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Rhetoric of Statecraft in Africa

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RHETORIC OF STATECRAFT IN AFRICA



Edited by Philippe-Joseph Salazar.

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In response to the “Wind of change”: The statecraft of Kwame Nkrumah

Eric Opoku Mensah

Introduction

During the first ever tour of Commonwealth countries in Africa, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made his first stopover in Ghana on 5 January 1960.

On 9 January, Macmillan, at a State Dinner organised on his behalf in Accra, made a momentous speech. A speech that is regarded as a rehearsal of a key British foreign policy statement Macmillan was to make a month later in Cape Town. This speech would later be referred to as the “Wind of change” speech.

The South African version of Macmillan’s speech was delivered on 3 February in Parliament in Cape Town. The Cape Town version completed Macmillan’s key rhetorical invention which expressed a new paradigm of Britain’s foreign policy in Africa. In the end, the speech resonated differently in the two countries where it was heard, for obvious reasons. That is, there were significant differences between the political contexts in Accra and Cape Town, rendering the speech rhetorically significant in terms of its effects and responses, both immediately and later.

By the year 1960 when the British Prime Minister visited Ghana, it had been independent for three years and was already a proud member of the British Commonwealth. Ghana was on the verge of attaining a republican status. As short a time as it was after independence, Nkrumah was in full gear marshalling resources to help eliminate colonialism in other African territories. It was within this positive political atmosphere that Macmillan’s address was received. Macmillan’s address in Accra was, in essence, in line with Ghana’s new political direction which had been set in motion by Kwame Nkrumah. In his Accra speech, Macmillan carefully stated that:

The wind of change is blowing right through Africa. This rapid emergence of the countries of Africa gives the continent a new importance in the world.¹

¹ This excerpt cited by Hunt is found in Colin Baker, “Macmillan’s ‘Wind of change’ tour, 1960”, in *South African Historical Journal* 38, 1 (1998): 181. The full version of Macmillan’s speech delivered in Accra could not be located by the author. However, various sources agree that the version of the speech which was delivered in Accra was slightly changed to be delivered in Cape Town.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Verwoerd of the Union of South Africa was strengthening his hand in apartheid and was on the verge of pulling the country out of the Commonwealth. Macmillan was scheduled to give three speeches in South Africa.² The climax of the three was to be his address to the South African Parliament in Cape Town. In this speech, Macmillan hit on the most key message at the heart of his African tour. He noted:

The wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. And we must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.³

Macmillan's 'bombshell' speech in Cape Town Parliament seemed rhetorically inflicting on the sensibilities of the South African government. It called for a deep reflection and overhaul of the Union government's racial policies. The setting — the South African Parliament — could not have been more appropriate for such a key deliberative invention.

Though both Prime Ministers Nkrumah and Verwoerd responded immediately to Macmillan's surprise in both Accra and Cape Town as custom demanded of them, such immediate responses can seldom ever articulate clearly the most desired responses to the exigencies that would have been created by a key speech such as Macmillan's. By the end of the Cape Town address, Nkrumah had conceived clearly the full spectrum of Macmillan's message in Africa. While Accra's address had seemed to be a rehearsal, the Cape Town delivery became the real performance which completed Macmillan's message to Africa. Be that as it may, Nkrumah gave two key responses. The first speech was delivered at the dinner in Accra; the other, eight months later in New York. My concern in this essay is to examine Nkrumah's craft in responding to Macmillan's central message. By this, I will explain the speech's articulation of a single policy direction between Ghana and Britain on one hand and their points of departure on the other hand. I will examine Macmillan's central metaphor and its application of indirect reference as a form of diplomatic rhetoric. Lastly, I will analyse how Nkrumah employed Macmillan's central message as an appropriate medium for his own argumentation at the United Nations General Assembly, and by so doing served as a means of strengthening Macmillan's message.

² *Ibid.* 178.

³ See the full speech in Harold Macmillan "The wind of change", in Philippe-Joseph Salazar, ed., *African Yearbook of Rhetoric* 2, 3 (2011): 28-38.

The metaphor: 'Wind of change'

To appreciate Nkrumah's craft as a response to Macmillan's momentous African policy statement, we need to understand the 'wind of change' metaphor as a rhetorical commonplace of Macmillan's address. We need to locate its locus in the two speeches (Accra and Cape Town) in order to assess the quintessential nature of Nkrumah's rhetorical choices in his response, both immediately and later. Colin Baker in his work explicates the conception, preparation and execution of Macmillan's 1960 African tour. The tour was to cover strategic British interests bordering on Commonwealth and colonial related issues.⁴ With the changing face of Britain's policy in Africa, Macmillan wanted to use the tour to state this new policy direction. Amongst the numerous considerations for the order of the visit, Ghana had been chosen for the grand opening of the tour with the Union of South Africa as the climax and as Baker notes, the speech that the Prime Minister was to deliver in Cape Town was "intended to be the most important of the four major speeches of the tour".⁵ The decision to use the phrase 'the wind of change' in Accra, according to David Hunt, was to "assure the Ghanaians that Britain was well aware that numerous changes were taking place in Africa and that far from opposing them, they intended to foster and 'direct them towards useful purposes.'"⁶ This choice of phrase seemed rhetorically appropriate for Macmillan's address in that, Ghana had not only become the first Sub-Saharan African territory to claim its independence, but by 1960, it had become the avant garde of nationalism in Africa.

It is important to know that initially, the focal phrase "the wind of change" had been destined to appear only in the Accra speech. However, it got the chance for a second life by being repeated in the Cape Town Parliamentary speech when Hunt decided to include the phrase. Hunt, who contributed in the drafting of Macmillan's address, remarks that, "as nobody had paid any attention to the phrase in Accra I thought I might as well use it again and ... put it in with only minor variations".⁷ By this destined repetition of the phrase in Cape Town, it became the rhetorical hinge upon which the locus of Macmillan's African policy statement came to rest. In other words, it had summed up the totality of the British Prime Minister's message, bringing forth an exigency which called for a crucial response.

It is within this rhetorical context of the significance of the 'the wind of change' that Nkrumah invented a climactic response seven months later at

⁴ Macmillan's tour was to cover Ghana, the Union of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Kenya and Nigeria. Kenya was later cancelled from the list. See Baker, *South African Historical Journal*, 174.

⁵ *Ibid.* 177.

⁶ *Ibid.* 177.

⁷ *Ibid.* 181. Hunt's remark is captured by Baker.

the United Nations (UN) on 23 September 1960. But examining what constituted Nkrumah's response at the UN, we can first take a glance at his immediate response to the 'wind of change' as it was first heard in Accra.

We are together but uncommitted

In Accra, Kwame Nkrumah did not hesitate to lay emphasis on Ghana's foreign policy to Macmillan, a foreign policy which he had carefully explicated in his Independence Declaration Speech three year earlier to the world.⁸ The visit of the British Prime Minister gave a platform for Nkrumah's reiteration of Ghana's unequivocal anti-colonial foreign policy in Africa. In view of this, Britain's changing policy in Africa was surprising news to Nkrumah as this brought about somehow strangely, a convergence of African foreign policies between Britain and Ghana, a former colonial master and its former colony. As Nkrumah gave his initial response to Macmillan's address, he clearly gave recognition to this convergence in Accra. The speeches of the two Prime Ministers are considered in Nkrumah's words, as the creation of a new foreign policy pact which places both Ghana and Britain on the same plane. It was welcome news to Nkrumah to see Britain, upon reflection, to have decided to stand up and pursue a new moral cause in Africa. Nkrumah noted:

We appreciate that the United Kingdom, which is heavily involved in Africa, is faced with very weighty problems in the discharge of her obligations in this Continent. We sincerely hope that it is recognised that Ghana which has been in the vanguard of the freedom movement is also faced with equally great problems. I am glad to observe that the United Kingdom has been among the first to show favourable reactions to the call of independence. We, hope sincerely, therefore, that it will be possible, within the Commonwealth context, to formulate policies and programmes within which our two countries can work together.⁹

Nkrumah's well-crafted remark cast Macmillan's speech within a certain rhetorical light: that Britain had come to see the light and now it (Britain) does not share the same moral principles with other Western Powers that still possess colonies in Africa. Nkrumah, holding a moral code, had endorsed Britain as an epitome of what a World power should be. In an epidiotic

⁸ See E. Powell, *Private Secretary (female)/Gold Coast* (London: Hurst, 1984): 107-109.

⁹ K. Nkrumah, "The African hurricane", in Samuel Obeng, ed., *Selected speeches of Kwame Nkrumah Vol. 1* (Accra: Afram Pub. Ltd, 1997): 14.

stance, he was "promoting values that are shared in the community".¹⁰ He therefore hailed the Commonwealth as a representation of the new moral forces which, Britain, a former colonial power represented. In praising Britain, this is what Nkrumah said about the Commonwealth:

Your visit thus dramatically reflects the growth and constant change of that remarkable institution, composed as it is of old countries and new countries, but all of them dedicated to the same principles of human dignity, and political freedom. Naturally we in Ghana think of the Commonwealth in its present form.¹¹

The epideictic tone of Nkrumah's speech placed Macmillan's new foreign policy direction in Africa on a high moral plane — a moral plane which has the potential to influence other world powers to take a second look at their own positions in Africa. Macmillan's speech had given Nkrumah the opportunity to establish and declare Britain as a firm and trusted partner for the sole cause of ensuring freedom in every part of Africa. The 'wind of change', both in terms of Macmillan's speech and nationalism in Africa, had begun in Ghana and Nkrumah was poised to blow it, with Britain's rhetorical backing, throughout Africa.

But beyond the common call between Nkrumah and Macmillan to pursue freedom in Africa, Nkrumah did not hide Ghana's neutral position in the Cold War. Thus as long as Macmillan was engaged in the decolonisation of Africa, Nkrumah presented himself in his response as an ally but would not extend the same level of cooperation in support of Western ideological position in relation to the Cold War. Through Nkrumah's craft, he had been able to establish a cooperative positive on one hand with Britain and on the other hand, a non-committal approach to ideological inclination in relation to the Cold War. Through his statecraft he had demonstrated carefully the boundaries of his commitment and neutrality to two key international situations (anti-colonialism and the cold war) whose pursuit, albeit with different approaches, is crucial to ensuring peaceful co-existence within the comity of nations. He noted in the peroration that:

Again, we have declared our stand in international relations: Ours is one of positive non-alignment... Our neutral position is thus intended to enable us not only to steer a middle course but positively to influence and sponsor whichever cause will ensure the peace of

¹⁰ See Perelman's discussion of the speaker and epideictic speech in C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts - Tyteca, *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation*, J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver, trans. (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1969): 52.

¹¹ Nkrumah, *Selected speeches*, 15.

the word.¹²

The non-aligned position which had been taken by Nkrumah was of grave concern to Macmillan. A concern which he would express deeply in his address in Cape Town. Part of Macmillan's speech in Cape Town subtly betrays Britain's policy of decolonising Africa — that newly independent African territories may be drawn into the ideological net of the West.¹³ Nkrumah was ready for Western collaborators in decolonising Africa but not to use their assistance as bait for Africans to embrace Western ideological trapping. Nkrumah's position of Ghana's neutrality expresses the firmness of his ability to craft a neutral ideological position in order to steer a middle course. Thus, with Nkrumah's speech in Accra, he had concluded, what I refer to as, his introductory remarks to his rhetorical response to Macmillan's initial address in Accra. Upon listening to the complete address of Macmillan in Cape Town, Nkrumah waited for the right opportunity to craft a suitable response to Macmillan's 'wind of change'. That opportune moment was to come seven months later at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Sailing on the wind of change

In his UN address, Nkrumah crafted a speech which explicated the 'wind of change' metaphor. By September, this important phrase of Macmillan's had gained maturity in view of key political developments in Africa. There was political strife in the Congo involving the Belgians, France was at war in Algeria, and racial political unrest was rising in the Union of South Africa, especially after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960. In addition to these incidents, as many as fourteen African countries had gained their independence between the time of Macmillan's speech in Cape Town and Nkrumah's address at the UN. This was within a record time of eight months. Africa, in view of these fascinating political developments, was continuously making news in the international media. In fact, to the international community, Macmillan's 'wind of change' could not have been more meaningful. The phrase, to a large extent, had gained political currency and was evocative of what was happening within the remaining colonies in Africa. In the introductory statement of his address, Nkrumah indirectly evoked the words of Macmillan by stating:

One cardinal fact of our time is the momentous impact of Africa's awakening upon the modern world. The flowing tide of African

¹² *Ibid.* 15-16.

¹³ See Macmillan's speech, "Wind of Change", 32.

nationalism sweeps everything before it and constitutes a challenge to the colonial powers to make a just restitution for the years of injustice and crime committed against our continent.¹⁴

The statement produces a complex symbolic liaison¹⁵ by ensuring a confluence of Macmillan's position and that of Pan-Africanism as advocated by Padmore. While our current focus is not on Pan-Africanism, pointing to it is relevant as it primarily underpins Nkrumah's statecraft. In this liaison, "Africa's awakening" expresses Nkrumah's known position whilst the phrase "flowing tide of African nationalism" brings Macmillan's words forcefully into the centre of the current argument of Nkrumah's speech. Nkrumah's remarks reiterated the new sense of cooperation between Africa and Britain, a key Western Power. The evocation of Macmillan's words is to give legitimacy to the moral arguments which Nkrumah pursued as he discussed the African situation. Nkrumah crafted his UN address in a manner in order to remain close to Macmillan's message whilst at the same time keeping Macmillan's authority at the centre of his arguments. With such a strategy, the argument which Nkrumah presents will be perceived not only through its logical appeal but also through the attractiveness of Macmillan's position which had already been received favourably by the international community.

While Nkrumah wanted to tailor his UN invention closely to Macmillan's, he also wanted to invoke it albeit with a new level of effect. Though Macmillan had in his address presented a picture of the growing nationalism of Africans with stupendous invention, Nkrumah deliberately crafted his speech to slap on Macmillan's invention another layer of effect. He remarked:

The wind blowing in Africa is not an ordinary wind, it is a raging hurricane and it is impossible for... any other colonial power, to prevent the raging hurricane of African nationalism from blowing through the oppressed and down-trodden colonies.¹⁶

Instead of a 'wind of change', Nkrumah rather presented his audience with "a raging hurricane" as a means of deepening Macmillan's metaphor in order to create a new intensity of rhetorical effect on the audience. As Perelman notes "even the words of other people, when repeated by a speaker, have changed their meaning, for in the process of repetition he always adopts toward them a position that is in some way new, even if only in the degree of importance

¹⁴ Nkrumah, *Selected speeches*, 156.

¹⁵ I apply Barbara Warnick's application of the term in her "Argument schemes and the construction of social reality: John F. Kennedy's address to the Houston Ministerial Association", in *Communication Quarterly* 44, 2 (1996): 190.

¹⁶ Nkrumah, *Selected speeches*, 167.

he attaches to them”.¹⁷ In effect, Nkrumah had transformed the meaning of Macmillan’s phrase. In other words, he had showed himself influential in the unfolding drama of nationalism in Africa as an insider and also an architect of the movement. The stark evidence of over a dozen independent countries within a period of eight months only lends credence to Nkrumah’s justification in intensifying Macmillan’s metaphor as “a raging hurricane”. Through a careful crafting of his delivery, Nkrumah did not only ride on the sail of the ‘wind of change’ but appropriated it unto himself whilst at the same time giving it a new meaning in New York.

The rhetorical examples

Another key part of Nkrumah’s statecraft at the UN was his ability to construct clearly rhetorical examples in his address as a means of delineating Macmillan’s ‘wind of change.’ By so doing, Nkrumah provides, dare I say it, the real evidence to the Macmillan invention. In his preparation to visit the Union of South Africa, Macmillan was a bit sceptical of Dr Verwoerd’s willingness to welcome him in South Africa.¹⁸ When the green light was finally given for the visit, Macmillan’s next worry was how to craft the most appropriate message to be delivered in the South African Parliament. This necessitated high level consultations involving Sir John Maud, the British High Commissioner in Pretoria. Maud had the knack of giving well received speeches in the Union and therefore had to travel to London to meet Macmillan to discuss every detail of the speech.¹⁹

With this background to the Cape Town speech, it is logical to infer that Macmillan, though with a clear goal for his speech, was very concerned with the reception and impact of his address by the South African government. He needed to be tactful in his approach and tread cautiously to avoid hitting on any wrong emotional chords in view of the seemingly sensitive nature of the subject of his address. Though the successful impact of the Cape Town speech could be clearly assessed on the basis of hindsight, Macmillan, though forceful in his words, resorted mainly to indirect references in stating his argument about the political situation within the Union of South Africa. Raising the delicate subject of the rising political consciousness of black people in the Union of South Africa, Macmillan intoned, “as I’ve travelled around the Union I have found everywhere, as I expected, a deep preoccupation with what is happening in the rest of the African continent”.²⁰ He carefully did not state in direct terms to the Union Government what

¹⁷ Perelman and Olbrechts -Tyteca, “The new rhetoric”, 317.

¹⁸ Baker, 174.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 177.

²⁰ Macmillan, “Wind of change”, 31.

seemed to be the obvious. In another instance, he attempted to route his argument of injustice of the apartheid system through Christian morality. He noted:

Our judgment of right and wrong and of justice is rooted in the same soil as yours — in Christianity and in the rule of law as the basis of a free society. This experience of our own explains why it has been our aim in the countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the material standards of life, but to create a society that respects the rights of individuals, a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature — and that must in our view include the opportunity of an increasing share in political power and responsibility.²¹

It is obvious that at the end of the delivery Macmillan had clearly stated his point but in as much as he yearned to make an impact, he needed to broach the subject of his address with the utmost caution, which he did, in order not to drive the Union Government out of the Commonwealth. Within the given circumstances in Cape Town, Macmillan had pushed his central message to the utmost limits with his rhetorical diplomatic arsenal. But in New York, Nkrumah's invention, to a large extent, provided some flesh to Macmillan's address, stripped his (Nkrumah) verbal attacks of all mild diplomatic strings and unleashed its venom into the heart of the apartheid government. After discussing the precarious situation of the Congo, Nkrumah noted:

I now turn to the Union of South African itself. The Union Government, against all moral considerations and against every concept of human dignity, self-respect and decency has established a policy of racial discrimination and persecution which in its essential inhumanity surpassed even the brutality of the Nazis against the Jews.²²

Whilst Macmillan had pointed in a mild seemingly diplomatic tone the problematic situation of apartheid, Nkrumah had rather gone in with an attack. He had continued to talk about the Sharpeville massacre which he had described vividly as "the gruesome massacre of defenceless men, women and children".²³ As I have already indicated, Macmillan diplomatically chose not to state the obvious as regards nationalist movements all over Africa, but Nkrumah in his speech furnished the audience with vivid images of

²¹ *Ibid.* 33.

²² Nkrumah, *Selected speeches*, 165.

²³ *Ibid.* 166.

what was happening in Africa. Aside from the description of the South African situation, the speech cited the Congo being “machine-gunned from the air by Belgian Military Aircraft and shell[ing] from the sea”²⁴ and in talking about war in Algeria, he notes how “for more than six years the sands of Algeria have been stained red with blood.”²⁵ In effect, Nkrumah’s address sought to expand Macmillan’s arguments and provided the actual rhetorical examples which due to Macmillan’s deliberate rhetorical choice of indirect reference were conspicuously omitted in the Cape Town address. Nkrumah had responded to Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ by giving it the needed rhetorical force in New York.

As Nkrumah provided vivid images to buttress his argumentation, it is interesting to note that Nkrumah turned a blind eye on what was happening in yet-to-be independent colonies still under the control of the British Empire. There were still over a dozen Britain’s colonies in Africa at the time.²⁶ Whilst this seeming silence of the speech is baffling, its justification could perhaps emerge from the goodwill which Macmillan had already expressed clearly as Britain had begun a new moral journey in Africa. Since there was congruity in Britain and Ghana’s foreign policies in Africa, Nkrumah’s silence on British colonial holdings in Africa was a deliberate rhetorical choice. It was a demonstration of Nkrumah’s trust in a new ally working to decolonize Africa. So as Nkrumah had promised friendship to Britain in Accra, he did indeed demonstrate it in New York, using his speech not only as a medium to provide solid evidence to Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ but in a subtle means providing solid defence for the former Colonial Master.

Conclusion

The success of Nkrumah’s delivery at the UN arguably is premised on the impact of Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’. On the heels of Macmillan’s speech, Nkrumah had crafted an address the impact of which will become an extension of Macmillan’s speeches in Africa. Through Nkrumah’s response, he had joined Britain as an ally for the singular purpose of fighting colonialism in Africa whilst at the same time he argued for a neutral position in the conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs of the world.

Through a careful rhetorical craft, Nkrumah had used vivid images as

²⁴ *Ibid.* 159.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 167.

²⁶ Apart from Nigeria which was on the verge of becoming independent on 1 October 1960, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Gambia, Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, Mauritius, the Kingdom of Swaziland, Seychelles and Zimbabwe still remained as British Colonies. It was going to be twenty years until the last British Colony (Zimbabwe) could finally become independent.

~ In response to the "Wind of change"~

rhetorical sources of evidence to the central issue, which out of careful diplomacy, Macmillan referred to indirectly. All in all, Nkrumah's response to the 'Wind of change' was a timely rhetorical intervention. By speaking on the heels of the 'wind of change', Nkrumah successfully added a layer of rhetorical proof to Macmillan's invention, therefore forcing the major powers to critically deliberate on colonialism in Africa.

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Ideographs of suppression: Jomo Kenyatta's Independence Day speech

Eddah M. Mutua and Alberto González

Introduction

In his ethnographic account of the Kikuyu people of central Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta devotes a chapter to their system of governance. He describes the differing decision-making bodies as inclusive and supremely democratic. In his account, government is perfectly attuned to the needs of the people only to be disrupted by British colonialism. "Today", he wrote, "an African, no matter what his station in life, is like a horse that moves only in the direction that the rider pulls the rein".¹ Twenty-five years after the publication of *Facing Mount Kenya*, Kenyatta would become Kenya's prime minister in 1963 and the first elected president in 1964.

Born Kamau wa Moigoi in the mid-1890s, Kenyatta was baptised and took the name Johnstone Kamau in his early twenties. He likely adopted the name Jomo Kenyatta upon the publication of *Facing Mount Kenya* in 1938.² Kenyatta attended colleges and universities in London and Moscow and lived abroad from 1931 to 1946. Associated with land reform and the Mau Mau Rebellion that opposed the increasing numbers of white settlements in Kenya, Kenyatta was imprisoned from 1952 to 1959.

By the late 1950s, Britain concluded that an independent Kenya better served its long-term defense interests than a colony wracked by open rebellion and inter-ethnic conflict.³ By supporting Kenyatta, the British would be assured of a moderate government (as opposed to what it considered to be a more radical and Soviet-friendly Odinga government) that would facilitate Western interests while remaining credible to internal nationalistic movements.

It is in this context that Kenyatta delivered his Independence Day speech on 12 December 1963 at Uhuru Park in Nairobi. The speech marked the end of colonial rule but it did not mark the end of colonial influence. The speech declared independence but it did not create a discursive space for the autonomy and self-determination of Kenya's populace. In this article, we examine two key ideographic terms that are significant within the speech:

¹ Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya, the tribal life of the Kikuyu* (London: Heineman, 1979): 213.

² Barbara Celarent, "Facing Mount Kenya by Jomo Kenyatta", *American Journal of Sociology* 116 (2010): 722.

³ David Percox, *Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial defence, colonial security and decolonization* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004): 8.

harambee and *uhuru*. We argue that Kenyatta redirects these terms from their traditional meaning that emphasises communal cooperation and anchors them to the enterprise of state-building. In the speech, the call for “unity” constructs an uncritical conformity that prolongs the subservience under colonialism.

Part 1. provides a description of the speech delivered by Kenyatta. Part 2. provides an ideographic critique of the speech and the conclusion advances several implications for ideographs and statecraft in Africa. Kenya’s history is incredibly complex, as have been its political relationships to other African nations and beyond. We do not write as historians but as critics interested in providing an account of this key rhetorical moment within the larger postcolonial project of understanding “the problematics and contexts of de/colonization”.⁴

1. Colonialism and the spirit of *harambee*

Kenyatta’s Independence Day speech meets the traditional expectations of epideictic speech. In delivering praise or blame at a public ceremony, the speaker is afforded an opportunity to identify and prescribe “right behavior”.⁵ Epideictic rhetoric affirms common values in honoring an accomplishment that in this case was the formation of an independent government for the Republic of Kenya. The context is a celebration of Kenya’s independence from British colonial rule. Kenyatta uses numerous strategies — exemplifications, description and narration — to reach a diverse audience comprised of Kenyans, colonial administrators, world leaders, and citizens of newly independent and colonised African nations at the time. The speech displays the conciliatory and inclusive themes that are intended to mark the early years of Kenyatta’s presidency. He used the speech to preview his agenda: national unity and pride, broad and non-aligned international relations, improving the economy, and maintaining civil order.

The first part of the speech (spoken in English) is congratulatory and pays homage to all who struggled for independence. Kenyatta declares that: “All the people of Kenya should remember and pay tribute to those people of all races, tribes and colours who — over the years — have made their contribution to Kenya’s rich heritage”. Kenyatta notes that Britain has “watched over” the destiny of Kenya and announces that the “close ties” between the two nations “are not severed today”. Kenyatta envisions a nation guided by high ideals of unity, tolerance and “social wellbeing”. Kenyatta asks

⁴ Raka Shome and Radha S. Hegde, “Postcolonial approaches to communication: Charting the terrain, engaging the intersections”, *Communication Theory* (2002): 249-270 [250].

⁵ James A. Herrick, *The history and theory of rhetoric: An introduction* (Boston: Pearson, 2009): 86.

for a dedication to nation building that goes beyond the attainment of freedom; he sets as national goals the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease inspired by the spirit of “*harambee*” (pulling together).

The second part of the speech addresses the audience in Kiswahili to reinforce a common identity, a shared worldview and “a people’s definition of themselves”.⁶ Echoing the “new nationalism” of the period, the common experience of colonisation is noted and Kenyatta urges African unity.⁷

Kenyatta invites Kenyans to remember the struggle against the colonial powers and to unite for a better future for Kenyans and all exploited Africans. He reminds his listeners that colonisation was “not of our choice” but that “our friendship with the Queen... will now be of greater value”. Even as Kenyans must fight to loosen the “foreign rule” in other African nations, there should be “faithfulness” at home.

To engage Kenyans in the process of nation building, Kenyatta elaborates the meaning of freedom as hard work (*uhuru na kazi*), self-reliance, self-determination and respect for the law. These themes of freedom, prosperity, and nation building are expressed by use of metaphors, proverbs, biblical references, collective memory of Kenyan history, and significant Swahili terms (such as *uhuru* and *harambee*) to command collective action. As in the English portion, Kenyatta concludes his speech by urging Kenyans to commit to *harambee* in order to solidify the historical significance of the day and sustain the future of a newly independent nation.

The development of themes and use of ideographs, the invocation of different languages and variation in tone reveals Kenyatta as a skilled rhetor in his own way. His ability to remain in dialogue on diverse interests, the needs of a new nation, cordial relations with the former coloniser, unity and support for colonised African nations sets the context for our interpretation of this key rhetorical moment.

2. Ideographs and constituting a national ethos

Each culture or society develops a language that reflects a certain sensibility. From that language certain terms emerge that “contain a unique ideological commitment” and are “one-term sums of an orientation”.⁸ For McGee, ideographs help to identify the discursive means for political control. Leaders who link policy and decisions to ideographs access the predispositions of audiences and thereby increase understanding and acceptance. Delgado

⁶ Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African language* (Oxford: James Curry Ltd., 1986): 4.

⁷ C. G. Rosberg, “Kenyatta, Jomo”, in *Political lives*, H. Young, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 397-400.

⁸ Michael Calvin McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A link between rhetoric and ideology”, *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (1980): 7.

explored how Fidel Castro in 1961 employed the ideograph 'revolution' to advance a new political culture in Cuba.⁹ Cloud argued that the ideographic expression 'clash of civilizations' helped to frame the United States of America's relationship to Islam and justify military action during the G.W. Bush presidency.¹⁰ Analysis of ideographs can point to how their customary meanings can be adapted by rhetors to address exigent circumstances.¹¹

Kenyatta employs terms with deep ideological meaning in order to advance a new national ethos. *Harambee* was a well-known expression not only among the Kikuyu people but among other ethnicities as well. It referred to the common practice of community participation. According to Galia Sabar, "Kenyatta linked the traditional, village-level principles of *harambee* with the broad national requirements for cooperative endeavor" toward the "task of national development".¹² Similarly, *uhuru* invoked the national desire for self-governance and the return of lands stolen by the white settlers. Implied in *uhuru* is a peaceful co-existence among peoples upon the removal of the common British threat.

Uhuru was to usher in both a restoration of customs and traditions disrupted during the colonial era and entry into the modernism of the 'developed' world. In his analysis of the relevance of African cultural values in African modernity, Kwame Gyekye considers most African cultural values "when the appropriate and necessary amendments and refinements have been made, to be relevant to African modernity, that is, to be the cultural life of the African people in the modern world".¹³

However, both *harambee* and *uhuru* are re-fitted to advance the labour and economic worth theme that is established early in the speech. Kenyatta refers to Kenya as a "thriving country" that has benefitted from the "labour" of all who have "made their contributions". The potential of the rich land is the "inheritance" that the independent people of Kenya must be worthy to receive.

