress, is considered to have run its course, and is unsustainable. Under the 13th Five Year Programme (2016-2020) continued reform and development takes shape under the major new strategies inspiring a people-centred programme of mass entrepreneurship and innovation[5]. Xi's government has put into place various mechanisms to advance self confidence in innovative internal production; the *China Road* domestic scheme promotes future determination through Chinese concepts and means and the *Made in China 2025* plan seeks to advance development through innovatively constructing high-tech manufacturing excellence. Through regulation and opportunities of state support individuals are capacitated to drive their own success.

The creation of a knowledge and service economy is the strategic shift, opening to a new era which is not only people-centered, but people-driven, through entrepreneurship and expanded consumer behaviours. This focus on innovation corresponds to contemporary global best practice, where new technologies have empowered entrepreneurs to greatly advance their own and by implication their countries' development projects. China's rejection of inclusion into liberal internationalism requires it to create the necessary social environment, the guided social construction, where citizens will take up the opportunities presented to them and steer their own development. The China Dream is the persuasive tool to induce and empower the people to be the means of this reform. The Dream invokes a spirit of populism; it is sold to the people, inspiring them to adopt self-actualisation towards the defined national rejuvenation as their own prospective goal.

Intimately linked to China's paramount leader Xi Jinping, the Dream follows previous ideo-political constructs; guiding political tools

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[4] Robert Ash, Robin Porter and Time Summers, *China, the EU and China's Twelfth Five Year Programme*, London: Europe China Research and Advice Network, 2012

[5] Zhang Jianfeng, "Xi expounds on guideline for 13th Five-Year Plan", *CCTV English*, 2015. http://english.cntv.cn/2015/11/03/ARTI1446559744633822.shtml

impressing meaning and direction. Xi's adoption of the Dream, as compact and memorable slogan follows what has become normalised practice. Mao who expounded various abstract and metaphorical phrases, such as 'let a 100 flowers bloom' was followed by Deng who characteristically stuck to the Party line, but employed new means to shape his pragmatic agenda. His dictum of 'reform and opening up' became synonymous with China since the late 1970's, eventually being captured into the national constitution. Jiang's 'three represents' joined state success to the necessary rule of the Party and ensuring the Party stays true to its developmental underpinnings. The practice of Constitutional amendment to including the outgoing leader's slogan continued with Jiang's 'three represents', but has not subsequently been fulfilled. Hu's 'harmonious society', which focused on the role of the individual in the return to Confucian and filial values, has been prompted to be included constitutionally, but has not been acted upon my Xi. Instead of according Constitutional expansion, Xi's intent to actualise that which is already captured in it is a clear sign of his leadership. Furthermore, his Dream can be seen as closely related to 'harmonious society'; bypassing Hu's slogan would further embolden his own.

The Dream as, richly multivalent rhetorical construct, is however unique in its foundation of democratic engagement. It transcends the authoritative and disconnected catchphrases of leaders past. It does not further Party rule or ideology, nor does it require the endorsement of specific policy. It instead aims to free up the citizen, inspiring rather than informing.

Instead of substantiating any new policy the Dream is the promotional banner of the two fundamental policy objectives of the centenary of Party (2021) and State (2049), as initiated per Deng's *Three Step Plan* and inscribed in the Party Constitution. As a political slogan the Chinese Dream offers great deliberative appeal. Its formulation engages all Chinese to aspire (Dream). The Dream substantiates and manifests the desired end state, but is also its guiding action. Its conceptualisation is both private, for individual gain, as well as communal, for collective benefit. The Dream of the individual is always internal to the determined greater goals of the collective, though this is only reachable through the dedication of the people.

Xi's tenure as president has matured in parallel with the Dream. The inauguration of the concept (discussed below), followed Xi's ascendency to Party chief. In his subsequent Presidential acceptance speech to the Chinese legislature, the National People's Congress, Xi presented the Dream as the central mechanism to conserve the "the ideals

and vision that we share and hold dear"; it would "embody the ideals of the Chinese people today and represent our forefathers' glorious tradition of untiring pursuit for progress"[6]. The Dream is deftly presented as inalieanable from the Party, which presents itself as natural and authentic upholder of Chinese civilisation. It is only through the guidance of the Party that the developmental goals of China can be realised, the goals not only of present and future generations, but that of historical Chinese civilisation as a whole; "to realize the Chinese Dream, we must take our own path, which is the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics"…"this path is deeply rooted in history and broadly based on China's present realities"[7].

Xi's personal association to the Dream merges present power to his future legacy. Xi *Dada* (big Xi or uncle Xi) assumes the 'core', the official leadership position as Deng and Mao also did. This increased power, in comparison to recent leaders, signals China's heightened power and thereby drives forward adoption and belief of citizen empowerment of all Chinese nationals. He represents the veritable embodiment of authority, his office affording him the capacity to assume historical responsibility. It is from this acme of civilisational duty that his personal conviction, his personal dream, becomes the Dream of the people.

Subsequent to launch, the Dream has become XI's personal dictum; he has raised it on numerous occasions, distilling it into minds of the people. The empowerment of this single leader exemplifies the Party's focus of endorsing and capacitating responsible individuals. Xi's achievement to the top of Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy sees him constructively using his ethos to inspire Chinese citizens to strive to their goals, as he did. During the Cultural Revolution Xi's family was banished to a backwater village, due to his politically influential father's falling out with the Party. Here Xi junior lived a modest life; his rise from humble beginnings to the ultimate leadership has made him a relatable and inspiring figure.

The symbol of the China Dream has become a ubiquitous site throughout China. With Xi as its symbolic figure, school textbooks inform and inspire children to Dream; university students are encouraged to include it in their research proposals, while scholars are tasked with expanding and deepening the Dream into the social fabric. Furthermore, it regularly appears in various newspapers, promotional banners, books and

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[6] Xi Jingping, "Address to the First Session of the 12th National People's Congress", *The Governance of China*, 2014
[7] Ibid

on television, encouraging and engaging the people reiteratively[8]. The 2015 White Paper on Defense indicates how the concept has penetrated into broader state policy, steering the direction of the administration. The Paper articulates the concept lucidly as the "Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"[9].

