Jairos Kangira & Philippe-Joseph Salazar (eds.)

Gender Rhetoric : North-South

GENDER RHETORIC : NORTH–SOUTH

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African Yearbook of Rhetoric I

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prefinal edit version

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Poly Press
WINDHOEK: NAMIBIA

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Cover art courtesy of the artist, "The kiss" by Toni Bico.

www.tonibico.com

This volume has been copy-edited by Brett Syndercombe.

Publication of this volume of the series
African Yearbook of Rhetoric
was made possible by the
National Research Foundation of South Africa,
Grant number UID 64477
(bi-lateral project South Africa/Norway).

Publisher: Poly Press
Private Bag 13388, Windhoek, Namibia
Telephone: +264-61-2072062

ISBN 978-99945-71-30-7

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Rhetoric as salvatory

Philippe-Joseph Salazar

The present volume is a "new beginning" of a story that goes back to the founding of democracy in South Africa in 1994.

For some fifteen years the Centre for Rhetoric Studies, at the University of Cape Town, has been promoting the cause of rhetoric on the African continent. Seconded by friends and colleagues, from Morocco to Romania, from Sweden to Argentina, from France to the United States, whose home disciplines or intellectual interests lie with philosophy and critical theory, politics and religion, the law and science, and simply rhetoric, we have forged ahead, moved by the belief, supported by observation, that a democracy without the means to argue is bound to fail, and impelled by the conviction, borne by intelligence, that a duty of deliberation, placed on both governed and government, is fundamental to the exercise of citizenship.

For some fifteen years our graduates have proudly gone to job interviews carrying a label novel enough to attract attention: "Rhetoric Studies". Ours were the first African PhDs in rhetoric. As the *International Encyclopedia of Communication* (Blackwell, 2008) points out, a continental pioneering work has been achieved. By all standards it has been a collective work, truly intellectual in its purpose and genuinely international in its compass, deeply collegial in the sense of recognition that animates us, while affirmative of what can be, and is achieved on this continent.

The "new beginning" mentioned earlier is the launch of a new book series: the *African Yearbook of Rhetoric*.

After fifteen years of colloquia, events and symposia (among our guests were Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Jean Rouch — I shall not humble the living by mentioning them by name), after fifteen years of successful and enriching bilateral projects, mostly funded by the National Research Foundation of South Africa, which must be credited for having welcomed "Rhetoric Studies" in its nomenclature of research fields, we have decided to launch a book series. This runs against the grain of common wisdom, common enough but commonly unwise, which considers electronic dissemination as *nec plus ultra*.

In spite of our instrumental resort to online tools, and a website that has become a major resource (www.rhetoricafrica.org), we have opted for the printed word. It may have to do with a fascination for the printed word which Doris Lessing, in her Nobel lecture,[1] places at the heart of Africa's salvatory. It has to do with the desire to affirm that for ideas not to be transient and vanish in the maelstrom of Internet flotsam they have to be set and to last and to effect change. There must be a tangible support. The irony

[1] Philippe-Joseph Salazar, "Nobel Rhetoric; or, Petrach's Pendulum", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 42, 4 (2009): 373-400.

is lost on none of us: we, rhetoricians, deal in speeches, the most transient form of human, civic art; we, rhetoricians, are acutely aware of the nature of public persuasion whose artifacts — speeches, its touchstones and references — disappear as soon as they appear; we, rhetoricians, observe and analyse the perversity of transient communication (think of a politician saying "I never said 'that'", such is the nature of a speech, it comes and goes). Because of all this, we, rhetoricians, mistrust the prestidigitation of the verbal and its ersatz, e-communication, and are wedded to seeing ideas in print. Printed books are like monuments: even defaced, monuments preserve a trace of that which was. Books are such a salvatory.

The first volume in this book series, *African Yearbook of Rhetoric*, draws on a bilateral project on gender and rhetoric, funded, over three years, by the national research agencies of South Africa and Norway.[2] Dr Jairos Kangira of the University of Namibia, and himself a PhD in Rhetoric Studies, has kindly accepted to be its co-editor, thus lending this inaugural volume a stronger African imprint. Writers from the project include Berit von der Lippe (Oslo) and a roster of young researchers at the Centre for Rhetoric Studies (Ruvimbo Goredema, Bridget Kwinda, Themba Ratsibe) as well as postdoctoral fellow Dr Sergio Alloggio and Zimbabwean academics Zifikile Gambahaya and Pedzisayi Mashiri. We have also secured decisive contributions by leading feminist rhetoricians, Barbara Cassin (CNRS, Paris), Nicole Dewandre (European Commission) and Cheryl Glenn (Penn State); and welcomed a collaborative essay by Gerard A. Hauser (Colorado) and Jens Elmelund Kjeldsen (Bergen) in the field of deliberative democracy. Their chapters need no presentation; they are their own very best orators.

In keeping with the African, continental purview of this book series, we aim at being multi-lingual. This volume is an incipient testimony to this strategic decision: rhetoric as a salvatory of *logos* on, and in Africa.

The second volume (2011) will deal with the *Rhetorics of Justice in post-societies*, the third (2012) will be devoted to *Presidential Rhetorics in Africa*.

[2] Material based upon work supported by the National Research Foundation under Grant number UID 64477. Disclaimer: Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in these materials are those of the authors and therefore the NRF does not accept any liability in regard thereto.

Rien de discours

Barbara Cassin

This opening text by French philosopher of rhetoric and feminist philologist Barbara Cassin deals with an opening. Since it is in French, another African idiom, this double opening needs some sort of introduction. Rhetoric enjoys fundamental texts, Aristotle's Rhetoric*, of course, but also, for the questioning of gender, the Sophist Gorgias'* Praise of Helen*. As rhetoric begins and logology enters the field of reflecting upon the nature of that which exceeds nature — human nature and its civility —, two texts face each other: here, Aristotle's* Rhetoric*, wherefrom gender is so expunged that a Martian would think that this fundamental handbook of democracy is for sexless animates: there, Gorgias'* Praise of Helen*, whereby gendering comes to the fore, in full force. It is the force of this staging to exhibit what male discourse can do with female presence, to show how one counter-performance of speech (the* Praise*, against the "common knowledge" that Helen was to be vilified, not praised) can outperform Aristotle's* Rhetoric*, and to inaugurate, at the same time, woman as an object for civil speech. Cassin offers here, with Gorgias and Lacan, a careful, detailed, probing unravelling of the sexed stakes within rhetoric, and of the (lack of) rapport rhetoric entertains with truth, reality, and knowledge. Cassin is the author of* L'Effet sophistique *(Paris, 1995) and the general editor of* Vocabulaire européen des philosophies *(Paris, 2004; now being translated at Princeton University Press, with further versions in Arabic and Russian on their way). Together with Alain Badiou, in a philosophical exchange that stages gendering, she has just released* Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel *(Paris, 2010) and* Heidegger. Le nazisme, les femmes, la philosophie *(Paris, 2010). A full scale treatment of the question of Helen and* logos *can be found in her* Voir Helène en toute femme *(Paris 2000).*
Ph-J. S.

Homme, femme et mot

"Un jour que Zeus se querellait avec Héra en soutenant que, dans l'acte sexuel, la femme avait plus de plaisir que l'homme alors qu'Héra maintenait le contraire, ils résolurent de mander Tirésias pour lui poser la question, étant donné qu'il avait fait l'expérience de l'une et l'autre condition. A la question qu'on lui posait, Tirésias répondit que, s'il y avait dix parts de plaisir, l'homme jouissait d'une seule et la femme de neuf".[1]

"Encore... est issu du latin populaire *hinc ad horam,* 'd'ici jusqu'à

[1] Phlégon de Thralles (fragment A 1 de Luc Brisson, *Le mythe de Tirésias. Essai d'analyse structurale*, Leyden, Brill, 1976).

> l'heure'... . La forme initiale *uncore, oncore,* est due à l'influence de *onque*, *onc* 'jamais' (latin classique *unquam)"* [2]

Est-il accidentel qu'Hélène soit une femme? En quoi une femme est-elle légitimement éponyme de ce type de discursivité (sophistique, logologique, à effet-monde)? En quoi "la femme" (qu'on barre le la, qu'on la dise la/une, etc...) est-elle évoquée par ce statut du mot plus chose que la chose, en tant qu'il est toute la chose, et que la chose est un effet de mot? Comment tenir ensemble le rien d'objet (l'eidôlon, l'Hélène comme excédent d'image utopique de Broch), le rien du désir et de la jouissance (Homère et Aphrodite, le désir d'Hélène comme absence dans la présence de Giraudoux), le rien du discours (Gorgias, Euripide, jusqu'à LN d'origine cruciverbiste).

Lacan les tient ensemble dans Encore. Pour faire boucle, nœud coulant plutôt, avec la psychanalyse, sur femme-discours-rien.

La thèse hélénique

On dirait qu'*Encore*[3] ne traite que d'Hélène, comme objet du ratage côté homme, et comme sujet du ratage côté femme.

S'il ne traite que d'Hélène, c'est pour une raison très simple: Lacan passe, en général et quant à la femme, de l'anatomique au discursif. La pain quotidien n'est plus fait de "quelques conséquences psychiques de la différence anatomique entre les sexes",[4] mais de quelques effets de la différence des discours. Non plus: l'anatomie c'est le destin, mais: dis-moi comment tu parles.

Pour autant, la logique du manque n'est pas démise. Elle est plutôt généralisée, si bien que le manque ne constitue aucune différence pertinente entre homme et femme. Mais la trope du manque, si.

Je continuerai à ne pas mâcher mes mots, parce que les bêtises, il vaut mieux, de temps en temps en tout cas, qu'elles se voient.

1. La posture lacanienne est sophistique, logologique: "Chaque réalité se fonde et se définit d'un discours".[5]
2. Parmi les discours performants, la psychanalyse: "C'est en cela qu'il importe que nous nous apercevions de quoi est fait le discours analytique... On y parle de foutre–verbe, en anglais, *to fuck*–, et on y dit que ça ne va pas".[6] Le ratage "est la seule forme de réalisation du rapport sexuel", "Il ne s'agit pas d'analyser comment ça réussit. Il s'agit de répéter jusqu'à plus

[2] *Le Robert, Dictionnaire Historique de la langue française*, (Paris: Le Robert, 1993): 880.
[3] Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, livre XX, "Encore" (1972-1973), (Paris: Seuil, 1975). Je cite entre parenthèses les pages de mon tissu.
[4] Titre de l'article de Freud (1925), trad.fr. in: *La Vie sexuelle*, (Paris: PUF, 1969): 197.
[5] Lacan, *Encore,* 33.
[6] Lacan, *Encore,* 33.

soif pourquoi ça rate".[7]

3. D'où, par transitivité, la thèse: "La réalité est abordée avec les appareils de la jouissance. ... d'appareil, il n'y en a pas d'autre que le langage. C'est comme ça que, chez l'être parlant, la jouissance est appareillée.[8] Ce nœud entre réalité-langage-jouissance, je propose de l'appeler *thèse hélénique*.