Under the guise of these ideographs, Kenyatta could justify his consolidation of power by arguing that political division would undermine the work necessary to improve the country. During this period, Kenyatta was working with the British to limit future political opposition. The constitution

⁹ Fernando Delgado, "The rhetoric of Fidel Castro: Ideographs in the service of revolutionaries", *The Howard Journal of Communication* (1999): 1-14.

¹⁰ Dana L. Cloud, "'To veil the threat of terror': Afghan women and the 'clash of civilizations' in the imagery of the U.S. war on terrorism", *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (2004): 285-306.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 288.

¹² Galia Sabar, *Church, State and society in Kenya: From mediation to opposition, 1963-1993* (London: Frank Cass, 2002): 67.

¹³ Kwame Gyekye, *African cultural values: An introduction* (Philadelphia: Sankofa Publishing Company, 1996). 171.

soon would be amended to secure more authority for the president so that he would not be hindered by the parliament. The notion of *uhuru* is applied to serve the interests of the government and maintain the status quo rather than assure the people of a government that is accountable to its people.

In the Kiswahili portion of the speech, Kenyatta is much more direct in explaining the transactional relationship between the governed and the government. It also defines the role of his government and its ideological positions. The shift from friendly/diplomatic demeanor to assertive independent voice of a leader of a new nation-state reveals Kenyatta's contradictory rhetorical persona. Condemnation of colonialism and injustice to African people is juxtaposed with institutionalisation of the police and prisons in Kenya.

Africa has nearly been "milked dry", Kenyatta explains, and unless people unite "we will be finished". The people must dedicate themselves to hard work because "there will be nothing from heaven". People must work hard and be faithful in order for independence to have meaning. "An African Government wants faithfulness", he states. To ensure faithfulness, he warns, "The Police and the Prisons will remain".

That Kenyatta would draw upon traditional terms is not unexpected. Joanna Lewis observed that, "Kenyatta's conservative and elitist views were grounded in solutions that drew on an elder's view of what was best for Kikuyuland".¹⁴ What is startling is the degree to which Kenyatta openly scolds the people of Kenya and admonishes his listeners to work to develop the nation since "Kenyatta cannot give you everything".

At the same time, Kenyatta reflects the cultural hybridity that is a consequence of colonialism. Early in his speech he thanks the Christian missionaries who had assisted the people of Kenya. In the portion of the speech spoken in Kiswahili, Kenyatta explains how the Biblical Children of Israel depended on God to help them in the desert. He draws a contrast to that situation stating that now God "had closed the door" and "work" was the only path to fulfilling independence.

What Kenyatta does not say is that the government would depend heavily upon the internationally-funded religious organisations to fill the void left by British withdrawal. Though the British would continue to have military staging areas within the country and train Kenyatta's bodyguards, their direct support of the people would be limited. Though Kenyatta affirmed the "thriving" quality of the land, he assured long-term dependence upon outside entities when no clear plan for land equity and power sharing emerged.

The acknowledgment of suffering inflicted on Kenyans during the colonial era did not provide specific strategies for how to heal the nation internally and externally. Kenyatta assumed that a new understanding could

¹⁴ Joanna Lewis, *Empire State-building, war & welfare in Kenya, 1925-1952* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000): 248.

be reached by perfecting relations with the coloniser. Recent events in Kenya reveal the need to redefine ways Kenyans seek healing from the effects of colonialism. The decision by President Kibaki to lift a ban imposed upon Mau Mau by the British government in 1952 and upheld by the Kenyan government (1963-2002) has opened legal avenues to address concerns still very strong in the public memory. Since 2003 Mau Mau fighters and their families have taken legal action against the government of the United Kingdom seeking compensation for atrocities committed against them by the colonial government. This politically enacted response by the victims illustrates the frustrations Kenyans still hold about what happened to their families.¹⁵

Hostilities among ethnic groups in Kenya are directly linked to land-ownership conflicts started in early 1950s. Land-ownership conflicts triggered inter-ethnic territorial claims notably among communities living in the Mt. Elgon area.¹⁶ Furthermore, territorial proclamations elsewhere in the country are also about identity and belongingness. The fierce 2007-8 post-elections violence stands as evidence of unresolved land issues in the country.

The failure to address the ethnic relations and land issues draws our attention to interrogate *Uhuru na kazi* as a motto to self-reliance and self-determination. It was not clear how Kenyatta planned to mobilise communities for collective work when they struggled with issues of identity, landlessness and dependency on colonial government and NGOs.

Conclusion

After two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the major European colonisers seemed exhausted and content to focus on re-building at home. The stage seemed set for sweeping decolonisation across Africa. Hopes of freedom and relief from internal violence were high among the people of Kenya in the early 1960s. The aspirations also were high within the Kenya African National Union, the political party that carried the first national elections. But as Edwin A. Gimode notes, “the actual unfolding of political events during the Kenyatta era proved to be antithetical to these hopes”.¹⁷

Oginga Odinga’s proclamation in 1967 of “Not yet uhuru”¹⁸ set off

¹⁵ Joyce Mulama, “Former freedom fighters to sue Britain for compensation”: <http://ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=20175>. (Accessed 21 January 2013).

¹⁶ Margaret Gathoni Gecaga, “Religious movements and democratisation in Kenya: Between the sacred and the profane”, in *Kenya: The struggle for democracy*, eds. G. R. Murunga and S. W. Nasong’o (Dakar: Codesria, 2007): 69.

¹⁷ Edwin A. Gimode, “The role of the police in Kenya’s democratisation process”, in *Kenya: The struggle for democracy*, G. R. Murunga and S. W. Nasong’o, eds. (Dakar: Codesria, 2007): 233.

¹⁸ Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

fierce opposition to Kenyatta's government that continued into the Moi regime. Concerns about the unfulfilled promises of *uhuru* are also echoed in the early 1970s by J. M. Kariuki's opposition to Kenyatta's government on grounds of capitalism, corruption, land tenure and the increasing wealth of the business, political and administrative elites.¹⁹ Ali Mazrui offers support for the assessment of "Not yet uhuru" by identifying "freedom gaps" needed to be filled for all Kenyans to fully claim *uhuru*.²⁰

We have argued that Kenyatta's state-building rhetoric — anchored by the ideographs *harambee* and *uhuru* — activated cultural dispositions that potentially could have constituted mutually beneficial relations between Nairobi and the people. Instead, the terms were reformulated to emphasise state benefit and ultimately the terms worked to reproduce the relations of colonisation.

Ali Mazrui explains indigenising freedom as a strategy that involves tapping indigenous values, traditional technologies, native cultures and languages, and ancient paradigms.²¹ Kenyatta fails to recognize the primacy of culture in uniting Kenyans in a new nation. Strategies to reclaim local cultural values condemned by colonialism and Christianity should have been prioritised as constituting a national ethos.

A consideration towards indigenising freedom would have included more use of Kenyan/African metaphors, idioms and values to explain the meaning and expectations of *harambee* and *uhuru* and the Government of the people of Kenya. Kenyatta was positioned to lead the indigenisation of Kenya given his educational and cultural experiences locally and abroad. He was known to epitomise African and more so Kikuyu traditions. For example, he popularised the use of Kiswahili in the national assembly and donned his trademark symbols of traditional authority: beaded Masai hat, carved walking cane and whisk. The cultural apparel are symbols of traditional authority and as such positioned Kenyatta as a person who understood the complexities of staying connected to indigenous cultures and still managing to navigate new cultural contexts. Ideographs, however maimed, remain powerful rhetorical resources.

Though Jomo Kenyatta is considered the founder of Kenya, he may not be its most well known figure. After colonial rule, there was an urgent need to replace the British civil service workers with skilled and highly trained Kenyans. By the early 1960s, Kenya was sending many promising students to

¹⁹ Charles Hornsby, "When Kenyatta lost control of events in government": <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000058095>. (Accessed 21 January 2013).

²⁰ Ali Mazrui, "*Uhuru bado Kidogo: Africa's condition of Not Yet Uhuru: the balance sheet*": <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/africa-oped/message/26016> (Accessed 20 February 2013).

²¹ *Ibid.*

the United States of America and Europe for university study.²² A young biology major was among the students sent abroad. Shortly before Kenyatta's death in 1978, Wangari Maathi, another Christian, Western-educated scholar founded The Green Belt Movement.²³ In 2004, Maathi was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace and upon her death in 2011, tributes to her work poured in from leaders across the globe.

The slogan for the Green Belt Movement — a women's empowerment movement that focused on planting trees — was "Save the land *harambee*". Due to the corruption of the Kenyatta regime, *harambee* had fallen into disrepute. Wangari's adoption of this term was a rhetorical effort to shift its meaning from government tithe to village self-determination. In this sense, she was reclaiming *harambee* as an indigenous practice even as the term spoke in opposition to government development and political opportunism.

Kenyatta certainly lives on in the collective public memory. Perhaps the two clearest moments remembered by Kenyans is the lowering of the Union Jack and Kenyatta's call for *harambee!* But Kenyatta's presence is being actively eroded. Currency no longer bears his visage and holidays are being renamed to express a broader nationalistic identity. A new national ethos is being constituted and a fragile new hope remains.

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²² Jim C. Harper, II, *Western-educated elites in Kenya, 1900-1963: The African American factor* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

²³ Wangari W. Maathai, *The Green Belt Movement: Sharing the approach and Experience* (New York: Lantern Books, 2004).

Statecraft and sovereignty in Mohammed V of Morocco's Tangiers Speech (1947)

Abdelhai Azarkan

*Any speech which is mere rhetoric is stillborn. Of all the speeches to have survived, not a single one has not been an act, therefore one cannot but weigh up the act against the word.*¹

— Joseph Reinach

In this article, we analyse the speech delivered in Tangier on Thursday 10 April 1947 by His Majesty the late Mohammed V. The essential objective of the speech was to develop one key idea and it is this idea which, in our view, renders the speech historic. The speech is generally alluded to when illustrating the King's courage and determination to proclaim his country's independence, as well as to recall the major error of judgment by the French State in exiling the Sultan after he made the speech.

While sharing in this conviction, I wish to revisit the contents of the speech with a view to determining its true originality and real strength at the political level. It undoubtedly constitutes a demand, addressing as it does the country's need for independence, but what I should like to dwell on in particular are his views on the transformation of the Moroccan State.

In the Tangier speech, the King manifests his determination to gain independence for his country, despite the actual word 'independence' not being mentioned. But what needs to be noted in particular is the sovereign's post-independence political agenda, namely the type of sovereignty to be re-established and the type of State to be rebuilt.

The idea which we attempt to develop through a brief reading of this speech revolves around the transformation after independence of the Alaouite monarchy — the royal institution — by Mohammed V, that is to say the transformation of the modern Moroccan State by, and within the context of, the Alaouite dynasty.

We believe that a reading of the Tangier speech not only affords us insight into aspects of the past but also, and more importantly, a clearer understanding of the nature of present-day Moroccan politics.

King Mohammed V, scrupulously respecting theoretical and practical rhetorical principles, begins by outlining the nature of the monarchy and the government in an independent Morocco. Unlike the political movements calling for independence at the time, both in the Arab world (including within Morocco itself) and on the African continent, the King of Morocco is not

¹ For this text see Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *L'art de parler, Anthologie des manuels d'éloquence* (Paris: Klincksieck, Cadratin Series, 2003): 302.

satisfied with simply trying to attain that first step, *viz.* national sovereignty, but also envisages the nature of the government to be constituted. The royal speech of Tangier informs us that these two political acts go hand in hand and, once achieved, would result in the restoration of that continuity which had been interrupted by the protectorate period. The purpose of independence is very clearly determined: to restore, first of all, the power solidly in place before the arrival of the French and the Spanish, and secondly, the political system of that former power.

At the time of the speech, two fundamental elements constituted a hindrance to the King's sovereignty: the effective presence in the country of two foreign forces, and the rise of a national political movement drawing legitimacy from its call for the country's independence.²

Attaining independence thus became an imperative first step for the monarchy, if it were to embrace the first political rule corresponding to its very nature, namely, to be sovereign. Throughout history, the principle underpinning any traditional monarchy has been that the representative of the people is One, and this principle is summed up very well by one of the great founders of modern political thought, Thomas Hobbes, who writes as follows:

That King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Sovereign. The Sovereignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him.³

So this, then, is Mohammed V's first objective: to affirm his supremacy over any other existing force in the country as a means not of claiming his sovereignty but rather of exercising it.

This is followed by the second step to be taken, that of asserting such sovereignty as would ensure continuity in the nature of the Moroccan monarchy, in other words a monarchy in step with Islamic political thinking and practice. The King of Morocco's legitimacy derives from his Sharifian ancestry; he is the representative of divine law and therefore the leader of the believers. Thus sovereignty covers the various aspects of social life, so that subjects submit to no other force or recognise no other commands save for those emanating from their Sovereign. Gratitude and submission are the key words characterising the relationship of the subjects to the sovereign, thanks to — or because of — the religious dimension.

² We refer to the Istiklal Party (meaning "independence" in Arabic), whose leaders had signed and presented to the French occupiers on 11 January 1943 (declared a public holiday some years ago) a manifesto calling for independence.

³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XIX.

As we shall see when we begin analysing the speech, the transformation of sovereignty requires total clarity in respect of the relationship between the king and his subjects: it must be vertical and in one direction only. This single direction, moreover, denotes the clear difference and removes any confusion between this sovereignty, based on religion and therefore classic, and a sovereignty which is based on reason and referred to as modern. In the first instance, the subjects, not having entrusted their rights to the governing party, are not, to use Hobbes' term, the ones who brought about their relationship with the governing party. Just as the latter is not, to use the same philosopher's expression, a mere player, in other words their representative. The sovereign speaks and acts in order to apply The Book as revealed by God through His Prophet, from whom he descends, and not to ensure rights entrusted to him by men who are his equals. The sovereign is not someone entrusted with common and public power but rather, as stated in the much-used Arabic expression, "the protector of belief and religion", the one responsible for a divine mission, having divine power.

Before moving on to the main ideas in the speech, what needs to be stressed is that Mohammed V is addressing the people of Tangier and, through them, all Moroccan people, as a true Sovereign, the only Sovereign, one who fully exercises his powers and carries out his duties and programmes; in other words, he addresses them as a Sovereign governing his people throughout the entire country. Nowhere in the speech is mention made of the terms independence, protectorate, colonisation, foreign forces, nationalist forces, resistance forces or national political parties. Throughout the speech, there is reference to what the Sovereign is doing, what he plans to do for his nation and his subjects, and what the latter will have to do for their country and for their Sovereign. It was undoubtedly this announcement of the exercise of total sovereignty, inseparable from the act of governing the whole country and all its subjects, which enraged the French colonial forces and drove them to make the choice of exiling the Sovereign.

To us it would seem that it was on this day of the Tangier speech, 10 April, that a fundamental practice saw the light of day in the act of governing, on the eve of independence and after independence, by the Moroccan monarchy, a practice which, one could state, became an integral part of the rules of the political game.

We consider that the main strength of the Moroccan monarchy, once it was restored after independence and to which Mohammed V alludes in this speech, is its assimilation of the political game rules, essentially those concerning the exercise of power in terms of the modern notion of power. To speak of modernity in relation to the Moroccan monarchy at a political level means, in actual fact, to understand that institution in terms of a modern notion of political power, to understand how it adopted that notion in order to exercise better control over the Islamic theory of this phenomenon and to

continue applying it by adapting it to the times. For the monarchical institution, if I may so say, it was a question of incorporating the essential elements of Muslim tradition into political practice, while revising and adapting them in accordance with certain aspects of modern political thinking and activity. This has become one of its fundamental features distinguishing it from other purely traditional Arab monarchies as well as completely modern Western monarchies.

Let us move on to the main ideas expressed in the royal Tangier speech. In his exordium, the sovereign recalls the first principle of the Muslim religion on which the community (or collective) is based: the belief in Allah, the true and only God. Islam is a religion which governs the behaviour of the faithful within society, the foundation of the social fabric; it is, if you like, a religion which has as its main objective to provide a foundation for the community. This objective must, however, be underpinned by convictions held by all members of the community, thereby serving as the guarantor and guide for any action taken within the social context. A Muslim community demands that every member believe, firstly, in Allah, the only and true God, and secondly, that he or she should apply the law dictated by the sacred book, the Koran.

The believer distinguishes himself amongst the members of humanity by the perfection of his belief, the quietude of his conscience and the fact that he trusts his God, in his activities as in his repose, in his joys as in the misfortunes of life... Thus we move into action only after firmly establishing the belief that we are truly one of Allah's faithful creatures.⁴

Having stressed the obligation of the Muslim believer to respect this first ethical principle, the King moves to the second section which, in terms of the rhetorical language of narration and argumentation, one may call a description of the situation of Morocco, of the Arab nation and of the Muslim community in general. Here he sets out his main initiatives to date as well as those required in future to ensure his subjects' well-being. He moves, in brief, from a description of the social, religious and political situation of his believer

⁴ Mohammed V, Tangier speech of 10 April 1947, "The Historic Voyage of the Sultan Martyr Mohammed V to the city of Tangier", Mhand El Bajlaji (Tangiers, Club de Tanger Ibn Batouta, Mhand El Bajlaji, 1997). This quotation we translated ourselves, whereas, for those which follow, we relied on the translation done and published by the Association for the Promotion of Tangier, copyright deposit 1988. For purely technical reasons we were unfortunately unable to consult the official translation. The Tangiers speech is available in *The great speeches of Africa's liberation, African Yearbook of Rhetoric* 2, 3 (2011): 19-25 — which is the first English translation (by Mohamed Shahid Mathee, introduced by Ph.-J. Salazar).

subjects, emphasising his commitment at government level to ensure the fundamental values dictated by Islam of peace, dignity and prosperity, to describing the emancipation and progress of the subjects and the nation.

The political element constituting the main thrust of this section is the distinction made by the King between two periods in Moroccan history, namely the period before his reign and that of his reign, the period of regression and that of construction. It must, however, be pointed out that no link is made in the speech between the first period and the presence in the country of foreign forces, nor is there any reference to colonialism. It is his audience's passion which the Sovereign is addressing with a view to rekindling their religious, cultural and nationalistic sentiments, so that these sentiments become both the cause of the citizens' misfortunes and the source of their salvation. The attitude of the colonisers, or protectors, is thereby neutralised because, *vis-à-vis* the people, he attributes no role to the foreign forces, while, *vis-à-vis* the foreign forces, no responsibility is attributed to them — whence the lack of any justification on their part to resort to any form of sanction.

What then are the reasons for the misfortunes of Muslims (and not only Moroccans) and the cause of the catastrophes that have befallen them? According to the royal speech, the Muslim community previously possessed scientific knowledge, which had abandoned it in favour of ignorance; it had chosen justice but had deviated from this path, so that justice had given way to injustice; it used to be known for its charity but greed had got the upper hand over all generous behaviour; throughout its history it had enjoyed unity and cohesion, yet disunity had become the order of the day, separating not only the Maghreb from the Mashrek but also giving way to a split within a single country, to the extent that the individual had become a stranger to his true brother. Thus, concludes the Sovereign, "we have become alienated from our sacred rights due to our ignorance, and the unity of our country is torn apart because of the mistakes we have made in this regard".

If, however, a certain degree of fatalism was to blame for this unfortunate situation, the Divine Will had shown mercy on the country. "Providence", states the King, "has fortunately inspired us in the indulgence of its mercy and guided us along the right path of salvation by elevating us to the dignity of Sovereign of this country". As a sovereign elected by God, the King was determined to assume his duty and accomplish his mission:

We have deployed all our means to redress our mistakes and remedy our misfortunes. We have endeavoured to point out the means of attaining present and future happiness, without ever deviating from the principles of our religion, which has brought together the hearts of all Moslems and made them to beat in unison; which has pushed the Arab and Muslim peoples to assist one another, so that the basis

of this league, which has strengthened the ties amongst all Arabs wherever they might be, has finally enabled their Kings and leaders, both in the East and the West, to unify their paths and march towards moral progress, the greatness of Islam, and Arab glory.

And finally, the King relies on a fundamental rhetorical procedure to lay a firm foundation for the new era of the Alaouite monarchy, which is the method known as analogy. The sovereign speaks of the period of obscurantism and darkness characterised by ignorance, injustice, greed and disunity, following which the Divine Will intervened to elect the man who would save them, and thanks to whom all this would be reversed. Thus, in irreversible fashion, would begin the future period of light, knowledge and justice, of benevolence and unity. Here the clear reference is to the transformation of the Arab-Muslim community, alluding to the beginning of the community's foundation with the coming of the prophet Sidna Mohammed.⁵ In the history of the Muslim community, the demarcation between the periods before and after the revelation of the Holy Koran is made in terms identical to those used by the sovereign.

This analogy is acceptable in religious terms because it is made by a King of Sharifian descent, whose ancestry goes back to the Prophet himself. Politically, it is relevant because it glosses over the whole Protectorate period, thus avoiding any allusion to responsibility, either of the Kings who preceded him to the throne or of the foreign colonial forces.⁶ The analogy is also

⁵ The Moroccan monarchy thus assimilates a fundamental principle pertaining to the foundation of a community, that of considering it as sacred, something which is, in fact, not specific to the Islamic tradition. Hannah Arendt mentions this in relation to the Romans: "At the heart of Roman politics", she writes, "from the beginning of the republic until virtually the end of the Imperial era, stands the conviction of the sacredness of foundations, in the sense that once something had been founded, it remains binding for all future generations. To be engaged in politics meant first and foremost to preserve the foundation of the city of Rome": Hannah Arendt, *Between past and future* (New York: The Viking Press, 1961): 21. (See too pg. 121 on the religious dimension of this sacred foundation). We should add that, in order for the founding of a community to be endowed with a sacred character, the king must pronounce himself to be a descendant of the Prophet; in the case of fundamentalist movements, they must endeavour to reproduce the type of government practised by the four khalifes who succeeded the Prophet; while for the Shiites, they must bestow some form of continuity on the reign of the fourth Khalife, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet.

⁶ Let us not forget that historians speak of the weakness of the Kings reigning from the beginning of the 1912 Protectorate up until Mohammed V's accession to the throne. Others go so far as to recall that those Kings gave their backing to the French and Spanish colonisers' repression of resistance movements in both the North and South of Morocco. The only King to whom Mohammed V refers in his speech is

relevant because, as pointed out earlier, it furthermore brushes aside all local movements claiming in any way to represent the Moroccan people, whether they be purely political movements, resistance movements, or both.

Moving on to the second part of this section devoted to narration and argumentation, which in itself is very closely related to the analogy just mentioned, the late Mohammed V, not satisfied with confirming his status as the supreme guide, also and especially wishes to emphasise the exercise of that which his calling as Sovereign confers on him, namely power and government. The King, placing himself in the present, describes his manner of governing, enumerates the various construction works in which he has invested, mentions the projects he has completed and speaks of those he still intends undertaking.

In this context, Islam once again remains the fundamental reference, whether implicitly or explicitly. It is through its teaching that the Sovereign begins to list his accomplishments:

Being convinced that those means which contributed to the progress of our glorious Ancestors represent the only way for our people to progress, we aim to expand the teaching of subjects taught formerly and also introduce new ones, the former to light up the soul with the light of faith and the torch of morality, the latter to facilitate progress and acquire the wherewithal to fight for a living... Schools are established for young Moroccans to be taught the tenets of virtue, and fortunately we are seeing the breaking dawn of an encouraging success.

What is the relationship between schooling and Islam? Firstly, it is through schooling that one passes from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge, and it must also not be forgotten that, in the Islamic imagination, any reform, any renewal, any improvement in behaviour or a situation, either individual or social, depends on writing and reading. In such instances, it is difficult for any Muslim not to recall the first verse of the Holy Koran received by the Prophet: *Ikrae*, which means Read (imperative form of the verb to read). Neither should we forget the importance of the *Madaris* (plural of *Madrassa*, meaning school) throughout the history of the Arab-Muslim civilisation, both in the East and in the West.

From teaching, the Sovereign moves to other areas where his government needs to intervene:

Through His divine grace and the effect of His goodness, we are

Hassan I, who reigned long before the Protectorate, and whose reign he refers to as being that of a great King of Morocco of the Alaouite dynasty.

guarding the integrity of the country, we are working to guarantee a brilliant and glorious future, and we are moving towards the attainment of this hope, which will bring new life to the heart of every Moroccan... We have travelled everywhere in order to give our full attention to all the regions of Morocco and attend to the fulfilment of their needs.

Finally, following a description of the exercising of government activities, the sovereign raises that of power. Here again, the King speaks of his present achievements and his future projects. What does the exercise of power entail? It means appointing his representatives across the various regions of the country, determining their prerogatives and, in the final instance, defining the nature of the relationship between the King and his people.

The King enjoins all his representatives in the various regions of the Kingdom to work in the general interest of the Moroccan people:

In absolute devotion to the Sharifian Throne which, for centuries, has ensured the unity of the people, the integrity of the Empire and the happiness of its inhabitants of all categories. Given these considerations, we exhort all delegates, pashas, local governors, *cadis*⁷ and civil servants of every rank whom we honour with our trust and in whom we place all our hope, to observe properly this imperious national duty.

Representation is always in a vertical direction and it is granted by the Sovereign so that social projects and projects in the general interest may be carried out in his name. All power to act in the service of the people and the nation is power emanating from the King and granted by him. Power is not divisible, neither at its source nor at its destination. Any progress which the country may experience in future must incorporate this constant element: that being invested with any power whatsoever and exercising that power may only take place and be carried out through the power emanating from the Sovereign, just as it may represent no source or force other than that of the Sovereign.

Thus the relation of the people to the Sovereign is one of submission, and the consent of the people in respect of their sovereign is expressed exclusively through allegiance. One does not transmit one's rights to the King for him to take care of them; rather one shows respect and gratitude to the sacred person of the King. Regarding the transmission of rights, the logic pertaining here is that of a contract to be respected by the person to whom those rights have been transmitted, since his person

⁷ *Cadi* is the Arabic term for a magistrate.

represents the contracting parties as a whole. In the second case, on the other hand, the logic is that of a prayer for the Sovereign to be guided, protected and helped by the One he represents, the Supreme Creator Allah. In our view, this is the salient line in the speech made by King Mohammed V in Tangiers and the reason for it being called historic. It redefines the nature of monarchical power in Morocco, for his own reign but also for the future of the monarchy. He chooses an Islamic conception of power, or at least the most widely spread interpretation of Islam throughout the history of the Arab world, as much on a practical level as on the level of the imagination. According to this interpretation, a king is on the throne to reign, but to reign essentially means to govern. We would almost want to say that it is precisely because a king must govern that he must also be sovereign. Sovereignty is necessary in order to meet the demands and prerequisites of government. It is around this relationship between sovereignty and government that the game is played out by existing political forces, while casting a favourable eye on the democratic spirit.

(Translated by Bas Angelis)

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Une nouvelle configuration du politique et du religieux dans le Maroc de Mohammed VI ?

Dominique de Courcelles

I. Préliminaires historiques et géopolitiques

Le Maroc appartient à la fois au monde arabe, à l'Afrique, à l'Atlantique, à la Méditerranée et à l'Europe. Son Etat est l'un des plus anciens de tous ceux du monde arabe et son territoire n'a été vraiment contrôlé par une puissance étrangère qu'entre 1934 et 1956. Le Maroc est donc une région du monde où se vérifie au quotidien la rencontre des cultures. Après avoir fait partie de l'Empire romain pour ce qui concerne sa zone méditerranéenne qui est la plus urbanisée, il est conquis par les barbares ostrogoths chrétiens et ariens au début du Ve siècle. Sa propre culture arabo-islamique lui est transmise au VII^{ème} siècle. A la même époque, le royaume wisigoth et chrétien de la péninsule Ibérique s'effondre à l'arrivée des premiers Berbéro-arabes du chef Tarik, qui franchissent le détroit de Gibraltar en 711: c'est tout le sud de la péninsule qui devient arabe et musulman pendant au moins un demi-millénaire et partage une culture commune avec le Maroc, jusqu'en 1492.¹ A cette date les Rois Catholiques s'emparent de Grenade, imposent leur souveraineté dans l'ensemble de la péninsule Ibérique et ordonnent la conversion des musulmans.

Le détroit n'a jamais été véritablement une frontière et, en 1987, le Maroc, comme pays partiellement francophone, a posé sa candidature à l'entrée dans la Communauté européenne; un accord de libre-échange avec l'Union européenne est entré progressivement en vigueur à partir de mars 2000. L'ouverture sur l'Atlantique, qui a jadis arrêté l'élan conquérant de l'Islam, tandis qu'au XVI^{ème} siècle les Espagnols et les Portugais vont partir s'emparer du Nouveau Monde, est aujourd'hui marquée par la somptueuse mosquée de Casablanca construite par le roi Hassan II (1961-1999) au bord de la mer. Les Berbères ne sont pas des marins et ne disputent l'espace maritime aux pêcheurs espagnols que depuis quelques décennies, avec l'influence des enclaves espagnoles de Ceuta et de Melilla. Le Maroc a achevé son expansion dans le sud du Sahara occidental, mais le désert n'est plus aujourd'hui l'espace d'échange qu'il a été. Par ailleurs, il entretient d'excellentes relations avec le Sénégal, porte ouverte sur l'Afrique noire. Si le souverain marocain est toujours bien considéré par les dirigeants israéliens, il

¹ Cf. Dominique De Courcelles, *Ecrire l'histoire, écrire des histoires dans le monde hispanique* (Paris: Librairie philosophique Vrin, 2008): 23-32, en particulier le premier chapitre.

n'a pas d'influence véritable dans la résolution des conflits du Moyen-Orient, mais il est présent dans le cadre du plan arabe de paix adopté par le Sommet arabe de Beyrouth en 2002.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'à la mort du roi Hassan II du Maroc, le 23 juillet 1999, son fils proclamé roi, Mohammed VI, hérite d'un pays aux potentialités certaines mais où les problèmes à résoudre sont nombreux, politiques, économiques, sociaux. Le roi Mohammed VI a fait des études de droit au Maroc et en France; il est docteur en droit de l'Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis; ses travaux ont porté sur les relations internationales de son pays avec l'Afrique et avec l'Union européenne. Il jouit alors d'une grande popularité. Ses premières interventions publiques lui valent la confiance de tous ceux qui ont souffert des "35 années de plomb" du règne de son père et souhaitent une modernisation du pays. De 1999 à 2009, le Discours du Trône du 30 juillet 1999, le Discours de Rabat du 18 mai 2005 et la Trajectoire décennale de mars 2009 démontrent l'art du pouvoir royal de manier les mots et les concepts.