While uniting Chinese citizens the concept has also been taken to the international audience. Expanding upon Hu's active counterbalance of negative perception around China's development, the supposed *China Threat*, Xi has sought to internationalise the Dream. His first address to the United Nations centred on attaining the required political climate to ensure China's continued peaceful development. He stressed that China's foreign policy is one of expanding international relations, through non-interventionism and a win-win approach. China's achievement of its goals would rely on amiable relations with all nations, he alleged that "we cannot realize the Chinese dream without a peaceful international environment, a stable international order and the understanding support and help from the rest of the world…the dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of other peoples of the world"[10]. Linking the success of others to their own, Xi would leverage international endorsement for China's development on the basis of quid pro quo, "the realization of the Chinese dream will bring more opportunities to other countries and contribute to global peace and development". Xi's use of the Dream as an abstract, yet tangible foreign relations tool extends China's posturing and development goals into the international arena. The Dream is presented as a natural component of Chinese diplomacy, as mutually beneficial to international partners and consistent with the Chinese historical programme.

The Chinese Dream was strategically launched by Xi, at the opening of The Road to Rejuvenation exhibition at the National Museum in Beijing, in late 2012, shortly following the inception of the new generation of Party leaders. By flanking himself with the Politburo Standing Committee, effectively the Chinese executive, Xi assigned the event even greater significance. The connotation of the event was not lost

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[8] The Economist, "Chasing the Chinese Dream", *The Economist,* 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his

[9] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy*, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm

[10] Xi Jingping, "Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future Mankind", *General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly*, 28 September 2015. http://qz.com/512886/read-the-full-text-of-xi-jinpings-first-un-address/

on Xi, who embraced this opportune event to launch his articulation of the party's road map, the vision statement of his reign and that of the Party's future. Choosing this setting Xi birthed this new slogan at a place that centres on the temporal progression from oppressed and exploited past, through revived present, towards revival.

Xi's speech at the launch of the exhibition presents a rhetorical moment for both inducing meaning and direction. This new, free to the public, exhibition, describes judicially the century of humiliation and the reign of the People's Republic. This display is purposefully divided across two floors separated by resting room and staircase; the first exhibiting the state's subjugation, demise and fight towards liberation, the latter being the rule and progress under the Party, with minimal mention of its grave failings. After a cavernous first room filled with abstract Chinese iconography the exhibition propounds a story of the Chinese dragon rising from the ashes. The preface tells how China "after being reduced to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society since the Opium War of 1840, rose in resistance against humiliation and misery, and tried in every way possible to rejuvenate the nation"[11]. This rejuvenation is that of a people who "for generations and generations…have been pursuing a dream of strength and prosperity"[12]. With its strength and capacity subordinated, the drive towards development is invoked and refuelled. Its recent capacitation has emboldened "the long-cherished dream and aspiration of the Chinese people"[13]. The exhibition serves as a monumental legitimation of the Dream as concept and emblem of rejuvenation. Its intent is to commemoratively bring together and demarcate the imposed from the liberating past, in a permanent, therefore continuously present, way. In name the display fixes the ultimate surmount of defeat (Rejuvenation), to the revolutionary Chinese way (Road). From this convergence of times the displayed afterward passes the baton to the subsequent leadership and opens the door forward. It reads: "standing on this new historic point and facing the future, one cannot but feel the weight of the mission on our shoulders"[14].

The significance of venue and the direct relationship with time establishes Xi's speech and the Dream itself within the rhetoric of temporality. Following Aristotle's design, Xi's designated end point (in 2049) functions not as means, but as the terminus of deliberation to

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[11] Road to Rejuvenation Exhibition, Beijing, *Preface*, Personal Visit.
[12] Ibid
[13] Ibid
[14] Road to Rejuvenation Exhibition, Beijing, *Afterward*, Personal visit.

ascertain situational expediency. The Dream, rather than constructing the present reinvigorates a constructed past as the vision for the future.

Xi's speech at the exhibition's opening constitutes the founding of the future, through a statement of vision; the meeting of the moment and the projected. The presentation was portrayed in a concise, easy to remember, relatable way. By persuading the present generation to adopt the Dream, it is instilling a culture to take root that future generations will be raised into. This longitudinal projection transcends the moment and empowers the people, both present and future, to be means through which the future will be achieved. This nurturing of the established strategy of rejuvenation projects forwards the extension of the now. This extension is supported by Aristotle's contention that policies are grounded in the past; "in most respects the future will be like what the past has been" (111) and that "we judge of future events by divination from past events" (44)[15].

Xi commences his speech by marking the exhibition as a celebration of historic surmount. His use of the epideictic leads the audience forward from suffering; "We waged indomitable struggles and succeeded in becoming masters of our own destiny"[16]. Purporting that the Chinese people were robbed of their agency, it is suggested that only through development they have shaped their reconstruction. Persistence towards the projection of rejuvenation forms the central deliberative regime of the speech. The "170 years since the Opium War have created bright prospects for achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"[17], these accomplishments have been ensured through its singular strategic course. The Dream itself embodies the rejuvenation through the Party's path: "We have finally embarked on the right path to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation…This path is one for building socialism with Chinese characteristics"[18].

Xi's rhetoric of temporality shapes his argument. Though the Party's strategic course has incurred successes over "hardships…sufferings and sacrifices in modern times", ensuring that "we are now closer to this goal…than at any other time in history"[19], the greater task remains incomplete until final rejuvenation. This achievement is made inseparable from 2049; all successes are overshadowed by this particular date. The present therefore shapes the opportune moment to inspire this advance; "looking ahead at the future, all party members must

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[15] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*. Translated by Rhys Roberts, 2004.
[16] Xi Jinping, "Achieving Rejuvenation is the Dream of the Chinese People", in *The Governance of China*, 2014.
[17] Ibid
[18] Ibid
[19] Ibid

bear in mind we still have a long way to go and much hard work to do before we can turn our blueprint into reality"[20]. Invoking his considerable ethos he corresponds, in one swift sentence, the accomplishment of rejuvenation with the realisation of the Dream: "In my opinion, achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times"[21].

Xi's speech itself, as with the Dream, is a call to overcome. This call is to the whole nation: "everyone has an ideal, ambition and dream"[22]. This Dream embodies the hope of several generations of the Chinese people; it is described as inherent and ingrained in the social fibre. Its longitudinal projection furthermore transcends the persuasion of the present generation, seeking to rear a culture for future generations towards take up and final realisation. The mission to rejuvenation, as it existed before him, will proceed Xi's term. The overcoming transcends this generation, whose task is to distil it in the minds of the people. Emphasis however remains on incompletion, the need for continuous endeavour forward. This unremitting challenge "requires the dedicated efforts of the Chinese people one generation after another"[23].