4. Il y a deux manières de dire que ça ne va pas, et donc deux manières que ça n'aille pas. Lacan les distingue, quant à lui, comme "d'un côté" homme et "de l'autre" femme: "Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel parce que la jouissance de l'Autre prise comme corps est toujours inadéquate–perverse d'un côté, en tant que l'Autre se réduit à l'objet *a*–et de l'autre, je dirai folle, énigmatique".[9] A expliquer.

Hélène petit a

> *"Que la femme soit l'objet* a *de l'homme à l'occasion, ça ne veut pas dire du tout qu'elle, elle a du goût à l'être. Mais enfin ça arrive. ça arrive qu'elle y ressemble naturellement. Il n'y a rien qui ressemble plus à une chiure de mouche qu'Anna Freud! ça doit lui servir!"*[10]

5. Côté homm–on n'oubliera pas qu' "on s'y range en somme par choix–libre aux femmes de s'y placer si ça leur fait plaisir. Chacun sait qu'il y a des femmes phalliques, et que la fonction phallique n'empêche pas les hommes d'être homosexuels. Mais c'est aussi bien elle qui leur sert à se situer comme hommes, et aborder la femme".[11]

Côté homme donc, ça rate pour deux raisons liées: la fonction phallique et l'objet *a.*

Choisissons les phrases les moins substantiellement lacaniennes:

- quant au phalle: "La jouissance phallique est l'obstacle par quoi l'homme n'arrive pas à jouir du corps de la femme, précisément parce que ce dont il jouit, c'est la jouissance de l'organe".[12] Il aime "à" elle, mais il ne jouit pas "de" elle, mais de lui–l'anatomie devient presque son destin à lui. Elle, de son côté, n'est pas toute, pas toute à lui. En tout cas, le plaisir d'organe est un obstacle à la jouissance, parce que ce n'est pas ça: "ça n'est pas ça–voilà le cri par où se distingue la jouissance obtenue de celle attendue".[13]
- quant à l'objet du désir: "C'est pour autant que l'objet *a* joue quelque part–et d'un départ, d'un seul, du mâle–le rôle de ce qui vient à la place du

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[7] Lacan, *Encore,* 54ff.
[8] Lacan, *Encore,* 52.
[9] Lacan, *Encore,* 131.
[10] Jacques Lacan, "Discours de Rome" (1974), *Lettres de l'Ecole freudienne*, 16, (1975): 177-203.
[11] Lacan, *Encore*, 67.
[12] Lacan, *Encore*, 13.
[13] Lacan, *Encore*, 103.

partenaire manquant, que se constitue ce que nous avons l'usage de voir surgir aussi à la place du réel, à savoir le phantasme".[14] Pour le mâle, il n'y a de partenaire que manquant, relancé en cause du désir.

Plaquons brutalement

Hélène fonctionne pour l'homme comme un objet *a*, cause du désir; elle est eidôlon, nouée au phantasme.

De plus, il y a deux manières de lui faire l'amour, c'est-à-dire de ne pas le lui faire, et elles valent la différence amant-mari, Pâris-Ménélas. "Pour l'homme, à moins de castration, c'est-à-dire de quelque chose qui dit non à la fonction phallique, il n'y a aucune chance qu'il ait jouissance du corps de la femme, autrement dit, fasse l'amour. C'est le résultat de l'expérience analytique. ça n'empêche pas qu'il peut désirer la femme de toutes les façons, même quand cette condition n'est pas réalisée. Non seulement il la désire, mais il lui fait toutes sortes de choses qui ressemblent étonnamment à l'amour"; ce que l'homme aborde, "c'est la cause de son désir, que j'ai désignée de l'objet *a*. C'est là l'acte d'amour. Faire l'amour, comme le nom l'indique, c'est de la poésie. Mais il y a un monde entre la poésie et l'acte. L'acte d'amour, c'est la perversion polymorphe du mâle, cela chez l'être parlant".[15] Première manière: celle de Pâris: Pâris homosexualisé, tout en chairs rondes et beaux habits, "fait l'amour", c'est-à-dire poétise, poématise, avec Peithô en intermédiaire. Deuxième manière: Ménélas dans tous les vases fait quelque chose (*prattei, praxis*) mais quoi, qui ressemble à de l'amour, épée basse, fourreau brandi. Silence actif, acte sidéré de pervers polymorphe.

Il n'y a de femme qu'exclue par la nature des choses qui est la nature des mots

6. Côté femme. Ça rate de manière "folle, énigmatique".
Qu'est-ce à dire?

Partons de la provocation: "Il n' y a de femme qu'exclue par la nature des choses qui est la nature des mots, et il faut bien dire que s'il y a quelque chose dont elles-mêmes se plaignent assez pour l'instant, c'est bien de ça–simplement, elles ne savent pas ce qu'elles disent, c'est toute la différence entre elles et moi".[16]

Qu'est ce que Lacan sait qu'elles ne savent pas encore? Il sait que la femme est "pas-toute": "*La* femme, ça ne peut s'écrire qu'à barrer le *La*. Il n'y a pas *La* femme, article défini pour désigner l'universel. Il n'y a pas *La* femme puisque–j'ai déjà risqué le terme et pourquoi y regarderais–je à deux

[14] Lacan, *Encore,* 58.
[15] Lacan, *Encore*, 67-68.
[16] Lacan, *Encore*, 68.

fois–de son essence, elle n'est pas toute".[17]

Ce pas-toute définit le rapport de la femme au langage: "*Nos collègues, les dames analystes, sur la sexualité féminine, elles ne nous disent... pas tout!* C'est tout à fait frappant. Elles n'ont pas fait avancer d'un pas la question de la sexualité féminine. Il doit y avoir à cela une raison interne, liée à la structure de l'appareil de jouissance"–appareil qui ne l'oublions pas est et n'est que le langage.[18] D'après le principe hélénique en effet, sont co-définis le rapport de la femme au corps, au langage, à la jouissance: "L'être sexué de ces femmes pas-toutes ne passe pas par le corps, mais par ce qui résulte d'une exigence logique dans la parole".[19]

On tient là la manière dont ça rate côté femelle. "Du côté de ~~La~~ femme, c'est d'autre chose que de l'objet *a* qu'il s'agit dans ce qui vient à suppléer ce rapport sexuel qui n'est pas"[20]: il s'agit "*d'une autre satisfaction*, la satisfaction de la parole".[21]

Le traité du non-être de la jouissance féminine

> "Que le non-être ne soit pas, il ne faut pas oublier que c'est porté par la parole au compte de l'être dont c'est la faute. C'est vrai que c'est sa faute, parce que si l'être n'existait pas, on serait bien plus tranquille avec cette question du non-être".[22]

7. De même qu'il arrive à Platon de donner la parole à Protagoras par la bouche de Socrate de la manière la plus protagoréenne qui soit,[23] de même il arrive à Lacan d'articuler le discours de la jouissance féminine de la manière la plus féminineme nt jouissive qui soit. Mais chez Platon comme dans Lacan, il est difficile de décider en quoi le passage par la bouche de l'Autre déforme.

Il est facile, par contre, d'isoler dans *Encore* ce qui constitue le traité du non-être de la jouissance féminine, ou *Traité de la non-jouissance féminine.*

Comme l'être dans *Le Traité du non-être* de Gorgias, la jouissance féminine est abordée selon une structure logique très précise, que Freud déjà nomme "sophisme". On sait que "A a emprunté à B un chaudron de cuivre; lorsqu'il le rend, B se plaint de ce que le chaudron a un grand trou qui le met hors d'usage. Voici la défense de A: 'Primo. je n'ai jamais emprunté de chaudron à B; secundo, le chaudron avait un trou lorsque je l'ai emprunté à B;

[17] Lacan, *Encore*, 68.
[18] Lacan, *Encore*, 54.
[19] Lacan, *Encore*, 15.
[20] Lacan, *Encore*, 59.
[21] Lacan, *Encore*, 61.
[22] Lacan, *Encore,* 56ff.
[23] Platon, *Thééthète,* "Eloge de Protagoras".

enfin. j'ai rendu le chaudron intact'". [24] Cette structure de recul est constitutive du *Traité du non-être* de Gorgias, où le sophiste démontre successivement trois thèses: 1. "Rien n'est". 2. "Même si c'est, c'est inconnaissable". 3. "Même si c'est et si c'est connaissable, on ne peut pas le montrer à autrui."[25]

Voici le nouveau traité:

7.1. Première thèse: Rien n'est = Elle ne jouit pas

- Cette thèse se décompose elle-même selon la même structure:

a) "Il n'y a pas d'autre jouissance que la jouissance phallique".

b) Et s'il y en avait une autre, mais il n'y en a pas d'autre, "s'il y en avait une autre que la jouissance phallique, il ne faudrait pas que ce soit celle-là".

S'il y en avait une autre, mais il n'y en a pas d'autre que la jouissance phallique–sauf celle sur laquelle la femme ne souffle mot, peut-être parce qu'elle ne la connaît pas, celle qui la fait pas-toute. Il est faux qu'il y en ait une autre, ce qui n'empêche pas la suite d'être vraie, à savoir qu'il ne faudrait pas que ce soit celle-là.[26]

La deuxième thèse est impliquée dans l'enroulement de la première: "il n'y en a pas d'autre sauf", de manière à ce que l'exception soit retoquée, refoulée, en vertu de la vieille stratégie dénégationniste de l'implication matérielle stoïcienne (*ex falso sequitur quodlibet*): il est faux qu'il y en ait une autre, mais il est vrai que ça ne serait pas celle-là.

L'être n'est pas chez Gorgias pour deux raisons complémentaires: parce qu'il n'existe pas comme verbe (il n' "est" pas), et parce qu'il n'a aucun prédicat possible (il n'est pas tel). De même, la jouissance féminine n'est pas, et si elle est, elle n'est pas telle — à savoir, féminine. Il y a à cela deux très lourdes raisons complémentaires.

En effet, "l'univers, c'est là où, de dire, tout réussit... — réussit à faire rater le rapport sexuel de la façon mâle".[27] Pourquoi? Parce que "c'est ça que je dis quand je dis que l'inconscient est structuré comme un langage".[28]

Ou à cause, et cela revient au même, du rapport entre dire et jouissance: de la jouissance, on peut simplement dire que ce n'est pas ça. "On la refoule, ladite jouissance, parce qu'il ne convient pas qu'elle soit dite, et ceci pour la raison justement que le dire n'en peut être que ceci–comme jouissance, elle ne convient pas".[29] Le refoulement signifie que "la jouissance

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[24] Freud, *Le Mot d'esprit et ses rapports avec l'inconscient*, trad. Marie Bonaparte et M. Nathan, (Paris: Gallimard, 1930): 99.

[25] *Sur Mélissus, Xénophane et Gorgias,* 979 a12s., cf. 82 B 3 D.K. J'ai traduit et commenté ce texte dans *L'Effet sophistique,* (Paris*:* Gallimard, 1995).