II. Le Discours du Trône, 30 juillet 1999: Prononcé par le roi à Rabat, peu de jours après la mort de son père, est un véritable rite d'initiation monarchique.

Après l'invocation rituelle "Louange à Dieu. Que la paix et la bénédiction soient sur le Prophète, sa Famille et ses Compagnons", le roi s'adresse directement au peuple: "Cher peuple", marquant ainsi clairement les rapports du politique et du religieux. Religieux, parce que la croyance est d'emblée présente avec l'évocation du texte sacré et des personnages sacrés; politique, parce que cette invocation rituelle impose et légitime immédiatement un régime de pouvoir, un ordre au sein de la société qui en réserve le gouvernement au nouveau roi. La dynastie alaouite, dont Mohammed VI est le 23^{ème} souverain depuis 1666, descend en effet du Prophète et s'est installée dès le XIII^{ème} siècle dans le sud marocain; jusqu'en 1955, les souverains avaient le titre de "sultan" et, en 1962, Hassan II a fait inscrire le titre de "commandeur des croyants", accordé au roi du Maroc, dans la constitution marocaine. Tout au long du discours du nouveau roi le nom de Dieu revient, et c'est par un verset du Coran que le roi choisit de clore son discours: "Dieu suffit à quiconque se confie en lui".

A cinq reprises le roi interpelle le peuple: "Cher peuple...", ce qui correspond à cinq parties de son discours. La première partie est un double hommage, d'une part au roi défunt, son père, et, d'autre part, au peuple qui lui a été fidèle et qui est désormais attaché au nouveau souverain. Dans sa deuxième adresse, si Mohammed VI annonce que l'essentiel du pouvoir politique est entre ses mains, il en énonce clairement les caractéristiques qui ne peuvent que satisfaire les partisans du changement: "monarchie

constitutionnelle”, “multipartisme”, “libéralisme économique”, “politique de régionalisation et de décentralisation”, “édification de l’Etat de droit”, “sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés individuelles et collectives”, “maintien de la sécurité et de la stabilité”, “règles démocratiques”, “alternance démocratique”. Il s’agit bien d’exercer en commun une forme de souveraineté moderne sur un territoire dont il faut “parachever l’intégrité”, sur ses ressources et les êtres qui le peuplent, sur un territoire aux frontières connues sinon reconnues par ses voisins. Ainsi est affirmé et légitimé dans le discours le droit du roi à dominer, à être le seul à gouverner comme “arbitre” et à représenter la tradition et la modernité, les aspirations et le désir du peuple et de l’Etat.

La troisième adresse, au cœur du discours, donne alors la perspective essentielle et novatrice du futur gouvernement de Mohammed VI: il s’agit du double attachement à la question de l’enseignement et à la question de la pauvreté, qui, pour le roi, sont liées, en prenant en compte également les Marocains établis à l’étranger.

La quatrième adresse évoque “les valeurs arabes et islamiques”, permettant un “regard prospectif sur l’avenir”: “le juste milieu, la pondération, la tolérance et l’ouverture”, également “la paix, la coexistence, la compréhension mutuelle”. De fait, toutes ces valeurs humanistes ont pu être considérées aux XVI^{ème} - XVIII^{ème} siècles en Occident, de Guillaume Postel au XVI^{ème} siècle aux philosophes des Lumières au XVIII^{ème} siècle, comme les grandes valeurs de la civilisation musulmane. Le roi se livre ici à une analyse géopolitique, évoquant “l’édification du grand Maghreb arabe”, le Moyen-Orient et “nos frères palestiniens”, “nos amis européens et américains”, “nos frères africains”. L’ordre politique et social est fondé à la fois sur “les droits dont Dieu a honoré l’homme” et sur “les conventions internationales”, donc sur des faits que l’on trouve dans les textes sacrés et dans l’histoire sacrée et également dans des textes internationaux et dans l’histoire internationale et que mettent en scène des événements religieux et de politique internationale, qui mobilisent toute la société comme des rites.

La cinquième et dernière partie du discours du roi, très courte, est destinée à affirmer, après un ultime hommage au roi défunt, les relations entre tous les sujets, leur coopération quotidienne à venir -” œuvrons la main dans la main pour la réalisation de nos aspirations et des nobles actions qui nous attendent en comptant sur l’aide de Dieu”. Dieu et son Prophète sont bien aux côtés du roi.

C’est ainsi que, dès son premier discours, Mohammed VI exprime sa volonté de modernisation du pays tout en restant fidèle aux valeurs de la tradition. La “sollicitude” et “l’affection” qu’il affirme à l’égard des “couches sociales les plus défavorisées”, son désir d’activer la Fondation Mohammed V “qui voue son action aux affaires des pauvres, des nécessiteux et des handicapés” lui valent immédiatement la sympathie et l’attention. Trois mois après son arrivée au pouvoir, sa dénonciation de l’immobilisme du makhzen

— la puissante administration du royaume — et le renvoi de celui qui était le ministre de l'Intérieur de son père, le redouté Driss Basri, ainsi que la nomination de nouveaux gouverneurs, la présence du socialiste Abderrahmane Youssoufi comme chef du gouvernement marquent bien sa volonté de démocratisation et de changement, que souligne par ailleurs le retour au Maroc de l'opposant historique au régime de Hassan II, Abraham Serfaty.

Le roi annonce ainsi une reconfiguration globale du politique et du religieux, liée aux défis considérables qu'il a à relever pour l'avenir du pays. Le politique et le religieux sont articulés dans la recherche du bien commun. Le roi montre qu'il a conscience que la modernité contemporaine pose particulièrement la question du lien social et de l'éducation. Les valeurs de la démocratie doivent être transmises et légitimées à travers les valeurs arabes et musulmanes, c'est-à-dire les cultures particulières du Maroc, dans le respect des altérités. Selon l'article 6 de la Constitution marocaine, "L'islam est religion d'Etat, qui garantit à tous le libre exercice du culte". "Aucun Etat, même s'il garantit universellement la liberté de religion et se doit de respecter la neutralité religieuse et idéologique n'est en mesure de se désintéresser totalement des valeurs culturelles et historiques dont dépendent la cohésion sociale et la réalisation d'objectifs publics", a affirmé la Cour constitutionnelle allemande dans une décision de 1995. Ce que désigne le roi, sans le dire, c'est la reconnaissance des expertises des acteurs culturels et religieux, c'est la reconnaissance citoyenne du religieux dans la sphère publique. Le sociologue Jean-Paul Willaime note: "Les religions sont des ressources identitaires et éthiques qui, précisément parce qu'elles représentent des forces convictionnelles, peuvent exercer un rôle positif dans des sociétés démocratiques et laïques".²

III. Le Discours de Rabat, 18 mai 2005

Six ans plus tard, le discours prononcé par le roi à Rabat le 18 mai 2005 veut marquer une nouvelle étape, fondatrice. Comme le Discours du Trône, ce discours s'ouvre par la même invocation à Dieu et au Prophète et se clôt par un verset du Coran: "Dis: Agissez, Dieu verra votre action, ainsi que son envoyé et les croyants. Véridique est la parole de Dieu". Entre 1999 et 2005, le roi n'a pas encore décisivement entrepris, sauf pour le Code de la famille en 2003, l'ensemble des réformes qu'il promettait en 1999 et que l'opinion démocratique attendait. Aussi le verset conclusif qui affirme et souligne sa confiance dans le jugement de Dieu est destiné à prévenir les critiques qui ne manquent pas alors de lui être faites.

² Jean-Paul Willaime, "Individu, communauté, société", *Semaines sociales de France: Les religions, menace ou espoir pour nos sociétés?* (Paris: Bayard, 2009): 116-133.

Il est en effet couramment reproché au roi de ne pas avoir su repenser le mode de fonctionnement du pouvoir et de laisser la monarchie coûter trop cher au pays. Le roi est entrepreneur et pas assez arbitre. “L’hégémonie de la monarchie dans le monde des affaires n’a jamais été aussi forte depuis cinq ans”, note le journaliste Ignace Dalle.³ Par ailleurs, après les attentats du 16 mai 2003 à Casablanca, l’adoption d’une loi antiterroriste a rendu possible toutes sortes d’interprétations, et cette loi a été jugée aussi dangereuse qu’excessive. Paradoxalement, à côté de publications sur des sujets que nul n’aurait osé aborder du vivant de Hassan II, les poursuites et les condamnations de certains militants des droits de l’homme ou de la démocratie, de journalistes, d’islamistes montrent que les acquis dans le domaine des libertés et des droits humains restent fragiles. Cependant, dans le même temps, grâce au courage du roi favorable aux revendications des militantes féministes, en dépit de manifestations islamistes, un nouveau Code de la famille a été adopté en janvier 2004⁴ par les deux Chambres parlementaires. Egalement, reconnaît Ignace Dalle, “la création de l’Institut royal de la culture amazighe (IRCA), l’une des principales revendications du mouvement berbère, constitue une bonne initiative”.

Dans ce contexte, le discours du 18 mai 2005 veut être une évaluation des problèmes et une prise en compte des critiques dans une logique de développement durable. Il comporte quatre interpellations du peuple “Cher peuple”, correspondant ici à une introduction, le message que le roi veut délivrer, une affirmation d’engagement souverain, la conclusion. Le peuple en tant que tel est donc beaucoup moins associé à la démarche du roi que dans le premier discours de juillet 1999.

Après la première adresse au peuple: “Cher peuple”, le roi rappelle qu’il a accompli un long travail de visite et d’évaluation de toutes les régions du royaume. La question qu’il s’agit désormais de traiter ensemble, parce qu’elle “préoccupe et interpelle instamment la nation dans son ensemble”, est celle de “la problématique sociale”, c’est-à-dire, explique le roi, “notre projet de société et de développement... avec l’aide de Dieu... L’initiative nationale pour le développement humain (INDH)”. Il emploie à plusieurs reprises le mot “vision”, ce qui est une citation implicite du président américain Georges W. Bush qui l’avait qualifié de “dirigeant visionnaire au sein du monde arabe”: “Cette initiative s’inscrit dans la vision d’ensemble qui

³ Ignace Dalle, “Espérances déçues au Maroc”, *Le Monde diplomatique* (archives), août 2004.

⁴ Mohamed Mouaqt, dans ses remarques sur la réforme du Code de la famille de 2004 (*Perceptions et pratique judiciaire*, janvier 2007) a montré que l’instauration de nouvelles lois n’est pas forcément accompagnée de nouvelles pratiques sociales. Ce n’est pas parce que la femme a le droit juridiquement de se marier sans la tutelle de son père qu’elle est socialement disposée à le faire. Il en est de même de “l’égalité entre l’homme et la femme, dans tous les droits politiques, économiques, sociaux, culturels et environnementaux”.

constitue la matrice de notre projet sociétal..”, “C’est dans cette vision équilibrée et portée vers l’avenir que s’inscrivent les réformes fondamentales et les projets structurants que nous avons engagés, ainsi que les progrès et les acquis aujourd’hui engrangés...”. Le roi a donc indiqué ce qui sera la teneur de son discours. C’est le seul endroit du discours où figure une référence à la croyance: “Avec l’aide de Dieu”; elle est placée en exergue car aucune initiative politique ne saurait être satisfaite sans invoquer la religion.

Le discours proprement dit est donné d’un seul tenant au peuple et il est destiné à fonder en légitimité l’initiative nationale pour le développement humain. Il s’agit ici de faire du lien social dans une société critique et perplexe, de trouver les conditions d’une représentation convaincante de ce fait collectif que doit être l’INDH. Le roi part d’abord du constat de quatre données objectives: la situation de pauvreté et de marginalisation, ce qui l’amène à prendre en considération les réalités douloureuses d’une frange de la population comme celle qui vit dans les bidonvilles et a pu susciter en son sein les auteurs des attentats de 2003; la nécessité de ce qu’il dénomme “politiques publiques intégrées”, c’est-à-dire des politiques publiques à long terme; le choix de l’ouverture sur le monde, c’est-à-dire de l’adaptation au changement dans le respect des acquis culturels; la nécessité d’analyser les expériences passées.

Le roi décrit alors l’INDH, qu’il place “sous le signe de la citoyenneté réelle et agissante”, selon trois axes: s’attaquer au “déficit social”, c’est-à-dire élargir l’accès aux équipements et services sociaux de base et l’on retrouve ici très précisément les caractéristiques du développement durable; “promouvoir les activités génératrices de revenus stables et d’emplois”; “venir en aide aux personnes” selon les cas. Dans ces trois axes, des programmes bien définis sont d’ores et déjà établis. Le roi évoque “la foi inébranlable en notre génie national, notre potentiel de créativité et nos capacités de travail”, “nos valeurs authentiques”. Nulle part il n’est question d’un ordre transcendant auquel se référerait la société marocaine. C’est le “génie national” qui est ici la référence.

Interpellant ensuite le gouvernement, en confirmant ainsi habilement les principes de la monarchie constitutionnelle, le roi déclare qu’il a fixé un “échancier” “sur le court, le moyen et le long terme”. Sur le court terme, il s’adresse au “premier ministre”, sur le moyen terme il s’adresse à “la classe politique”, le long terme appartenant au roi et au peuple marocain. Il appelle ensuite le gouvernement à respecter ses responsabilités, selon une “démarche d’écoute et de concertation”, avec un “plan d’action fondé sur les principes de bonne gouvernance” et un plan de financement efficient, en faisant droit à “l’innovation” qui est, par exemple, l’une des recommandations majeures au niveau international et global de l’OCDE.⁵

⁵ Citons par exemple, récemment: “Innovation ouverte dans des réseaux mondiaux”, *Synthèses* (Paris: Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques

La troisième adresse au peuple, très courte, consiste à rappeler que l'INDH est un "chantier de règne, ouvert en permanence", "une réaffirmation tangible de notre engagement". Le roi évoque deux questions qui lui semblent particulièrement importantes et qui s'inscrivent parmi les priorités les plus actuelles du développement durable et de l'ONU: l'éducation et la formation, le "devoir de solidarité à l'égard du monde rural".

La quatrième adresse est enfin la conclusion du discours royal. Le peuple dans un même bloc est appelé à adhérer et à se mobiliser, et le roi lui donne rendez-vous dans trois ans pour "faire l'évaluation des résultats de cette nouvelle initiative" pour un "développement humain durable".

Est-ce que dans ce discours, lié à des problèmes importants, nouveaux, le roi situerait délibérément son action dans "une ultramodernité qui représenterait un processus de sécularisation de la modernité... une sécularisation aboutie"? pour reprendre l'expression de Jean-Paul Willaime.⁶ Les espaces politiques et sociaux ne semblent pas — ou plus? — assignables à la religion. C'est peut-être la fin d'un certain exclusivisme et un réaménagement du rapport à la vérité religieuse dans un contexte globalisé, dans un monde mouvant. Les identités marocaines sont sollicitées par le roi et non pas les identités religieuses héritées, prises entre la mondialisation et l'individualisation, assignées volontairement au flou, à l'érosion — rappelons ici que les attentats islamistes ont eu lieu deux ans auparavant — pour mieux les fragiliser au profit des identités par choix, les identités marocaines. Face à la menace des courants salafistes prônant une pratique rigoriste de l'islam, le roi cherche à maintenir l'autorité du rite malékite, traditionnel au Maroc. Faisant peut-être ici le pari d'une ultramodernité, fier de sa spécificité marocaine, le roi tient à s'engager particulièrement sur la question de l'éducation et sur la question du lien social, dans les villes et dans les campagnes. Le lien social est en quête de sens et ce sens est apporté par l'éducation. Le roi se présente ici comme le médiateur du peuple avec lui-même, il joue le rôle de facilitateur des sociabilités. L'INDH est un instrument qui peut susciter des comportements corrigeant fractures et rigidités.

IV. La *Trajectoire décennale* de mars 2009

Trois ans plus tard, la *Trajectoire décennale* publiée en mars 2009 s'inscrit bien dans la même perspective. Mais ici il ne s'agit plus d'un discours royal et donc il n'y a plus les cadres religieux mentionnés à propos des deux discours analysés plus haut. Citons seulement ici le début du préambule:

(OECD), décembre 2008); "The global competition for talent", *Policy Brief* (Paris: OECD, February 2009).

⁶ Willaime, art. cité, 122.

La trajectoire historique du Royaume a vu s'opérer de grandes transformations. Elle fut marquée par le renouveau affirmé du projet de société du Maroc moderne — démocratique, développé et solidaire; projet autour duquel toutes les composantes de la nation se retrouvent désormais unies et engagées, malgré les différences d'opinion qui s'expriment ici et là. Elle fut marquée aussi par l'ambition, grande et nouvelle, que nourrissent aujourd'hui les Marocains pour le développement et le rayonnement de leur pays et quant à la prise en main de leur destin. Inscrite dans la continuité des grandes options du Maroc indépendant, capitalisant sur les acquis démocratiques et socioéconomiques réalisés sous le Règne de Feu Sa Majesté Hassan II, la première décennie du Règne de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI a consolidé la confiance des marocains en eux-mêmes, en leur potentiel et en leur avenir.

Le rappel de l'histoire passée, mythique, ressortit bien à ces pratiques symboliques nécessaires qui entourent tout discours du pouvoir pour l'imposer et le légitimer. La *Trajectoire* se compose de quatre parties qui évaluent les avancées et les difficultés. Elles s'intitulent: Une décennie de réformes politiques et sociétales majeures; Une option franche pour le développement humain et la solidarité; Une approche intelligente et pragmatique du développement économique; Des infrastructures en développement, au service de la compétitivité du pays.

C'est le premier chapitre de la première partie "Un nouveau style et de nouvelles valeurs pour un "vivre ensemble" renforcé et régénéré" qui constitue ici le cadre de l'évaluation des dix premières années du règne. Il est évidemment significatif qu'il traite de l'articulation entre le politique et le religieux, entre la modernité et la tradition. La monarchie "attachée à la démocratie et aux droits de l'homme" est bien cette forme de souveraineté moderne qui a su consolider son "intégrité territoriale" en donnant à chaque citoyen et à chaque parti politique la place qui lui revient dans l'Etat. Le "dossier du Sahara", d'emblée mentionné, est en effet une source de fierté pour l'administration marocaine, et certains experts⁷ vont même jusqu'à estimer qu'est mise ici en œuvre une logique du développement durable. Le roi, par son action, a réalisé les aspirations et le désir d'un peuple et d'un Etat. La menace terroriste et l'émergence d'intégrismes extrémistes se réclamant de la religion sont ensuite évoquées pour mieux souligner l'importance des "réformes audacieuses touchant aussi bien le champ religieux que des domaines de la vie civile régents par la référence religieuse". On ne peut qu'admirer ici l'expression précise des auteurs du texte. Il est clair que, si les ambitions politiques affirmées dans les discours

⁷ Cf. Henri-Louis Védie, *Une volonté plus forte que les sables: L'expérience du développement durable des régions sud-marocaines* (Paris: Eska, 2008).

royaux ne peuvent être satisfaites sans invoquer la religion, aucune réforme religieuse ne peut se réaliser sans le soutien d'un pouvoir politique légitime et reconnu.

La *Trajectoire décennale* indique donc:

Cela n'a fait que grandir la foi en un Islam authentique, modéré et tolérant... Ni la légitimité religieuse de l'Etat marocain, ni la sécurité spirituelle des Marocains ne se sont fragilisées. Au contraire, les Marocains demeurent attachés à l'essence de ce qui a toujours fait la force de l'islam marocain: l'institution d'Amir Al Mouminine, l'unité du Rite Malikite, la vertu de l'Ijtihad et le rejet des intégrismes et des extrémismes.

Ce sont bien les formes concrètes de pouvoir monarchique mêlant politique et religion qui peuvent entraîner les transformations des modes économiques et sociaux.

C'est ainsi que, selon l'évaluation royale, l'intégration de l'économie marocaine au monde globalisé accompagne les réaffirmations des identités individuelles et collectives, de l'identité nationale.⁸ Il est alors possible de parler de démocratie et de démocratisation, de développement humain et d'agir, sans que le religieux et le politique ne soient en lutte de domination. Religion et citoyenneté sont réconciliées. L'économique ne peut que profiter des liens réciproques et apaisés du religieux et du politique. L'INDH constitue une étape importante dans ce processus.

Ainsi, en 2009, la *Trajectoire décennale* a pour objectif d'affirmer que la politique du roi Mohammed VI, qu'il s'agisse de finance, de politiques sectorielles, d'infrastructures ou d'éducation, ne peut que contribuer à transformer le pays en un carrefour efficace entre l'Europe, le Moyen Orient, l'Afrique et l'Amérique, en un lieu de dialogue des cultures. Surtout, cette nouvelle configuration du religieux et du politique en Islam, telle qu'elle ressort de l'analyse des deux discours évoqués et de la *Trajectoire décennale*, peut peut-être donner à penser sur les relations entre autorités politiques et autorités religieuses en démocratie, dans la mesure où elle semble vouloir aboutir à ce qu'on peut dénommer une laïcité de reconnaissance du religieux et de dialogue avec lui.

Epilogue: Et pourtant

Aujourd'hui en 2011, depuis le mois de février, le "printemps arabe" a pénétré

⁸ Cf. Les remarques de Maurice Godelier, *Communauté, Société, Culture: trois clefs pour comprendre les identités en conflits* (Paris: Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), 2009).

le Maroc, instaurant des débats sociaux et des démarches participatives de toutes sortes. Dès le 9 mars 2011, le roi a annoncé une réforme constitutionnelle. Le "mouvement du 20 février" à Rabat a constitué une marge d'expression appréciable, mais certaines manifestations, celles du 13 mars ou celles de la fin du mois de mai, ont donné lieu à des violences policières inquiétantes. De nombreux journaux marocains, souvent demeurés ignorés de leurs confrères européens, et les réseaux sociaux ont attiré l'attention sur ces actes de violence inacceptables dans un pays qui prétend se démocratiser. De nombreux médias étrangers ont affiché leur enthousiasme: "Le Maroc rentre dans la modernité"; certains ont parlé d'une "limitation des pouvoirs du monarque" et d'un "renforcement de la démocratie". Certes, l'Ecole de Gouvernance et d'Economie de Rabat a mis en place des ateliers où des étudiants marocains sont venus s'exprimer sans aucune censure sur la constitution et faire des propositions, accompagnées parfois de critiques; ces propositions ont été reprises dans un document remis en juin à la Commission de révision de la constitution.

Le 17 juin 2011, le roi dans un discours extrêmement long a présenté les 180 articles de ce qui sera la sixième constitution du Maroc en quarante ans et qu'il qualifie de "tournant historique", et il a appelé les sujets-citoyens à l'approuver. Mais, contrairement à ce que beaucoup attendaient, il n'y a pas eu de véritable limitation par le roi de ses propres pouvoirs. Par exemple, Mohamed VI annonce qu'il devient "roi citoyen" et, immédiatement après, il déclare que "sa personne est inviolable et le respect lui est dû en tant que roi, commandeur des croyants et chef de l'Etat". Il est remarquable que la dénomination "chef de l'Etat" n'existait pas jusqu'à présent. "Cette réforme est un dépoussiérage, analyse Zakaria Choukrallah du journal *Actuel*. On passe d'une monarchie absolue à une monarchie intouchable". Tel est le pouvoir des mots. Le respect est une notion très vague qui peut conduire à des abus. Le roi reste au-dessus de la justice et aucune de ses actions ne pourra être contestée. Les magistrats, les diplomates, les militaires seront nommés par le roi. Le premier ministre voit ses pouvoirs élargis, puisqu'il sera issu du parti vainqueur des élections, et il sera pleinement responsable devant le Parlement. Les deux chambres ont deux fois plus d'attributions qu'actuellement, mais qui a le pouvoir de proposer la loi? Est-ce le Parlement ou le gouvernement? Pas un seul article ne l'indique. Les flous juridiques abondent dans cette constitution. Il est remarquable que la Commission de révision de la constitution avait penché pour "une liberté de croyance", mais cette liberté de croyance impliquant la possibilité de la conversion a été vivement combattue par les islamistes légaux du Parti de la Justice et du Développement, et seule la "liberté de culte" est finalement restée dans la constitution. Le roi, en cédant, s'est ainsi assuré le soutien de la frange légale des islamistes et des conservateurs dont le poids est important dans la société marocaine. Il apparaît ainsi que cette nouvelle constitution marque un recul par rapport à une laïcité de reconnaissance du religieux et de dialogue

avec lui, telle qu'elle était décelable dans la *Trajectoire décennale* de mars 2009. Sur la liberté d'information, la constitution est claire. L'article 27 interdit de parler de tout ce qui touche à la sûreté intérieure ou extérieure et à "la vie privée des personnes". C'est ainsi que la maîtrise des mots et des concepts aboutit à élargir les pouvoirs et désigne la maîtrise du jeu.

Les événements de 2011 au Maroc vérifient sans doute la pertinence d'une remarque de Tocqueville: derrière les ruptures visibles et les changements de régimes, il y a les inévitables continuités avec lesquelles il convient de composer pour démocratiser la vie politique et, à terme, peut-être, permettre une nouvelle configuration du politique et du religieux.

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Collective leadership during Thabo Mbeki's presidency: A rhetorical perspective

S'fiso Eric Ngesi

When Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as the President of a democratic South Africa, there was a generally-held view that he was just what the nascent post-apartheid South Africa needed.¹ Touted as “Africa’s Renaissance man”, he was determined to make Africa — as a whole — stable, democratic and less poor.² The then President of the United States, George W. Bush, once called him America’s “point man” in Africa.³ Conversely, Mbeki’s critics described him as enigmatic, aloof and arrogant.⁴ Others viewed him as paranoid.⁵

Whether these were accurate characterisations or not, Thabo Mbeki as the President of both the ANC and South Africa left a lasting imprint on the country’s political landscape. He is accredited, *inter alia*, with the founding of institutions like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Union (AU).⁶ His international standing, however, took a knock in 2000 when it emerged that he had questioned the link between HIV and AIDS.⁷ He equally courted controversy over his handling of the crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe.⁸

While there have arguably been many outstanding individual leaders in the

¹ Alec Russel, “Thabo Mbeki: Aloof leader who fell from grace” (2008): <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0433e6b6-87d3-11dd-b114-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1RmW86Xen>. (Accessed 5 September 2012).

² Adekeye Abajo, “Africa’s Renaissance man”: <http://www.crascdz.org/IMG/ARB%20Pdf/Africas%20Renaissance%20Man%20by%20Adekeya%20Adeba%20jo.pdf>. (Accessed 5 September 2012).

³ Tim Butcher, “Bush gives way to South Africa over call to topple ‘evil’ Mugabe Regime, (2003): <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/4188518/Bush-gives-way-to-South-Africa-over-call-to-topple-evil-Mugabe-regime.html>. (Accessed 5 September 2012).

⁴ William M. Gumede, *Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005): 34.

⁵ Quoted in “Thabo Mbeki: A man of two faces” (special report), *The Economist* (2005): <http://www.economist.com/node/3576543>. (Accessed 05 September 2012).

⁶ Timothy Burke, “Misrule in Africa: Is NEPAD the solution?”, *Global Dialogue* 3-4, 6 (2004): <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=312>. (Accessed 5 September 2012).

⁷ Katherine Furman, “Mbeki’s AIDS denialism” (2011): <http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/mbeki-aids-denialism>. (Accessed 06 September 2012).

⁸ “The many failures of Thabo Mbeki”, *The New York Times*, (2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/opinion/27iht-edmbeki.1.13244922.html?_r=0. (Accessed 5 September 2012).

African National Congress (ANC), one of the hallmarks of the party has been a reference to “collective leadership”. According to Raymond Suttner, the concept of “collective leadership” commenced in the 1950s. In this regard, Suttner maintains:

The importance of collective then was that an individual did not decide, but that it was more democratic. See, collective has been referred to as having a number of different potentialities. On the one hand, in war situations, it restricts what you can do. But in the context of the ANC of that time, when it started, to have collective leadership made it much more democratic than to have individual leadership. But it also meant that having discussed it fully, the collective would abide by that decision until individuals had persuaded others to depart from it. So this was the democratisation of the ANC.⁹

The underlying assumption in the ANC's *modus operandi* is that “the whole” is greater than “the part”. This then translates into a propensity where those in a leadership position often speak in the third person, using a pronoun “we” that, at times, makes it almost impossible to say with certainty whether the views expressed are those of the speaker or if the speaker speaks on behalf of the organisation. Until or unless explicitly stated, the assumption is that the speaker is a spokesperson of the collective.