After seeking to inspire a natural affiliation, Xi closes his founding speech by stamping the Dream with meaning. "I firmly believe that the goal of bringing about a moderately prosperous society in all respects can be achieved by 2021, when the CPC celebrates its centenary; the goal of building China into a

modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious can be achieved by 2049, when the PRC marks its centenary; and the dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will then be realized"[24]

Whereas the Party's path has remained the same, the goalposts have steadily shifted over the years as various development goals have been fulfilled ahead their aspired dates. With this latest articulation of strategy Xi looks beyond the targets of Five Year Programmes or even his own tenure, focusing into the future (2049), this ultimate goal requiring the maintenance of Party incumbency in order to dictate strategy.

Through their alignment the centennial goals of the Party Constitution and the Dream are made inseparable, theirs paths are one and the same. This course is written by the Party, who, through the

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[20] Ibid
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid

persuasive Dream seeks to firmly maintain the order and power in itself. Though the Dream inspires adoption, it is ultimately a strategic concept towards ensuring stability and trust in the leadership of the Party; the Dream is a concept inalienable from the Party.

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Soft power and forecasting influence

François-Bernard Huyghe

Soft power? A systematic way to make the other party desire what you want? Who wouldn't be attracted by such a program? It suggests to please to appease, to be seductive to shape minds, to make other people share your values, to get international support...or the contrary.

The success of the concept, in economics and geopolitics is symptomatic: the idea that you could gain power - that is, increase the probability that the other will behave in the way you wish - softly, without using violence or giving counterparts has everything to please the occidental elites. The soft power and the hope of expanding it to the rest of the world are appealing to those who have already tasted success from their political and economic position and to those who are not too dissatisfied with the world as it is. When a single word serves so many purposes, it legitimately raises ideological suspicions.

Such ambiguities have a relationship with the evolution of the meaning of the word itself but also with its semantic "ecology" (the other words it replaces or generates) and with its "mediology"; that is, the material ways and means of such a "spiritual" process.[1]

Softly but surely

The term appears for the first time in a book by an academic who served under the Carter and Clinton administrations, Joseph S. Nye in his1990, '*Bound to Lead*'. Since then, hard, soft, or, a little bit later, smart power have become common categories in geopolitic debates, immediately understandable by power circles from Brazil to Japan.

Naturally, the idea of elaborating positive strategies to attract: exporting a model; presenting a favorable image of one's country; or negative ones to demonize an opponent; to create havoc among its allies or supporters; to it ..are anything but new. Such strategies combine to a certain degree persuasive ideologies, lifestyles, economical models,

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[1] Courmont B., *Chine, la grande séduction. Essai sur le soft power chinois*, A. Colin, 2009 - Fraser M., *Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire*, New York: Thomas Dunne 2005 - Huyghe F.B., *Maîtres du faire croire. De la propagande à l'influence*. Vuibert 2008 - Leonard, M. "Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society." Foreign Policy Center, 2005.

cultural prestige, instrumentalising international organizations, networks, spreading a language, some intellectual, technical, juridical norms and religious proselytism.

Without even referring to the Sun Zi, Alexander the Great who succeeded in spreading the Greek aesthetic models and made himself recognized as the descendant of local gods, could be considered as a genius of soft power even after 24 centuries. But when J.S. Nye used the neologism it was at the right time, in the right country for a receptive audience. The program of shaping the world, mostly by seduction and attractiveness is typical of this period.

This syncretic notion refers to:

- a presumption of attractiveness based on the idea that any normal well informed individual should wish to share the American way of life; the American dream; US liberty; system and icons; components of prestige. The 2 H & 2 M principle is quite eloquent: Hollywood for the mainstream culture which pleases everybody; Harvard for the best science; Microsoft for technology and McDonalds for American consumption worldwide. Who could resist? To sum it up: what others seek to imitate.

A policy showing ostensible good will, being friendly to other countries, an open foreign policy and a strategy of benevolence sufficient not to spoil the advantage of the leading nation.

In Nye's view, soft power appears as a sort of immaterial capital to be measured in terms of exemplarity and conformity. Exemplarity of national performances, prosperity and desirability of a social and political system. Conformity of the products and symbols which will satisfy everybody's tastes and express a mainstream culture: it ranges from Spiderman to Faulkner; or from the hamburger to computers. Exerting soft power appears as a way of saving energy: fewer means of constraint or less force would be necessary to continue prevailing; but also less money; fewer subventions and counterparts. During the first period, in the 90's, soft power appeared as a way to replace hard power or, at least, make it less necessary. Such capital should prosper if not spoiled by unnecessarily provocative or authoritarian attitudes. Should the private companies, like CNN who became the channel which provided images to the whole world, do the job instead of the state, it would be even more beneficial. "Let it be" sounds like a very simple program.

Some of the means sound like a modern reformulation of classical influence diplomacy: keep networks in allied countries; give one's nation best image (branding). Some appear as modernized ways of propagating ideology on the basis of principles dating back to the beginning of the 20th century: helping friendly political parties abroad; propagating messages

intended for "winning their hearts and minds"; and showing the excellence of one's national model. Nye also recommends positive attitudes: favoring the Nation's attractiveness; subtly making the international agenda and keeping a clear consciousness of one's assets; values, culture and political practices. He also advocates a positive governmental strategy which could favor communication with other peoples and a multilateral attitude to encourage allies' cooperation.

To Professor Nye's credit, besides giving a sexy name to ancient methods: he clearly felt that civil society would play a bigger role; and that increasing soft power is not something which can be monitored from the White House; it requires a synergy with NGO's, creators, media and cultural industries. Nye also has the merit of pointing out the relationship between communication technologies and beliefs and the link between culture and ideology: the faculty which demonstrates the ability of the US to export mass culture as well as an elite or vanguard culture.

Is soft power a descriptive or prescriptive notion? On one side, it appears as an idealization of American predominance considered as a universal principle. On the other, it sounds like a program which could be duplicated by others, from the perspective of a global governance. Or to put it baldly: a mixture of narcissism and wishful thinking reflecting a temporary historic trend or a new key to History?