[26] Lacan, *Encore,* 56.

[27] Lacan, *Encore,* 53.

[28] Lacan, *Encore,* 53.

[29] Lacan, *Encore,* 57.

ne convient pas–*non decet*–au rapport sexuel. A cause de ce qu'elle parle, ladite jouissance, lui, le rapport sexuel, n'est pas. C'est bien pour ça qu'elle fait mieux de se taire, avec le résultat que ça rend l'absence même du rapport sexuel encore un peu plus lourde. Et c'est pour ça qu'en fin de compte elle ne se tait pas et que le premier effet du refoulement, c'est qu'elle parle d'autre chose. C'est ce qui fait de la métaphore le ressort".[30] "Elle": c'est vrai de la jouissance, mais c'est vrai de vrai de la jouissance qu'il ne faudrait pas, la jouissance féminine. La jouissance fait rater le rapport parce qu'elle parle–sois belle et tais-toi, le silence est le *kosmos* des femmes, leur "monde", disait Hésiode. Alors la femme, pour ne pas faire rater le rapport, elle parle d'autre chose: le refoulement produit la métaphore; ou pire, elle ne parle de rien, elle parle pour parler. Comment c'est enroulé au langage: il est indécent que sa jouissance parle, et insupportable qu'elle ne parle pas.

"Il n'y a de femme qu'exclue par la nature des choses, qui est la nature des mots". Pas de quoi s'étonner que, côté femme, ça rate "de manière folle, énigmatique": ça rate parce que toute la réalité, tout l'univers est une fleur de rhétorique mâle, et ça rate simultanément parce que la jouissance, en tant que par essence elle ne convient pas, est féminine.

7.2. Deuxième thèse: Si c'est, c'est inconnaissable = Si elle jouit, elle n'en sait rien.

La structure de recul permet de repartir de la négation de la thèse précédente.

Mettons qu'elle jouisse: "Si elle est exclue par la nature des choses, c'est justement de ceci que, d'être pas toute, elle a par rapport à ce que désigne de jouissance la fonction phallique, une jouissance supplémentaire" ("vous remarquerez–ajoute Lacan–que j'ai dit *supplémentaire*. Si j'avais dit *complémentaire*, où en serions-nous! On retomberait dans le tout".[31] On suppose donc qu' "il y a une jouissance... *au-delà du phallus"*–mais l'hypothèse a du mal à passer sans *joke* "c'est pour le prochain de la collection Galilée — *au delà du phallus.* Ce serait mignon ça. Et ça donnerait une autre consistance au MLF. Une jouissance au-delà du phallus...".[32]

> Soit la nouvelle thèse: si elle jouit, alors elle n'en sait rien.
>
> "Il y a une jouissance à elle, à cet *elle* qui n'existe pas et ne signifie rien. Il y a une jouissance à elle dont peut-être elle-même ne sait rien, sinon qu'elle l'éprouve–ça, elle le sait. Elle le sait, bien sûr, quand ça arrive. ça ne leur arrive pas à toutes".[33]

Thèse alanguie, quasi-fraternelle: dont "peut-être" elle même ne sait rien, "sinon qu'elle l'éprouve". C'est déjà pas mal pour un savoir, de savoir qu'on éprouve quelque chose, surtout en matière de corps, c'est un savoir plutôt bien su que d'éprouver.

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[30] Lacan, *Encore,* 57.
[31] Lacan, *Encore,* 68.
[32] Lacan, *Encore,* 69.
[33] Lacan, *Encore,* 69.

Le tranchant est ailleurs. Non seulement elle est pas-toute, ce qu'on vient d'accommoder en jouissance supplémentaire, mais elle n'est "pas toutes", au pluriel. "ça ne leur arrive pas à toutes". Sauvage partition apparemment "réelle" entre les chanceuses et les autres?

"Je ne voudrais pas en venir à traiter de la prétendue frigidité, mais il faut faire la part de la mode concernant les rapports entre les hommes et les femmes. C'est très important. Bien entendu, tout ça, dans le discours, hélas, de Freud comme dans l'amour courtois, est recouvert par de menues considérations qui ont exercé leurs ravages. Menues considérations sur la jouissance clitoridienne et sur la jouissance qu'on appelle comme on peut, l'autre justement, celle que je suis en train de vous faire aborder par la voie logique, parce que jusqu'à nouvel ordre, iln'y en a pas d'autre".[34] Déniez, laissez frapper la mode. Mais les femmes se remettent moins bien de cette étrange partition qui, elle, n'est pas encore analysée comme logique, ou, plutôt, dont l'énoncé, par Jacques Lacan, n'est pas encore analysé dans *Encore*.

7.3. Troisième thèse: Si c'est et si c'est connaissable, c'est incommunicable = Si elle jouit et si elle le sait, elle ne peut pas le dire.

Ce qui laisse quelque chance à ce que j'avance, à savoir que, de cette jouissance, la femme ne sait rien, c'est que depuis le temps qu'on les supplie, qu'on les supplie à genoux–je parlais la dernière fois des psychanalystes femmes — d'essayer de nous le dire, eh bien, motus! On n'a jamais pu rien en tirer. Alors on l'appelle comme on peut, cette jouissance, *vaginale*, on parle du pôle postérieur du museau de l'utérus et autres conneries, c'est le cas de le dire. Si simplement elle l'éprouvait et n'en savait rien, ça permettrait de jeter beaucoup de doutes du côté de la fameuse frigidité.[35]

Admettons, pour pacifier, que ce qui ne leur arrive pas à toutes, ce soit de le savoir. La troisième thèse est que, si elles le savent, et même elles sont payées pour le savoir, les analystes, elles ne savent pas le dire, le communiquer à autrui.

Puisqu'à la fin des fins les femmes ne "disent" pas, alors on comprend, en bonne logologie, que l'univers soit une fleur de rhétorique mâle. "La réalité est abordée avec les appareils de la jouissanc... d'appareil, il n'y en a pas d'autre que le langage. C'est comme ça que, chez l'être parlant, la jouissance est appareillée": si ~~la~~ femme ne dit pas, mais métaphorise, bavarde et se tait, on comprend qu'en ce qui la concerne, la thèse hélénique, si j'ose dire, se morde la queue.

[34] Lacan, *Encore,* 69.
[35] Lacan, *Encore,* 69ff.

L'homme rate et jouit en philosophe, la femme rate et jouit en sophiste

> "*Ce jour ne suffirait pas à dire tout ce que je pourrais révéler sur ce lit si je voulais le faire*".[36]

8. On risquera tout net le commentaire suivant: du côté mâle, le ratage et la jouissance sont liés à l'objet, du côté femelle, le ratage et la jouissance sont liés à la parole. Côté homme: "La pensée est jouissance. Ce qu'apporte le discours analytique, c'est ceci, qui était déjà amorcé dans la philosophie de l'être — il y a jouissance de l'être".[37] Côté femme, on vient de le dire: "une autre satisfaction: la satisfaction de la parole". L'homme rate et jouit en philosophe, la femme rate et jouit en sophiste.

Plus lacaniquement, Hélène est l'objet *a*, cause du ratage côté mâle, Socrate est le sujet supposé savoir, cause du ratage côté femelle. Evidemment, l'homme est le maître, c'est "la bêtise du discours m'être".

9. Cela dit, l'homme est moins bête quand il est lacanien, puisqu'il sait que l'être auquel il s'adresse est un semblant d'être: "La jouissance ne s'interpelle, ne s'évoque, ne se traque, ne s'élabore qu'à partir d'un semblant. L'amour lui-même... s'adresse au semblant. Et s'il est vrai que l'Autre ne s'atteint qu'à s'accoler au *a*, cause du désir, c'est aussi bien au semblant d'être qu'il s'adresse. Cet être-là n'est pas rien. Il est supposé à cet objet qu'est le *a* ".[38] Il s'y connaît en Hélène, en *a*, c'est Gorgias, c'est Euripide, c'est Nietzsche ("Il n'y a qu'une manière de pouvoir écrire *la* femme sans avoir à barrer le *la*– c'est au niveau où la femme, c'est la vérité. Et c'est pour ça qu'on ne peut qu'en mi-dire").[39] L'homme est moins bête, le philosophe est moins maître, quand il est trempé d'analyse ou de sophistique.

Voir Hélène en toute femme: "répéter jusqu'à plus soif pourquoi ça rate",[40] le faire "parce que parler d'amour est en soi une jouissance",[41] savoir que "la jouissance, c'est ce qui ne sert à rien... Rien ne force personne à jouir– sauf le surmoi. Le surmoi, c'est l'impératif de la jouissance–*Jouis!* "[42]

Qui vient avec moi jouir?

> *"Le moi peut être aussi fleur de rhétorique, qui pousse du pot de principe de plaisir, que Freud appelle* Lustprinzip*, et que je définis de*

[36] Benoît de Sainte-Maure, *Le Roman de Troie,* v. 14940-14942.
[37] Lacan, *Encore,* 66.
[38] Lacan, *Encore,* 85.
[39] Lacan, *Encore,* 94.
[40] Lacan, *Encore,* 55.
[41] Lacan, *Encore,* 78.
[42] Lacan, *Encore,* 50.

ce qui se satisfait du blablabla".[43]

Barbaros, *"barbare, étranger".*

Etymologie: "*Il s'agit d'une formation fondée sur une onomatopée. On rapproche bien skr.* Barbara —*, "qui bredouille", au pluriel désignation des peuples étrangers".*[44]

Le Second Faust. *Hélène et ses suivantes ont gagné la haute forteresse, non pas les murs d'Ilion, mais le château-fort du seigneur allemand. Faust la séduit parce que sa langue la séduit.Voici leur premier chant alterné, coup d'envoi moderne du rapport entre désir et langage, et, beaucoup plus précisément, entre différence des langues et jouissance. L'amour, c'est en effet le signe qu'on change de discours.*

On s'arrêtera à la question d'Hélène.

Hélène: Je vois, j'entends beaucoup de choses merveilleuses.
Je suis étonnée, je voudrais poser beaucoup de questions.
Mais d'abord, je désirerais apprendre pourquoi le discours
De cet homme sonnait si étrange, étrange et amical.
Un son semblait s'accorder à l'autre,
Et dès qu'un mot s'installe à l'oreille,
Un autre arrive, pour caresser le premier.

Faust: Si la manière de parler de nos peuples te plaît déjà,
Ô comme sûrement leur chant te ravira,
Il contente au plus profond l'oreille et le sens.
Mais il est bien plus sûr de nous y exercer tout de suite;
La discours alterné l'appelle, le fait naître.

Hélène: Dis-moi donc comment je puis, moi aussi, parler si bien?
Faust: C'est très facile, il faut que cela parte du cœur.
Et quand la poitrine déborde de désir,
On cherche autour de soi et l'on demande —

Hélène: — qui vient avec moi jouir?[45]

[43] Lacan, *Encore,* 53.
[44] Pierre Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, nouv. éd. (Paris: Klincksieck, 2009): 157.
[45] Goethe, Faust II, v. 9365-9380: "Und fragt – wer mitgeniesst".