In 1997, the ANC reflected on the features that those at the highest echelons of the party should possess. The discussions centred on the new challenges that the party faced as it was then in power. This paradigm shift had implications for the character and leadership of the organisation, with new emphasis on building the capacity to govern and implement programmes to transform the country. The success or otherwise of the ANC depended on how it performed on this front. After much deliberation on the issue, the party resolved, pertaining to its membership, in general, and the members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) — the party's highest decision-making body between conferences — in particular, that:

- An NEC member should understand ANC policy and be able to apply it under all conditions in which s/he finds her/himself. This includes an appreciation, from the NDR [National Democratic Revolution] stand-point, of the country and the world we live in, of the balance of

⁹ Raymond Suttner (interview), “Models of ANC leadership”, *Polity* (2010), <http://www.polity.org.za/article/models-of-anc-leadership-2010-08-20>. (Accessed 18 June 2012).

forces, and how continually to change this balance in favour of the motive forces of change.

- An NEC member should constantly seek to improve his/her capacity to serve the people. S/he should strive to be in touch with the people all the time, listen to their views and learn from them. S/he should be accessible and flexible and not give her/himself the status of being the source of all the wisdom.
- An NEC member should win the confidence of the people in their day-to-day work. Where the situation demands, s/he should be firm, and have the courage to explain and seek to convince others of the correctness of decisions taken by constitutional structures, even if such decisions are unpopular. S/he should not seek to gain cheap popularity by avoiding difficult issues, making false promises or merely pandering to popular sentiment.¹⁰

By virtue of being at the helm of the ANC NEC, the ANC President is expected to embody all the afore-mentioned qualities. This, however, does not prohibit an ANC President from having leeway or taking an initiative provided that this is done in the interests and within the confines of the constitutional structures of the party. As Mandela asserted:

There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way.¹¹

In its discussion document, titled “Through the eye of a needle: Choosing the best cadres to lead the revolution”, the ANC National Working Committee (NWC) — the most politically influential leadership collective in the country, comprising the ANC President, Deputy President, Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General, National Chairperson and Treasurer-General — expanded on Mandela’s view on leadership and argued:

A leader should seek to influence and be influenced by others in the collective. He should have the conviction to state his views boldly and openly within the constitutional structures of the movement and without being disrespectful. He should not cower before those in more senior positions in pursuit of patronage and should not rely on cliques to maintain his position.¹²

¹⁰ African National Congress (discussion document), “Challenges of leadership in the current phase” (1997): <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=307>. (Accessed 18 June 2012).

¹¹ Nelson Mandela, *Long walk to freedom* (London: Macdonald Purnell, 1995): 627.

¹² African National Congress “Through the eye of a needle: Choosing the best cadres

Again, in his closing address during the 1997 State of the Nation Address, Mandela made the following remarks on leadership:

Leadership means leadership. It implies sometimes moving ahead of one's constituency and — not seldom — taking unpopular decisions in the interests of the country and all its people.¹³

Moeletsi Mbeki, a brother to Thabo Mbeki, concurs with Mandela and opines:

A leader is someone who identifies political and/or economic opportunities that can lead to the solution of overwhelming social problems or challenges facing his or her community and successfully persuades others to work with his or her to implement those solutions.¹⁴

Mbeki's definition of a leader underlines the centrality of deliberative rhetoric as he argues that while a leader should exercise some discretion, it is incumbent upon him or her to persuade his or her followers of the advantage(s) that will accrue to them if they choose to initiate a particular course of action for the future. A leader does not have to impose his/her views on his/her followers. On the contrary, he/she has to argue his/her point of view persuasively always bearing in mind that "[n]o single person is a leader unto himself or herself, but a member of a collective".¹⁵ From an organisational perspective, when a person has a view on how to improve things or rectify mistakes, he/she should state them within organisational structures and seek to win others to his/her own thinking.

This paper looks at the arguments advanced by Thabo Mbeki during his tenure as President of the ANC and South Africa. The focus is on the "African Renaissance" and the racism debates. An attempt is made to analyse the rhetorical techniques used or arguments advanced by Mbeki as he had been mandated by the ANC or the Tripartite Alliance — the alliance between

to lead the revolution" (National Working Committee discussion document, 2001): <http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/2001/eye-needle.htm>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

¹³ Nelson Mandela, "Closing address on the State of the Nation Address, 12 February", *Debates of the National Assembly* (Cape Town: Hansard, 1997): 148.

¹⁴ Moeletsi Mbeki, *Advocates for change: How to overcome Africa's challenges* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2011): 1-2.

¹⁵ African National Congress "Through the eye of a needle: Choosing the best cadres to lead the revolution" (National Working Committee discussion document, 2001): <http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/2001/eye-needle.htm>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) — to lead the ANC and South Africa. As he exercised these dual roles, was Mbeki doing so within the ambit of “collective leadership”, as expected of an ANC leader? Is there any discernible evidence that he deviated from the norm?

Speech at his inauguration as President of South Africa — 16 June 1999

Following in Mandela's footsteps — someone revered as an international icon and on whom a “saintly” status had been conferred — would have been an almost insurmountable task for anyone. In an attempt to shake off Mandela's shadow, Mbeki chose the “African Renaissance” as one of the rallying points for his presidency. He called for an “African Renaissance” as a doctrine for Africa's political, economic and social renewal:

Being certain that not always were we the children of the abyss, we will do what we have to do to achieve our own Renaissance. We trust that what we will do will not only better our conditions as a people, but will also make a contribution, however small, to the success of Africa's Renaissance, towards the identification of the century ahead of us as the African century.¹⁶

Mbeki's call for an “African Renaissance” might have elicited mixed reaction from his audience. Some, especially the minorities, might have wondered whether this was not the ANC's turn towards narrow Africanism, a notion which risked excluding them from the new South Africa. Indeed, others dismissed it as “confusion”.¹⁷ Others might have understood it from a mythical perspective, a celebration of and a call for Africa that reportedly existed prior to slavery, colonialism and apartheid. It was therefore imperative for Mbeki to define the “African Renaissance” concept so that any possible misconception would have been dispelled. A failure to do so would have resulted in, *inter alia*, alienating certain South Africans and this could have made Mbeki's task of continuing with the transformation of the country that Nelson Mandela had initiated an almost impossible mission.

¹⁶ Thabo Mbeki, “Speech at his inauguration as President of South Africa”, (16 June 1999): <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1999/mbek0616.htm>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

¹⁷ Eddy Maloka, “The South African “African Renaissance” debate: A critique”: <http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol8ns/maloka.pd>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

Speech at the Launch of the African Renaissance Institute — 11 October 1999

The notion of the “African Renaissance” was first mooted within the ANC in 1997 at the party’s 50th National Congress as a key component of its ideological outlook, particularly pertaining to international matters. The ANC’s contention was that South Africa’s destiny was intrinsically linked to that of the African continent.¹⁸ It followed then that South Africa could not succeed without the success of the African continent. Through this lens, the “African Renaissance” debate could be characterised as a classic example of an argument of inclusion.¹⁹

On 11 October 1999, Mbeki launched the African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria. He used this occasion to elaborate on what he meant by “African Renaissance”. According to him, the concept meant “rebirth, renewal, springing up anew”.²⁰ Mbeki told his audience that throughout its existence, the ANC had “been exposed to the inspiring perspective of African unity and solidarity and the renewal of our continent”.²¹

Acknowledging that the idea of an “Africa Renaissance” was not his own invention — which can be viewed as a commonplace of precedent — and conceding that its attainment had previously been merely a pipe dream, Mbeki expatiated:

Accordingly, what is new about it today is that the conditions exist for the process to be enhanced, throughout the continent, leading to the transformation of the idea from a dream dreamt by visionaries to a practical programme of action for revolutionaries. What, then, are these conditions! These are:

- The completion of the continental process of the liquidation of the colonial system in Africa, attained as a result of the liberation of South Africa;
- The recognition of the bankruptcy of neo-colonialism by the masses of the people throughout the continent, including

¹⁸ African National Congress, “Discussion documents: Developing a strategic perspective on South African foreign policy (1 July 1997): <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2348>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

¹⁹ Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation*, J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver, trans. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1969): 231.

²⁰ Thabo Mbeki, “Speech at the launch of the African Renaissance Institute, Pretoria (11 October 1999): <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/991011345p1001.htm>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

²¹ *Ibid.*

- the majority of the middle strata;
- The weakening of the struggle among the major powers for spheres of influence on our continent, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War; and,
- The acceleration of the process of globalisation.²²

Here, Mbeki made use of the common topic of possibility.²³ He sought to persuade his audience that the existence of the conditions that he enunciated made the realisation of the “African Renaissance” possible. Although this argumentative technique has a persuasive effect, its success hinges on the interlocutor believing that the proposed course of action is feasible. A common way of inspiring an audience with confidence in the practicality of the particular proposed course of action is to cite examples of people who have accomplished a similar or identical thing.

State of the Nation Address — 25 June 1999

This was Mbeki's inaugural State of the Nation Address. It was arguably one of his most crucial speeches as there were still questions as to whether his presidency would continue with Mandela's nation-building and/or reconciliation project or it would mark a departure from this and, if so, what this meant for the country. Mbeki told his audience that he would lead the country according to the dictates of the ANC:

To these masses we owe the obligation to recommit the government on whose behalf I speak, to the construction of a people-centred society. This I am happy to do with all the authority at my command.²⁴

Mbeki's argument was predicated on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which advocated for a people-driven development. The RDP outlined the democratic mechanisms that had to be put in place, fostered and implemented so that South Africa could deal with the socio-economic challenges that it was confronted with. The RDP was a culmination of much discussions, consultations and negotiations between the ANC, SACP,

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Edward P. J. Corbett, *Classical rhetoric for the modern student* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 119.

²⁴ Thabo Mbeki, “Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa at the opening of Parliament (25 June 1999): <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/9906281018a1006.htm>. (Accessed 26 July 2012).

and COSATU, as well as mass organisations in the wider civil society.²⁵ By undertaking to base his presidency on the tenets of the RDP, it may be argued, Mbeki created the impression that he subscribed to the notion of “collective leadership”.

Perhaps in an endeavour to allay the fears of the sceptics and/or to assure investors, in particular, Mbeki promised continuity as regards the implementation of policies aimed at improving the lives of the people. In this regard, he contended:

The Reconstruction and Development Programme... and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) were implemented by our first democratic government to achieve socio-economic transformation and macro-economic stability... The RDP and GEAR will remain the basic policy objectives of the new government to achieve sustainable growth, development and improved standards of living.²⁶

However, Mbeki's insistence that his government would continue with the implementation of GEAR put him at loggerheads with the Tripartite Alliance. This was so because the SACP had expressed its objection to GEAR:

We remain convinced that GEAR is the wrong policy. It was wrong in the process that developed it, it is wrong in its overall conception, and it is wrong in much of its detail.²⁷

Echoing the sentiments of the SACP, another Tripartite Alliance ally, COSATU contended:

We have stated from the beginning that it was impossible for GEAR to meet some of its key targets, such as employment creation and growth, because of the contradictory fiscal and monetary that it pursues.²⁸

In sharp contrast to the RDP document which had been intensely discussed

²⁵ African National Congress, “Policy documents: A basic guide to the Reconstruction and Development Programme”: <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=234>. (Accessed 2 May 2012).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ “SACP slates GEAR”, *Mail & Guardian* (1998): <http://mg.co.za/print/1998-07-01-sacp-slates-gear>. (Accessed 14 September 2012).

²⁸ Congress of South African Trade Unions, “COSATU's response to the 1998/9 budget” (1998): <http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/subs/1998/budget98.htm>. (Accessed 14 September 2012).

within the Alliance partners, GEAR was reportedly preceded by no consultation within the ANC. It is argued that even top ANC figures were not acquainted with its details before its public release. Indeed, COSATU bemoaned this departure from the modus operandi within the Alliance:

One of the critical problems is the fact that the formulation of policies... has been driven by technocrats, the bureaucracy, and Ministries. *The ANC, and the Alliance more broadly, has found itself dealing with these policies as they emerge, rather than driving their development* [my emphasis]. The result is that we often have to react to policies which are directly opposed to the thrust of the platform outlined in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The introduction of GEAR... is the most serious example of this problem. GEAR in this respect, however, was not unusual. It followed a pattern of treating the Alliance with contempt by certain Ministers on issues of governance and policy formulation.²⁹

It is evident from the two aforementioned passages that both SACP and COSATU felt that they were sidelined from the decision-making processes and that their views were not accommodated by Mbeki and his Government. As COSATU stated, “a pattern of treating the Alliance with contempt” had taken root.³⁰

State of the Nation Address — 4 February 2000

After highlighting some inroads made into creating a “humane and people-centred society”, Thabo Mbeki argued that racism still remained one of the challenges that had the potential of jeopardising the gains that had been made. To buttress his argument, he extensively cited from an electronic mail in which a certain company engineer had made the following racist remarks:

I would like to summarise what the Kaffirs have done to stuff up this country since they came into power... If a white buys a house, he pays transfer duties. If a kaffir buys a house it is free of duties because he was ‘previously disadvantaged’... More than 20% of the GDP is embezzled by the kaffir politicians and corrupt civil servants.³¹

²⁹ Congress of South African Trade Unions, “COSATU 6th Congress” (1997): <http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2154>. (Accessed 2 May 2012).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Thabo Mbeki, “The State of the Nation Address” (4 February 2000): <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/000204451p1001.htm>. (Accessed 2 May 2012).

It is worth noting that the issue of racism predated Mbeki's presidency. It had earlier on been raised by the ANC as one of the issues that had to be tackled in the democratic South Africa. Delivering its January 8 statement — an annual occasion on which the ANC celebrates its anniversary — the party contended:

The distribution of wealth, income and opportunity in our society continues to be determined in terms of race and colour, a situation that will perpetuate itself if we do not elaborate policies and implement programmes to end this continued entrenchment of racism.³²

When Mbeki cited the company engineer, he had recourse to an argument by example.³³ This was intended to give credence to his contention that racism was still an issue in the new South Africa. Mbeki's technique had the potential to persuade his audience to concur with him that this was, indeed, the case. Conversely, some of Mbeki's interlocutors might have argued that the example he had given was just an isolated incident and therefore was not a true reflection of the general thinking of the majority of the White South Africans.

Response to the debate on the State of the Nation Address — 10 February 2000

During this debate, Mbeki read a letter that he had received from a White South African, Paul A. Dunn, who was reacting to his assertions on racism. In the letter, Dunn maintained:

It is with great shame that I write to you today as a white citizen of the RSA. I live in Russia temporarily for study reasons and read this morning of the absolutely abominable and offensive e-mail from a fellow white citizen. Certainly in your wisdom you know that not all South Africans, despite their colour, are racists. However, I know that in the Afrikaans segment, where I also come from, there are still those who are racists... Be assured that you have my own individual support in the struggle against racism. In my heart I long for the day

³² African National Congress, "Statement of the National Executive Committee on the occasion of the 84th anniversary of the ANC (8 January 1996): <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=64>. (Accessed 2 May 2012).

³³ Chaïm Perelman, *The realm of rhetoric*, W. Kluback, trans. (Notre Dame: University of Notre, 1982): 106.

when we will not refer to each other as black and white, but as fellow South Africans!³⁴

Mbeki made reference to a second letter from another White South African, Mr Lemmer, who “was sceptical... when the ANC first won the elections”.³⁵ Confessing that he used to revel in the ANC's shortcomings and would cite these as an indication of incompetence on the part of the ANC, Mr Lemmer asserted that he had had a change of heart and had committed himself to making a positive contribution to the creation of a non-racial South Africa.

The two cases chosen by Mbeki, rhetorically speaking, qualify as an argument by model.³⁶ The actions of the individuals cited serve as models of the kind of behaviour that should be emulated. The fact that the individuals that Mbeki referred to were Afrikaners might have persuaded some in Mbeki's audience to argue that the individuals in question demonstrated that despite his contention that there was racism, there were people who were ready to embrace the new South Africa. Indeed, one would further argue that this category of people might far outnumber the one that still harboured racist views.

Thabo Mbeki was often accused, especially by the opposition parties, of playing the “race card” with a view to justifying the incompetency of his leadership, as far as dealing with the challenges confronting the country was concerned.³⁷ Notwithstanding this charge, Mbeki was adamant that not sufficient progress had been made to bring about a non-racial South Africa that the country's Constitution envisioned.³⁸ He constantly made referrals to the country's Constitution which states that South Africa has one of its values a commitment to promote “non-racism and non-sexism”.³⁹

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³⁴ Thabo Mbeki, “Response to the debate on the State of the Nation Address (10 February 2000): <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/000210227p1007.htm>. (Accessed 2 May 2012).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Perelman, *The realm of rhetoric*, 110.

³⁷ Lawrence Schlemmer, “Thabo Mbeki's strategy” (2000): <http://www.hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/issues-11-20/issue-20-fourth-quarter-2000/thabo-mbekis-strategy>. (Accessed 4 April 2012).

³⁸ Thabo Mbeki, Statement at the opening of the debate in the National Assembly, on “Reconciliation and nation building” (29 May 1998): <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm>. (Accessed 4 April 2012).

³⁹ *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (1996): 3.

Songs that shaped the struggle: A rhetorical analysis of South African struggle songs

Sisanda Mcimeli Nkoala

1. Introduction

Struggle songs are a fundamental part of South Africa's political past, present and future. Being such significant entities in South African politics, much research has been done into tracing the history and significance of liberation songs. However, to date, not enough scholarly work exists which has discussed struggle songs as musical texts, and which looks at the fundamental argument that permeates each of them as such. The consequence of this is that very few political actors have been able to harness the persuasive power inherent in struggle songs in South Africa's post-apartheid dispensation. Currently it is only the governing African National Congress and its alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist party, that appear to have the monopoly on the use of struggle songs. There have been attempts by the opposing Democratic Alliance to use these songs in campaigning, however because the party does not yet fully understand how these songs function as tools of persuasion, and because the party has not yet managed to effectively utilise the historical memory imbedded in these songs to their advantage, these efforts have not yielded the desired outcome. Thus, a research paper such as this provides a model of how one can begin to analyse the elements that make struggle songs 'work', and then in turn utilise this knowledge to better persuade would-be supporters and voters in future.

Research of this nature runs the risk of coming across as placing too much emphasis on the role of music in South Africa's journey to liberation, at the expense of actual human life that was lost during this period. However as Perkins notes, "inspiration play[ed] an important role in mobilising the hearts and energies of people to strike back at forces which appear[ed] to be insurmountable".¹ Further, as Pring-Mill explains, "the sound of song is described as a blow at the invader, a rampart in defense, a weapon against injustice".² Struggle songs 'work' because in these songs one finds historical "events recorded passionately rather than with dispassionate objectivity, yet the pas-

¹ E. Perkins, "Literature of combat: Poetry of African liberation movements", *Journal of Black Studies* 7, 2 (1976): 226. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2783968>. (Accessed 2 August 2012).

² R. Pring-Mill, "The roles of revolutionary song — A Nicaraguan assessment in popular music", *Popular Music* 6, 2 (1987): 183. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/853420>. (2 August 2012).

sion is not so much that of an individual singer's personal response, but rather that of a collective interpretation of events from a particular 'committed' standpoint".³

1.1 Definition of liberation songs

In this paper the terms 'liberation music', 'liberation songs', 'struggle songs', 'struggle music', 'protest songs', and 'protest music' have been used interchangeably. The term 'protest song', became popular in "the context of the anti-war movement in the United States during the 1960s".⁴ It was used to describe songs of "socio-political commitment which... developed out of traditional folksong".⁵ But as Pring-Mill notes the phrase 'protest song' is:

Misleading insofar as it is interpreted to imply that all such songs are 'anti' something, denouncing some negative abuse rather than promoting something positive to put in its place.⁶

A more accurate description is that of "songs of hope and struggle".⁷ This is because over and above expressing 'resistance' to some form of oppression, these songs are about 'projecting hope' for the day when the oppression will be no more.

1.2 Using rhetorical analysis techniques in analysing struggle songs

According to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the discipline of rhetoric in its strictest sense is:

Concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated.⁸

If one considers aspects that made liberation art effective as part of a strategy to overthrow oppressive regimes, one can see that the efficacy of struggle songs lies largely in their ability to persuade. Through being functional, inspirational, educational, instructional, ideological and political, they were

³ *Ibid.* 179.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, W. R. Roberts, trans. (1994) 5. www.bocc.ubi.pt. (Accessed 25 September 2012).

able to be persuasive⁹. Since the ability to persuade is what informs other rhetorical texts such as speeches and debates, struggle songs can thus also be analysed using rhetorical analysis techniques. As Aristotle notes:

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.¹⁰

In liberation music all three modes are indeed present — the singers who fulfil the role of orator, the songs which play the role of the text, and the audience to whom the songs are being sung. However, the manner in which these modes manifest in struggle songs differs from the conventional arrangement of speeches.

1.2.1 Orator

Firstly, unlike instances where a speech is being delivered by a single orator, the delivery of struggle songs often occurs in a group context.¹¹ When one listens to interviews by struggle veterans, one gets a sense that the comradely spirit that was experienced, as people sang in unison about their struggles, as well as their hopes, unleashed a dynamic that would have been unachievable outside of the group context. Thus in the same manner that one would analyse the character and mannerism of an orator, in order to gauge their unique power to persuade, one needs to bear in mind the group dynamics present that made struggle songs such effective tools in the fight against apartheid.

1.2.2 Audience

The second aspect in which the employment of the modes of persuasion used in struggle songs differs from conventional speech delivered, is in the manner in which the orator (or singers of the song, in this case) were often simultaneously the audience to whom the song was being performed. Other than in instances where people were directly marching against apartheid authorities, and thus subsequently singing to these authorities, when groups gathered to sing struggle songs, they were in essence singing to themselves. In these instances, the purpose of the singing was still to persuade, even

⁹ Perkins, *Journal of Black Studies*, 230.

¹⁰ Aristotle, 8.

¹¹ Pring-Mill, *Popular Music*, 181-182.

though the singers were persuading themselves, in a sense. Likewise the songs were a “means used by.. people to speak of.. poverty.. sufferings [and].. exploitation”,¹² to rouse their fellow oppressed peoples to grow even more indignant against the injustices that they were being subjected to. This occurrence is important to note because in conventional rhetorical addresses:

Of the three elements in speech-making-speaker, subject, and person addressed — it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object.¹³

Thus when the hearer is the same person as the speaker, as is the case in the performance of struggle songs, the dynamic changes altogether.

1.2.3 Speech

The final dynamic that one encounters in the analysis of struggle songs using rhetorical techniques is the fact that the struggle songs were not static texts, and were often not written down. With each phase of the struggle, song were often modified in order to capture the emotions and articulate the conditions of the time. The consequence of this is that the lyrics, and even the structure of the songs, were often subject to change, which implies that the meaning was also often altered. Further, the fact that the actual physical and musical performance of a song were part and parcel of how it was used to be persuasive, implies that one cannot simply read lyrics and then perform a rhetorical analysis on that basis. Rather, one needs to watch the songs performed in order to get a sense of not only what they sounded like, but what kind of actions accompanied them. This is not always mandatory when one analyses at a conventional speech because the assumption is that the techniques of persuasion are primarily expressed in the text.

Yet despite these interesting additional dynamics, the fact that struggle songs are texts that were used to persuade implies that they can be analysed rhetorically to come to a better understanding of how they employed rhetorical genres and proofs in order to persuade.

The songs that will be analyzed are *Senzeni Na?* and *Pasopa Verwoerd*.

2. Discussion

By way of lyrical content, *Senzeni Na?* is a very simple song. The lyrics as per a recording of a performance by the Bangor Community Choir are as follows:

¹² Pring-Mill, *Popular Music*, 181.

¹³ Aristotle, 15.

Senzeni Na?

Senzenina? (x4)
Sonosethu, ubumyama? (x4)
Sonosethuyinyaniso ? (x4)
Sibulawayo (x4)
Mayibuye i Africa (x4)¹⁴

(Translation)

What have we done? (x4)
Is our sin the fact that we are black? (x4)
Is our sin the truth? (x4)
We are being killed (x4)
Return Africa (x4)

In a documentary on the history of South Africa's struggle songs called *Amandla! A revolution in four part harmony*, one of the interviewees, Duma Ndlovu, a former apartheid activist said:

Senzeni Na? like *We Shall Overcome*, will take her rightful place in society, because at one time a mass body of people related to that song and touched each other's hearts using that song.¹⁵

The song was sung mainly at funerals, protest marches and rallies.¹⁶ Without a real indication of when the song first appeared, it is difficult to speculate on what events may have triggered its composition, however what is clear is that it formed part of the struggle repertoire from the earlier days of apartheid right through into the country's democratic dispensation post-1994.

Three of the four verses of *Senzeni Na?* are posed as rhetorical questions, leading to the conclusion that part of the song's efficacy lies in its approach of posing probing questions that are not meant to be answered, but rather are meant to evoke an internal response from the subconscious of those being questioned. In this regard, a study by Burnkrant and Howard shows that "introducing a counter-attitudinal message with questions leads to more intensive processing of message content than introducing it with statements".¹⁷ Used in this context, where there really were no concrete or

¹⁴ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sMKm1Ulc0U>

¹⁵ Lee Hirsch, *Amandla! A revolution in four-part harmony* (Kwela Productions, 2004).

¹⁶ Hirsch, *Amandla!* 2004.

¹⁷ R. E. Burnkrant and D. J. Howard, "Effects of the use of introductory rhetorical questions versus statements on information processing", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 47, 6 (1984) 1227.

logical answers as to what black South Africans had 'done' to deserve the harsh treatment that they were being subjected to by the apartheid regime, the use of the rhetorical questions in *Senzeni Na?* is a way of exposing the absurd nature of the race-based laws of apartheid. Speaking in an interview which is featured on the same documentary singer, songwriter and activist Sibongile Khumalo alluded to the power of the song lying also in the repetitive nature of the lyrics. She says, "if you ask *senzeni na?* (what have we done?) four times, someone is bound to get the message".¹⁸

According to Aristotle's principles on rhetoric, *Senzeni Na?* falls into the forensic genre of rhetoric, in that it is concerned about the past, and what the oppressed black nation 'had done' to warrant being treated so unjustly. That is why the employment of the enthymemes, as they are expressed in the questioning form of the song, are so effective. Aristotle notes that "it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen".¹⁹ Thus the song is effective because it makes compelling statements by posing these statements as questions, and thereby demonstrates that there are no good reasons why such atrocities, as were perpetuated under apartheid, should have happened.

In his discussion on what makes a statement persuasive, Aristotle notes: "[a] statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so".²⁰ The argument being made in *Senzeni Na?* is posed in question form, but is in fact the statement "we have done nothing to deserve this treatment". Instead of stating this directly, however, the statement is made more persuasive by framing it as a question with an obvious answer that effectively implicates those who were responsible for perpetuating the injustices of apartheid. The syllogism that is being made in this song can be given as follows:

1. Atrocities are perpetuated against bad people,
2. Being black does not automatically make you a bad person, therefore,
3. We do not deserve these atrocities that are being perpetuated against us simply because we are black.

Looking over the structure of the entire song, one observes that *Senzeni Na?* adheres to Aristotle's prescription for the structure of a conventional rhetorical speech, namely that "[a] speech has two parts. You must state your case, and you must prove it".²¹ The question-statements in the first three

¹⁸ Hirsch, *Amandla!* 2004.

¹⁹ Aristotle, 44.

²⁰ Aristotle, 10.

²¹ *Ibid.* 166.

verses of the song state the claim and prove it simultaneously because they cause the listener to arrive at the obvious conclusion themselves.

*What have we done? Nothing.
Is our sin that we are black? No.
Is our sin the truth? No.*

Thus while being simple and somewhat repetitive, these properties render *Senzeni Na?* a text that makes a compelling argument rhetorically.

The last verse of the song is interesting to note because it deviates from the verses preceding it. It is a demand, and somewhat of an instruction, that based on the fact that there really was no logical answer to why black people were suffering, they now need to act to claim Africa back for Africans. It is as though it is compelling the singers that now that they have argued and proved the absurd nature of the injustices that they were being subjected to, they must work at reclaiming the Africa that they know and love, in order to restore it to its former glory and its original people. This is an important aspect of how the song manages to be persuasive because without a call to action, it would merely be deliberation of what had happened, and not really a rhetorical text that persuades the audience to some form of action.

Looking at the performance of *Senzeni Na?*, the repetitive lyrics, combined with the somewhat slow and sombre tune, meant that it was easy for a person to speak while the crowd hummed or continued to sing the song softly in the background. This style of performance for this song can be seen in a scene in the documentary *Amandla!* In the segment that looks at *Senzeni Na?* there is footage from a funeral. While *Senzeni Na?* is being sung quietly, two youths break out into monologues. Following in the wake of the questioning nature of the lyrics of the song, they too ask questions such as "how long, mama, will our people continue to die", as they mourn their fallen comrades.²²

For a song that was not nearly as militant in content and tune as some of the other songs that were composed during the latter years of the struggle, the performance of *Senzeni Na?* in contexts such as these, manages to evoke anger and communicates a sense of frustration at the injustices of the time.

Before considering the second song, *Pasopa Verwoerd*, a brief discussion must be held on the issue of language use and translation when it comes to liberation music. One of the complexities of attempting to translate struggle songs into English is that a great deal of meaning is lost in the translayion process. The isiXhosa and isiZulu lyrics that were used when composing these songs were deliberately chosen by the composers because

²² Hirsch, *Amandla!*

of their political and linguistic significance. Attempts to translate them into English often fail because the ideas embodied are specific to those languages, and cannot be adequately articulated in one or two English words. This is not to say that words do not exist to accomplish this, but rather this means that the corresponding English words have different meanings and discourses to their vernacular counterparts. Take for instance the isiXhosa word and concept of *ubuntu*. Simply translated, it means “one’s humanity”. If you ask a Xhosa speaking person to explain it though, you will most likely get a paragraph long discussion which includes aspects such as culture and belief, all of which fail to be captured by the literal English translation. Such is the plight of many of the words used in struggle songs, and hence a great deal of misunderstanding has arisen as South Africans have attempted to discuss liberation music in the post-apartheid era by using English as the primary language when conducting those dialogues in the public sphere.