A partial answer was given by the success of the method in the rest of the world, various countries experimenting with variations of the initial concept:

Winning new markets by promoting norms of economic and cultural behaviors: weighting on the decisions of international organizations; having allies; animating political or religious networks abroad; using professional services to promote one's national branding; using NGO's and moral or cultural authorities; not to mention financing international TV information channels or online publications; there is probably no Nation who did not try. Israël has initiated "*hasbarah*" campaigns (meaning more or less "explanation") through networks of sympathizers and campaigns online. Even Switzerland tried to correct its image by "Nation Branding". Not to mention Qatar (soccer and al Jazeera) and Bahrain (contemporary art and architecture). It could be aesthetic styles and genres (like Japanese manga) or any element that creates familiarity with a country's way of thinking or its accomplishments, is more efficient than explicit messages like "we are leading a just war" or "our economic policy is a triumph" throughofficialchannels.

China, which explicitly uses the term "soft power", is obviously leading a great seduction operation which includes: Confucius institutes;

national cinematographic industry; information TV in several languages; great events like the Olympic Games of 2008 (with it's incredible opening ceremony directed by Zhan Yimou); constant references to Silk Roads and several others stereotype that speaks to the western imagination. Is Russia's soft power negligible? The over-reaction of the American military to the supposed incredible efficiency of Putin's "disinformation" through media like Russia Today (a sort of reversed *Voice of America*, half a century later); social networks and populist circles in Europe, proves the contrary.

And France? Without going back to Louis XIV, whose prestige policy was renowned, there is a tradition of cultural diplomacy: the "Alliance Française" was created in 1883 with the explicit purpose of making international elites more francophile; the same idea which inspired cultural attachés and international media like Radio France Internationale, TV5 or France 24 etc. It goes with the idea of being the universal Nation of human rights but also with various public institutions and governmental agencies devoted to cinema, books, etc. Recently the notions of economic diplomacy and sport diplomacy confirmed this very French trend to research influence.

Obviously there is an international competition of seduction as if every Nation wanted to convince every foreign citizen.

Soft power and hard times

What happens when hard times come back and when the "universal Nation" realizes that it has enemies again and not only competitors? After 9/11, the US discovered the problem of "why do they hate us?: is that one had to integrate the notion that CNN and GAFA were not the best tools to lessen a metaphysical hostility formulated by Al Qaeda; a defensive jihad to retaliate for the secular persecution led by Crusaders and Jews. Bad news: ISIS has since shifted toward an "offensive" jihad.

Besides invading Afghanistan, one of the most significant US reactions was a semantic one: soft power became "smart"; public diplomacy became fashionable again.

For instance, J.S. Nye produced the mantra of smart power, immediately endorsed by his admirer Hillary Clinton.[2] The idea is to use (smartly) a combination of military strategies, political, economic, but also cultural ones and communication. Some might object that this phraseology

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[2] Nye J.S. *Cyberpower*, Harvard University, 2011 - Nye, J. S., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics New York*: Public Affairs, 2004.

refers to a millennial practice: sometimes you negotiate; sometimes you fight; sometimes you seduce; Pericles and many others knew that policy, which could be labelled as realism. But the idea was successful. Formerly everything that was soft was more or less labelled as a Democrat program, while Republicans tended to favor "public diplomacy". Created during the Cold War, celebrated by Ronald Reagan as a great contribution to the fall of the Wall, public diplomacy clearly has a more aggressive tone, it's a weapon of the ideological fight between the two blocks. This strange diplomacy, which addresses peoples abroad and not by diplomatic channels, was a reply to the popularity of Marxism among "brother" parties and intelligentsia. During several decades, the American taxpayer's money served to finance broadcasting in various foreign languages and exporting cultural content to counter the world view dominating on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This was mostly the work of the US Information Agency. Human networks were not neglected, many future leaders or opinion-leaders were invited to visit the USA and discover its "real image".

Of course during the 90's the disappearance of the main enemy (and the prospect of liquidating the last archaic autocrats who were obstructing a New World Order) were not in favour of offensive public diplomacy. Nor was the fact that CNN and mainstream cultural industries were doing the job of making the US popular more effectively than would a bureaucratic State agency. The same was said about the Internet (at that time the Web 1.0 version) which should unify the world through the virtues of technology.

After 9/11 some old reflexes were automatically reactivated: the second reaction of G.W. Bush, just after bombing Afghanistan, was to recreate an Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Public Diplomacy was back again. It was supposed to have disappeared with the USSR, as its defunct function: encouraging dissent; leading a subversive action against an ideological system; and making the occidental system more attractive to better informed Russians, Serbs, Germans, etc. The methods which were used against a centralized and territorial bureaucracy had to be reshaped to fight a borderless ideology of a clandestine voluntary network.

But public diplomacy was appealing again to the West. Germany got its politische *Öffentlichkeitsarbeit*, the Netherlands their *publieksdiplomatie* and Nato had soon its own Public Diplomacy Division. The slogan of "new public diplomacy" appeared to designate a less centralized policy which would also be channeled by NGO and social networks, but the general idea remained the same.

Nowadays, it's more difficult to distinguish a soft power policy (supposedly left wing) from a public diplomacy policy (presumed to be more conservative) as the flourishing concepts the leading circles love to produce like strategic influence, e-diplomacy, *psyops*, storytelling, don't contribute to clarification.

Public diplomacy which implies the deconstruction of an adverse ideology and soft power which evokes a more inclusive or seductive approach, appear as the two poles of a new current. Once abandoned, the innocent belief that everybody wants to be like us, if only connected to the Net, and once reconsidered the idea that hostility and ideological competition were obsolete, the distinction becomes less sensitive.

Three main trends seem to emerge. Syncretism: public diplomacy is more and more conceived as a way to end restoration of soft power which does not prevail so automatically. Privatization: while States and their armies rediscover the alchemy of influence, private actors like the Soro's Open Society or the Albert Einstein Foundation seek to exert a greater ideological influence, including by monitoring dissident national groups. Virtualization: the process tends to move from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0. While big companies tend to develop their influence online and rely so much on their community managers to protect them, no wonder that armies and governmental or non-governmental organizations tend to do the same.