Farewell as sign of love: Irigaray with(out) Nietzsche in *Marine Lover*

Sergio Alloggio

> "More light and light: more dark and dark our woes!"
> — Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, III.5.36

1. *Un homme et une femme* / a child and a mermaid[1]

> "We need a commitment not only to narrative and counternarrative, but also to the rendering (im)possible of (another) narrative".[2]

Luce Irigaray's *Marine Lover* is part of her "tetralogy" on natural elements (water, air, fire and earth) and male philosophers. The aim of this project is to show how the primal elements are the natural fabrics of passions, feelings and emotions, both in everyday life and philosophical interrogations.[3] As we can guess, *Marine Lover* is about water and the philosopher in question is Friedrich Nietzsche, a great thinker whose encounters with feminism are "interesting and productive, but never easy",[4] whose reading is "worthwhile for feminist theorists",[5] as well as "his critique of the liberal subject and the ethics of self-creation that this critique entails".[6] The way in which Irigaray *meets* Nietzsche is simple and direct: she addresses the philosopher using only the second person, without even using his name (she starts mentioning him only in the last section), working in an endless face to face with the main concepts that Nietzsche introduces in his famous masterpiece *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. For instance, concepts such as eternal recurrence, the *Übermensch*, self-overcoming, latest thought and the death of God, among others, are all rethought by Irigaray using both the sexual difference and the role of the woman as key features. This gesture is an instance of the well-known textual strategy that Irigaray calls *mimétisme* or "mimicry", that is the act of reading by which the woman's "foreclosure"[7] is pushed to its own

[1] The author wishes to thank Kylie Thomas for her invaluable support.

[2] Gayatry C. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1999): 6.

[3] On these topics see "Introduction", in *The Irigaray Reader*, ed. M. Whitford (Oxford-Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

[4] See Joanne Faulkner, "Voices from the Depths: Reading "Love" in Luce Irigaray's *Marine Lover*", *Diacritics* 33, 1 (2003): 80-94, [81].

[5] Cynthia Kaufman, "Knowledge as Masculine Heroism or Embodied Perception: Knowledge, Will, and Desire in Nietzsche", *Hypatia* 13, 4 (1998): 63-87, 64.

[6] Rosalyn Diprose, "Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference", in *Nietzsche: A Critical Reader*, ed. P. R. Sedgwick (New York: Blackwell, 1995): 70.

[7] As in G. C. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1999): 4-5.

extreme consequences in order to show how the patriarchal mechanisms cannot work if they do not have a woman to exploit.[8] How can Nietzsche create his own *logoi* only with a conception of woman (at his best) "as virgins or repentant sinners?"[9] *Marine Lover* is thus a dialogical genealogy on the role of women in Nietzsche's unconscious; an interested performance conducted by a mermaid who wants to discover if there is still a chance for a mutual exchange with him. 'Is Nietzsche, or his Zarathustra, still a child in his mirror stage?' seems to be the silent question that we experience from the first page to the last. As Irigaray writes in the opening page, "How should I love you if to speak to you were possible?"[10]

In this sense, showing the main elements by which *Marine Lover* gives us a picture of Nietzsche, we will know not only all his mistakes but also, *ex contrario*, all those attributes that Irigaray would like to *meet* in a man no longer subjected to phallogocentrism: Will the philosophers of the future be men and women outside any sexist representation? Therefore, one of the possible senses for a man who reads Irigaray's text is learning how even his deepest thoughts and desires about women reflect the long history of patriarchy. Consequently, love between the sexes will be possible only if a *selective act of forgetting* precedes it. But this operation does not even have a starting father figure in men's field of thought.

2. For a limited alterity society? On Zarathustra's metaphorics of sterility

> "And since life is on the line, the trait that relates the logical to graphical must also be working between the biological and biographical, the thanatological and thanatographical".
> — Derrida, *Otobiographies,* 4-5

Irigaray's feminist encounter with Nietzsche is grounded in several aspects of his philosophy. Here I identify the most important groups as time, space, and life/death (the divine). These are the main metaphorics through which I read Irigaray's *Marine Lover* critiques about Nietzsche.

a) *Time*. Under this label it is possible to gather all Irigaray's patient readings of the temporal metaphors in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The main objection on the temporal becoming is a conception of the time which always

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[8] Ping Xu, "Irigaray's Mimicry and the Problem of Essentialism," *Hypatia* 10, 4 (1995): 76-89, [78-79].
[9] Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991): 195.
[10] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 3.

fails to remember its own origin: the feminine womb. Irigaray shows how the genuine figure of Zarathustra's becoming is a conception of time as self-cloning — the eternal recurrence of the same — a dynamic in which Zarathustra perpetually repeats the same actions and denies the intersubjectivity of being, particularly with women. As we can argue, the real crime that Nietzsche commits, according to Irigaray, is simply trying to eternally give birth to himself or, in other words, he tries to be the substitute of his own mother through a "murderous triumph".[11] The ring, the sun with its lights, the noon and, above all, the eternal recurrence as circle, are all symptoms of Nietzsche's willingness to leave in the darkness the other (side) of his own project, the woman as source of (his) life.[12] Nietzsche fails to recognise that his conception of time reflects a decision that is the same every time.[13] A decision made in loneliness which always looks for the same isolation to be affirmed again and again. Irigaray asks "What are you using as a pivot for everything so that you can tie up the two ends? But if I take leave of your universe, what becomes of it?"[14] The woman, hidden from the very beginning of Nietzsche's time, will always be a ghostly presence in this (vicious) circle of the same. The most important moment, in this particular kinetics of time, is the beginning, the first step: if the woman is forgotten at the very establishment of the circle, she will be nothing but a way to reaffirm this oblivion. [15] It is clear now why Irigaray repeatedly states that "the evil begins at birth".[16] In this sense, the temporal dimension in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* leads to a maturation in which a subject, the Übermensch, endlessly reaffirms his own lack of shared feelings. Therefore eternal recurrence, one of the most powerful of Zarathustra's desires, becomes an eternal night, a permanent exile, in which the confrontation with the woman is always deferred. Such a temporal hallucination affects from the inside every consideration of what is natural, given and received in Nietzsche's Zarathustra: time turns into a politics of space.

b) *Space.* In Irigaray if a man negates his natural birth, *a fortiori* he must have an unconscious hatred for that particular element that has sustained him as fetus, i.e. the amniotic fluid. The liquid element, on the contrary, is the emblem of the woman, of the marine lover in this case. Several commentators have already stressed how accurately Irigaray works on the censorship in the *Zarathustra* about liquid forces and how these acts reflect Nietzsche's special consideration for mountains and vertical elevations/erections. [17] But in

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[11] Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 61.

[12] See for instance Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 6.

[13] Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 8.

[14] Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 11.

[15] Or she might receive only three fixed forms as in J. Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979): 97-101.

[16] Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 65.

[17] In addition to Faulkner, see Lynda Haas, "Of Waters and Women: The Philosophy of Luce Irigaray", *Hypatia* 8, 4 (1993): 150-159.

Marine Lover we want to read space not only as solid place and background setting, but also as body, inner space and emotive distance. When the earth is only a sequence of cliffs from which one starts a solitary flying, both the reason and the effect are to leave the other at the bottom. And this external topography has consequences for the way Nietzsche exposes Zarathustra's relation with his body and its inner geography — or "echonomy" in Irigaray's terms,[18] a neologism used to stress the *spatial monolinguism* of Zarathustra's bodily interior. The masculine space, in order to be a safe place for its creations, redefines what is natural. As soon as the woman, the mother, and the feminine are cut off from the very beginning, there is only a figure which plays all the roles, the Father. The secret, moreover, of this sleight of hand is safe as long as every possible menace is kept away or *at a distance*. Here patriarchal order means power (over women) as multiple layers and simulacra between this institutional moment and the ways in which women can feel their most inner feelings, desire and identities. The production of an inner space using only patriarchal language is a direct result of the master's fear of losing his power. Patriarchal law establishes a particular version of women's bodily experience which comes to be naturalised and legitimated by authoritarian mythology. Therefore, the more a woman feels the patriarchal construction of her body/holes/borders as natural, the more she will feel distant an original (re)productive capacity. As a result women have not created their language, word and style and they do not feel this lack.[19] In particular, Nietzsche's rhetoric on the tempting abyss between Zarathustra, himself and women, speaks of this patriarchal birthing of the inner space. Irigaray states that

> "The distance does not come from her, even if, for him, it is at a distance that her seductive charm works. Even if, in the present, he lends her that element of authority. Because he does not wish to see the effect of his operation: the abyss enters. Which holds him and fascinates him like the attraction of a knife thrust into the other. The other's belly. The other that he no longer approaches simply, except at the risk of his life: some horrendous retaliation for his own act. The removal of one's own self, the decisive incision between the lips that leaves (the other) mute and alluring like a tomb".[20]

As such, the second aspect of the space we want to underline is its mirroring effect, or the transformation of the other in a shiny mirror. When the other/woman is formed only according to men's desires, the

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[18] Irigaray, *Marine Lover,* 88.
[19] Luce Irigaray, *To Speak is Never Neutral*, trans. Gail Schwab (London-New York: Continuum, 2002): 4.
[20] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 105.

other/woman is just a reproduction of the same. A mirror with a twofold goal: first, it must transform, silently, the other's difference into a secure self-image and, secondly, this mirroring enforces men's stability in erasing every possible menace to his established order. A mirror placed at the doorstep of the self to ensure a *discriminatory hospitality*, if we can rephrase what Derrida say about the same function in Heidegger.[21] Thus this kind of hospitality is haunted by the (impossible) dream of a limited alterity society — the patriarchy. Irigaray classifies this love as "strange", since it is a "love for a looking glass eternally set opposite you".[22] A love for a "superficial existence", gained from "a faithful mirror", to freeze the separation from the starting whole of the birth.[23] The mirror marks here the process by which the other is forgotten and transformed as foreign, according to the mirroring "echonomy of the sameness".[24] A different conception of the sexual difference would simply break this mirror that reflects only a death image of the woman where her depths are continuously concealed, if not erased.

c) *Life/Death (The Divine)*. With this binary metaphorics comes what I argue is the most important magnetic relation in Irigaray's text, the man-woman relation. The couple man-woman is, by the end, the most important *encounter* in *Marine Lover*. Femininity for Irigaray is the other face of the patriarchal coin, a kind of order founded on a criminal murder. The life of Zarathustra, his striving to overcome himself, brings about the death of women in his life. The identity of the man is made of murderous crimes (the exiles and the deaths of women) which enact the love for 'the woman,' "[a]n exemplary echo chamber".[25] In this sense, man is driven by a death desire. Yet, to a divine life, to a life in the birthing whole, Zarathustra incessantly reaffirms in its place the death of god as direct consequence, on the one hand, of his inability to talk about a divine whole and, on the other, of his incapacity to enjoy both the sexual difference and a time without the eternal recurrence of the same. The life of the man in Irigaray means the death of the woman or, more specifically, the eternal life of 'the woman' that has become an ideal. Being an actor on a stage full of lifeless women negates the possibility of a life whose new beginning, whose genuine beginning, starts only when both the man and woman open themselves to a risky relationship:

> "And is not a thirst to be full with child nor needful of being delivered! But that you should sometimes remember her and embrace her without wanting to fill her to the brim, overwhelm her with your gifts. Let her return to the rhythm of her blood. To that happiness in living that remains a mystery to you. And that you do

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[21] J. Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1989): 29.
[22] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 32-33.
[23] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 66-67.
[24] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 87.
[25] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 109.

not want to receive from her".[26]

This new kind of relationship between man and woman introduces us to the *par costruens* of Irigaray's text. As Spivak clearly states, the sexual difference in Irigaray does not close access to the other. Irigaray does not support a politics of separation in order to achieve women's liberation. Instead, sexual difference is the limit of ethical relations grounded on mutual recognition, a recognition beyond any secure decision.[27] This (im)possible act in *Marine Lover* is called "harmonious encounter" and its traces run as an underground river through Irigaray's text. Such an encounter, first of all, can only occur between two wills of equal strength and by which the other can lose him/herself as in a "labyrinth". It is clear that without mirrors the other's difference becomes a risky journey. The will is a keyword here, because a woman with a free will refuses all man's old simulacra that created femininity and 'the woman:' "she will give back to you as things neither she nor you want, and in which you do not recognize your will. Beyond the horizon you have opened up, she will offer you that in which she still lives and that your day has not even imagined".[28] Irigaray is referring here to a woman whose identity no longer rests on her role of wife, prostitute, mother, madonna, servant and so on, or by a fulfilment of any operation created by the masculine standpoint. An affirmation of the other (partner) without possessive categories (subject-object), essences or spatial borders (inside-outside). The harmony of this encounter needs that

> "the passage between has to open, not just to crash into barriers, even if the barriers are interchangeable. Not just to meet appearances closed in, at every moment, upon themselves. That move across their borders only to take possession of some 'thing' of the other's, or even to take (back) all she has. Wedding ring that closes around the other he doesn't manage to espouse, as if she were his prey. In order to take marriage, there must be a harmonious passage from external to internal, from the interior to the exterior of bodies. One arrives at the other without violently breaking down barriers, without jumping over the river, without being carried brutally into the abyss below or on high. Let the two be here and there at the same time, which is not to say that they are indistinguishable".[29]

It is only through this relationship that men and women can create and share the divine, another *topos* of Irigaray's *par costruens,* which is the exact opposite of Nietzsche's death of god. A divine bond as direct consequence of a

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[26] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 40.
[27] G. C. Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993): 185-186.
[28] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 73.
[29] Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 116-117.

new ethics of closeness located into the uncertain proximity between flesh, skin and faces, not masks. In this encounter there will be no space and time for overcoming the other, one of Nietzsche's obsessions. The divine between men and women seems to recall in Irigaray the whole forgotten by the patriarchal order but redescribed in a more mature way. It is as if the sexual difference must translate the initial whole between mother and child in order to achieve its final dimension. If this is the case, the woman is already installed in this element, due to her role of mother. Is Irigaray suggesting the man has to start a process of emancipation by which he produces his active part of the divine? As such, women's liberation is only part of the creation of Irigaray's notion of the divine, for the rest is up to a (new) man beyond masculinity and patriarchy whose features are exactly the opposite of Nietzsche's Zarathustra in *Marine Lover*. From *l'autre femme* to the other man? The divine dimension, in order to be a complete new whole, needs not only a full, new feminine order but also a new masculine one. In this reinvention of the male-female nexus and their subjectivities, the power of imagination has the immediate task of subverting both traditional knowledge and hegemonic discourses of the phallic law.[30]

3. Kinetics of separations (on forgetting as selective assimilation)

> "It created a sensation and even fascinated by means of its mistakes".[31]

As we have seen, the woman, in Irigaray, must give back to men all those projections that have inhabit her from thousands years. In doing so, she will free herself from man's images and patriarchal order. In fact, she will gain a new sense in which there is no seed of the phallic law. The "harmonious encounter" offers a new horizon in which (most) men are lost because things happen far beyond their imagination. This (sexual) difference is now what sustains women's life. In addition, what makes possible a real marriage (the final aim of Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche) is the transformation of men, from being patriarchal oppressors to partners of the new whole. In *Le corps-a-corps avec la mere*, Irigaray writes of her reading of Nietzsche in *Marine Lover* "Ce n'est pas un livre *sur* Nietzsche mais *avec* Nietzsche qui est pour moi un partenaire amoureux [It is not a book *about* Nietzsche but *with* Nietzsche, who is for me a partner in love]".[32] Is this the case? Has Irigaray truly met Nietzsche in a "harmonious encounter" in her *Marine Lover*?

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[30] Ofelia Schutte, "Irigaray on the Problem of Subjectivity Source," *Hypatia* 6, 2 (1991): 64-76 [74-75].
[31] F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinburgh-London: Foulis, 1911): 68.
[32] Faulkner, *Diacritics*, 89.

For woman must say goodbye to herself as man's creation in the same way she has to say goodbye to man as he has treated her until now. And this operation is *a sign of love* to herself as well as to himself. But I want to emphasize two aspects of this double act. Firstly, if Irigaray works for a new dimension of the woman, for a new feminism, there is still space for loving men, but only for men who have changed their perennial beliefs on sexual difference. The problem is that such philosophy for this kind of man has not been written yet. This philosophy is yet to be written. Who will write this? How can a man write a philosophy whose name is already suspect? A man-ism, again? And above all, is that a solitary task? Do men need a new kind of brotherhood? The fact is that, without this new man, the Irigaray's "love encounter" is far to be completed. Secondly, maybe Irigaray fails to encounter Nietzsche for the very reason that, in *Marine Lover*, there is no such thing as a "harmonious encounter", as we know it according to Irigaray. There are, of course, banal reasons for this failure: since Nietzsche is dead, he cannot answer to Irigaray's objections and change himself consequently, but this is not the case. If Irigaray declares that Nietzsche is her "partner in love", what does she *share* of his philosophy if every single page of *Marine Lover* is a fair, strong critique of Nietzsche's misogyny and sexism? How could a "harmonious encounter" happen between two persons who do not share anything, who do have opposite thoughts on the very concepts of harmony and (love) encounter? The price of this meeting would be the refusal of the authenticity of their mutual beings and thus they would fail to recognize the other as legitimate difference. In this sense, there would be no "harmonious encounter" between Nietzsche and Irigaray. In fact, Nietzsche is the philosopher he is exactly because *ab initio* he has forgotten-assimilated "the woman". There is space for a woman, in Nietzsche's work, only as a *sparring partner*. The very conditions of possibility for a transformation of "the woman" in Nietzsche's philosophy are bound to the transformative processes of a young classical philologist at the University of Basel to a wandering philosopher of the future:

> "Every animal — therefore la bête philosophe, too — instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors, just as instinctively and with a subtlety of discernment that is "higher than all reason", every kind of intrusion or hindrance that obstructs or could obstruct this path to that optimum... Thus the philosopher abhors marriage, together with that might persuade him
> to it — marriage being a hindrance and calamity on his path to the optimum".[33]

[33] F. Nietzsche, *On the Geneaology of Morals: A Polemic,* trans. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967): 107.

> "Aristotle says that in order to live alone, a man must be either an animal or god. The third alternative is lacking: a man must be both — a philosopher. ...One can recognise the hearts that are capable of noble hospitality, by their wealth of screened windows and closed shutters: they keep their best rooms empty".[34]

> "A man who strives after great things, looks upon every one whom he encounters on his way either as a means of advance, or a delay and hindrance — or as a temporary resting-place".[35]

> "For I love thee, Eternity! ...I am not man, I am dynamite. ...If nothing was caught, it was not I who was at fault. There were no fish to come and bite".[36]

I am not trying to write a defence of Nietzsche, his statements about women are simply inexcusable. However, I question Irigaray's love: Is that a love for an impossibility? Of an impossible encounter with Nietzsche, since that in Marine Lover the author meets Nietzsche only as unaware source of his own unforgivable mistakes. Each pr text is right and strong criticism of Nietzsche's phallic philosophy. And for Irigaray, the only way in which Nietzsche could be rehabilitated is to rethink, reverse and rewrite all his concepts. Only in this case, a "harmonious encounter" would take place. Which kind of love does Irigaray feel for a "love partner" who, in order to be such, has to say goodbye to all of his peculiarity? A forgetting as active assimilation? But this time forgetting is an active force in shaping Irigaray's act of loving. On this regard, Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* argues that

> "Forgetting is no mere a *vis inertiae* as the superficial image; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process 'inpsychation') as does the thousandfold process, involved in physical nourishment — so-called 'incorporation.'"[37]

The limit of Irigaray's reading is the fact that, in order to be a 'love encounter' with Nietzsche, this union should at least have had a double-bind

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[34] F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophise with the Hammer*, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinburgh-London: Foulis, 1911): 1, 81.
[35] F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Helen Zimmern, (Edinburgh-London: Foulis, 1909): §273, 249.
[36] F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinburgh-London: Foulis, 1911): 189, 131, 115.
[37] Nietzsche, *On the Geneaology of Morals*, 57.

form: from Irigaray to Nietzsche and *vice versa*. For this limit is her blind spot, in *Marine Lover* her philosophy of sexual difference suffers this lack. The Irigarayan reading of Nietzsche rightly shows us the philosopher both as sterile sexist and impotent misogynist. But without another Nietzsche, a Nietzsche beyond himself, such reading can produce only a deep critique, not a *love encounter*. In this sense, Irigaray is at the same time faithful and unfaithful to herself. On one hand, she does not pretend to create a brand new Nietzsche using her voice and language (as the patriarchal order does with woman). On the other, her love reading can only be a frustrated one due to its impossibility to encounter a Nietzsche that does not (yet) exist. Which Nietzsche does Irigaray love?

Benevolent philanthropy, co-optation and identification

Berit von der Lippe

"Take up the White Man's burden/Send forth the best ye breed". This is the exordium, the opening, of Richard Kipling's well known poem, "The White Man's Burden", written in 1899. It was a response to the Spanish-American war and the heavy burden of Great Britain to save the world's others. Since the end of the "cold war" this burden has mainly been the USA's burden, manifested in an extreme manner after September 11th 2001. Today some few women too "have taken up this burden". As part of a neoliberal project for global gender equality and gender security under Pax Americana? One may wonder.