For the purposes of this research, the translations given have been as literal and as verbatim as possible. This was done for simplicity, so as to avoid drawn out discussions on the translation. Venturing into the realm of interpretative translation would have required extensive discussions on other linguistically relevant topics such as grammar and context. Thus simplicity was chosen, although at the expense of thoroughness. Such a sacrifice is warranted, however, especially in the case of this study which seeks to discuss meaning in context.

Pasopa Verwoerd

Nantsi’ndodemnyama, Verwoerd (x4)

Pasopa nantsi’ndodemnyama, Verwoerd (x4)

Nantsi’ndodemnyama, Verwoerd (x4)²³

(Translation)

Here is the black man, Verwoerd (x4)

Watch out here comes the black man, Verwoerd (x4)

Here comes the black man, Verwoerd (x4)

As with the preceding song, the lyrics to this song are simple and repetitive, making them easily transferable in a group context. Also without delving too deeply into the intricate musical components of the discussion, the stoical tune and almost daring melody of this song, add to its confrontational feel. Lyrically, *Pasopa Verwoerd* is a direct warning to Hendrik Verwoerd who is said

²³ Hirsch, *Amandla!*

to have been the “architect” of apartheid.²⁴ Verwoerd was the Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958-1966. It was during his tenure in the South African government that liberation movements such as the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress were banned. He is described as the architect of apartheid because it was while he was minister of Native Affairs, and then subsequently South Africa’s Prime Minister, that the policy of racial segregation, as espoused by apartheid, was formulated and passed as law.²⁵

It is interesting to note that the one key word that indicates this warning, namely the Afrikaans derivative *pasopa* (or *passop* in proper Afrikaans), has a Xhosa equivalent, *lumkela*, which means “look out” or using a slightly stronger tone, “watch out”, and yet this Xhosa word is not used. Instead a word similar to the Afrikaans warning word *Passop* is used. Because this song was normally used when struggle activists were marching in direct confrontation to the apartheid police or army,²⁶ it can be assumed that the Afrikaans word was deliberately chosen so that the apartheid authorities could comprehend that a direct warning and challenge was being issued to them. By simply singing “Pasopa Verwoerd” or “Passop Verwoerd” the marches ensured that the apartheid authorities were able to understand that a warning was being issued. As freedom-fighter and current ANC National Executive Committee member Thandi Modise put it: “When you really, really wanted to make the *Boers* (Afrikaaners) mad, you sang *Pasopa Verwoerd* because you were almost daring them”.²⁷

Pasopa Verwoerd also falls into the deliberative genre of rhetoric because it warns the audience of an event that is still to come. As Aristotle explains, the deliberative orator “is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against”.²⁸ For the deliberative orator, the end is “establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action”.²⁹ In the case of this song, the warning is that if ‘the white man’ as personified by Verwoerd, continues on the oppressive path that he is on, the black man will retaliate. It is a warning that the black man (*ndod'emnyama*) will one day have his day of revenge. At its core, the deliberative genre is concerned with what actions or choices will result in future good. Some of the advantageous things that Aristotle notes include health, beauty, justice, honour and reputation. Most pertinent to this song, however, is the issue of justice, and to some extent honour and reputation for

²⁴ H. Kenney, *Architect of apartheid: H.F. Verwoerd, an appraisal* (Johannesburg: J.Ball, 1980).

²⁵ C. M. Cole, *Performing South Africa's Truth Commission: Stages of Transition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010): 31.

²⁶ Hirsch, *Amandla!*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Aristotle, 15.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

the oppressed black nation.

The predominant artistic proof used in this song is ethos. This is because *Pasopa Verwoerd* deals strongly with expounding on “human character and goodness”.³⁰ Because the ethos proof functions mainly by drawing on the values espoused by the audience, as opposed to the orator, the song’s direct address to Verwoerd personalises the message being delivered. Further it plays quite strongly on the sense of fear that existed in both black and white South Africans, based on the fact that the conditions under apartheid were so turbulent that at any moment violence could break out on either side. This song warns the apartheid government of a pending day when the oppressed black South Africans would decide to rise up against the regime, and in so doing successfully draws on the fears of white South Africans. This combination of the use of the deliberative genre, together with the ethos proof, renders this a persuasive text.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, by considering the songs above, it has been shown that it is possible, through textual analysis, to analyse struggle songs as texts and in so doing to decipher the methods and techniques they employ to make rhetorically sound arguments. The songs have been viewed primarily as texts capable of persuasion. That the history of the songs has also been a key feature of the discussion is a consequence of their meaning being deeply imbedded in where they come from and how they were used in the past. The purpose, however, has been to move the discussion around South Africa’s struggle songs from one that focuses primarily on the history and context in which these songs were written and sung, to one that analyses and discusses the actual content of the songs in order to understand them as texts with relevance in relation to the country’s political communication field post-1994. What is interesting about these songs is that they do not remain lost in the apartheid days, and still form a very important part of South African political culture, especially in political entities with a strong liberation history such as the governing ANC (African National Congress) as well as parties like the Azanian People’s Organisation and the PAC (Pan African Congress).

The second issue that has been unveiled in relation to liberation music is the fact that language will always be a barrier when dealing with South Africa’s past, particularly where struggle songs are involved. It is a pity that the national debates around this music, that have occurred since 1994, have been conducted primarily on English media platforms. This issue of translation has been particularly contentious in the South African media, as

³⁰ *Ibid.*

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controversy has arisen as a result of the singing of certain songs that, when directly translated from the vernacular into English, have violent undertones which are not necessarily present in the original isiZulu and isiXhosa versions. It must not be forgotten that even language was contested terrain during the struggle because of the recognition that a people's culture and ideas are intimately linked to the language that they spoke. As such, the exclusive nature of struggle songs was deliberate and must be born in mind, even as some of the lyrics have had to be translated for the purposes of academic writing that can be understood by a larger audience.

For the foreseeable future, struggle songs will continue to play a prominent role in South African political communication. Even though many of these songs are strongly linked with the ANC, it is worth noting that because they are so organic, different political parties that were not around during the apartheid era can indeed begin to appropriate them to communicate their own messages if they educate themselves on some of the issues of meaning discussed in this dissertation. By doing so, they too can begin to draw on the rich historical significance that these songs possess, and harness the political clout that these communication tools carry.

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Street republic in Egypt: From bullets to ballots

Ibrahim Saleh

On 2 June 2012, Hosni Mubarak and his Minister of Interior were both convicted and given life sentences. This comes fifteen months after the spark of the 2011 revolution that marked a great moment of history, though it aggravated many of the suppressed problems associated with the disorientation towards democracy and the confusion about what to do next.

This sweet moment revived the notion of “street politics”,¹ where grassroots movements of young people, workers and the most downtrodden succeeded to get rid of the autocratic regime, but it brought back the notion of ballots and bullets that kept no one really knowing when or if the bitter fruits can ever sweeten.²

The Egyptian revolution has stalled causing an escalation of anger and disappointment felt by the majority of Egyptians regarding their continuous subjection to the bullets of police forces; even ballots did not serve the initial goal of the revolution of establishing a new secular and democratic Egypt. Instead, anarchism, conflicts of interests, and fragmented public opinion were reflected in the ballots giving way to Islamic fascism. As stated by a revolutionary activists in the socialist party news paper: “Egypt is like a house where the curtains have been changed but everything else is the same”.³

This perplexing situation was marked with a continuous swing between revolution and counter-revolution, often with movements in both directions taking place at the same time leading to bloody, unsettled and confusing scenarios. However, it only emphasized the weakness of the Egyptian capitalist class and its inability to stabilise a democratic and inclusive rule.

Authorities during Mubarak’s dynasty and even after the revolution represented by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), adopted pervasive means to maintain their power through the use of live bullets, to keep the exhausted public silenced, and by using various other manoeuvres to affect the ballots in their favour or at least aligning the results with their political agenda to ensure their continued control over the country’s present

¹ Assef Bayat, “Activism and social development in the Middle East”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 1-28.

² Ibrahim Saleh, “When the sweet Arab Spring turns sour: The ties that bind”, *Insights: Journal of the Association of Schools of Journalism and Mass Communication* 1 (2012): 71-75.

³ David Johnson, “Egypt — A year of revolution and counter-revolution”, *Socialist Party Newspaper* (25 January 2012): <http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/13572>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

and future while offering them a safe exit if needed. Besides, the SCAF claimed to protect Egypt from falling into a total state of anarchy.⁴

This absence of political dynamism had dire consequences, influencing the performance of the “Majlas ElShab” (People’s Assembly) and turning it into a handpicked house of representative and thus demoralising the national police forces into suppressing religious and liberal political descent.

In this unfortunate setting, many Egyptians (liberal and conservatives, Muslims and Christians, rich and poor and old and young) found themselves plunged into civil strife and prolonged fighting. It was in fact a direct confrontation between the familiar and the strange, the visible and the vocal, wherein sentiments and outlooks are formed, spread, and expressed, particularly the suppressed views of the bitter poor, the desperate unemployed and formerly silenced actors like students, workers, and state employees.

This dilemma left Egyptians with limited choices between, not the ballot or the bullet, but the bullet and the bullet. These unfolding of events brought about a time, when ‘street republic’ represented a new space and set of dynamics for those who were structurally and functionally absent from positions of power in the past. It becomes pertinent to revisit the essence of Malcolm X’s seminal speech on social justice: “The ballot or the bullet” that declared that freedom must be attained by any means necessary.⁵

The reason is the obvious — because the parliament crowned the winning of a new Islamic fascism at the expense of all which Egyptians had fought for. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won with 47 percent of 498 seats, the more extremist Islamist Salfist organisation “Al Nour Party” (The Light) won 25 percent, and seculars “Wafd” (Delegation) and “Egyptian block” each won 9 percent. And the two candidates going for the run off for the presidential election, (Ahmed Shafik and Mohamed Morsi) represented an odd political formula of a close friend of Mubarak (Shafik), and the head of Freedom and Justice, the political arm of MB (Morsi), and were both under the watchful eyes of SCAF.

Though both elections demonstrate how Egyptians aspire toward electoral process, it frames the increasing power of Islamic Fascism in Egypt which appeals to idealistic young people with a desire for a ‘clean’ utopian future and with a bitter nostalgia for past empires and lost glories.⁶

⁴ Kambiz Basetvat, “Will the ruling class in Egypt fundamentally transform itself?” *Global Politician*: <http://www.globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=7311>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

⁵ Malcolm X, “The ballot or the bullet” (3 April 1964): http://www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/malcolm_x_ballot.html. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

⁶ Christopher Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism”, *Slate* (22 October 2007): http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/10/defending_isl

The new space is not only exploited by the ballots and bullets as a result of the military dominance over the political life, but it is also controlled by fanatics operating a fascistic concept of the “pure” and the “exclusive” over the unclean and the “kufar” (profane) that compromises the role of the moderate Islamist and secular liberal actors.

The bigger dilemma now is to try to predict the future of an ongoing revolution with these divergent extremist political forces like Islamists and leftist who united to overrun the military and annihilate the last bastion of law and order to pursue an interruption of political democracy.

It is thus very important to cast a backwards glance to try and figure out, with some perspective, the dynamics of what has happened, physically and conceptually. It is also important to comprehend how the “street republic” was used as a space for negotiating freedom and democracy via ballots, though bullets remained front stage of such negotiations.

Institutions cannot be accurately analyzed and studied without recurring to the individual actions that shaped and transformed them. The whole state, groups in civil society and traditional authorities only become tangible and effective through the agency of people who oriented their actions towards them.

One keeps wondering how the promise of a democratic future was simply sullied and turned into permanent confrontations between progressive (if sometimes underspecified) politics and tenacious authoritarian rulers. It is probably the fault of the ‘demeanor’ of the military rather than the vibrancy of the public spheres.⁷

How the street republic redefined politics

Time has already passed since the beginning of the 2011 popular protests, when Egyptians assumed the beginning of democratic era based on free and fair elections. Indeed, both the parliamentary elections and presidential elections could have captured this fresh start of ‘street republic’.

In Imbaba, one of Cairo’s poorest residential areas, excitement and positive vibes were felt from the queues formed outside the gates of the ‘Gihad secondary school’, which served as a polling station. This euphoria hinted at the establishment of Egypt’s ‘second republic’.⁸ And in Abdeen, the

amofascism.html. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

⁷ Barrie Axford, “Talk about a revolution: Social media and the MENA uprisings”, *Globalizations* 8, 5 (2011): 681-686: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14747731.2011.621281>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

⁸ Ian Black “Egyptians head to polls in presidential election ushering in ‘second republic’”, *The Guardian* (23 May 2012): <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/23/egypt-elections-voters-polling-stations>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

Cairo district where King Farouk lived until he was overthrown by Nasser and the 'Free Officers' in 1952, voters streamed into the polling stations in the shadow of the wall of concrete blocks protecting the hated interior ministry from attack. On the corner of Tahrir Square, images of 'martyrs' stared down from every slogan-scarred wall. The nearby Muhammad Mahmoud Street was renamed as 'Ayoun al-Hurra' (eyes of freedom), a grim tribute to protesters who were blinded when soldiers fired birdshot at them last year. It is thus explainable to make connections between the media ecologies of protest and political change as the interlocking of political discourses⁹ for destabilising and delegitimising authoritarian power structures theoretically,¹⁰ as well as empirically.¹¹ This emergence of new forms of resistance culture catered to the desperate need for change in the post-uprising phase,¹² which was affected by the Iron Cage of Liberalism¹³ and explains the discrepancy between the insincere commitment to the liberal democratic principles of the former regime and its actual performance.¹⁴ The situation was further intensified with the crippling of the economy as a result of corruption and inept bureaucracies.¹⁵

The use of a common language and the sharing of skills through local/indigenous knowledge (Local or indigenous knowledge refers to the social, historical, and cultural experience of individuals within a distinct culture or locality that differs from the westernized/scientific epistemology that usually often excludes local knowledge, ignores cultural values, and disregards the needs of local communities. These local experiences, identities, and definitions need to be encouraged and empowered as a necessary ingredient to truly sustainable development) enabled the marginalised and disregarded voices to speak, be heard, and become valuable contributors to events,¹⁶ especially through the use of 'open sources'

⁹ Jürgen Habermas *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 1989).

¹⁰ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press: 1998).

¹¹ Philip Howard, *The digital origins of dictatorship and democracy: Information technology and political Islam* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹² Simon Cottle, "Media and the Arab uprisings of 2011: Research notes", *Journalism* 12, 5 (2011): 647-659. <http://jou.sagepub.com/content/12/5/647.full.pdf+html>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

¹³ Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978).

¹⁴ Daniel Ritter, *Why the Iranian Revolution was nonviolent: Internationalized social change and the iron cage of Liberalism* [Dissertation], (University of Texas at Austin, 2010).

¹⁵ Tarek Elswaei, "A revolution of the imagination", *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011): 1197-1206.

¹⁶ Victoria Annewsom, Lara Lengel and Catherine Cassara, "Local knowledge and the revolutions: A framework for social media information flow", *International Journal of*

to overcome communication barriers (offline and online).¹⁷ This encouraged the protests to build up alternative flows to aid and perpetuate the established systems of communication, by connecting and overcoming any gaps along the way.¹⁸

In this context, “Al-Tahrir Square” (Liberation Square) has become an emblem of popular struggles in a sort of re-appropriation of physical centers of the polis within the notion of ‘cybernetics’¹⁹ to produce and reproduce the structure of political community and experiment with collaborative administration.²⁰

The square was officially the epicentre of the ‘street republic’, where all players, voices and actors shared their dreams and fears regarding the ballots and bullets. As the Iraqi poet and critic, Sinan Antoon put it eloquently: “Cairo commune, ready to conquer the skies to achieve the legitimate demands of the popular revolution”. It was a heroic struggle of “ordinary” people in “extraordinary” times.²¹ The occupation of the square helped Egyptians join forces and generate a brute force which was expressed in riots and mob violence that echoed their long overdue anger and frustration with their harsh and miserable lives.

Many groups of activists, including Islamists, agreed to hold a joint demonstration on 29 July motivated by their demands for an end to the emergency law, for the putting of Mubarak and his close circles on public trial, for the prosecution of police officers and soldiers who had attacked the peaceful protestors, and for the establishment of a free secular civilian government.

To serve that goal, more than one million Egyptians took part in the ‘Day of Kandahar’. In July 2011 alone there were 22 sit-ins, 19 strikes, 20 demonstrations, ten protests and four short-term protest gatherings

Communication 5 (2011): 1303-1312.

¹⁷ Brian Katulis and Susan Brooks-Thistlethwaite, “Power shift: WikiLeaks illustrates a new dynamic at play across the globe”, *Centre for American Progress* (16 December 2010): http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/power_shift.html. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

¹⁸ Max Rousseau, “Le mouvement des immobiles”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (July 2011): <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2011/07/ROUSSEAU/20762>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

¹⁹ Pedro Noel, “A new culture of resistance: From WikiLeaks to the squares”, *Reflections on Revolutions* (11 November 2011): <http://roarmag.org/2011/11/from-wikileaks-to-the-squares-a-new-culture-of-resistance/>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

²⁰ Stewart Umpleby, “The science of cybernetics and the cybernetics of science”, *Cybernetics and Systems* 21, 1 (1989): 109-121.

²¹ Mona Anis, “Of bullets, ballots and counter-revolution”, *Al-Ahram Weekly online*, (29 December 2011): <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1078/eg4.htm>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

counted,²² motivated by their aim to improve their wages, secure permanent contracts, and clear out Mubarak's stooges from senior management.

Egyptians' hopes for change, the future and democracy faded away with the beginning of the deadly mass protests against the pace of democratic reform that erupted everywhere. The 'street republic' blamed the failure of traditional media to respond to the citizens' needs. Egyptian private media was weak, while the public media are still (after transition) captured by the state/ruling party.

Voter turnout decreased from 52 percent in the first round to less than half, though the SCAF threatened to enforce a fine for not voting. However, activists remained very present in the election meetings, questioning and challenging candidates in front of their audiences that clearly helping them gain a better understanding of how to win support among the masses.

But pertinent questions remained unanswered: How suitable is the current political environment for allowing people to express themselves? Is it safe for the public to vote? The fact is, the former sweet 'street republic' has turned sour as a result of the fragmented views of the public and that the Egyptian revolution made a detour from its original goals and visions. In brief, there is a complete dissintigration of the social contract in Egypt that used to reconcile differences.

The broken social contract: Ballot and bullet

Since the 1952 coup d'état the Egyptian state has always used its economic power to manipulate the public, this as a result of its being the main provider of everything and that which kept the society divided between two poles, namely the elite and the militants, while leaving the third sector (the grassroots) completely marginalised and neglected.²³

Violence coloured this broken social contract resulting from among other reasons, police brutality against civilians, the emergence of Islamists, and attacks against Egyptian Christians/secular movements. The 'street republic' underlined the frustration with the revolution felt by many Egyptians that resulted from continuous chaos, a shipwrecked economy, a breakdown in public services, increasing crime and persistent protests that turned into bloody riots. That has left many craving stability.²⁴

²² David Johnson, "Egypt — A year of revolution and counter-revolution", *Socialist Party Newspaper* (25 January 2012): <http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/13572>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

²³ Ibrahim Saleh, "Sitting in the shadows of subsidization in Egypt: Revisiting the notion of street politics", *Democracy and Security* 4, 3 (2008): 245-267.

²⁴ Michael Vincent, "The full story... From bullets to the ballot box", *The World Today*

The unavailability of *tawzir* (ballot fraud) critically shaped the regime's calculated decision to relinquish its commitment to peaceful elections. Ballot fraud, or ballot-box stuffing, is not only common in authoritarian elections, but constituted the most effective tool to correct unexpected and/or undesired opposition inroads until very late in the election process. In any event, however, the presence of judicial supervision rendered it very difficult, if not impossible, for the Egyptian authorities to resort to this illegitimate electioneering device.

This has come in contrast to the earlier of SCAF's views that the second republic offers the first opportunity to participate in relatively free elections. Such public discontent caused the enthusiastic public to become very wary of the possible outcomes. An omen that proved valid by 2013, but even then the positive street atmosphere faded and was turned violent, while the less active audience (usually called the 'Al-Kanbah' or "The Sofa Party", an Egyptian slang term for disinterested supporters of the revolution) became reluctantly supportive of to the former positive atmosphere of the early days of the revolution and many decided to abstain from the voting.

In the final days before voting began Egyptians looked for an alternative to both Islamists and the 'feloul' (the old guard associated with the former regime).

Violence escalated in the face of an SCAF that used force against the opposition groups posing the gravest threat to itself. Before the revolution, violence was mainly directed towards an MB that had a strong showing at the ballot box, which endangered the National Democratic Party's (NDP) stranglehold over the legislature which in turn constituted a key pillar of authoritarian survival.

At the time, Egypt endured several violent confrontations, such as the "Bloody Sunday" protests; where at least 27 civilians were killed and 300 were wounded,²⁵ which left Egypt on the brink of sectarian violence between the army and the Egyptian people. In another instance of sectarian violence,²⁶ Christian Egyptians marched peacefully against religious persecution but the protesters were attacked. The army used tear gas to disperse protesters at Maspero (the state TV building in downtown Cairo), and where rocks were thrown down from the October 6 bridge by police and armed forces.

(28 November 2011): <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3378044.htm>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

²⁵ Roni Durkan, "Egypt's troubled road from revolution to chaos", *Big Peace* (24 October 2011): <http://bigpeace.com/rdrukan/2011/10/24/egypts-troubled-road-from-revolution-to-chaos/>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

²⁶ Yasmine Fathi, Lina El-Wardani, Mostafa Ali and Nada El-Kouny, "Protest against persecution of Copts in Egypt attacked with bloody force", *Ahram online* (9 October 2011): <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/23714.aspx>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

Islamists quickly jumped front of stage which reflected the increasing role of the MB in various academic institutions and socialist guilds that seemed to pursue an “Islamic democracy” formula.

Later, many more incidents occurred of peaceful protests being broken up by the riot or the military police as well as a continuous pattern of arbitrary arrests of demonstrators, journalists and sometimes activists. These recurrences of attacks did not stop the fight for freedom, but only served to further radicalise the activists.

The escalation of violence emanated primarily from the ‘revolution block’, which felt betrayed by the SCAF and other religious groups. The anger and growing frustration was a result of the marginalisation and seclusion instead of inclusion and recognition within the polity. Besides, the polarisation and conflict within the religious groups, especially by the ‘Salafist’ and later by the Islamists terrorised the young secular grassroots movements and created many violent confrontations between the two fractions smearing the revolution with blood and violence. Later, the ‘fatwa’ or religious legislations against the secular groups turned Egypt into a complete religious inquisition.²⁷ In a desperate attempt to rectify things, young protesters decided to take matters into their own hands and went into other neighbourhoods to convince people to gather at the square. As stated by Tawfik Gamal: “We’re going to go out on the streets and start screaming and ask people to join us”.²⁸

In these reciprocating agitations of the ballots and bullets, the ‘street republic’ was compromised as a result of the widening gap between different constituents and political colours in Egypt. It was further shaken by the absence of viable alternatives to manufacture desired election outcomes so late in the voting process and at minimal external cost.

When the SCAF insisted on maintaining its control over the army budget, massive demonstration were off on 18 November, in which the MB and hard-line Islamist ‘Salafists’ participated. Sadly, activists endured more aggressive attacks over the following five days by the army and security forces, leaving seventy killed, some of whom were suffocated from unusually strong tear gas. Hundreds were injured.

Further brutal attacks took place on 16 December that left at least another 17 dead. But among the shocking scenes was that of a female demonstrator dragged along the ground and being repeatedly kicked by security personnel. An angry march by 10 000 women took place a few days

²⁷ Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Francesco Cavatorta, “Bullets over ballots: Islamist Groups, the State and Electoral Violence in Egypt and Morocco”, *Democratization* 17, 2 (2010): 326-349.

²⁸ Tawfik Gamal, *Social Capital Blog* (26 January 2011): <http://socialcapital.wordpress.com/tag/hosni-mubarak/>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

later in what was considered to be the biggest women's demonstration in Egypt's history

The episodes of violence can be divided into two parts: The first episode began on 19 November, which took place mainly around the ministry of the interior building and involved riot police who wanted to clear the Square, while the second episode began on 16 December outside the offices of the cabinet, where military personnel were beating up women, children and the elderly and were apparently undeterred by the news cameras in a desperate attempt to stop or at least delay the mass mediatisation of events.

The first battle ended with a concrete wall being built across Mohamed Mahmoud Street to separate the two sides, imposing a truce of sorts; and the second ended with another wall being built at the entrance of Tahrir Square across Qasr al-Aini Street.

During these two weeks of bloody clashes, demonstrators were killed and injured by Egyptian State bullets with many maimed or blinded, while simultaneously millions of Egyptians were making their way to the polling stations.

Somehow these two sets of events seemed disconnected, as if they were taking place in two different countries. Egyptians kept resorting to protesting in the square and the subsequent violence which lead the scene because they did not seem to find either the parliamentary nor the presidential elections enough of a guarantee of a transition to civilian power. The SCAF declared that the parliament was incompetent to establish its own government and passed a number of super constitutional principles that gave it a special status and also limited parliamentary oversight over the SCAF's budget and over legislation related to the military. In addition, the SCAF did not retain the right to ratify any legislation.

Conclusion

Egypt started down the path toward democracy with a high risk of a bloody and confusing civil war that might be confusing for the public, who are still ill prepared for the journey.²⁹ Elections were instigated without orienting the institutions to accommodate with political competition.

Before the revolution, Islamist candidates were banned, monitors were kept away from the polls and Mubarak's regime used to win in a landslide. After the revolution the SCAF gambled on the appeal of nationalists as a way of hanging onto power, which caused violent nationalism and

²⁹ Ibrahim Saleh, "Living in a lie and dying in silence: The trauma of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa", *The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 11, 4 (2009): 30-38.

sectarianism to thrive in this turbulent politics.

Many Egyptians still perceive the emerging power of the street as only a development of the postcolonial eruptions of the 1950s and 1960s, when they were fed up with the idea of cohesive whole that eventually³⁰ this caused their anger to explode regarding their being mere objects of the colonial history.³¹ The 'regular people' used the street to initiate change in ballots but had to confront the bullets of the military in their fight to stop the military hegemony.

The Egyptian authorities have always resorted to violence to manage legislative elections, there being previously an absence of a basic framework of law, effective government and consensus on which all political colours get to exercise the right of self-determination, elections became an opportunity for political-baiting.

Many things seem uncertain in the current fluid post-revolutionary politics, however the 'street republic' was not engineered through decorous elite pacts, wise political leadership, or committed democrats full of trust for one another. Instead, it was composed of many vigilant, mistrustful ordinary players.

The fight should continue for social justice and a free democratic Egypt, though many questions remain unresolved, such as: Who presented the court cases with insufficient evidences? Who made a wrong choice with the ballots? Who used bullets against fellow Egyptians? The first revolution has only 'changed the curtains' so there is need for a second revolution to take into public ownership and place under democratic workers' control and management to reduce the risk of strengthening democracy's foes. The focus should be directed towards putting in place the preconditions of democracy in the proper sequence, starting with economic reform and the development of a competent, impartial state administration, echoing what Abraham Lincoln said: "Ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors to bullets".³²

The street republic attempted to link political and economic grievances in an attempt to address the complex problems of corruption and injustice in Egypt. But the cross-class and cross-ideology coalition that united behind the initial phases of the second republic has predictably fragmented, and different groups now have divergent views on the applicability of the Egyptian State causing an acute case of identity crisis and thus putting to an end the hope for a better life for

³⁰ Douglas Boyd, "Development of Egypt's radio: Voice of the Arabs under Nasser", *Journalism Quarterly* 52, 4 (1975): 645-653.

³¹ Tarek Elswaei, "A Revolution of the imagination", *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011): 1197-1206.

³² Abraham Lincoln, *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln Vol. II*, Roy P. Basler, ed. (1953) 454. <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1903.html>. (Accessed 24 January 2013).

~ *Street republic in Egypt: From bullets to ballots* ~

Egyptians, at least in the short and medium terms.

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الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي في اعلام جنوب افريقيا (The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in South African media)

Mouad Khateb

معاذ خطيب

This paper attempts to address the following question: Is the media in South Africa biased in favour of either the Israelis or the Palestinians in its coverage of the political, social, cultural, and military conflict between them? Through analysis of four major news outlets, we found that the coverage of the conflict in South African media is balanced for the most part, without bias to any of the two sides.