Ways and means of influence

Beyond the old question of delivering the right "message" and channeling it to as many people as possible, unexpected problematics surged. Mc Luhan's mantra "Message is medium" has to be reinterpreted.[3]

Firstly, because occidental elites were prone to overestimate the intrinsic democratic power of the Internet. The so called Arab Spring made popular the hypothesis that social media allowing anyone to get informed, to express himself and to cooperate with his peers would automatically guarantee the victory of democrats versus the old fashioned autocrats who used to spread their propaganda from top to bottom. Experience showed that things changed when cyber dissidents had to go into a classical electoral process and that, due to their "learning curve", dictators or jihadists were not bad at using social media. Technologically modern tools

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[3] Observatoire géostratégique de l'information, "Diplomatie publique, soft power, influence d'État", Iris, Juillet 2011.

do not guarantee the predominance of politically correct content, nor does it filter archaic ideas.

The second factor is that technology besides opening the game of influence to new actors, also changes the rules of efficiency. It evolves from the logic of delivering an inherently persuasive rhetoric to the widest possible audience: to catching attention and trust; to make every target a potential cooperator.

On one side, conducting a national influence policy cannot be a short term activity: if it is deliberate, it has to rely on a coherent policy and a constant strategic scope. Influence does not come out of the blue, but it has to integrate historical memories and existing stereotypes of a people, it's character, it's food, it's representative great men, its customs and culture, it's political ambitions etc. But even taking into account those limits, influence policies can greatly vary in their forms and by their scopes. Obviously exacerbating the other blocks contradiction (promising the people behind the Wall a prosperity and a freedom they dreamed of), celebrating globalization as an irresistible and glorious sense of History, or trying to convince jihadists that they should abandon "violent extremism" in favor of "moderate Islam" are three different tasks.

They require specific messages and the last one - directed toward would-be jihadists, is anything but clear in its present form. Counter-propaganda generally hesitates between: revealing to the focused audience "truths"; what every newspaper or TV in the world repeats several times a day, if you go to Syria you will kill and die. The problem is that it is exactly what they want to do: accomplish hijrah; to live under the caliphate's law; jihad to avenge the persecution endured by the true monotheists; and martyrdom to win Paradise.

Reducing the attraction of jihad to a psychological or sociological problem may be due to an historic resentment based on bad interpretation: nothing that could be cured by a form of assistance and pedagogy; "demonstrating" one's benevolence -we don't hate Islam and it has nothing to do with authentic religion"; for the most audacious, naming the enemy-Salafi jihadist doctrine; instead of referring to mysterious entities like "violent extremism" or "radicalism".

We are not very efficient at formulating the right "counter" message: the one which would concurrence the promise of heaven; plus the prospect of conquering the world after a last eschatological battle; plus the opportunity to retaliate for any humiliation ever suffered by Moslems.

Worst, influence does not rely only on the good message and sufficient public funds. Getting the right media is also a necessity: it appears crucial once you realize that national mass media, even with the

support of international satellite TV did convince a good part of the planets minds. Therefore, the problem of controlling social media and prohibiting "their" message being accessible becomes a priority (a paradox, only five years after everyone celebrated the uncontrolled Google or Twitter revolutions in Arab countries). The chosen answer often combines censorship with more sophisticated methods, like Jigsaw from Google whose algorithms are supposed to monitor suspicious requests and to send those who could be searching for jihadist content, to good de-radicalization content. But the specificity of social media and online communities is a part of the problem: it creates semi-private spaces which are ideal for a group who wishes to reject the rest of the world and to confirm itself to its faith.

The limit of soft powers attractiveness is also the mental ecology of those who have already adopted a different code: for instance; advocating democracy to those who are already convinced that any form of man's law is an offense to Gods law; has a limited effect. Mediation is also a decisive factor: human beings are influenced by human beings and the Isis doctrine is spread by correspondents and members of the same community, not only the sudden contact of young minds with shocking images.

Social networks are the field of a new competition to catch attention (visitors, followers, "*likers*", new members, links, recommendations, quotations...), what one would call gaining e-influence. A game where the strong and the affluent are not necessarily the winners when it comes to attracting more than distributing. For instance the effective visibility of messages can be altered by the simple enthusiasm of militant communities or by simple cheating. Recently the existence of "Kremlin trolls" was revealed: employees are paid to intervene systematically on discussions online to express a view favorable to Russia or to literally sabotage the debate. But recently and on a very modest scale, the UE have also financed a brigade of "e-influencers". The process known as "astroturfing" which consists of creating false movements of opinion by creating false online supporters (in reality simple algorithms) understandably concerns hundreds of companies.

Message, Media, Mental world, Mediations: each step can be an obstacle. But the bigger "M" problem is "*meta*": meta-beliefs or meta-values, the principles that are beyond. And obviously, in the opposition with the jihadi fascination, our main handicap is our incapacity to understand choices which are commanded by such a different logic. After all, our soft power is revealing more of what we are and we are erroneous to think universally what the others are and how they might change.

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Death as an ideological stimulant:
Epitaphios and *logos hegemonikos* through Nicole Loraux's *The Invention of Athens*

Sergio Alloggio

For the bow (βιός), the name is life (βίος),
but its work is death (θάνατος).
Heraclitus

The function of the funeral orations within Athenian ideological struggle

The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of the
beloved be the same; so they seek for a nature that is
philosophic and lordly [*philosophoste kai hegemonikos*]
Plato, *Phaedrus* (252d6-e6)

In this paper, I will first discuss how funeral orations (*epitaphioi*) in Nicole Loraux's *The Invention of Athens*[1] are read as part of the Athenian ideological struggle against internal and external conflicts. Loraux's book is by far the most influential study of the Greek *epitaphios*. Further, I will focus on the rhetorical strategies that allow the funeral orations to transform death into an ideological tool to strengthen Athenian hegemony during its classical phase (fifth and fourth centuries BC). Lastly, drawing on Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Paul Sartre, I shall briefly examine some philosophical implications about death and its ideological function when collectively implemented in an *epitaphios*.