The rhetoric of benevolent philanthropy discussed in this essay will consider how feminist ideas and strategies have created favorable environments for the introduction and development of new concepts of gender equality in general and when it comes to issues on war and peace in particular. This will be illustrated by an approach to the UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, born in October 2000, and after decades of pregnance among millions of women. The text was described as "a watershed political framework that makes women — and a gender perspective — relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations and reconstructing war-torn societies. It makes the pursuit of gender equality relevant to every single Council action, ranging from mine clearance to elections to security sector reform".[1]

The resolution was first and foremost meant as a challenge to the "womenandchildren" as-helpless-victims-construct in war/peace narratives. Women should now, *pace* this resolution, be seen as active agents in the peace building (public) arena. The women-as-agents-rhetoric in the text, would or could it become more than "mere rhetoric?" One year after the birth of the resolution, "the war on terror" — Operation Enduring Freedom — began, so did the Western "liberation of Afghan women". The burqa, rather than the women as agents, became an integral part of the rhetoric. The spectacles of the veiling served to reinforce and bolster the "saving/liberating Afghan women" trope.[2] And the resolution as a "watershed political framework" thus seemed to be absorbed the day after its birth.

The rhetorical approach in this article is limited to only a part of the

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[1] *UNIFEM,* 2002.

[2] See Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women really Need Saving? Anthropological reflections on Cultural relativism and Its Others", *American Anthropologist* 104, 3 (2002): 783-790; K.J. Ayotte and M. E. Husain, "Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil", I *NWSA Journal*, 17, 3 (2005): 112-133; Berit von der Lippe, "Taushetens kjønnete retorikk", *Materialisten*, 3 (2007).

Norwegian war rhetoric, dressed in benevolent philanthropy, at a time when the burqa as spectacle had disappeared and Operation Enduring Freedom had lasted five years. While the rhetoric in the USA had to balance between a neo-conservative and a liberal feminized rhetoric,[3] Norwegian female representatives of the power elite were dancing on a different rhetorical tightrope. They had to reach a public characterized by equity feminism, i.e. a feminism focused on incorporating women into existing male-dominated (market) liberalist ideology.[4] At the same time, they had to avoid identification appeals with president and "the commander in chief", George W. Bush, in particular, and the US rhetoric in general.

The focus is on the rhetoric of the former Norwegian Minister of defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, and how she, after five years of the Western saving the world's "others", first and foremost Afghan women as "the others", used Resolution 1325 as a vehicle for gender equality commitment in Afghanistan. Changes in the physical world often demand rhetorical changes, and various rhetorical strategies are needed. The aim is thus not only to indicate how a gendered rhetoric of benevolence is applied arbitrarily, but also how gendered war rhetoric is easily replaced by traditional "gender neutral" rhetoric. I will attempt to show, or more modestly, indicate, how difficult it is to avoid the hegemonic war rhetoric and how easy it is to mix the hegemonic war narrative with gender awareness.

The essay contains four parts. The phenomenon of co-optation is introduced in the first part, as a common discursive and rhetorical practice that easily absorbs the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities. To contextualize this phenomenon, Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of *doxa* will be included, supplemented by Kenneth Burke's understanding of rhetoric and identification. In the second part I will outline some aspects of Norwegian and Nordic liberal feminism(s), thereby indicating the specific context of Norwegian war rhetoric and gendered liberation. Finally, I will question what is at stake at the global level when gender awareness is made visible, co-opted and/or silenced.

Rhetoric, co-optation and identification

According to Bourdieu,[5] the *doxic* room is a room whose doors are never opened. It indicates "thoughts which are thought through". For the political elites concerned with foreign policy rhetoric and public deliberation their

[3] See T. Dubwriny, "First ladies and Feminism: Laura Bush as Advocate for Women's and Children's Rights", *Women's Studies in Communication* 84, 28, 1 (2005): 89-100; Laura Flanders, *The W effect. Bush's war on women* (New York: The Feminist Press and the City University of New York, 2004).

[4] Berit von der Lippe and Tarja Väyrynen, "Co-opting Feminist Voices for the War on Terror: Laura Bush Meets Nordic Feminism", *European Journal of Women's Study* (forthcoming 2011).

[5] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practices* (London: Cambridge, 1979).

strategy is to avoid a discussion of potential political themes; this they seek to achieve by elevating a part of the symbolic system to the correct opinion, and by preventing people with blasphemous views from having access to tools which might be used to contest existing definitions of "reality". Bourdieu's point is that in any society, there are topics never questioned because someone wants to present "something" in many cases the most important aspects of societal structures and the control of these — as something given and natural. A similar *doxic* room might also be present — in its absence (because often not perceived) — in organisations, corporations and institutions.

Co-optation is a fertile means to contain and maintain large areas of silences. It is a practice that both absorbs and neutralises the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities or the taken-for-granted. Because concepts, such as gender equality, allow for multiple conflicting interpretations, spaces are created for empty declarations. Gendered concepts can easily be co-opted and mixed with hegemonic discourses, hegemonic war rhetoric included, whereby they are used in ways not corresponding to the original goals of those who formulated them.[6] In the co-optation process, the concepts (for example "gender equality" or "liberation of women") are not necessarily rejected. Today most people pay lip service to gender equality as a fundamental principle of democracy and social justice. Co-optation becomes therefore all too likely and gender can easily be shrunk to the use and juxtaposition of "he" and "she" in official acts. Further, gender concepts are not just neutralized or absorbed, they might in fact also work against mobilization for real changes. It is difficult to mobilize for something already "being there".[7]

According to Kenneth Burke, we are inclined to communicate and cooperate with groups who share or pretend to share the same interests, thereby achieving a degree of what he calls "consubstantiality", an area of "overlap", real or perceived, between individuals, groups, organizations or nations.[8] When it comes to aspects of persuasion as are found in what Burke calls "the magic" of class relationships, ethnicity, religions, it might be evident that the classical notion of clear persuasive intent is not an accurate fit for describing the ways in which the members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another. Competing interests are often more important than differences over beliefs or attitudes. Conflict is not the same as controversy or communicative breakdowns. I

[6] Maria Stratigaki, **"**Gender Mainstreaming vs. Positive Action - An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy", *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 12, 2 (2005): 165-186.
[7] Stratigaki, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 165-186.
[8] Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: Berkeley, University of California Press): 22-55.

therefore suggest that "magic" may be replaced by power and elements of coercive persuasion.[9] Closely linked to power is the question of gender.

Striving to form ourselves in accordance with communicative norms that at least to some extent match the cooperative ways in the society, institutions or corporations, we are, in some way or other, acting upon ourselves persuasively. There is an apparent link between gender issues and the importance of issues during negotiation processes. Projecting one's vision with sufficient authority may for women require some unlearning of former practices and a display of behaviours regarded as masculine.[10] At another and more fundamental level, values and goals concerning security issues and strategies are seldom gender neutral; muscles and strength, force and aggressivity, control and conquest are seldom associated with female characteristics. Within organisations such as the UN, only when negotiations are bogged down and become boring, do spaces open for gender or "female participation" topics.[11] To raise gender related issues when negotiations are tense, is seldom a rhetoric appealing to persuasive identification.

There is "an outer voice" acting upon our (often) multiple "inside voices", and the interests of the individual and the nation, group, corporation or organisation may often tend to overlap. We thereby may come to see our own reflection(s) in the social mirror of the collective.[12] One aspect of identification, as part of identification strategies, is the well known and often subtle workings of antithesis: When allies who would "normally" dispute among themselves, join forces against a common enemy — and the enemy is seldom gender neutral. Such application of rhetoric serves to deflect criticism, including issues of gender and power. When this inducement goes unnoticed, the power of identification is fulfilled.

Aristotle and his followers were not interested in offering advice to slaves and women on how they could agitate against their masters. Their rhetoric was mainly a rhetoric for "insiders" who shared values and interests, a rhetoric considerably less applicable to those seeking to penetrate "hostile circles", circles some women today identify as theirs — "mirroring their own reflections?"

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[9] H.W. Simons "Persuasion in social conflict", *Speech monographs/Speech Association of America*, 39 (1972): 227-247.

10 Su Olsson, "Gendered heroes: male and female self-representations of executive identity", *Women in Management Review,* 17, 3-4 (2002): 142-150.

[11] Torild Skard, "Gender in the malestream – acceptance of women and gender equality in different United Nations organizations", *Forum for Development Studies,* 36, 1 (2009): 155-192.

[12] Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives,* 22-55; and see also George Cheney, "The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational Communication", *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 96 (1983): 143-158.

Norwegian liberal feminism(s)

Norwegian (and Nordic) feminism is largely characterized by equity feminism. Women are seen to be inherently similar to men, and gender equality has been the driving force for the feminist movement. Male dominance and power have been criticized and one of the goals has been women's equal participation in the domestic political sphere. The state ideology is that of a welfare state with strong labour unions and labour parties. Official feminism coincides to a large extent with that ideology.[13] Safety nets and free health care are part of this ideology and are taken for granted.

However, the tradition is not without its fissures. The dominant Norwegian gender equality policy is also called a "balance equality" because of its focus on a 50/50 or sometimes 40/60 balanced relationship between women and men in power positions. Gender justice is mainly considered synonymous with this type of gender balance. It is the balance which is the main concern, and the question of equality with whom or with what (interests) is seldom raised.[14]

The notion of women's "responsible rationality" was also developed and used in Nordic feminism. Responsible rationality was pitted against men's instrumental rationality. It was argued that neither instrumental nor value rationality capture the specific women's approach to situations of conflicts of interest. Women have a tendency to identify with those in need of care, and thereby, develop responsible rationality. Women's everyday experiences drive them towards care that is a rationally developed standpoint rather than an emotional reaction.[15] In short, there is a trace of difference feminism in Norwegian feminism, although the official feminist ideology is strongly geared towards gender equality. Nordic/Norwegian responsible rationality can, though, often take the form of "patronizing rationality" when it seeks to save "brown women from brown men".

Ideologically, the links between Norwegian foreign policy and NATO and the USA have been strong. <Solidarity>, <internationalism> and <multilateralism> have been the ideographs around which the foreign policy rhetoric has been established in the post-Cold War era and in whose name actions are performed. The foreign policy master narrative cherishes the idea that Norway, together with the other the Nordic countries, have a long standing tradition of participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities, conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation and high levels of overseas

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[13] Marit Teigen and Hege Skjeie, *Menn i mellom. Mannsdominans og likestillingspolitikk* (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk Forlag, 2003).

[14] Cathrine Holst, "Balansefeminismens begrensninger", *Tidsskrift for kjønnsforskning,* (http://kilden.forskningsradet.no/c35640/artikkel/vis.html?tid=46684)(2007).

[15] von der Lippe, *European Journal of Women´s Study* (2011).

development aid.[16]

What characterizes Norwegian foreign policy rhetoric is the story of remote geographical position which, according to the hegemonic narratives, has historically permitted the state to remain aloof from international engagement. The decision to enter into military alliances was taken after World War II, i.e., with Norway's NATO membership in 1949. Solidarity, internationalism and peace-keeping operations have been the ideographs around which the Norwegian foreign policy rhetoric has been established and in whose name actions are performed. According to this policy rhetoric, Norway never takes part in war or warfare; it happens, though, that the country takes part in military operations. The narrative cherishes the idea that Norway has a long-standing tradition of participation in UN-led peace-keeping activities, conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation and overseas development aid on a large scale.