تعتبر دولة جنوب أفريقيا أكثر الدول تطورا في القارة الأفريقية وهي صاحبة أقوى اقتصاد في القارة. جامعاتها الحديثة طلاب من كل أطراف العالم، من شرق آسيا، من الجزيرة العربية، من الشرق الأوسط، من دول شمال أفريقيا، من دول أوروبا، بل ومن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أيضا. وفي جنوب أفريقيا تتداخل الثقافات والمجموعات العرقية والدينية. فهناك المسيحيون والمسلمون والهنود والبوذيين واليهود. هذه المقالة تحاول ان تجيب عن السؤال: هل ينحاز اعلام جنوب أفريقيا للطرف الفلسطيني أم للطرف الاسرائيلي في تناوله للصراع الفلسطيني الاسرائيلي؟

في جنوب أفريقيا يسود الحزب "المؤتمر الوطني الأفريقي" African National Congress المسمى اختصارا ANC، والذي يحكم جنوب أفريقيا منذ انتخابات 1994، أي منذ سقوط نظام الفصل العنصري "الأبرتهاید"، ويفوز منذ ذلك الوقت بغالبية الأصوات (فوق 65%) في انتخابات الجمعية الوطنية (National Assembly) المرادفة للبرلمان في الدول الأخرى، والمكونة من 400 عضو والتي يقرر الحزب الأكبر فيها من يكون الرئيس. وقد كان للـ ANC وجناحه العسكري المسمى "رُمح الأمة" (Spear of the Nation) دور بارز في الصراع مع حكومة الفصل العنصري التي كانت مقصورة على البيض من أصول هولندية، وبرز قادة هذا الجناح ليكونوا لاحقا من اعلام النضال الوطني، وعلى رأسهم نلسون مانديلا. الحزب المنافس للـ ANC هو التحالف الديمقراطي Democratic Alliance، اختصارا: DA والذي يضم بشكل رئيسي اشخاصا من البيض كانوا مناهضين للعنصرية ونظام الأبرتهاید في الحقبة السابقة.

المؤتمر الوطني الأفريقي، داعم صريح للقضية الفلسطينية

عُرف عن نلسون مانديلا، قوله المأثور "نعلم جيدا أن حريتنا منقوصة ما دام الفلسطينيون لم ينالوا حريتهم"، وهي جملة قالها في خطاب القاه في 4 ديسمبر 1994 في اليوم العالمي للتضامن مع الشعب الفلسطيني¹. وكما ذكرنا، كان نلسون مانديلا أول رئيس منتخب ديمقراطياً لدولة جنوب أفريقيا بعد سقوط الأبرتهاید، ممثلاً عن حزب المؤتمر الوطني الأفريقي (ANC) والذي كان مانديلا أيضا قائد جناحه العسكري قبل سجنه ونفيه في سجنه الشهير بجزيرة روبين. ولذلك فقد باتت مناصرة الشعب الفلسطيني سياسة عامة اتبعتها الحزب وقادته منذ ذلك الحين. فقط مؤخرا، أعلنت دولة جنوب أفريقيا أنها ستبتزح بـ 2 مليون راند لوكالة الغوث للاجئين التابعة للأمم المتحدة لمساعدة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين²، كما أن غرفة التجارة التابعة للحكومة أعلنت مؤخرا عن نيّتها

¹ الخطاب الكامل: <http://anc.org.za/show.php?id=3384>

² الخبر: - <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2012/10/09/sa-government-gives-money-to-palestine-agency>

تطبيق قانون بموجبه يتم وسم المنتجات المستوردة من المستوطنات الاسرائيلية على انها "منتجات مستوطنات" ليعرف الزبائن انها من مناطق فلسطينية محتلة، وهو مشروع قانون تم تمريره بضغط من مؤسسات اهلية وغير حكومية مؤيدة للقضية الفلسطينية في جنوب أفريقيا. أخيراً، دائما ما يدلي إبراهيم إبراهيم، وهو رئيس دائرة العلاقات العامة في حزب المؤتمر الوطني الحاكم، ونائب وزير العلاقات الدولية والتعاون في حكومة جنوب أفريقيا، يدلي بتصريحات مناهضة لسياسات اسرائيل الاستيطانية والاحتلالية ويشبهها بنظام الأبرتهاید، ويثال في ذلك دعم حكومته ورئيسها، وأخر تصريحاتها كان في مؤتمر التضامن الدولي في العاصمة بريتوريا، والذي فيه وجه المتكلمون انتقادات حادة لإسرائيل وسياساتها.³

وأما هذه المقالة ففيها سنحاول كشف الكيفية التي بها يتعاطى إعلام دولة جنوب أفريقيا مع للصراع الفلسطيني-الاسرائيلي. وبصورة أدق، سنحاول ان نجيب عن التساؤل: هل الاعلام المحلي في جنوب أفريقيا منحاز للطرف الفلسطيني، أم الإسرائيلي، أم انه محايد؟ وللاجابة عن السؤال سنقوم باستعراض الكيفية التي يُها تتم صياغة أخبار الصراع الفلسطيني-الاسرائيلي، وسنعمد على المقارنة بين تقارير وسائل الاعلام المحلية المختلفة التي تتحدث عن نفس الحدث او الخبر، وهو مهم لكشف ما إذا كانت هناك اختلافات وطبيعة هذه الاختلافات، وسببها.

عيّة للدراسة: تغطية اعلام جنوب افريقيا لمقتل مواطنين اثنين من غزة في الفترة بين (5-8 نوفمبر 2012).

مساء يوم الاثنين 5 نوفمبر اطلقت القوات الاسرائيلية المتمركزة شرق مخيم البريج النار على الشاب الفلسطيني أحمد النبهان (20 عام) الذي كان يعاني من اضطرابات نفسية. تم ترك الشاب ينزف لمدة 6 ساعات دون تقديم اي اسعاف له، ومنعت طواقم الاسعاف الفلسطينية من الوصول إليه. أخيراً وبعد اتصالات من قبل الصليب الأحمر تم انتشال جثة الشاب الذي كان قد فارق الحياة.

لاحقاً، مساء يوم الخميس 8 نوفمبر توغلت قوات اسرائيلية في منطقة خان يونس جنوب قطاع غزة، وخلال التوغل قتل الفتى حميد يونس أبو دقة (13 عام) برصاصة في الرأس حين فتحت مروحية اسرائيلية النار على جموع من المدنيين خلال تغطيتها لعملية التوغل من الجو. لاحقاً في نفس الليلة أصيب جندي اسرائيلي بجروح متوسطة بانفجار قنبلة اعلنت كتائب القسام أنها ردا على مقتل الفتى الفلسطيني⁴. أهمية هذا الحدث بالنسبة لنا تكمن في أنه حدث تضرر فيه الطرفان، الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي، وبالتالي فإن طريقة تناول الخبر في وسائل الاعلام تكشف عن انحيازها لأي من الطرفين أو حياديتها وعدم انحيازها.

خدمة (IOL) Independent Online الإخبارية الإلكترونية.

بالبحث عن الكلمة "GAZA" في موقع هذه الخدمة التي توفر خدمات اخبارية الكترونية للعديد من الصحف الشهيرة في جنوب أفريقيا، نجد أن الموقع لا يذكر أبداً خبر مقتل أي من الشابين الغزويين المذكورين أعلاه. الأخبار الوحيدة التي يرد فيها ذكر "غزة" خلال اسبوع الاحداث المذكورة هي اخبار تتحدث عن تصريحات البشير (رئيس جمهورية السودان) وتوعد إسرائيل بالرد على قصفها لمصنع الاسلحة السوداني.

أما نتائج البحث عن "غزة" من الاسبوع السابق (23-31 أكتوبر) فعناوين الاخبار التي يرد فيها ذكر غزة هي:

- "السودان هي دولة خطيرة وارهابية"⁵، وفيه تتبنى الشبكة وجهة النظر الاسرائيلية تجاه السودان واتهامها لها بأنه يمد غزة بالسلاح.

³ <http://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-more-inhuman-apartheid-south-africa-anc-conference-told/11857>

⁴ <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/15ad03c8-6a94-4203-bad3-9a4d1e94cae8>

⁵ www.iol.co.za/news/.../sudan-is-a-dangerous-terrorist-state-1.1411118

الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي في اعلام جنوب افريقيا The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in South African media

- "بقرة خائفة تقتل فلسطينيا في غزة"⁶
- "إطلاق صواريخ على إسرائيل من غزة"⁷
- "7 صواريخ تضرب إسرائيل بعد مقتل مسلح"⁸

كما نرى، لا يوجد ذكر لأي من العمليات الإسرائيلية التي نفذتها إسرائيل خلال تلك الفترة، والتي كانت في الحقيقة سبب قيام المقاومة الفلسطينية بالرد بإطلاق الصواريخ على إسرائيل. حتى "مقتل المسلح" كُتبت بصيغة المبني للمجهول وليس "بعد قتلها مسلح". هناك خبر عن قيام "بقرة خائفة بقتل فلسطيني" لكن الفلسطينيين الذين قتلوا برصاص دولة إسرائيل لم يرد ذكرهم في الموقع أبدا.

ولو بحثنا عن "إسرائيل" في نفس الشبكة خلال الفترة الزمنية إياها (23 أكتوبر – 8 نوفمبر) لما وجدنا أي قطعة إخبارية فيها أي ادانة أو نقد لإسرائيل وسياساتها. عوضا عن ذلك، نجد عناوين فيها تتبنى الشبكة المواقف الإسرائيلية حتى دون علامات اقتباس. فأحد العناوين مثلا كان: إيران تديرها مجموعة من المعادين للأسامية (Iran Ran by Anti-Semites)⁹. وفي داخل الخبر تم اقتباس مسؤول اسرائيلي يظهر انه هو صاحب هذا الكلام. عادة، وحين يتم اقتباس أي جهة في عنوان الخبر، يتم وضع الكلام بين علامات اقتباس، وإلا سيُفهم ضمناً أن هذا الكلام هو موقف الصحيفة وليس اقتباسا لطرف ثانٍ. لكن الشبكة لم تفعل ذلك، وبالتالي فهي تبنت هذا الاتهام الخطير ولم تقف أبدا موقف الحياد.

صحيفة The New Age وموقعها الالكتروني

بخلاف IOL، نجد أن صحيفة The New Age، وهي من كبريات الصحف في الدولة وتوزع في كل أقاليمها تحتفظ بقدر من الموضوعية والحيادية في النقل، في نسخها الالكترونية أيضا. لتجسيد ذلك، ننقل عناوين اخبارها عن غزة خلال نفس الفترة التي بحثناها أعلاه.

- "ثلاثة قتلى فلسطينيين نتيجة العنف في غزة"¹⁰. مع ان تفاصيل الخبر تشير الى انهم قتلوا بنيران اسرائيلية، يكتب العنوان بالقول "عنف في غزة"، ويمكن اعتبار ذلك انحيازاً لجانب إسرائيل، لأن العنوان بصورته الحالية مضلل وغير شفاف.
- "مسلحون من غزة يطلقون الصواريخ على إسرائيل بعد غارة جوية"¹¹. يمكن القول ان هذا العنوان منصف للطرفين، فالمسلحون الفلسطينيون أطلقوا الصواريخ، لكن الموقع ذكر ان ذلك جاء "بعد غارة جوية"، مع انه لم يذكر انها غارة جوية اسرائيلية. ولو اكتفى العنوان ب "مسلحون من غزة يطلقون الصواريخ على إسرائيل" لكان الخبر انحيازاً لإسرائيل وتغطية على كونها هي البادئة بالعمل العسكري مما حدا بالفلسطينيين للرد بإطلاق الصواريخ تحت الحصار، الحياة في غزة هي مثل معركة يومية من أجل البقاء¹².

⁶ www.iol.co.za/news/world/panicking-cow-kills-man-1.1412375

⁷ www.iol.co.za/news/world/rockets-fired-from-gaza-strip-1.1412410

⁸ www.iol.co.za/news/world/7-rockets-hit-israel-after-militant-killed-1.1412790

⁹ www.iol.co.za/news/world/iran-run-by-anti-semites-israel-1.1329734

¹⁰ http://www.thenewage.co.za/66807-1020-53-Three_Palestinians_killed_in_Gaza_violence

¹¹ http://www.thenewage.co.za/64918-1020-53-Gaza_militants_fire_rockets_into_Israel_after_air_strike

¹² http://www.thenewage.co.za/44553-1020-53-Under_siege_life_on_the_Gaza_Strips_a_daily_fight_for_survival

- مقتل شخص واصابة ثلاثة في ضربة اسرائيلية لقطاع غزة¹³.

مثل العنوان السابق، نقل للصورة الحقيقية، وعدم التعمية عن العمليات الاسرائيلية التي تقوم بها اسرائيل ضد قطاع غزة.

مع أنه لم يظهر في نتائج البحث ما يتطرق للمستجدات الأخيرة (مقتل الفتى والشاب) إلا ان العناوين اعلاه تعكس صورة ولو أولية عن كيفية تغطية هذه الصحيفة الشهيرة للصراع، وهي تغطية ربما يمكننا القول انها غير منحازة لأي من الطرفين.

صحيفة Sunday Times وموقعها الالكتروني

وهي الاخرى من كبريات الصحف القطرية في جنوب أفريقيا، ويمكن القول انها تتناول الصراع الفلسطيني الاسرائيلي بحذر وحيادية.

فالخبر الذي يتحدث عن مقتل الفتى الفلسطيني برصاص المروحية الاسرائيلية، مثلا، كان عنوانه في موقع الصحيفة "نيران اسرائيلية تقتل فتى فلسطينيا خلال مناوشة عسكرية بغزة"¹⁴. ربما لا يمكن القول ان العنوان يُظهر انحيازاً للجانب الفلسطيني، لكنه حتماً غير منحاز للطرف الإسرائيلي. فوضع "اسرائيلية" في أول العنوان، وهو أهم مقطع فيه، لهو بمثابة تسليط الضوء على "الجاني"، الذي اقررت هذه الجريمة، جريمة قتل الفتى الفلسطيني. أي ان العنوان الذي بدأ بتسليط الضوء على القاتل، انما ساهم في تعرية هذا القاتل وإلغاء أي فرصة لأن تكون هوية القاتل مجهولة او فيها أي شك. وقد كان بالإمكان وضع العبارة "بنيران اسرائيلية" في آخر العنوان، أو عدم وضعها بتاتاً، مثل "مقتل فتى فلسطيني في غزة" وترك الامر ضبابياً دون الإشارة للجاني صراحة، وهو ما يعتبر تغطية على الجاني. أما نص الخبر (يمكن الرجوع اليه ورابطه في الهوامش)، ففيه قدر من الحيادية، إذ انه يعرض رواية كلا الطرفين، الفلسطيني والاسرائيلي لما حدث.

وفي خبر أحدث، وهو خبر اغتيال أحمد الجعبري قائد كتائب القسام في غزة، يظهر حياد الصحيفة مجدداً. فالخبر الذي عنوانه "مقتل احد كبار قادة حماس بضرية اسرائيلية"¹⁵ يلخص أولاً ما حصل بالقول ان "الهجوم جاء رغم ما يشير إلى ان مصر نجحت في التوصل الى هدنة بين الطرفين بعد ايام من العنف المتبادل". وفي هذا إشارة إلى ان اسرائيل خرقت الهدنة، ولا سيما وأن التعبير "رغم" يشير إلى وجود تناقض معين، وهو عملياً التناقض الذي ظهر في الموقف الاسرائيلي الذي وافق على الهدنة من جهة، لكنه قام باغتيال الجعبري من جهة أخرى. ثم يذكر التقرير رواية حماس عن اغتيال قائدها بصاروخ اسرائيلي، وبعد ذلك يذكر الرواية الاسرائيلية التي تؤكد ذلك. ولو اردنا تقييم التقرير بشكل عام لقلنا انه اقرب للحياد منه إلى الانحياز لأي طرف. هذان الخبران يعكسان التوجه العام للصحيفة وهو ما تمكن ملاحظته بمعاناة اخبار وتقارير اخرى، لكن نكتفي بهذا القدر.

صحيفة Mail and Guardian وموقعها الالكتروني

مع ان الفكرة العامة عن الصحيفة واسعة الصيت والانتشار هي أنها منحازة للجانب الفلسطيني، إلا أنني بعد

¹³ http://www.thenewage.co.za/Detail.aspx?news_id=65832&cat_id=1020

¹⁴ <http://www.timeslive.co.za/world/2012/11/08/israeli-gunfire-kills-palestinian-boy-in-gaza-clash--medics>

¹⁵ <http://www.timeslive.co.za/world/2012/11/14/top-hamas-commander-killed-in-israeli-airstrike>

الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي في اعلام جنوب افريقيا *The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in South African media*

الفحص والمعاينة وجدت أن الصحيفة في الحقيقة محايدة، في أنها تعرض وجهتي النظر بنفس القدر. لم ألمس أي انحياز في طريقة صياغة الأخبار وعناوينها في الصحيفة (وموقعها الإلكتروني)، والتي تغطي أحداث غزة الأخيرة. ولذلك قمت بالبحث عن المقالات المنشورة في موقع الصحيفة، والتي ساهم بها قراء الصحيفة وتطرق للصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي. وما وجدته هو ان هناك توزاناً معيماً في التعاطي مع القضية، ولتجسيد ذلك أذكر هذا المثال: في 24 من اكتوبر 2012 نشرت الصحيفة خبراً¹⁶ عن الاستبيان الذي اجري في اسرائيل والذي أشار الى أن معظم الاسرائيليين يؤيدون سياسات عنصرية شبيهة بسياسات نظام الأبرتهاد في جنوب أفريقيا، والذي تم اشهاره في تقرير نشرت في صحيفة هآرتس الاسرائيلية. لاحقاً، في 9 من نوفمبر 2012 نشرت الصحيفة نفسها مقالاً ساهم به احد قراء الصحيفة، عنوانه "اسرائيل ليست دولة ابرتهاد" ودافع فيه عن دولة اسرائيل وحاول نفي تهمة كونها دولة عنصرية¹⁷. فالصحيفة تفسح المجال لكلا الطرفين للتعبير عن رأيهم وتمنح كل طرف حق الرد على الطرف الآخر، وكثيراً ما تنشر مقالات هي ردود على مقالات اخرى نشرت في الصحيفة نفسها. هذا هو الحال تقريبا في هذه الصحيفة، ومعظم الصحف في جنوب أفريقيا، بل والقنوات التلفزيونية أيضاً.

الخلاصة

اعتماداً على العيّنات التي تمت معابنتها خلال هذا البحث المقترض، لا يمكن القول إن هناك انحيازاً من قبل وسائل الاعلام في جنوب أفريقيا ولا سيما التجارية منها، مثل الصحف والمواقع المذكورة أعلاه. لكن هناك بلا شك انحيازاً كاملاً وواضحاً من قبل وسائل الاعلام غير التجارية التابعة لإحدى الجماعتين الدينيتين في جنوب أفريقيا: المسلمون واليهود. فوسائل الاعلام التي يمتلكها المسلمون، مثل قناة الراديو Voice of the Cape، وصحفهم المحلية مثل Muslim Views، تبدي تبنياً واضحاً للرواية الفلسطينية وتضامناً مع قضية الشعب الفلسطيني، وهو ما يتأثر بلا شك بالخطاب الديني الداعم لفلسطين، إذ أن المشايخ ومجالس العلماء والجمعيات الاسلامية كلها داعمة لفلسطين، ومن جنوب أفريقيا انطلقت عدة قوافل إغاثة لفلسطين ولغزة. وهو ما يلقي بظلاله على نظرة المسلمين ككل للقضية، والوسيلة التي بها يتعامل اعلامهم معها. على الطرف الآخر، نجد أن وسائل الاعلام التي يملكها اليهود تتبنى الرواية الاسرائيلية الصهيونية بحذافيرها. فكما أن المجتمع اليهودي هنا والذي يسيطر على قطاعات اقتصادية كبيرة جداً يقدم دعماً سخياً ولا نهائياً لدولة اسرائيل، فكذلك تفعل وسائل الاعلام التي يملكها، مثل Jewish Report، والمواقع الإلكترونية الأخرى التابعة للجمعيات والاتحادات اليهودية المختلفة.

الكاتب معاذ خطيب، طالب لقب ثاني في دراسات البلاغة السياسية في جامعة كيب تاون (Cape Town)، ومدوناته هنا: <http://Al-rasid.com>

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¹⁶ <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-24-poll-shows-majority-israelis-in-favour-of-apartheid-policies>

¹⁷ <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-09-israel-is-not-apartheid-state>

Le *Staatskunst* et l'empire colonial allemand d'Afrique à l'épreuve de la défaite de 1918

Christine de Gemeaux

The following study by leading French specialist of nineteenth Century Germany and rhetoric deals with the question of statecraft or Staatskunst in relation to German colonialism in Africa when both came to be reappraised after the defeat of 1918.

Cette histoire de colonies serait pour nous exactement comme la soyeuse fourrure de zibeline que portent les familles polonaises de la noblesse qui n'ont pas de chemises!

– Otto von Bismarck

Avec cette saillie lourde de sous-entendus envers la Pologne,¹ Otto von Bismarck exprime, au lendemain de la refondation du *Reich*, son refus d'une politique coloniale outre-mer. Aux yeux d'une opinion publique conquise, le *Staatskunst*, l'habileté politique de l'État allemand, s'incarne en la personne du chancelier impérial. Ce dernier s'oppose à l'aventure coloniale car il cherche à stabiliser l'Allemagne sur le continent européen plutôt qu'à prendre des paris risqués dans le reste du monde, d'où ce célèbre propos, à Versailles, le 9 février 1871. Il faut attendre le discours du 26 juin 1884 au *Reichstag*, à la veille d'élections difficiles, pour que Bismarck semble faire volte-face. En annonçant une politique coloniale allemande,² il cherche à gagner des voix, à satisfaire les lobbies des armateurs et commerçants des villes hanséatiques et à installer le *Reich* dans "le concert" des nations impérialistes. Mais il se distingue par un argument de comparaison négative. Face à ce qu'il appelle le "système français", qui arracherait des territoires avant d'y attirer des colons, des

¹ La position impérialiste de Bismarck par rapport à la question polonaise est connue; cf. Christine de Gemeaux, "Die französische Perspektive über Bismarck und seine Frankreichpolitik mit Ausblicken auf die polnische Frage. Vom Historiker Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889) bis zur Gegenwart", in Bożena Gorczyńska Przybyłowicz (éd.), *Polityka Bismarcka wobec Polski I Francji/ Bismarcks Politik gegenüber Polen und Frankreich*, Publikacja Centrum w Warcinie/ Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań, 2010.

² Voir Patrice Neau, "Les ambiguïtés d'une politique opportuniste: Bismarck et les débuts de l'aventure coloniale", in Christine de Gemeaux (dir.), *Empires et colonies. L'Allemagne, du Saint – Empire au deuil postcolonial*, Clermont-Ferrand, PUBP, coll. "Politiques et Identités", 2010, p.125-140.

fonctionnaires et d'y instaurer des garnisons,³ il affirme le modèle "naturel" allemand. "On ne peut créer de projets coloniaux de manière artificielle",⁴ déclare-t-il, et de justifier l'engagement du *Reich* par ces arguments "naturels": la présence de sujets impériaux, de représentants du *Volk*, dans les comptoirs commerciaux, le devoir de justice du *Reich* de les protéger. Puis il pose le principe directeur du colonialisme allemand, en concluant: "Notre intention n'est pas de fonder des provinces, mais des entreprises commerciales..."⁵

Devenu ultramarin par ses comptoirs maritimes, l'Empire occupe vite la quatrième place parmi les empires coloniaux en Afrique, contraints de l'accepter du fait de son poids économique et politique. Mais, tard venu, établi entre 1884 et 1885, le *Reich* est en position bancale. Trente ans plus tard, au moment de livrer bataille sur le sol africain,⁶ il souffre de deux handicaps: l'Empire n'a pas d'unité géographique, ses territoires sont éparpillés entre l'Atlantique et l'Océan indien, et il ne dispose pas de troupes coloniales aux effectifs suffisants pour résister. L'Afrique orientale allemande est prise entre le Mozambique portugais, la Rhodésie et le protectorat de l'Afrique de l'Est britanniques (Kenya), ainsi que le Congo belge; le Togo est "coincé" entre le Dahomey français et la Côte de l'Or britannique (Ghana); l'Afrique équatoriale française et le Nigéria britannique cernent le Cameroun.⁷ L'Afrique allemande du Sud-ouest (Namibie), est encerclée par l'Angola portugais, le protectorat britannique du Bechuanaland et l'imposante République sud-africaine.⁸ Les colonies allemandes, isolées, s'effondrent plus rapidement que ses ennemis ne pouvaient l'espérer. Le *Reich* colonial subit la défaite au moment même où il paraissait galvaniser l'opinion allemande. *Quid* du *Staatskunst* en cette matière alors que le chapitre colonial semble clos? Une stratégie de contournement va prédominer. Orientée vers un horizon restitutif, la bataille des propagandes commence. En 1919, le régime républicain, qui continue de se référer juridiquement au *Reich*,⁹ poursuit le combat pour les colonies sur le plan du discours.

³ Otto von Bismarck, *Die gesammelten Werke, Reden*, Wilhelm Schlüssler (ed.), t. 12: 1878-1885, Berlin 1929, p. 479: "Dass man Kolonialprojekte nicht künstlich schaffen kann" [OvB].

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ OvB: p. 482.

⁶ Les îles allemandes du Pacifique et le territoire de Kiaotchéou avec la ville de Tsingtao ne seront pas abordés.

⁷ Envahi par 19 000 Français et Britanniques en 1914, vaincu en 1916.

⁸ Il n'y a en 1914 que 5000 soldats allemands en Afrique du Sud-ouest et les attaques aériennes sud-africaines achèvent la colonie impériale.

⁹ Article premier: "*Das Deutsche Reich ist eine Republik*" / Le *Reich* allemand est une République.

Sachant que parler “enracine le politique”¹⁰ et “est [le politique]”, que les savoirs et les pouvoirs sont des phénomènes discursifs,¹¹ nous plaçons le discours colonial allemand au cœur de notre étude. Comment se traduisent la politique gouvernementale et la rhétorique révisionniste face aux discours des Alliés? Quels sont les acteurs, les types de discours, et les résultats obtenus? Diverses sources seront utilisées, dont un ouvrage de 1924 - *Die deutschen Kolonien/ Les Colonies allemandes* - parallèle à celui d'Heinrich Schnee, la “bible” du révisionnisme allemande:¹² *Die koloniale Schuldlüge*¹³/*Le mensonge sur la culpabilité coloniale*. Dès l'introduction, les éditeurs se félicitent d'avoir “servi l'avenir colonial de l'Allemagne”.¹⁴ Ce sont deux acteurs de l'entreprise coloniale impériale: le major Kurd Schwabe,¹⁵ insatiable photographe de l'Afrique allemande qui participa en 1904 à la lutte contre les Héréros en Afrique du Sud-ouest, et le lieutenant Paul Leutwein, également impliqué dans cette lutte.¹⁶ Comme Bismarck en 1884, Schwabe, Leutwein, et chacun des auteurs de ce livre, utilisent les trois arguments suivants: celui de la justice, du naturel et du *Volk*. Ils commentent rétrospectivement les conséquences de la “tragédie coloniale” (*Kolonialtragödie*), de cette dure mais

¹⁰ Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *L'Hyperpolitique, une passion française*, Paris, Klincksieck, coll. “Pouvoirs de persuasion”, 2009, p. 40.

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, Paris, Gallimard, 1966.

¹² Heinrich Schnee fut gouverneur de l'Afrique orientale allemande. Voir Horst Gründer (éd.), “...*Da und dort ein junges Deutschland gründen*” *Rassismus, Kolonien und kolonialer Gedanke vom 16. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, München, DTV, 2005, p. 323.

¹³ Heinrich Schnee, *Die koloniale Schuldlüge*, Berlin, Sachers & Kuschel, 1924.

¹⁴ Les italiques sont de nous [CdG]. *Die deutschen Kolonien [DK]*, Jubiläumsausgabe zur vierzigjährigen Wiederkehr des Beginns der deutschen Kolonialgeschichte, (éd.) Major A.D. Kurd Schwabe und Dr. Paul Leutwein Berlin, 1924, Reprint, Komet Verlag, Köln, 2009, Préface Horst Gründer: “der kolonialen Zukunft Deutschlands gedient zu haben”, p. VIII.

¹⁵ Né en 1866 à Munster, il arrive en Afrique du Sud-ouest en 1893 et combat le chef nama Hendrik Witboie, quitte ensuite le pays pour participer à la répression de la révolte des Boxers en Chine (1900-1901) puis revient en Afrique du Sud-ouest combattre les Héréros en 1904. Cet “expert colonial” près du Haut-Commandement militaire à Berlin est l'auteur de livres d'expériences militaires, notamment de : *Dienst und Kriegsführung in den Kolonien und auf überseeischen Expeditionen. Dargestellt und an Beispielen aus der Kolonialkriegsgeschichte erläutert*, Berlin 1903.

¹⁶ Né en 1882 à Berlin, fils de Theodor Leutwein, gouverneur de l'Afrique allemande du Sud-ouest, Paul Leutwein écrit des romans coloniaux. Dans les années 1920, il fut directeur de la “*Rednerschule für Weltpolitik*” (“École des orateurs pour la politique mondiale”) et, en 1926, chargé de cours par les Affaires étrangères (“*Koloniale Abteilung*”) au département d'études orientales de l'Université de Berlin, puis (1931-1936) directeur du “*Kolonialer Volksbund*” (Union Nationale Coloniale).

“efficace” école (“*harte... wirksame Schule*”)¹⁷ pour l’Allemagne, afin de justifier la perspective révisionniste.