Funeral orations, a public institution created and implemented byAthens to celebrate her citizens died at war, are a highly elaborated "national" ceremony. Traditionally, *epitaphioi* are understood as part of epideictic rhetoric, in which both praising and blaming inform its *topoi* to foster and promote collective identification and shared unity – I am following here Aristotle's theory of *epideixis*. Only few *canonical* funeral orations from classical Athens survived: we are left with six *epitaphioi*

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[1] Nicole Loraux, *The Inventions of Athens. The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, (trans from French by Alan Sheridan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). The book was originally published in 1981.

either written or delivered by Thucydides, Gorgias, Lysias, Plato, Demosthenes and Hyperides, in a time span that goes from 464 to 322BC. As soon as Athens became a democracy at the end of the sixth century BC, the lyric lament (*threnos*) as a praxis was rejected and reformed into the *epitaphios logos*. The shift from aristocracy to democracy marked the foreclosing of an archaic, feminine and poetic relation to the dead which became incapable to add civic triumph to prescribed mourning. In short, there was a shift from families and tribes to soldiers and politicians.

Funeral orations were usually held once a year in classical Athens to commemorate and celebrate her war dead. But, first, the funeral oration did not come alone as several ritual practices accompanied it: a procession took place, followed to a public burial in a common grave located in the finest suburb, as well as official laments for the dead who were exposed for two days. Secondly, funeral orations as civic eulogies were also part of a much larger social landscape where war difficulties, political deliberation and geopolitical struggle informed their *rhetorical exigencies*, that is funeral orations' *kairos* with their underlying hegemonic motivations. This becomes clear when we list the most recurring *topoi* of the classical *epitaphios logos*: primacy of public values over the individual, idealisation of the city, military tradition, contrast between Athenians and non-Athenians, and heroization of the (noble) dead in battle. Moreover, funeral orations constantly implement these *topoi* through their five main rhetorical structures: introduction, praise, lament, consolation and conclusion.[2] What needs to stressed here is how the classical funeral orations are read by Loraux in her book as a powerful ideological tool in democratic Athens to achieve, mainly, two aims: to silence internal conflicts (*stasis*) and to counter-balance Spartan hegemony in the rest of Greece (*Hellas*). In this sense, the *epitaphios logos* is a two-fold *logos*, a political and military *logos* that attempts to work through collective mourning while at the same time exalting both Athenian *nomos* and hegemonic *paideia* of its citizen-soldiers: "out of this decisive confrontation between the city and death, the eulogy must emerge the victor, for the greater glory of the dead and of the city."[3] In short, through the praxis of the funeral orations, democratic Athens *reinvents* herself in a powerful discourse that celebrates its new major role during and after the Persian Wars – a time in which the city enjoyed economic growth as well as colonial power. It is as if a new ideological narrative needed to be

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[2]See for instance Paul Hunter, "'Waiting for an Aristotle': A Moment in the History of the Basic Writing Movement", in *College English* (vol 54, no 8, Dec 1992), 914-927; John E Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (New York: Arno, 1981).
[3]Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*: 50.

collectively organised and publicly replicated. In fact, this move could only be undertaken through a massive process of secularisation as the new democratic hegemony, its national ceremonies and human community had no space for mythical cults, their religious epic and aristocratic leaders.

So far, this is how rhetorical scholarship has traditionally discussed the *epitaphios logos*. But things are far more complex. In fact, Loraux patiently shows throughout *The Invention of Athens* how each funeral oration is, amid Athenian internal/external ideological struggle, modulated on conscious/unconscious acts of denial in which, for instance, slaves, women, metics, barbarians, the young, the elderly, the enemy or imperialism in Athens are constantly silenced to construct and promote a hegemonic paradigm (*logos hegemonikos*). More specifically, being a "politicomilitary practice of the city,"*epitaphioi* have a "triple destination": the dead (past), the living (present) and posterity (future).[4] The source of glory comes from dying in battle for Athens; the source of consolation comes from either protecting or making Athens greater; and the source of valour and courage comes from being an Athenian citizen who should be *always-already* faithful to his noble ancestors. The origin of political legitimacy comes only from one single model: the democratic city of Athens and her community of citizen-soldiers, the hoplites. It is here that Athenian hegemony gets its secularising power over Attica. Glorious autochthony, anonymous democratic equivalence and oratorical prose support each other to foster the Athenian *logos hegemonikos* and its PanHellenic vocation:

> The funeral oration is animated by (…) and organised around [these] themes (…):exaltation of the eternal memory of valour; contrast between perishable life and immortal courage; refusal to accept the possibility that Athenians could ever be defeated; increasing importance of the theme of ancestors, even if this theme was not always a traditional one; a representation of time in which myth is fulfilled in 'history'; last, and above all, the democratic desire for anonymity that excludes any special mention of the *strategoi*.[5]

The funeral orations celebrate a city that always acts on generosity (a recurring *topos*) when another Greek *polis* has been conquered. In fact, military exploits in an *epitaphios*, which is also a military speech, are the

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[4]*Ivi*, 14.
[5]*Ivi*, 55.

other side of "Athens' interventionist policy."[6] And this is where civic *arete* meets geopolitics in shaping the *topoi* of the Athenian exceptionality: even the enemies in funeral orations ought to recognise the valour of Athens in "international affairs". Athens is always portrayed as the potential saviour of a land, Attica, irremediably fractured by antagonistic relations, by *agon*. As such, Loraux is adamant when it comes to explain "the real function" of the funeral orations: internally, they help to foster social cohesion with their equalising tropes, *topoi* and tactics; externally, they rationalise the way in which Athens opportunistically acts on other *poleis* or, put differently, an epitaphios "was similar to a speech justifying the right of Athenians to hegemony."[7] As such, the relation between *epitaphioi* and Athenian domination is structural, even though the other/the enemy is never mentioned explicitly but always summoned *in absentia* in its role of foe, inferior, subordinate, spectator or colonist who has to constantly recognise Athens' superiority.