Benevolent philanthrophy – co-optation and gender blind identification

The step from responsible rationality and benevolent altruism to patronizing rationality is a short one and easy to take. The rhetoric used by the Minister of defence from 2005 to 2009, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, may illustrate this. Her speech in Brussels 2006 to the European Union (EU) members on security issues serves as an illustration of promoting self-evident truths within an apparently harmonious security discourse. She had to balance soft and hard rhetoric carefully. In front of this audience her rhetoric may be called loyalty rhetoric, rhetoric similar to the rhetoric of a brave and trustworthy pupil addressing a group of highly respected teachers.

Underscoring the need to improve NATO-EU relations, NATO-EU cooperation and the value of the strategic partnership, she approaches security challenges and the complexities of peace-keeping and peace-building, paying specific attention to the war in Afghanistan: "First, the international community must coordinate civilian efforts in a better way. Today the civilian aspects of our engagements, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are often fragmented and uncoordinated. This means that the overall results are less effective". Catastrophes for Afghan civilians are presented as insufficient coordination of "civilian efforts;" they are simply a coordination problem and the problem is so far "gender-neutral".

Strøm-Erichsen, after panegyrically embracing all Western-dominated institutions, somewhat surprisingly turns to the UN Resolution 1325, she concludes by first praising the EU decision to promote "gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management, in line with UN

[16] Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm Enterpreneurs. Scandinavia's Role in World Politics", *Cooperation and Conflict,* 37, 1 (2002): 11-23.

Resolution 1325". She then assumes the role of the teacher and tells the audience: "This is important progress. Norway puts great emphasis on the UN resolution and has adopted a national action plan to promote gender issues". A complete harmony is at last established as she urges the EU members to conform with Norway and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, emphasising that operations should be gender-sensitive at all levels. Her ethos now seems taken for granted, representing a country known for its gender equality policy.

This rhetorical use of this resolution may be seen as a subtle form of feminist co-optation, constructed along the following reasoning: Norway participates in Afghan peace operations. The UN Resolution 1325, stressing the importance of women as participants in peace-building, the Norwegian authorities thus tend to avoid any question relating to warfare and killings as part of all wars. Norway is therefore always participating in peace-building and establishing gender equality in general, as well as for Afghan women in particular. The Norwegian Minister is promoting both gender equality issues and the Norwegian interpretation of participation in warfare. This rhetoric is also a subtle way of silencing the voices of Afghan women. The gender main-streaming is so main-streamed that the UN Resolution easily fits into most war stories, no matter what is referred to.

The danger of co-optation is greater in large organisations and particular if there is a high level of normative legitimacy for the general principle underlying the original policy goal. "Today", Stratigaki notes, "European politicians of all parties pay lip service to gender equality as a fundamental principle of democracy and social justice".[17] In the long run co-optation can even produce a counter-effect and a negative impact. Co-optation works against mobilization and pressure by interested parties and individuals by using the original as well as the transformed concept as an alibi. Or, as Stratigaki writes: "It is difficult to mobilize against a claim that appears to be one's own even if it no longer is used to mean what one intended".[18]

The co-optation outlined above, is also indicative of her rhetoric in public deliberation and seemed for some time to be rather successful. The necessity to keep dancing on the feminist rhetorical tight rope, has, however, been a real challenge, at several levels. One such challenge has been the identification aspect, and simultaneously a non-identification with the Bush regime. In an article titled "Why do we send soldiers abroad",[19] she writes: "We who every day are working with foreign issues, we know why we are in Afghanistan. For us it is thus easy to forget that it might not necessarily be so for others". Her ethos is now somewhat threatened and she has to stand up as one-who-knows-better-than-others, which is seldom the way to success.

She continually reminds us, as she does in this article, that "… we

[17] Stratigaki, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 165-186.
[18] Stratigaki, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 165-186.
[19] Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, "Hvorfor sender vi soldater utenlands?" *Dagbladet* 3.18 (2007).

take part, not in war, but in military engagement", because "we want to contribute to peace and conflict resolution". This is, she continues, "a moral duty and a natural part of our tradition of peace building and stabilisation in the world". Norway's aim is to "prevent weapons of mass destruction to come into the hands of terrorists".[20] The humanitarian rhetoric, rhetoric of democracy and freedom, is the red-cross-thread here, running together with traditional gender neutral or gender blind rhetoric. Marginalization of the feminist rhetoric is probably a must since hearts and minds after years with warfare are difficult to reach by an explicit interpellation to "hearths and minds" by a rhetoric of "saving and liberating Afghan women".

In rhetoric antonyms often become synonyms: the transformation of peace into war — peace means war and war means peace — is common and nearly classical in all war rhetorics. Norwegian peace rhetoric is upheld despite a non-traditional Norwegian foreign policy — NATO's and Norway's out-of-area-warfare. "Together with 25 other members of NATO Norway has promised to take part in security and peace building in Afghanistan. Thereby we will also strengthen our common freedom, culture and civilisation",[21] Strøm-Erichsen also tells us in this article. Her eulogy is thus not only foregrounding an identification between Norway and NATO, but also identification with an almost homogeneous and benevolent Western culture and civilisation as such. Doing this rhetorical manoeuvre, she is able to include the USA, without, though, explicitly including the superpower in her panegyric of "our engagement". The invisibility of Afghan women is compensated by an increased focus on NATO; a NATO, apparently independent of the USA, and closely linked to the abstractions of freedom, security and peace building; thus an implicit reference to the UN Resolution 1325.

For rhetoric to be successful, the audiences must experience that their autonomy is upheld and simultaneously experience identification with the rhetorical interpellation. There are indeed multiple rhetorical tightropes to balance. Identification is about being equal and different, unified and separated. Identification with the USA was difficult to establish with George W. Bush in power. Identification with NATO, ISAF and UN is on the other hand strong.

Identification and the rhetoric of silence

There are many silences, particularly in war rhetoric, and I concur with who writes: "Just as we use words to obfuscate meaning or to buy time, we use silence, sometimes productively, sometimes not — just as we use speech".[22]

[20] Strøm-Erichsen, *Dagbladet,* (2007).
[21] Strøm-Erichsen, *Dagbladet,* (2007).
[22] Cheryl Glenn, "Silence: A Rhetoric Art for Resisting Discipline(s)", *JAC* 22, 2 (2002): 261-92.

The question is not only whether speech or silence is the most productive, effective or appropriate. Rather, the question is about a rhetoricity of purposeful silence when it is self-selected or when it is imposed. When silence is imposed on us, it may be professional suicide, and for some, it may be a question of life and death. Some Afghan women broke the silence years before the terror attacks of 2001, knowing they put their lives in danger. But nobody listened. For a short period after September 11, a rhetoric of protecting and liberating Afghan Muslim women (and children) was a suitable rhetoric for the hegemonic discourse.[23] Co-optation thus occurs at different levels.

The authority of the dominant group and its silences are, as outlined above, not always imposed by force on individuals, but offered to them in subtle ways. The authority in this case was forcibly imposed. It was not offered to Afghan women (or men) in any subtle ways. The twist is that hegemonic discourses, according to Gramsci,[24] are offered as something you already agree with, as a reflection of your own desires, needs and wants, and in which you can effortlessly recognize yourself. Hegemony thus seems to offer what you already want anyway. Gramsci is, in his way, adding aspects of power to the Burkean "magic", and in a subtle manner he also indicates how the phenomenon of co-optation may occur.

The common benevolent philanthropy indicates that it is often easier to identify with oppressed women than with strong and potent women — women who also might be in need of support; support based, however, on solidarity as equals. A mirroring of oneself as benevolent philanthrophist and liberator seems to be an identification appeal which men and women alike easily embrace. Potent Afghan women speaking themselves about needs and aspirations based on their own experiences might have raised problems for the benevolent rhetoric of feminist co-optation.

In 2010 president Barak Hussein Obama has declared the end of "war on terror". Gender neutral "overseas contingency operations" have begun and the terrorists have become "violent extremists". Today the identification with USA is easier. The ethos of president Obama, commander in chief and receiver of the Norwegian Nobel peace price in December 2009, is in Norway extremely strong. And he is "brown". The actual Norwegian female Minister of Defence, Grete Faremo, has an easier rhetorical work to do than Strøm-Erichsen, the former Minister. The gendered rhetorical tightrope balancing has disappeared. Norway, ISAF, NATO and the USA are now cooperating towards a "gender neutral" stabilisation and democratisation in Afghanistan. A nearly "pure" communication, based on an identification apparently exempt of the Burkean segregation, the "human need" to overcome division from each other, characterizes her rhetoric. Faremo's body seems to have become unified with the body of the new president.

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[23] C. A. Stabile & D. Kumar, "Unveiling imperialism: media, gender and the war on Afghanistan", *Media, Culture and Society* (London: Sage Publications, 2005): 755-782.
[24] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence, 1978).

As burqa-clad Afghan women are made invisible in the war discourse, their voices not listened to, and any reference to the UN Resolution 1325 is avoided, the "gender neutral stabilization" rhetoric seems in Norway not to be challenged. The burqa-clad women have, however, reappeared in other public discourses, partly as a threat to Western liberalism (sic) and partly as fascinating spectacles or sexual objects in magazines. Co-optation does indeed occur at different levels. And the burqa as metaphor for the war rhetoric may be more repressive than the literal burqa.

The rhetoric of benevolent philanthrophy is contained — and remains — within a frame of protection scenario. Gayatry C. Spivak's "saving brown women from brown men",[25] with both Western genders as protagonists, is these days transformed into a gender blind rhetoric of "stabilization and democratization". When Richard Kipling in his poem more than hundred years ago also wrote "Go bind your sons to exile/To serve your captives' need", Western men and women today advise both their sons and daughters to serve "our captives need" — in the name of gender equality and sometimes in the name of liberating women as "other". Afghan women, who, once upon a time (2001 seems so long ago), and whose need "we" should serve by liberating them from "brown men", might today perceive more of the Burkean "consubstantiality" (necessary for any identification) with these "brown" men, than they do towards their Western protectors, be they males or females.

[25] Gayatry C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in L. Grossberg & Cary Nelson, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988).

African feminism:
the African woman's struggle for identity

Ruvimbo Goredema

There is an interesting point, where at the crossroads of being a researcher of rhetoric and an observer of gender relations in Africa, I find that my biology of being a woman filters the experiences of how I understand literature, arguments and social interactions. I view this as a result of accepting how my biology and socialisation (in and outside the academic environment) have influenced to a large extent my relations with men, women and texts. With this in mind, the question I seek to answer is how do women create and maintain identities for themselves in Africa, particularly in the academic public sphere?

I choose this space because historically, and still to some extent, the academic public sphere is a place in which they have been in the minority and have had limited access. In order to tackle this question, I present two arguments. The first is that the understanding of the "feminine/feminist" perspective, (which has been mostly disseminated by women in academia) is based on the idea that there is an opposite and invasive understanding of the world that is masculine. Secondly, the study of Rhetoric has often been accused as being a male preserve that has historically failed to accommodate the role of women in creating a 'rhetorical' path, especially in Africa. Therefore, by analyzing arguments concerning African feminism, I hope to create the opportunity for the two disciplines of Rhetoric and Gender Studies to interact on the African intellectual plain.