Le commentaire ouvre sur la fin de la guerre et les conditions imposées à l’Allemagne par le Traité de Versailles. Il met en relief l’injustice faite au *Reich* en droit international: pas de négociations pour les Allemands; le pays est accusé d’“indignité coloniale”. La condamnation internationale repose sur les *blue books* des Britanniques relatant les exactions allemandes, mais elle n’a aucun fondement juridique, elle n’est que propagande hostile.¹⁸ Les Allemands rappellent leurs ennemis à la légalité. En 1914, le gouvernement impérial comptait – selon Leutwein – sur le respect juridique de l’Acte final de la Conférence sur le Congo (26 février 1885), et donc sur le respect de la neutralité des territoires concernés; le bassin géographique du Congo, mais aussi l’Afrique orientale allemande et le Sud-est du Cameroun qui devaient rester à l’écart de toute guerre. L’Allemagne ultramarine se trouvait dans une situation militaire très défavorable.¹⁹ Les troupes coloniales, réduites, étaient destinées “au [seul] maintien de l’ordre, à la répression des émeutes indigènes et à la protection de la propriété allemande..., par conséquent en aucun cas au combat avec des puissances étrangères”. C’est la défaite. La République est proclamée le 9 novembre 1918. Au mois de mai 1919, prévoyant le pire, le chancelier social-démocrate Philipp Scheidemann évoque l’image du cachot (*Kerker*) dans lequel on veut confiner le pays et s’écrie, devant l’Assemblée nationale: “Tout, tout disparaît. L’Allemagne a cessé d’exister à l’étranger. Mais cela ne suffit pas encore... sans bateaux – car notre flotte passe aux mains de l’Entente, sans câbles, sans colonies, sans établissements à l’étranger... sans même le droit de contribuer à fixer les prix des marchandises que nous devons livrer en tant que tribut...”.²⁰ En juin, le Traité de Versailles affirme la responsabilité allemande dans le déclenchement de la guerre (article 231,

¹⁷ *DK*, p. VIII.

¹⁸ Heinrich Schnee, *Die koloniale Schuldfrage*, Munich, 1924, nombreuses rééditions jusqu’en 1940.

¹⁹ Voir Rémy Porte, *La conquête des colonies allemandes. Naissance et mort d’un rêve impérial*, préface Jacques Frémeaux, Paris, Éditions 14-18, 2008.

²⁰ Rapports sténographiés des débats de l’assemblée législative de l’Assemblée nationale, Berlin, 1920, t. 327, p. 1083: “Alles, alles verschwindet! *Deutschland* hat im *Ausland* aufgehört zu existieren. Aber das genügt noch nicht... ohne Schiffe - denn unsere Handelsflotte geht in die Hände der Entente, ohne Kabel, ohne Kolonien, ohne ausländische Niederlassungen... ja, selbst ohne das Recht mitzuwirken bei der Festsetzung der Preise für die von uns zu liefernden Waren...”. Les italiques sont dans l’original [CdG].

dit *Kriegsschuldparagraph*)²¹ et, pour des causes “morales”, interdit à l'Allemagne de posséder des colonies (article 119 à 127). Cela est perçu comme une injustice, doublée d'une humiliation: 3.8 millions d'Allemands protestent dans une pétition nationale. Leutwein, Schwabe et Schnee²² le soulignent: l'Allemagne a rendu les armes en se fondant sur les 14 points de Wilson comprenant le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples et la promesse d'un règlement colonial impartial.²³ Les Allemands, seuls interdits de colonies en Europe, se sentent traités de façon non équitable dans un traité qualifié de *Friedensdiktat*. Les révisionnistes instrumentalisent ce sentiment pour parler de “chantage colonial par rapport à l'Allemagne, chantage le plus artificiel et le plus absurde qui soit avec la monstruosité des mandats”.²⁴ Ils font référence à l'article 22 du Pacte de la SDN qui transfère à cette dernière la souveraineté sur les colonies allemandes et les place sous mandat français, britannique, belge.²⁵ La tutelle “de nations évoluées” sur les territoires anciennement “allemands” permettrait d'accomplir “le devoir sacré de civilisation”.²⁶ En novembre 1920, lorsque les mandataires semblent outrepasser leurs droits, le gouvernement de la République de Weimar adresse une plainte à la SDN. Il affirme que l'Allemagne n'acceptera jamais sa spoliation, et “déclare qu'il se réserve à jamais tous ses droits sur ce territoire”.²⁷ En conséquence, le courant révisionniste développe l'idéologie paradoxale d'un “colonialisme sans colonies”, avec le soutien des gouvernements successifs de la République de Weimar. Toute la propagande révisionniste coloniale concorde. L'injustice est dénoncée sur les plans moral, politique, mais aussi économique. Pourtant, le bilan comptable des colonies est réputé déficitaire. Dans *Les Colonies allemandes*, la nécessité et le droit à s'approvisionner en

²¹ Article 231: “Die alliierten und assoziierten Regierungen erklären und Deutschland erkennt an, daß Deutschland und seine Verbündeten als Urheber aller Verluste und aller Schäden verantwortlich sind, welche die alliierten und assoziierten Regierungen und ihre Angehörigen infolge des ihnen durch den Angriff Deutschlands und seiner Verbündeten aufgezwungenen Krieges erlitten haben”. Cet article visait au départ à engager la responsabilité financière de l'Allemagne pour les réparations de guerre.

²² *Op. Cit.*

²³ “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined”.

²⁴ *DK*, p. VIII: “die künstlichste, ja widersinnigste koloniale Erpressung Deutschlands mit ihrem Mandatsunwesen”.

²⁵ Mandat japonais pour la Chine et le Pacifique.

²⁶ “Die heilige Aufgabe der Zivilisation”.

²⁷ *DK*, p. 13: “erklärt, daß sie sich für alle Zukunft ihre Rechte auf diesem Gebiete vorbehält”.

produits exotiques sont évoqués. L'importation de matières premières, réservée aux grandes puissances coloniales, la mise en place, par ces dernières, d'une politique de protection douanière sont présentées comme insupportables, tandis que l'Allemagne est privée de territoires européens vitaux pour son industrie.²⁸ La propagande dénonce le déclin industriel et établit le lien entre manque de matières premières, marché du travail et stabilité monétaire. Enfin, il est souligné que l'Allemagne, pays le plus peuplé du continent européen, est privée de populations ultramarines alors qu'elle ne contrôlait déjà qu'un petit nombre d'indigènes (13 millions toutefois, avec les territoires du Pacifique et de la Chine). La nouvelle répartition coloniale est jugée inique et artificielle: ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France ne seraient en mesure d'administrer les populations aussi bien que l'Allemagne. La compétence allemande est affirmée sur les plans administratif, technologique et économique et les révisionnistes prédisent à leurs rivaux un recul économique qui touchera durement les indigènes dont ils se font désormais les défenseurs. L'argument colonial initial sur la protection des Allemands est renouvelé par inversion des termes. Enfin, la propagande révisionniste dénonce l'incapacité des nouveaux maîtres à entretenir les infrastructures allemandes (oubliant, par exemple, que les Allemands ont dynamité la grande station télégraphique de Kamina au Togo avant leur départ). D'où un recul démographique dans ces territoires; recul largement dû aussi, pour les territoires devenus français, à l'usage abusif des soldats indigènes dans les campagnes militaires en Europe. Ici, l'argument moral se fait biopolitique,²⁹ rappelant les devoirs et les pouvoirs des empires sur la vie et dénonçant les dérives d'utilisation de chair à canon coloniale.

Pour l'Allemagne elle-même, la propagande invoque la préservation de la vie de la "nation" ou du "peuple" (*Volk*),³⁰ premier terme à apparaître dans le préambule de la constitution de Weimar,³¹ monté en puissance au cours du 19^e siècle. Depuis le romantisme politique, l'Allemagne identifie en effet l'État au *Volk* conçu comme un

²⁸ Sont perdues l'Alsace et la Lorraine avec le minerai de fer et la potasse; la Haute-Silésie avec le zinc et le lignite.

²⁹ Nous utilisons le modèle Foucauldien, car il recouvrait déjà une réalité, même si la notion de biopolitique n'existait pas encore. Voir Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, t.1 "La volonté de savoir", Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1976; Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer :Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Standford University Press, 1998.

³⁰ Le terme se traduit en français des deux manières.

³¹ "Das Deutsche Volk, einig in seinen Stämmen und von dem Willen beseelt, sein Reich in Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit zu erneuern und zu festigen, dem inneren und dem äußeren Frieden zu dienen und den gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt zu fördern, hat sich diese Verfassung gegeben".

organisme placé au centre absolu de la vie.³² La politique est “comprise comme la représentation du peuple, [et] se déploie dans... une biosphère fusionnelle de la parole”.³³ Dans l’entre-deux-guerres, à l’époque d’un romantisme renouvelé, les canaux propagandistes répandent l’idée que le “peuple” doit sortir “renforcé” de l’épreuve et arrondir “organiquement” l’espace germanique, non pas en Europe où cela est (encore) impossible, mais en Afrique. En 1924, les objectifs de guerre, tels qu’ils avaient été définis dix ans plus tôt, servent toujours de référence, ainsi le *memorandum* de 1914 proposant de renoncer à des prises telles que le Maroc, pour concentrer l’attention sur les territoires susceptibles d’être arrachés aux Français et aux Britanniques.³⁴ L’idée étant de créer un empire colonial au centre du continent; des “Indes africaines”, qui intégreraient aux colonies allemandes récupérées les territoires situés du Niger jusqu’à la frontière sud de l’Angola et toutes les régions entre Dar es-Salam et la Sénégambie, en passant par Douala: avec la côte de l’Afrique occidentale française et les deux Congo. Une partie influente de l’opinion allemande, et même certains socialistes, comme le député du SPD August Winnig,³⁵ soutiennent, dans l’intérêt du “peuple”, l’idée d’une Afrique centrale et d’une Europe centrale allemandes, économiquement complémentaires. Cela convainc une population allemande en proie aux crises économiques (1923 et 1929).

Après l’occupation de la Ruhr, l’intérêt colonial, autrefois limité aux élites,³⁶ touche les milieux populaires. On collectionne les cendriers et les cartons de bière aux motifs coloniaux. Gustav Stresemann,³⁷ ardent défenseur de l’idée coloniale dès sa jeunesse, devenu chancelier en 1923, puis ministre des Affaires Étrangères jusqu’en 1929, est le principal moteur du *Staatskunst*. L’opinion l’apprécie autant que Bismarck en son temps. Le tribun n’oublie pas que la révision du Traité de Versailles doit concerner la question coloniale.³⁸

Dans cette entreprise, il est soutenu par la propagande

³² Voir, Christine de Gemeaux, “Adam Müller et le concept romantique d’État-médiateur”, in Gérard Raulet (dir.), *Les Romantismes politiques en Europe*, Paris, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, coll. “Philia”, 2009, p. 135-165.

³³ Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *op. cit.*, p.39.

³⁴ *Memorandum* du centriste, Matthias Erzberger, 2 septembre 1914, *Bundesarchiv*, Coblenze, fonds Erzberger n° 27.

³⁵ Horst Gründer, *op. cit.*, p. 308-309.

³⁶ Voir une pétition signée de 1341 personnalités, dont 352 professeurs d’université – d’où son nom “*Professoreneingabe*” - adressée en 1915 en faveur de la guerre sous-marine au chancelier Bethmann-Hollweg.

³⁷ Il avait été de ceux qui avaient soutenu l’aventure coloniale dès le début.

³⁸ Texte du 16 novembre 1925, in *Gustav Stresemann Vermächtnis*, (éd.) Henry Bernhard, Berlin, Ullstein 1932, t II, p. 283-296.

paragouvernementale. Certains fonctionnaires, les faiseurs d'opinion et les artistes, mêlent pour ce faire les *topoi* du *Volk* et de la Nature. La nature, c'est par excellence l'Afrique, paradis perdu,³⁹ véritable *locus amoenus*. Le Kilimandjaro, renommé *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Spitz*, est présenté comme le plus beau et le plus haut sommet (5895 m) du *Reich* et le symbole de l'Allemagne coloniale. L'ouvrage de Schwabe et Leutwein ne manque pas d'en présenter une superbe photographie. Cette nature fut mise en valeur, rehaussée par l'ingéniosité allemande.⁴⁰ Les timbres émis par la *Reichspost* en témoignent.⁴¹ En 1935, on peut encore en acheter avec des paysages africains et même l'inscription "L'Allemagne n'oublie pas ses colonies".⁴² Enfin, produit de l'union du *Volk* et du Naturel, le héros germanique et ses exploits sont omniprésents. Le *topos* du héros s'exprime dans les affiches, les réclames, les tableaux d'un Ernst Vollbehre,⁴³ d'un Rudolf Hellgreve,⁴⁴ et surtout les périodiques avec leurs illustrations. Les journaux pour la jeunesse, comme " *Jambo*",⁴⁵ destiné aux jeunes adolescents, sont ici significatifs. Ces publications, portées par la KORAG,⁴⁶ organe semi-officiel, montrent le lien entre propagande gouvernementale et mouvements coloniaux. Tiré de la rhétorique homérique, le culte du héros proposé dans *Jambo* est lié à la grandeur, la noblesse d'âme des soldats et colons allemands comme les officiers Schwabe ou Leutwein. Le contrôle de soi est la vertu spécifiquement héroïque mais la volonté du héros "tend à acquérir la puissance, à engager sa responsabilité, à manifester sa hardiesse. C'est pourquoi il peut se manifester sous les traits de l'homme d'État, du grand Capitaine, ou, comme dans les temps très anciens, sous les traits du Guerrier"⁴⁷.

³⁹ Thèse de Catherine Repussard, *De l'impossibilité d'une île ? Utopies coloniales dans l'espace germanophone autour de 1900*, soutenue à l'Université de Strasbourg, le 4 novembre 2011.

⁴⁰ Une colonie utopiste avait été fondée au pied du Kilimandjaro par les Allemands.

⁴¹ Christine de Gemeaux, "Le Reich et l'Allemagne en perspective coloniale", in *op. cit.*, p. 41

⁴² Christine de Gemeaux, *ibid.* Voir aussi dans le même ouvrage, Fanny Dufétel-Viste "L'exemple de la *Reichspost*", p. 207-237.

⁴³ 1876-1960. Vollbehre fut le peintre de la propagande avec quelques tableaux sur le Togo et l'Afrique du Sud-ouest.

⁴⁴ 1860-1935. Il peignit des tableaux représentant notamment les Allemands en Afrique du Sud-ouest.

⁴⁵ C. Repussard, "La revue coloniale *Jambo* dans les années trente : formation identitaire de la jeunesse sous Weimar", in Christine de Gemeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 269-283.

⁴⁶ KORAG : *Koloniale Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft* qui coordonne depuis 1922 l'ensemble des associations coloniales.

⁴⁷ Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* ; trad. Jean Bréjoux, préf. Alain Michel, PUF, coll. Agora, 2 tomes, Paris, 1956, *La Littérature européenne et le Moyen Age latin*, t.1, p. 277-278.

Ainsi le général von Lettow-Vorbeck, celui qui combattit avec ses Askaris en Afrique de l'Est jusqu'après l'armistice, devient-il "le lion d'Afrique", un véritable héros national⁴⁸. Le *topos* des exploits héroïques⁴⁹ exalte les discours *de* et *sur* ces personnages emblématiques. Ils penchent vers le récit d'aventure et le récit scientifique avec des éléments qui se valorisent mutuellement.⁵⁰ Le système des vertus chevaleresques⁵¹ resurgit, et l'idéologie révisionniste célèbre le mariage des armes et des sciences⁵² dans des publications populaires qui conjuguent propagande, *docere et delectare*. Enfin, le succès des romans coloniaux comme celui de Paul Lettow-Vorbeck *Heia Safari*, ou bien le célèbre *Volk ohne Raum* de Hans Grimm⁵³ ne se dément pas.

Cependant, vers la fin des années 1920, le gouvernement, représenté par Stresemann, relègue le "colonialisme sans colonies" à l'arrière-plan. Le *Staatskunst* se fixe d'autres objectifs, notamment le succès du plan Young en 1926 et le règlement des problèmes économiques et sociaux lors de la grande crise de 1929. Issue de la défaite, la perspective révisionniste coloniale allemande semble échouer, ou du moins perdre de son dynamisme.

Conclusion

La propagande coloniale et la politique révisionniste des gouvernements de Weimar interagissent étroitement, particulièrement entre 1919 et 1926. La situation imposée par le Traité de Versailles est présentée comme artificielle et injuste pour le *Reich*. L'opinion publique exige la révision du traité afin que la politique de l'Allemagne coloniale soit reprise et amplifiée. L'injustice faite au mouvement naturel du *Volk* est soulignée. Au final, c'est bien le *Volk* qui apparaît comme le véritable héros du discours national, un héros que ne manquera pas de célébrer "le parvenu autrichien", comme Hindenburg appelait Hitler. L'habileté politique de ce dernier saura user avec discernement de la rhétorique coloniale; tantôt

⁴⁸ Eckhard Michels, *Der Held von Deutsch-Ostafrika: Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck: ein preußischer Kolonialoffizier*, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2008, et du même: "Deutschlands bekanntester 'Kolonialheld': Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck und der Feldzug in Ostafrika im Ersten Weltkrieg", in Catherine Repussard, Monique Mombert (éd.), dossier "Pensée et politique coloniale", in *Revue d'Allemagne*, n°4, 2006, p. 541-555.

⁴⁹ Norbert Dodille, *Introduction aux discours coloniaux*, Paris, PUPS, 2011.

⁵⁰ Dodille, 2011: p. 42.

⁵¹ Ernst Robert Curtius, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 293-295.

⁵³ *Heia Safari*, 1920; *Volk ohne Raum* ("Peuple sans espace"), slogan de la politique national-socialiste, 1926.

utilisée pour gagner des suffrages,⁵⁴ tantôt étouffée pour ne pas gaspiller les forces dans des objectifs secondaires. Dans cette affaire, le *Realpolitiker* Stresemann, venu du monde de l'industrie, apparaît ponctuellement comme le pendant du *Juncker* Bismarck: pour eux, déjà, l'ancrage en Europe et l'économie priment. Ainsi, le *Staatskunst* allemand témoigne-t-il d'une réelle continuité au fil du temps. Après 1945, les Allemands, débarrassés de "la zibeline coloniale", reviennent à un engagement mondial, naturellement économique, soulagés, comme le confie Konrad Adenauer à Charles de Gaulle, de n'avoir pas à vivre les affres de la décolonisation dans les années 1960.⁵⁵

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⁵⁴ Jusqu'en 1941, il sera question d'un Empire allemand au centre de l'Afrique.

⁵⁵ Pour l'actualité : Christine de Gemeaux, *Postkolonialismus, theoretische Fragen im internationalen und deutschen Kontext*, Varsovie, IVG, à paraître 2013.

论中国网络公共修辞：形态、效果、问题与策略¹

(On public Internet rhetoric in China: Current forms, effects, problems and strategies)

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In recent years internet communication has rapidly developed and become popularised in China. The Internet has become not only an important media through which Chinese people deal with daily affairs but also constitutes important forms of new social relationships, social constructions and social culture in China. Discourse on the Internet has changed from individual discourse to public discourse, from Netizen discourse to national discourse. The content of Internet discourse in China has changed from expressing individual feelings, thoughts and wills at the beginning of Internet's rise in the 90s to expressing public opinions and manifesting participation within public affairs and public policies, and it has played an important role regarding the creation of public affairs and the construction of public policies. Many public policies have been made, put into force, and become supervised and adjusted greatly because of Netizen's participating through discourse. As an important means of raising the efficiency of discursive Internet communication, rhetoric and its studies have also moved from individual rhetoric to public rhetoric and from Netizen rhetoric to national rhetoric. In this paper, the author systematically summarises forms of public rhetoric on the Internet in China based on his studies of public rhetoric in recent years. He analyzes these problems derived from public rhetoric on the internet as well as their causes. Finally, the author also puts forward some strategies for improving the competence of public rhetoric in the context of internet communication. It will be a great help in raising the efficiency of internet communication and constructing a new national culture of China.

摘要：近年来，中国大陆的网络普及迅速。网络不仅已成为中国人解决日常个人事务的重要媒介，同时也成为中国新型社会关系、社会结构乃至社会文化的重要形态。网络话语正在从个体话语走向公共话语，从民众话语走向国家话语，逐渐从网络兴起之初的

¹本文曾发表于第13届《韩中文化论坛》（2011年8月韩国·仁川大学，主旨报告）、第2届国际修辞传播学前沿论坛（2011年10月日本·札幌大学），发表时作了补充完善。

个体情感、思想、意志等的个性表达，逐渐转向参与公共事务、公共政策，并对中国的法律法规以及其他形态的公共政策、公共事务决策产生了深刻的影响和巨大的促动。许多公共政策的制定、施行、监督乃至调整，因为网民通过公共话语的参与而产生了显著变化。与之相应，作为提高话语传播效率重要手段的修辞，也正在从个体修辞走向公共修辞，从民众修辞走向国家修辞。修辞学研究也正在从个体修辞学走向公共修辞学，从民众修辞学走向国家修辞学。为此，本文作者在其近年来的公共修辞研究基础上，对中国当下的网络公共修辞形态进行了系统的梳理，剖析其引发的问题和成因，最后提出了提高网民公共修辞能力，改善网络传播环境，提高网络传播效率，进行国家文化建构的策略。

关键词：公共修辞；国家修辞；国家文化；对策

一、公共修辞及其网络形态

最近几年，我国大众传播、新闻传播特别是网络传播的形态发生了许多根本性的变化，公众的修辞形态、话语形态也随之产生了许多变化，出现了许多新的样类。自2009年以来，我们在长期关注中国的修辞和传播实践及其话语形态变化基础上，先后提出了国家传播、国家话语、公共修辞、公共话语等范畴。在此，本文将集中对中国近年来的网络修辞形态做一简要的概括和阐释，较为系统地分析该领域中存在的问题，并提出相应的对策。

“公共修辞”(public rhetoric)是相对于“个体修辞”的一个概念。“所谓个体修辞，就是修辞者是社会个体实施的以自身利益为主要指向的修辞行为。个体修辞的功能最终虽然也会产生社会功能，但其出发点重在个人利益。公共修辞则是指社会个体或群体以公共利益为指向的修辞行为，其修辞动机在于公共意志表达，公共权力建构和公共政策制定。”²

近几年来，中国的网络传播呈现出许多新的特点，首先是出现了许多新的传播方式和传播方法，比如博客、微博等。同时，也产生了许多新的网络修辞手段，网民创造了大量的新词，并且迅速流行，成为网络热词、网络潮语，比如“偶”、“稀饭”、“94”、“潮”、“萌”、

²陈汝东《论全球化时代的东亚修辞学教育》，《韩中语言文化研究》第22辑，韩国现代中国研究会、韩国中国言语文化研究会编，2010年2月，第3-19页。

“卖萌”、“围观”、“装嫩”、“给力”、“雷人”、“肿么”、“月光族”、“逗你玩”、“蒜你狠”、“姜你军”、“糖高宗”、“油你涨”、“苹什么”、“海豚族”、“伤不起”、“内牛满面”等等；涌现了许多新的流行短语或句子，比如近两年的“妈妈喊你回家吃饭”、“我爸是李刚”、“神马都是浮云”、“至于你信不信，由你，我反正是信的”、“你懂得”、“元芳，你怎么看”等等；同时，也产生了许多新的网络修辞方法，比如故意运用谐音方法，

³使用同音、近音词语。在上面列举的词语中，“稀饭”就是“喜欢”，“94”代替“就是”；“杯具”、“洗具”、“杯洗具”，就是“悲剧”、“喜剧”、“悲喜剧”。“酱紫”是“这样子”。“河蟹”、“围脖”分别指“和谐”、“微博”。

⁴至于“逗你玩”、“蒜你狠”、“姜你军”、“糖高宗”、“油你涨”、“苹什么”，则分别是针对2010年以来大豆、蒜、姜、糖、油、苹果等商品的大幅涨价现象创造的谐音词语。显然，谐音既是一种创造新词语的方法，同时也是一种修辞方法，旨在讽刺时下的某些不良现象。

此外，网民也采用故意写错别字的方法，比如“肿么”、“柜族”、“有木有”、“内牛满面”、“鸭梨山大”，则是谐音自“怎么”、“贵族”、“有没有”、“泪流满面”、“亚历山大”（意即“压力山大”）。为什么故意使用错别字呢？一方面是因为年轻人特别是女生，语音发“嗲”，即故意装出娇嫩的声音，有意制造错别字，以此引起他人注意，显得别具一格。

⁵另一方面，在拼音输入法中，由于同音的词语容易排在选字的前面，为

³这方面有许多文献，比如（鄢春艳《从修辞的视角看网络新词构造》，《湖北民族学院学报》（哲学社会科学版）2008年第4期；迪丽努尔·吾甫尔、古丽齐曼·赛买提《谈网络语言中的谐音修辞》，《和田师范专科学校学报》2009年第2期；王晶《浅谈网络语言中的谐音生造词》，《商业经济》2010年第3期。

⁴有人把这种谐音构成的词语称为“皮钦语”(pidgin)，即由汉语和外语构成的“混合语言”。这并不准确。“网虫”(networm)、“粉丝”(fans)、“微博”(micro blog)，具有混合语的特征，但是单纯由汉语构成的上述网络热词不同。参见陈淑霞《皮钦语的网络文体形式》，《民营科技》2010年第11期；扈畅《中国网络皮钦语的文体形式及特征》，《中国科技翻译》2009年第1期。

⁵这种方法在修辞学上叫做“飞白”，参见连晓霞《从修辞手法看网络词语蕴含的价值取向》，《修辞学习》2006年第2期。

了省事就直接用错别字。采用一些具有象形意义的生僻汉字，比如“冏”、“槩”等，也是网络修辞方法之一。“冏”取其面部表情状，表示窘迫、郁闷、无奈。“槩”则表示“很呆”、“很傻”。

近年来，在中国的网络传播领域中也不断涌现出新文体，或者说话语体式，比如“梨花体”、“羊羔体”、“菜刀体”、⁶“咆哮体”、“凡客体”、“淘宝体”、“元芳体”等等。这些文体多以行业、单位、个人命名，比如“丹丹体”、“根叔体”、“校内体”、“清华凡客体”、“北大咆哮体”、“警察卖萌体”等等，不一而足。当然，这些所谓的“网络新文体”或“网络新语体”，还没有或者说正在形成固定的规范。这些新文体使用了许多新的修辞手段和修辞方法，显得新颖别致，给人以新异的感觉，特别是能切合年轻受众的心理需要，更具有亲和力，值得肯定。一定程度上说，中国正在进行着一场文体、语体的“革命”，正在进行着国民的修辞化，网络的修辞化，中国的修辞化！

以上是近年来中国网络修辞微观上呈现出的新形态。在宏观上，中国的网络修辞，呈现出公共修辞形态。这表现在传播媒介、主体、动机、信息性质、机制、效果等诸多方面。首先，网络传播的媒介形态与既有的传播形态不同。20世纪90年代以来，特别是新世纪以来，涌现了许多新的媒介形态和传播方式，继BBS、MSN、博客、播客等之后，最近几年又出现了飞信、微博等新的传播方式。这些为中国的公共修辞传播提供了更为广阔的媒介空间。微博的产生，不但使人人都可成为大众传播者，而且催生了一种短小精悍的新文体形式，且对中国的社会产生了广泛影响。

⁷由于一百多字的限制，发帖者必须在有限的字数内就能吸引读者的注意力，抓住读者。为此，发帖者需要动用各种新颖的修辞手段和方法。

其次，从传播主体看，如今的网络传播主体不仅从数量，而且从性质上出现了根本性的变化。2012年7月19日，中国互联网络信息中心（CNNIC）发布了《第30次中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》。该《报告》显示，截至2012年6月底，中国网民规模达到5.38亿；手机网民规模为3.88亿，手机首次超越台式电脑成为第一大上网终端；微博用户达2.74亿，手机微博用户

⁶Justdo《网络多少事，都付笑谈中——

盘点2010年度热门网络文体》，《电脑爱好者》2011年第4期。

⁷张辛欣、杨玉华《中国微博用户骤增至1.95亿

微舆论深刻影响中国社会》，《新华网》2011年8月24日。

达1.70亿，微博在网民中的使用率达50.9%。

⁸这使更多的中国人参与到网络传播中，构成了推出网络新修辞现象的生力军，为新修辞现象的产生提供了技术和传播主体数量上的支持。因此，每一个社会个体都是信源和信宿。这是公共修辞传播，与既有的传统媒体修辞传播的根本不同。

再次，网络传播的动机和信息性质产生了巨大变化。20世纪90年代初期，中国的网民多关注新闻时事，通过网络获取各种信息，重在个人情感、思想、观念的抒发，功能范围多限于个体之间的交流。新世纪以来，逐渐转向了公共事务，特别是国家的公共政策。从传播机制看，如今的网络传播，呈现出更多的公共性和即时性，比如微博，就可以实现新闻时事的公共、即时、互动传播。最后，网络传播的效果也逐渐由个体之间的信息互动，调整社会个体之间的关系，逐渐扩大为调整社会阶层关系，影响甚至干预国家的政治、经济、文化等方面的政策。“互联网在社会公共领域发挥着越来越重要的作用。”⁹

我们提出“公共修辞”，是基于对修辞观的重新阐释。“修辞不仅是一种选择语音、词语、句式、修辞格等的语言运用现象，也不仅是一种运用语言、音乐、图片、图像、建筑、环境等涉及听觉、视觉、触觉等媒介符号，建构有效的文本，传播信息，以影响、改变他人情感、态度、思想、观念乃至社会行为的社会行为和社会现象；它也是一种人类传播现象，是一种人类传播秩序和社会秩序，是公共权力和公共秩序建构、社会事务处理、公共政策制定的方式和方法，是一种社会公平、公正的制度体系，是一种人类生活方式，同时也是一种文化传统和文化形态。”¹⁰因此，探讨中国当下的网络公共修辞，必须进行修辞观念上的变革。