Of course, drawing on Freud, Loraux aptly describes this levelling of any independent alterity in terms of "imaginary satisfactions (…). The city invents perfect enemies and allies who are always content (…) as the purest expression of Athenian narcissism."[8] In fact, the relations of power between Sparta and Athens, or between Athens and other Greek cities, were obviously quite different from those implicitly portrayed in funeral orations. Nonetheless, I want to focus here on the rhetorical aspects of the funeral orations when they shape, model and channel hegemony. And, in this sense, when Loraux discusses Pericles' funeral oration–the one reported by Thucydides–she argues that *epitaphioi* have "the profound nature of the hegemonic oration, *a speech without reply*, intended to arouse in its listeners both submission and respect." Then, in the same page she fleshes out the two general strategies that inform the hegemonic oration: "the coexistence of justification and threat within the same speech (…) which is inherent in the very notion of hegemony–superiority exerted over equals."[9]

Through the *epitaphios logos*, (Athenian) democracy founds its symbolic self on a hegemonic imaginary that *always-already* excludes any symmetrical negotiation with the real. It is through an act of denial (*Verneinung*) which refuses to take into account both material conditions and relations of power within and outside the city that Athenian

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[6]*Ivi*, 69.
[7]*Ivi*, 79.
[8]*Ivi*, 83.
[9]*Ivi*, 90, for the last two quotes.

hegemony is performed by the orator before his fellow citizens. Geopolitical struggle, oratorical patriotism and collective narcissism shape the ideological foundation of a democratic city that has decided to hegemonise *Hellas* through its paradigmatic *logos*. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser, I understand ideology functioning on both the individual and the collective as replacing representations of exploitative material conditions with conscious/unconscious imaginary relations that deny, silence and make us forget class subjugation, power relations and economic inequality. In fact, Loraux also understands ideology in the same terms, and she focuses in her book on the imaginary (*imaginaire*) continuity the funeral orations made possible for almost two centuries in Athens. As such, it is not surprising that *The Invention of Athens* shows the philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis and the historian Georges Duby consistently operating in the thick footnote apparatus when, outside her disciplinary knowledge, Loraux needs to ground her claims on *la long durée* of the ideological formations: "the official oration is for us the irreplaceable vehicle of the Athenian imaginary of the city."[10]

But when the *logos hegemonikos* and its rhetorical imaginary does not function properly, the democratic citizen-soldiers of Athens resort to violent domination. This is how Thucydides, in one of his chronicles, reminds us the nexus between hegemony and violent repression of local *nomoi* operates within Athenian imperialism:

> *Athenians*: Since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. […] *Melians*: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be the masters? *Athenians*: You, by giving in, would save yourself from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you. […] It is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power. *Melians*: Is that your subjects' idea of fair play – that no distinction should be made between people who are quite unconnected with you and people who are mostly your own colonists or else rebels whom you have conquered? […] *Athenians*: You will see that there is nothing disgraceful in giving way to greatest city in *Hellas* when she is offering you such reasonable

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[10]*Ivi*, 329.

terms (…). This is the safe rule – to stand up to one's equal, to behave with deference towards one's superiors, and to treat one's inferiors with moderation.[11]

Logos hegemonikos facing *thanatos*: fine death and collective dialectics

In mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish–
that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable
circumstances (…) it can once more be brought to light.
Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*

In terms of rhetorical identification, the classical funeral orations achieve their aims using the dead in battle as a vessel to produce a general subjectivity that *always-already* encapsulates both the present and future generations of Athenians. The *topoi* employed to enable such identification are always arranged around *arete*, autochthony and *demokratia*. Abstraction, that is the main device that every orator uses, is grounded on a specific *topos* that connects each Athenian to the same geometrical space and ideal history: "fine death" (*belle mort*).

The funeral orations celebrate only those Athenians who died in battle and because of this, they are worthy of honor, glory and praise. In each *epitaphios*, the source of what made Athens great is the military valour of those citizen-soldiers who took *arete* to its most extreme terms, that is, they accepted to sacrifice their own lives for the city's benefit. The democratic city allows and praise aristocratic virtue (*arete*) only when it is performed for her own glory. In turn, the citizen who dies in battle becomes immortal as *thanatos* is transfigured into civic *exempla* to be celebrated publicly. "Fine death" becomes part of the civic values Athens annually celebrates through the *epitaphios logos*, during a time in which her citizens are constantly reminded that being an Athenian means to be ready to die for the city because what made Athens the center of *Hellas* is the same rational readiness to die of their own ancestors:

> a choice of consent against inclination, of the will of reason against the will of impulse–involving a whole conception of the actual share the subject assumes in his decision. The lesson is clear: at this crucial moment of the *krisis* in which the Athenian renounces life, it is the city that decides through him.[12]

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[11]Thucydides, *The Melian Dialogue*,
http://lygdamus.com/resources/New%20PDFS/Melian.pdf
[12]*Ivi*, 103.

It is this individual decision, to be always made before each battle, that adds greatness to *thanatos*, that makes death just or, more specifically, death a "fine death". A whole sense of community is infused in every citizen through the extreme ideal of self-commitment. Becoming part of the eternal glory of Athens, death is re-inscribed into the city's life, the real subject of any *epitaphios*. It is for this reason that the funeral orations focus only on past war exploits and do not ever mention events or biographical details of living citizens. The proper way of life ("fine life") finds in democratic Athens its culmination in the proper way of dying ("fine death") – and this can only take place through an act that merges autochthony, civic devotion and military bravery. It is as if the (transitory) private may only achieve its ultimate aim when becomes part of the (eternal) public. Thus, consolation in an *epitaphios* is centred on how grief and mourning must be worked through pride and glory as the only death that can be celebrated is "fine death."

Death, mourning and mortality adopt a new political meaning when they are being reinvented by the *logos hegemonikos* of the classical funeral oration: death becomes fine death, individual mourning turns into collective pride and mortality is just the first stage of a greater civic immortality. Death, individual mourning and mortality serve now the aims of a new paradigmatic order, a new ideological imperative: Athens' narcissistic domination over time and space. Therefore, death and its destructive drives (*thanatos*) are employed in the classical funeral orations as ideological stimulant by Athenian life and its hegemonic drives (*eroshegemonikos*).