二、公共修辞的效果与问题

1、公共修辞的传播效果

公共修辞对中国的政治、经济、文化等具体领域产生了巨大影响。显然，目前网络公共修辞已经成为中国社会秩序的主要传播途径。任何政治组织、社会阶层都无法忽略网络修辞的传播现实。

⁸中国互联网络信息中心（CNNIC）《第30次中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》，《中国互联网络信息中心网站》2012年7月19日。

⁹浩钧《工信部刘利华：我国互联网业发展呈现5大特点》，《腾讯科技》2011年8月23日。

¹⁰陈汝东《新兴修辞传播学理论》，北京大学出版社2011年10月，第178页。

公共修辞对中国的法律、法规以及其他形态的公共政策、公共事务决策产生了深刻的影响和促动。许多公共政策的制定、施行、监督乃至调整，由于网民的公共话语参与而产生了显著变化。从2003年《城市流浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法》的被废止和《城市生活无着的流浪乞讨人员救助管理办法》的实施，到2007年《中华人民共和国物权法》的制定、2011年《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》修正案的诞生等等，都离不开社会公众的积极参与，离不开公共修辞传播的巨大影响。

公共修辞也对新国家传播模式产生了促动。这包括以下方面，首先是公众的修辞传播模式发生了根本性变化，日常公共修辞主要通过网络进行。其次，政党、政府等的政治传播模式也发生了根本性变化，由既有的传统传播模式，转向了与网络同时并存，而且逐渐依靠网络来实现。第三，对大众新闻传播的修辞模式变革产生了巨大推动作用，新闻修辞从原有的单纯依靠政党、政府权势的宣传模式，逐渐向依靠修辞进行说服的传播模式转变，由政治组织固有的传播程式向灵活多样的网络修辞传播模式转变。比如，在模范人物的报道中，媒体往往把人物事迹极端化，通过过度渲染人物舍弃对家庭、亲友的眷顾，而执着于集体、国家事业，表现其无私奉献精神。但是，公众已经厌倦了这种无限拔高模范人物的宣传方式，他们更喜欢具有民众亲和力的表达方式。比如，在最近的“深圳丧子交警”的报道中，网民就通过微博对拔高式报道提出了质疑，使人物的真实性得到了还原。¹¹

公共修辞对中国的传播秩序形成了新的冲击和挑战，促使中国的传播秩序进行变革。在传统媒介环境下，中国的社会、政治传播主要通过政党、政府以及各种组织传播形式实现。但是，随着网络公共修辞的发展，目前的社会舆论形成方式产生了巨大变化，舆论并不单纯依靠政党、政府和官方媒体形成，而是多种形成方式并存，而且网络公共修辞正在成为社会舆论的主要形成方式。一个网民通过微博发布的新闻事件，很可能迅速成为舆论热点，比如北大校长的“化学歌”、北大副校长的“撑腰体”等新闻热点的出现就是一个很好的例证。网民正在成为社会舆论的制造者和主要参与者，政党、政府舆论一统天下的局面正在发生改变。此外，中国的人际传播秩序也发生了根本性变化，人际网络等新媒介人际传播正在成为主要的人际传播渠道。

公共修辞也对传播主体以及公共修辞教育产生了巨大影响。随着网络等新媒介传播形态的出现和发展，公共修辞正在成为社会个体、群体抒发个体意志、公共意志，参与社会政治、经济、文化等生活的重要途径和方式，直接影响社会个体和群体乃至国家利益。因此，公共修辞能力和综合素养，正在成为社会个体、群体乃至整个国家软实力的重要组成部分。因此，中国的公共修辞主体以及公共修辞教育也面临新的挑战。

¹¹李涛《丧子守岗深圳交警是否“被塑造”》，《北京青年报》2011年8月15日。

总之，中国的网络公共修辞催生了新的修辞现象、新的修辞手段、新的修辞方法和新的文体、语体，对中国的政治、经济、文化等产生了广泛影响，不仅在微观上产生了积极的传播效果，同时也对既有的政治传播、新闻传播、人际传播以及传播秩序产生了巨大促动，正在促使中国的修辞传播发生翻天覆地的变革。

2、公共修辞领域存在的问题

公共修辞固然对中国的发展产生了巨大影响，但是，也引发了许多问题。这主要表现在以下方面：

传播主体问题。这包括传者问题和受众问题两个方面。从信息传播角度看，中国的网络传播者存在许多问题，比如信息虚假、网络暴力等。由于网络的虚拟性和监管力度不够以及追究程序的繁琐性，导致谣言、诽谤、诋毁等网络暴力等现象屡禁不止。网络推手或者称为“五毛党”的存在，使虚假信息的信息传播有增无减。从信息接受角度看，中国的网络修辞领域中也存在许多受众问题。网络拓展了网民传播权利实施的空间，网民参与公共事务的热情空前高涨，这是网络传播的积极面；但是，受众也往往表现出极端情绪化，他们藐视一切，怀疑一切，质疑一切，把一切都娱乐化，表现出“癫狂”倾向。

12“部分网民缺乏自律意识和自我规范，传播低俗网络文化产品，或是恶意煽动蛊惑他人，形成不文明、不理性、不负责任、不尊重他人隐私的网络环境。”

13这些一定程度上制约了中国的国家文化建设和发展，进而影响了中国政治、经济的发展，也对中国新国家形象的建构产生了负面影响。目前，虽然国家也制定了相应的管理和惩戒律条，但是，由于对违背社会道德和违法行为的管理和追究成本比较高，导致目前尚难以抑制和控制网络暴力现象。

修辞模式问题。虽然中国的新媒介传播形态不断涌现，公共修辞态势正在形成，但是，固有的政治宣传模式依然存在。传统的政治宣传体制下形成的“国家媒体八股文”¹⁴[13]现象依然占主导地位。这显然不利于公共修辞传播，也不利于新国家形象的建构。网民受众心理的多样化，国际网民民族心理的多样性以及修辞文化传统的差异，使宣传模式面临严峻的挑战。因此，中

¹²陈汝东《论国家话语能力》，《北京大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）2011年第5期，第71页。

¹³李玲、黄健荣《论当下中国公共治理中的网络话语表达》，《探索》2010年第4期。

¹⁴陈汝东《国家修辞：实现国家话语转型的新基石》，《中国社会科学报》第201期，2011年6月30日，第28版。

国的传统宣传模式需要变革，公共修辞传播的出现代表了这种变革的发展方向。

公共修辞秩序问题。自古以来，中国的修辞形态基本属于“个体修辞”范畴，缺乏公共修辞赖以存在的社会秩序或者说制度。因此，在网络等新媒介产生后，虽然呈现出公共修辞的形态，且在公共政策、公共利益等方面发挥了积极作用，但是，公共修辞在许多方面依然缺少制度和秩序上的保障，原有的社会制度和秩序难以适应新的公共修辞形态发展的要求。虽然公众参与到了许多公共政策、公共事务领域，但是，在有些领域中公共意志并没有得到有效体现。比如，在中国医疗、房产价格居高不下，社会分配制度不公，城乡和社会阶层收入差距较大，公众对此通过网络等发表了他们的利益诉求，但是，这些意见和建议有些尚难以被有效地纳入公共政策议程。因此，建立公共修辞的政治、法律、行政等制度和秩序保障，是公共修辞秩序建设的重要前提。

公共修辞观念及教育问题。中国重行轻言的修辞伦理观念和个体修辞教育观念，制约了公共修辞的发展。目前，虽然中国网民在公共权利、公共利益受到损害时，不再采取集体沉默的态度，可以通过网络表达出来，但是，其表达方式多呈现出不理性甚至癫狂状态，这影响了其公共修辞效果的发生。因此，中国网民的公共修辞观念亟待转变，其公共修辞素养亟待提高。此外，中国历史上很少重视公共演说修辞教育，目前依然延续着重视德行修养、重视个体书面修辞的传统，但是，这种既有的个体书面语修辞教育，已经不能很好地适应社会发展的需要，需要变革。

三、中国网络公共修辞的发展对策

根据中国的网络公共修辞传播领域所存在的问题，我们提出以下针对性策略：

加强公共修辞研究，转变修辞观念。要解决上述近年来中国网络修辞传播中出现的新问题、新挑战，必须加强对近年来中国网络修辞传播特别是公共修辞现象、修辞手段和方法以及形态的研究，加强对人类修辞发展史的比较研究，在对比基础上，提出适合中国网络公共修辞传播发展的新理论。当然，这首先需要修辞观念上的更新和变革。显然，如果继续囿于传统的“修饰”、“调整”、“技巧”、“美辞”等修辞观，已难以对当前修辞形态发展的现状做出科学的阐释。需要把“修辞观”从微观的语词选择、调整，提升到社会行为、传播行为、社会秩序和文化制度乃至文明形态等高度加以认识。

提高公众公共修辞素养，改善网络修辞传播环境，提高网络修辞传播

质量。中国当前网络修辞传播领域中存在的诸多问题，根本在于网络传播环境，特别是网民的修辞素养。显然，在中国的网络传播中，并不缺少传播者和受众，他们参与公共事务的热情空前高涨，但是他们的修辞素养特别是修辞伦理素养，却不尽如人意。因此，加强网民的修辞传播道德建设，提高其自觉遵守修辞伦理原则，维护网络传播的道德秩序，十分迫切。这不仅有助于提高网民的公共修辞素养，抑制不道德的修辞行为和现象，同时也有助于改善网络传播环境，提高网络公共修辞的质量和效率，有助于改善中国网民的国际形象。

加强公共修辞秩序研究，转变修辞传播模式。目前，在中国的网络传播领域，虽然涌现了大量的公共修辞现象，也对中国的政治、经济、文化等建设，产生了积极影响。但是，既有的修辞传统和宣传模式，依然大量存在。从人际传播到新闻传播，固有的以政党、政府等权势作为说服核心的现象依然大量存在。话语态度上的官腔，信息结构的行政化、程式化，以及传播秩序上的政治化，难以适应不断变化的网民心理需要，也难以切合国际受众的信息接受习惯。因此，在转变修辞传播观念的基础上，变革既有的政治宣传模式，从修辞角度，重新定位表达态度，根据受众心理选择修辞手段和方法，设置信息结构，无疑是转变宣传模式的正确途径。显然，政治宣传模式的转变，根本上还需要落实到修辞传播秩序建设上。这就需要加强人类的公共修辞秩序研究，逐步制定适合新媒介环境下网络公共修辞需要的传播秩序或制度，最终落实到国家的修辞教育之中。

强化国家修辞研究，创建新国家文化。新媒介技术的发展和普及，为中国的政治经济发展提供了信息传播的技术支撑，但是，也给迅速发展的国家经济提出了严峻的文化挑战。中国的文化建设和发展速度与经济发展的高速度不匹配，甚至可以说落后。可以说，近30年的发展正在使中国向经济大国乃至强国迈进，但是，中国并没有提供与其经济发展速度相适应的国家文化产品。如果说，在经济领域中国正在引领世界的发展趋势，那么，在文化上中国也应该起同样的作用。中国应该为人类文化的发展进步，提供新的创造性的思想。要实现这一点，首先需要解放思想，需要创新国家文化。而新国家文化的建设和发展，不仅是一个政治、经济的建构过程，同时也是一个国家修辞建构过程，是一个修辞说服过程。中国要通过国家修辞，展示其文化魅力。这不仅需要中国的政治领袖具备国家修辞意识和国家修辞能力，同时也需要中国的媒体、中国的网民具备国家修辞意识和国家修辞能力，掌握国家修辞的技巧、方法和规律。因此，加强国家修辞研究，创新国家文化，为人类发展提供新的创造性的价值观念，无疑是中国修辞学家、传播学家的一个重要任务之一。

综上所述，近年来中国的网络传播呈现出一些新的态势，不断涌现出新的传播方式、新的修辞现象，特别是网络公共修辞现象，这对中国政治、

论中国网络公共修辞
(*On public Internet rhetoric in China*)

经济、文化、教育等的发展产生了巨大的推动作用。尽管这些新的修辞现象良莠不齐，利弊共存，但是，这些并不能阻止中国网络修辞传播的总体趋势：从个体话语走向公共话语，从民众话语走向国家话语，从国内话语走向国际话语。与之相应，作为提高话语传播效率的修辞，也正在从个体修辞走向公共修辞，从民众修辞走向国家修辞，从国内修辞走向国际修辞。修辞学研究正在从个体修辞学走向公共修辞学，从民众修辞学走向国家修辞学。

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Political discourse in an egalitarian society: The Hamar of Ethiopia

Ivo Strecker

The Hamar belong to those “tribes without rulers”¹ which have non-centralised political systems and live without formal laws or punishments, without great distinctions of wealth, without social class, without nobility, chiefs or kings. This paper is aimed at contributing to our understanding of the way in which such egalitarian systems work.

The Hamar have hereditary ritual leaders (*bitta*). They also select political spokesmen (*ayo*), leaders for war (*djilo*), guardians for grazing land (*kogo*) and for cultivated land (*gudili*), but the basic agents of politics are the married men (*donza*). Conceptually they are likened to a grass, which has roots that spread like a web on the ground (*zarsi*).

Hamar politics is thus grass-root politics similar to the way people in contemporary democratic societies like to speak of and engage in grass-root politics. An important difference is, however, the fact that in Hamar the women are completely missing from public politics. They nevertheless exercise an important influence, which is hidden and difficult to fathom.

As some of the literature on the ethnography of speaking has shown, oratory plays an important role in traditional societies and its study leads us straight to the heart of politics.² The peoples of East Africa are known for their great competence in oratory. Among those who practice a significant amount of pastoralism, occasions of public oratory are often associated with the consumption of an animal or animals. In Hamar this institution, called *osh*, may be held at different levels of social inclusiveness. It may involve only a small neighbourhood, *i.e.*, several adjacent settlement areas (*gurda*); it may involve a larger part or the whole of a territorial segment (*tsinti*); it may involve several territorial segments or parts of them; or it may even involve the whole of Hamar country (*Hamar pe*). But even though there will be differences in size, duration, general tenor, seriousness of matters *etc.*, the general pattern of the *osh* remains largely the same, and it is this pattern which I explore in what follows below.

¹ John Middleton and D. Tait, Eds., *Tribes without rulers* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

² Richard Bauman and J. Sherzer, *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Maurice Bloch, Ed., *Political language and oratory in traditional society* (London: Academic Press, 1975); Donald L. Brenneis and F. R. Myers, *Words: Language and politics in the Pacific* (New York: New York University Press, 1984).

Hamar political discourse may be seen as a process that moves repeatedly through four related stages each of which has its own mode of communication.

The political process rotates in a never-ending spiral from informal conversation to divination to oratory to blessing and cursing.

When the usual routine of Hamar herding, farming, hunting, gathering *etc.*, is threatened by sickness, drought, internal or external conflict *etc.*, the political process sets into motion. First responses happen on an individual level. People ponder quietly over the seriousness of the affair and individually look for signs in nature, clouds, stars, sounds of animals and children *etc.*, which help them to interpret what is happening. Also, during the early morning hours and in the evenings at the homesteads and the cattle camps, and during the day in the fields and at the water holes, people begin to exchange views about the problems at hand.

Once a problem has reached such proportions that the elders decide that public decisions are necessary, they call the married men (*donza*) of the locality to a public meeting (*osh*). Such a call is always preceded by the search for an animal, which will have to be slaughtered in order to feed the men who attend the meeting. Without such an animal (ox, sheep or goat) no public meeting can be held.

Once a man has been found who agrees to provide the animal, the elders will be informed about the appointed day and the place where the meeting will take place. When the men arrive, they first settle down in the shade of a tree, relax and then enter into informal conversations. This is how the proper political discourse begins. Such informal conversations are always part and parcel of a public meeting and are clearly a customarily proscribed form of action. The most manifest element of the informal conversations is the exchange of news, which allow for a better evaluation of the problem for which the men have been called to the *osh*. First the more junior men who are present will speak, especially when they have been witnesses to events and are well informed about details of the current problems. Later, when the facts have been told and discussed in detail, the more senior men, especially the spokesmen who have come, enter the conversation. Typically they will relate historical events, which have been in some way like the present situation and can act as precedents and models for how to cope with the current issues.

In a more hidden way the informal conversations provide a forum for social and cultural criticism, the articulation of social values and, most importantly, the formation of social consensus. Here at the informal conversations people speak their minds and argue with one another. Also they can speak at length for there is usually lots of time at hand and people are willing to listen to one another. A striking theme of the conversations is lamentation. Everyone complains about the fact that others will not listen to him, that things are

going wrong because he has so little influence over others and the matter at hand, and that therefore he cannot be held responsible for all the disasters that surely will happen.

I have found that these lamentations follow the structural lines of Hamar society: junior men, for example, will complain about the senior men who will not listen to them, and senior spokesmen from one locality will complain that the spokesmen of other localities would not listen to them *etc.* That is, everyone complains towards the direction where he finds that his freedom of action and his influence is most severely impeded. It took me some time to understand the logic of such endemic lamentation. Now I think that lamentation goes very well with the egalitarian character of Hamar social organisation and politics: everyone is checked by someone else. No one will ever enjoy complete political success. Complete success would lead to a concentration of power and influence once it was achieved repeatedly. Therefore, frustration must be a perpetual part of egalitarian politics. But the frustration is measured, and the very fact that people indulge in long and colourful lamentation rather than lapse into mute silence is an indication that their political spirit is alive and that their aspirations have only been frustrated but not killed.

If the problem, which is facing a particular locality of Hamar or Hamar country at large, is really threatening, a divination will be held. This happens when the informal conversations are finished. The men move to another shade tree where a diviner has settled down to throw sandals in order to ask questions related to the existing problem and how it may be solved. He asks his questions either directly or in form of propositions, which the sandals may either confirm or reject, depending on the way they fall to the ground. Thus he may say, "we move the herds and the rain will fall", and then the silent answer of the sandals will be "yes" or "no".

On the first and manifest level, Hamar divination acts as a means by which the elders focus on the most difficult aspects of their political decisions. While the diviner throws the sandals, the men sit around him, watch and ask him to pose the questions, which interest them. In this way the diviner does not act all on his own but is to a large extent the medium of others. In the last resort, however, neither he nor the other men matter. Only the sandals "speak" and provide information on which the elders will act. The political implication of this, I think, is obvious: through divination the donza achieve an absolution from their responsibility, because it is not they but a third party, the sandals that is deciding the matter.

The process of divination shares some characteristics with the informal conversations in that it provides an opportunity for the men to air their views and articulate social fears. In fact the latter is more prominent here, because the men may ask the diviner critically to examine the behaviour of others under the pretext that it may be the cause for the existing problem. Thus the divination does not only serve as a shield behind which one escapes

responsibilities, it also acts as a way to find scape-goats and allows for accusations which are so indirect that the accusers need not fear any retribution by the accused.

While the conversations and the divination are going on, young men slaughter the animal or animals provided for the meeting and roast the meat over the fire. When the meat is ready, they call the men to come and sit down along a semi-circle of branches with fresh green leaves that will serve as a table from which the men eat. They will slowly pick up the meat from the leaves while they listen to the speeches being made. Only selected men are allowed to speak at a public meeting. They are called *ayo*. The verb *ai'a* means 'do'. So the *ayo* are those who get things done, they are leaders, and they lead especially by what they say. An *ayo* is selected by his 'elder brothers' and 'fathers' (*i.e.* men of senior age groups) when, at a particular place and in a particular moment in time, there is need for a new spokesman. They bless him and install him by handing him a spear at a public meeting. But the privilege they offer is provisional and holds only as long as his leadership is good and fruitful. To give more colour to this important fact let me quote from a Hamar text:

One boy is a goatherd, but tomorrow he is a warrior: "When you go that way, if you meet a leopard kill it. Kill the lion! Kill the ostrich with the feathers. Kill the giraffe and when you return in the evening bring the fillet". So the fellow draws forth service. Such a man is an *ayo*. If those who go don't kill the giraffe, the buffalo, the lion, the ostrich, the leopard, but if they meet the enemy and one of them dies, it will be said: "His word is bad, his command is bad. Stop him".³

At an *osh* the men sit in order of seniority, the oldest to the right, the youngest to the left, and the principle of seniority applies also to speaking, the older ones speak first, the younger speak later. When a man's turn has come to speak, he gets up from his place at the leaves, takes the spear and walks over to where the animal has been slaughtered and roasted. There he takes some of the chyme, which is the green and only partly digested stomach contents of the animal, and rubs it on to his spear, his forehead, his chest and often also his legs. Then he passes slowly back and forth along the semi-circle of listeners and begins to speak. Old and experienced speakers who know of the respect they command usually begin their speech with a noisy and stylized expression of anger. They reprimand the younger for failing to act properly, for neglecting their duties, for thinking of themselves and not being strong,

³ Jean Lydall and Ivo Strecker, *The Hamar of Southern Ethiopia. Vol. I: Work journal* (Hohenschäftlarn: Klaud Renner Verlag, 1979): 109.

reliable and courageous. From this intimidation the public meeting has its name, *osh*. *Oshimba* means to be intimidated, shy, in social fear, and the term *osh* implies this intimidation. But let us note that the listeners are not really intimidated, and that it is because of their proud rejection of authority that the spokesmen shout so vehemently and complain that people do not listen and do what they want.

After he has finished with his rhetorical anger, the speaker comes to the particular matter of the day. Typically, he places the current issue in a historical context and looks for parallels and precedents in the past. The older a speaker is, the further back his memories reach. After the first speaker follows a second, a third and so on depending on how important the issue is and how many spokesmen are present. No speaker is listened to in complete awe and silence. On the contrary, one often hears the younger *ayo* who are sitting in the audience call out to the others: "listen, be quiet", which attests to the inattentiveness of the others. Listeners sometimes also interrupt speakers, throw in their comments, tell them what to say, laugh and tease them and generally may begin to chatter with each other when a speech begins to bore them. Of course such a refusal to listen dismays the speakers immensely.

Also, when a meeting concerns matters of war and peace, and when the men are determined to fight even though the speakers urge them to be prudent, the men will begin to chant their war songs (*raega*) with which they indicate their willingness to fight and their rejection of any advice of prudence which might be interpreted as fearfulness by their adversaries. Thus in Hamar a public speaker may be "sung down" rather in the way in which at western political meetings a speaker may be "booed" or "whistled" down.

Usually, there is a limit to which people can continue a meeting. The sun will get hot and the herds will have to be watered *etc.* Therefore, if a matter cannot be finished at one public meeting, another meeting will be called where the debate can be continued. In a sense, no debate is ever really finished and Hamar political history can be viewed (and is told as) a long line of public meetings. At each *osh* preceding ones are remembered and future ones projected and anticipated.

I have called the *osh* a debate, but I must qualify this. We speak of a debate when people try to persuade each other by refuting the arguments of others and by showing the strength and validity of theirs. At a Hamar *osh* such features are surely present, but debate should not spoil the central aim of the *osh* which is to articulate consensus. The *osh* is not the place and time where people should sort out and debate things from scratch. We have seen already how the *osh* is preceded by informal conversations and divination. The debates should have been finished during these earlier stages, and ideally the public speeches should express similar views, and agree on the way, which would lead everyone out of the existing problem.

I now turn to the fourth mode of Hamar political discourse, the curse (*asha*) and the blessing (*barjo aela*). We have already seen how the first three processes have gradually moved from a very open mode (conversations) to a more stylized and closed mode of communication. The curse and the blessing are even more closed and focused than the preceding divination and oratory. In the act of cursing and blessing the will of the group is expressed most emphatically. Here the consensus is complete. There is no divergence, no debate, no doubt.

Cursing and blessing are closely related to speaking. Only the more senior spokesmen may do it, and they often place it at the end of their speeches. There are various ways in which a speaker may combine cursing and blessing with his speech. Sometimes, when for example a speaker is so upset by a problem that he wants to get rid of it as soon as possible, he may begin his speech with a curse and having thus unburdened himself (and his audience) he moves on to speak.

There are also occasions where after the *osh* the men move to another place where the *ayo* then raises his spear and calls the evil to leave and the good to come forth.

Here is an example of a blessing. The speaker is standing in front of the men and lifting the blade of his spear up into the air while he calls, he makes rhythmic gestures of pulling or drawing the desired thing (state of affairs) towards himself, and the men, who are imitating his movements with their hands, answer in refrain:

Leader:

Eh-eh!

My herds are at Mello,
which are in the open grass lands,
may my herds come lowing, come
grazing the grass may they come, come
having eaten may the calves come, come
leading their kids may the goats come... . . . come ...⁴

Chorus:

When a spokesman curses, that is when he “hides away” (*asha*) the undesired, he turns his spear around and jabs with the sharp metal point on the end of his spear in the direction towards which the evil should disappear, usually westward, where it should “get lost with the setting sun”:

⁴ Jean Lydall and Ivo Strecker, *The Hamar of Southern Ethiopia. Vol. II: Baldambe explains* (Hohenschäftlarn: Klaud Renner Verlag, 1979): 14.

Leader:

Chorus:

Eh-eh!

The herds are carrying sickness,
may the sickness go beyond Labur, may it go
may the sickness go beyond Topos. may it go
Cattle owners you have enemies,
down there, the Korre,
if he looks at your cattle, may he die, die
may his eyes fail, fail
may his heart get speared, speared
may they disperse like doves, disperse
and leave... leave...⁵

As we can see, Hamar political discourse moves from an open form, in which differences, insecurities and alternatives are expressed and discussed, to more and more closed forms in which the differences are narrowed down and are funnelled as it were towards a consensus. Here lies the decisive difference that distinguishes egalitarian from centralised forms of political organisation. In the egalitarian practice of the Hamar, the ordinary problems of everyday-life set the political process into motion. At the beginning, people's individual views differ and collide about the right ways of action, and only when the differences have been negotiated and consensus has been reached will joint action be taken. Egalitarian politics are here the exact opposite of centralised politics. The former begin with a multitude of wills, which come to a consensus while the latter begin with a single will, which imposes itself on a multitude of others. In centralised political systems, like for example ancient Egypt, all politics emanate from an apex, from the divine ruler whose voice commands downwards reaching each and every-one in the social pyramid. In Hamar things are different. There is no single will which imposes itself on others, but rather many different wills which first diverge and then move towards each other, find consensus and act together. Such agreement never lasts because things change, new problems arise and the political process is set into motion again. Egalitarian political discourse converges from difference of view to consensus.

Besides the funnelling of opinion, several shifts towards seeming "irrationality" characterise Hamar political discourse. The two most important shifts occur when the Hamar move from conversation to divination and then again from oratory to blessing/cursing. How are we to interpret these shifts? Returning to a point I have made above, the shift towards divination may be

⁵ *Ibid.*

explained as a way of reducing the social danger involved in decision making. The divination reduces the threat inherent in answers, suggestions, commands, advice, *etc.* separating, as it were, speaking from will. The men express their views and offer their advice freely and without disguise during the informal conversations when nothing they say has any claim of authority. However, when they move towards the formulation of binding decisions, they hide behind the shield of divination. Following the terminology of politeness theory, one can say that they employ a strategy by which they soften the face-threatening act (FTA) involved in proposing decisions affecting others.⁶ Not all decisions are equally problematic. It is when decisions are socially threatening and difficult to justify that one should expect divination to be practiced.

What about the shift from oratory to blessing/cursing? Here we find the reverse of what happens in divination. All politics moves constantly between acts of commitment and acts of non-commitment, of saying 'yes' and saying 'no'. While divination embodies a strategy of non-commitment, of saying "no, I have nothing to do with it", blessing and cursing constitute acts of strong commitment and affirmation. They say, "Yes, we want things definitely to become like this or that". But they seem irrational in so far as they express wishes that are beyond human control. In this way, Hamar political discourse moves towards a kind of magical action. But it is important to note that this magical element is intrinsic to all expressions of emotional emphasis, rhetoric hyperbole, mimesis *etc.*, and that it can be found in all human communication. That is, whenever people attempt to move others by indirect means of persuasion they enter the realm of magic. The persuasive magic of the Hamar *osh* aims at influencing the future in a kind of prophetic way, and one is reminded of certain Dinka ceremonies led by the "master of the fishing spear" of which Lienhardt writes:

Like prophecies, the ceremony eventually represents as already accomplished what the community, and those who can traditionally speak for them, collectively intend.⁷

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⁶ Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, "Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena", in *Questions and politeness. Strategies in social interaction*, Esther Goody, Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978); *Politeness: Some universals in language usage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Ivo Strecker, *The social practice of symbolization: An anthropological analysis* (London/Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1988).

⁷ Geoffrey Lienhardt, *Divinity and experience; The religion of the Dinka* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961): 251.

THE ELEPHANT AND THE OBELISK


About the Special Series and Imprint of the African Yearbook of rhetoric

In the fantastical imagination Europe holds of Africa the Elephant and the Obelisk have an enduring presence. During the Renaissance their images lent an African presence to the culture of emblems, not much different in purpose and means from the modern obsession with branding logos supposed to encapsulate a corporation's ethics beyond selling goods. In rhetoric (of which emblems were the visual analogue) the Elephant spoke to the virtue of memory and the prudential value attached to formulating forward-looking arguments heeding past lessons. The Obelisk, not unlike Neptune's trident, emblematised the penetration of wit – a point driven home by its engraved hieroglyphs. Memory and intelligence, prudence and projection, sure footedness and quick sharpness – the Elephant carrying the Obelisk on its back told a telling tale about the distanced virtue European high culture, at the very time of Portuguese descobrimentos, attributed to a continent, Africa, which had always been part of it, in reality or in imagination. Africa has sometimes afforded Western minds an occasion to reflect.



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