What the funeral orations create through the "fine death" is a dialectical machinery that masters time, space and alterity to display Athens as the centre of a glorious *kosmos*. In its mastery over the real, Athens' narcissistic satisfaction transforms the city into a self-sufficient circularity in which each citizen (the oratorical 'we/us') finds his true expression only when he becomes part of a civic community (Athens) that justifies its hegemony by the glorious acts of its past citizens: history is just "the repetitive and exemplary enactment of a single *arete*."[13] We never know who is the real subject in a classical funeral oration, who the orator is really praising – the dead, the living or the city. The equivalence between the collective 'we/us' and 'the city'serves to hide and suppress internal political conflicts (*stasis*) through synecdochical immunization. In fact, this immunization is based on an anonymous, interchangeable model, that is the dead (citizen-soldiers) who are *always-already* understood as harmonious subjects serving the same values. Jean-Paul Sartre explains

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[13]*Ivi*, 134.

such dialectical move in clear terms:

> 'The terrible thing about Death,' said Malraux,' is that it transforms life into Destiny.' By this we must understand that death reduces the for-itself-for-others to the state of simple for-others. Today I alone am responsible for the being of the dead Pierre, in my freedom. Those dead who have not been able to be saved and transported to the boundaries of the concrete past of a survivor are not *past*; they along with their pasts are annihilated. […] There is a past only for a present which cannot exist without being its past–back there, behind itself; that is, only those beings have a past which are such that in their being, their past being is in question, those beings who *have to be* their past. […] Death reunites us with ourselves. Eternity has changed us into ourselves. At the moment of death we are; that is, we are defenceless before the judgments of others. They can decide *in truth* what we are (…). A last hour repentance is desperate effort to crack all this being which has slowly congealed and solidified *around us*, a final leap to dissociate ourselves from what we are. In vain. Death fixes this leap along with the rest; it does no more that to enter into combination with what preceded it, as one factor among others, as one particular determination which is understood only in terms of the totality. By death the for-itself is changed forever into an in-itself in that it has slipped entirely into the past.[14]

The funeral orations capitalise the dead and their defenceless in making "one particular determination" (citizens-soldier) the mark of (their) eternity, of the city's hegemonic temporality. It is for this reason that Loraux writes that "in an *epitaphios* there is no praise of the lives of the citizen; what is praised in them is always the *proairesis*, that is, ultimately, the fine death."[15] The ruling group decides to use the dead for their political aims, that is Athenian hegemony, and the orator persuades the audience creating one single spatio-temporal continuum. In this continuum made of citizen-soldiers who share the same imaginary, the orator's audience is form one ideological community with the dead, with those citizen-soldiers who made Athens glorious. Sartre explains how it is up to the living decide "*in truth*" how the dead will be remembered, and in the case of classical Athens, there is only one possible collective identity made available by the *logos hegemonikos* of the

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[14]Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (London: Routledge 1958): 112, 114 and 115.
[15]Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*: 105.

funeral orations. Again, Loraux: "so we can now understand the importance the eulogy had in the city: the dead had no other life than that of Athens. (…) *There is no life but that of the city.*"[16]

Moreover, everything has been made easier for the orator as the dead share the same (collective) proper name with the living, they are all Athenians. Discussing similar topics, Jean-François Lyotard analyses the commutative power of proper names:

> One escapes death by the only means known – the perpetuation of the proper name. This proper name must be proper not only to the interested party, but also to the collectivity (through patronym, eponym, or nationality), since the collective name is what assures the perenniality within itself of individual proper names. Such is the Athenian "fine death," the exchange of the finite for the infinite, of the *eschaton* for the *telos*: the *Die in order not to die*.[17]

But, Lyotard, within his *phrasistics*, tries to contain and stop the orator's dialectical machinery from creating the spatio-temporal continuum the Athenian *logos hegemonikos* needs in order to produce the same ideological community for both her dead and living. Once there is only one single ideological community, the personal decision (*proairesis*) to die for Athens can easily be grounded on the certainty of its civic iterability – the present self accepts to forever disappear into the future we. Those who are ready to die in battle know that their proper names will merge in the collective proper name (Athenians), the name for which they died. This is what Lyotard warns us against:

> A single proper name, whether singular or collective, designates an entity astride two heterogeneous situations. It is the property of proper names to receive such heterogeneities. But it is not legitimate, it is even illusory, in the Kantian sense of a transcendental illusion, to suppose a subject-substance that would be both a "subject of the uttering" (even though it is not the addressor in the prescriptive) and the permanence of a self (even though from one phrase to the next it leaps from one instance situation to another). Its proper name allows it to be pinpointed within a world of names, but not within a linking together of phrases coming from heterogeneous regimens and whose universes and the tensions exerted upon them are

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[16]*Ivi*, 105-106.
[17]Jean-François Lyotard, *TheDifferend*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1988):100.

incommensurable with each other. The we would be the vehicle of this transcendental illusion. Halfway between the rigid (constant) designator that the name is and the "current" designator that the singular pronoun is. It is not surprising that in the "currentness" or "actuality" of obligation, the we that reputedly unites obligee and legislator is threatened with being split.[18]

What Lyotard cannot accept is how the finite gets under the spell of the infinite in the *epitaphios logos*. In Lyotard's *phrasistics*, the finite must always be addressed as finite, the ethical as ethical, the cognitive phrase *qua* cognitive phrase and so on – this is his philosophical imperative which he constantly repeats throughout his work. But the other side of his philosophical imperative is a constant delegitimation of both politics and the political. This act of delegitimation in Lyotard rests on the assumption that the *logos hegemonikos* surreptitiously privileges actuality over potentiality when a phrase is linked to another. As we saw, the funeral orations' strategy is hegemonic and the *logos hegemonikos* deals with *thanatos*, the imaginary and ideology in order to extend the power of his community – precisely what Lyotard cannot allow within his ethics of phrases. But the *logos hegemonikos* knows no other imperative than making the (Athenian) community larger and stronger. And for this purpose, the funeral orations transcend and break, as Sartre made evident, any past rule, determination and value in order to produce new prescriptions, actualities and truths. Athenian hegemony uses oratorical persuasion to achieve its political aims and (fine) death is just another tool to defeat every possible internal and external enemy in her permanent state of (ideological) struggle.

~ *The Allan Gray Centre for Leadership Ethics, Rhodes University* ~

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[18]Lyotard, *TheDifferend*: 99.

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THE ELEPHANT AND THE OBELISK

A Special Series and Imprint of the African Yearbook of Rhetoric

In the fantastical imagination Europe has of Africa and the South, the elephant and the obelisk enjoy a lasting presence. During the Renaissance the Elephant meant the energy of memory in heeding lessons of the past while the needle of the Obelisk emblematised the probing penetration of reason – the Elephant carrying an Obelisk was an evocation of lost or recondite virtues European high culture, at the very time of Portuguese descobrimentos, attributed to Africa or to the South, which in turn provoked a sharper investigation into Europe's place in a newly expanded humanity.

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