I would ask the reader to evoke for themselves a '*double consciousness'* as propagated by W.E B Du Bois,[1] "this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, two identities warring in one body". On one hand there is an identity that has been historically oppressed, and the other that understands privilege and has been successful in so doing, you are imagining the current position of the middle class African Woman. The rest of this paper will aim to shed light on the following questions: who is this African woman and what does she want to achieve? What do her past, her present and future look like? Finally, what does she think of others? African feminism, like any other discourse that asserts itself, gives pleasure for both its advocates and scholars in highlighting the struggles of the subject. It is these challenges that I wish to discuss, and leave you not only with a perspective to the questions I put forward, but also leave you with more questions regarding the future of African feminism in an increasingly integrated world.

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[1] W.E.B. Du Bois," Strivings of the Negro People", *The Atlantic Monthly,* August (1897): http://www.americasinging.com/wordpress2/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/WEB-DuBois, pdf. accessed December 2009.

African Feminism

African feminism is a feminist epistemology and a form of rhetoric that has provided arguments, which validate the experience of women of Africa and of African origin against a mainstream feminist discourse. It is a justice that aims to create a discernible difference between women who were colonised and those who were deemed the colonisers, and a social movement that aims to raise a global consciousness which sympathises with African women's histories, present realities and future expectations.

African feminism concerns itself not only with the rights of women from Africa but is also inclusive of those living in the Diaspora as many of the contributors to the literature have often lived "abroad". Therefore, let our inquiring minds not be limited by a geographical location as the name would imply. However, the debates, practices and implementation are most credibly pursued on the African continent.

Ama Ata Aidoo,[2] an authoress of African literature states,

> *"I should go on to insist that every man and every woman should be a feminist – especially if they believe that Africans should take charge of African land, African wealth, African lives and the burden of African development. It is not possible to advocate independence of African development without also believing that African women must have the best that the environment can offer. For some of us this is the crucial element of feminism".*

There is an understandable misinterpretation which regards African feminism as a part of Third Wave feminism, however, it is within the realm of the Third Wave feminist interpretation that the tensions between race and culture begin to appear. The tension has even led to the rejection of the concept of Third Wave feminism being applied as a principle for African women. It is because this wave is interpreted as an ideology that is hinged on Western Feminism, or to be more explicit, "historically recent Europe[an] and America[n] social movements founded to struggle for female equality and subsequently carried forward in an imperial march across the globe".[3]

Within Africa, in both social and most academic environments, there seems to be an agreement about what feminism is, and that its source originates from European and American (hereafter referred to as Western) definitions. This is because traditionally and geographically the West has provided the disposition and the strategies associated with this movement.

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[2] A.A. Aidoo, "African Women Today" in *Sisterhood Feminisms & Power: From Africa to the Diaspora,* O. Nnaemeka, ed. (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa Wide Press, 1998).

[3] O. Oyewumi**,** *African Woman and Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood*, (Trenton New Jersey: Africa World Press Inc, 2003).

Natasha Gordon in her paper highlights this point and supports it with other feminist literature done by Chandra Mohanty.[4] She argues that "Western Feminism has ultimately created an ahistorical, stagnant 'Third World Woman' that is constituted as a coherent group, (thus) sexual difference becomes conterminous with female subordination, and power automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it (read: men) and people who do not (read: women)".[5] Yet, African feminism cannot be defined by one or several movements that are as discernable as in Western feminism where the distinction between the first, second and third wave movements are clear. For African women, feminism is very dependent on a temporal scale shaped by political eras. These eras are pre colonial, colonial and post colonial Africa. These eras are dissimilar across African countries because the histories of the liberation struggles are different for each country. The result of this is that the definitions and experiences of feminism are different from region to region within Africa.

Regional distinctions add further problems when defining African feminism, particularly regarding at which level the discourse's subject and terminology are to be set. If national borders are used as a parameter, it would be possible to distinguish between, Nigerian and South African Feminism for example. These countries' histories are different and so are their cultures and traditions. "But Nigerian and South African feminisms too are mere constructs which hardly do justice to feminisms' heterogeneity".[6] This is because there is ethnic plurality in South Africa which is supported by the recognition of 11 official languages that include English and Afrikaans (Colonial languages). There could be a Zulu-Feminism, but what would that consist of and how would it interact with Afrikaner Feminism or even Sotho Feminism? In an effort to not be overwhelmed by issues of heterogeneity, African feminism returns to iconic categories that put a spotlight on the differences between African and Western Feminisms initially. They are the following: 1.) Culture/Tradition, 2.) Socio-economic and socio-political issues, 3.) The role of men, 4.) Race, and 5.) Sex and/or sexuality.

These categories are fundamental because they are the cement that hold the discourse of African feminism. They're also dynamic because to varying degrees, they represent the concerns that have shaped many of the movements within Western Feminisms. However, African Feminism would have us believe that these very same categories make the experience of feminism in Africa unquestionably different from that experienced in the West. These categories are explained as oppressions. Gwendolyn Mikell, supplies us with a description of African feminism as "dealing with multiple

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[4] C. Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses", *Feminist Review*, 30 (1988): 61-88.

[5] N. Gordon, ""Tonguing the Body": Placing Female Circumcision within African Feminist Discourse", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 25, 2 (1997): 24.

[6] S. Ardnt, *The Dynamism of African Feminism: Defining and Classifying African Feminist Literatures* (Trenton New Jersey: Africa World Press Inc., 2002): 35.

oppressions" as indicated by the aforementioned categories. She also comments that African feminism is dealing with "women first and foremost as human, rather than sexual beings".[7] This is a key point because a woman's sexuality and reproductive role in society has been a point of conflict in determining women's access and mobility in the public sphere.

Duality of African feminist thought

It is clear that understanding African feminism is a delicate process of negotiating several discourses that can result in a double edged sword. In some ways African feminism, purposefully seeks to be detached from the notions of colonialism, race, class etc, as a way of explaining the current position of women in Africa. Yet, the very reason for its advocacy is because African women have tried to re-define and re-express the importance of these issues. The rationale for wanting to be detached from the colonial is illustrated when arguments that claim historically (by this I mean pre-colonial times) that African women have been in positions of power, and have had equal access to resources like men, and furthermore that authentic African culture and tradition did not oppress women.

For example, the existence of events and actions done by Black South African women prior to colonisation can be interpreted as feminist action. Black women did have positions of leadership and influence. Many women leaders existed throughout Africa even though historical evidence for some is fragmented. In South Africa, "Zulu royal women demonstrated such leadership before, during and after King Shaka's reign and this took a variety of forms... Sometimes military, but more often economic and religious… including rain making, administering ritual medicine and custodianship of sacred objects".[8]

It is historical narratives like these that support the imagery of the strong, black, selfless African woman. Yet the shortcoming is that often, the few women who have been documented have been left in the vaults of myth and exception. The repercussions have often resulted in a fruitless debate in the public sphere and an appeal to return to 'authentic traditional practices' that have been forgotten or watered down, due to "modernity", for lack of a better term.

Colonisation also helped create the image of the selfless liberation war heroine. The liberation struggle in South Africa clearly exemplifies how black women who were actively fighting against apartheid could be labelled

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[7] G. Mikell, "African Feminism: Toward a New Politics of Representation", *Feminist Studies*, 21, 2 (1995): 405-424.

[8] J. Weir, "Chiefly Women and Women's Leadership in Pre-Colonial Southern Africa", in *Women in South African History: Basus'iimbokodo, bawel'imilambo/ they remove boulders and cross rivers,* N. Gasa, ed. (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2007): 8-12.

feminist by the very act of bearing arms. In addition, there is selflessness which women in society are still expected to perform. At this point let me emphasise that it is the *attitude of selflessness* that often is a deliberate self-construction advocated by some African women that is often juxtaposed against Western feminists who are viewed to be selfish in their desires, and daily practices when trying to obtain equality with men.

Another argument boils down the issue to a matter of linguistics. Some argue that feminism in Africa has always existed. It is only because in African languages there was no word to describe this position linguistically that unfortunately African women have blindly ascribed to an expression brought from the West. Accordingly, some writers and theoreticians who study gender relations in Africa have argued that traditional African societies have always thought and lived in a feminist way long before the colonial invasion. Kolawole stated:

> *"Although many African languages have no synonym for feminism as it its defined by the West, the concept of group action by women, based on common welfare in social, cultural, economic, religious and political matters is indigenous and familiar to a majority of these women".*[9]

This statement gives pause for thought. It cannot be fairly argued that every traditional 'group action' of African women was feminist in nature. If we agree to that then it implies that a feminist organisation is simply a gathering of bantering women who may or may not seek to challenge gender inequalities that repress and discriminate against them.

Another pinched nerve within the discourse is that lo and behold, African feminists do not really want to be called feminists. To be frank, you are not going to hear the term "African Feminism" in everyday conversation without someone having to offer an explanation for the terminology; even though there is an understanding that feminism in Africa is not quite the same as in America or Europe. In this vein Nora Chase, a Namibian Black woman activist argued that the minute you hear about feminism one immediately puts in the connotation of European and North American women's struggles. These are women from societies which have long been independent — people who support the governments that support her experience of oppression. She maintains that she could never feel solidarity with that.

I would like to highlight a duality of thought within African feminist discourse, as highlighted by Flora Nwapa, an African authoress. Women in Africa are in two minds as to whether they should refer to themselves, or let themselves be referred to, as feminists.

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[9] M. Kolawole, "The Dynamism of African Feminism: Defining and Classifying African Feminist Literatures", in *The Dynamism of African Feminism: Defining and Classifying African Feminist Literatures,* S Arndt, ed. (Trenton New Jersey: Africa World Press Inc. 2002): 31.

> *"I don't think that I am a radical feminist. I don't even accept that I am a feminist. I accept that I'm an ordinary woman who is writing about what she knows".*[11]

Buchi Echemta another African authoress declared in a speech at George Town University that,

> *"I have never called myself a feminist. Now if you choose to call me a feminist, that is your business; but I don't subscribe to the feminist idea that all men are brutal and repressive and we must reject them. Some of these men are my brothers and fathers and sons. Am I to reject them too?"*[12]

The above quotes not only exemplify the crisis in determining the experience of feminism in Africa, but also highlight a form of negotiation that African women are particularly privy to — this is negotiating a dual existence of Western knowledge and values together with African authenticity and cultural value, a world where feminism is un-African because it is not part of African culture.

The debate that pushes forward the un-Africaness of feminism implies, a somewhat unflattering assertion, a jibe towards the description and value of "the 'real' African woman… [who] is content with her subordinate position as wife, mother and beast of burden. She is passive in the face of abuse, tolerant of all forms of infidelity; her only real ambition is to retain respectability by laboring for the maintenance of a stable marriage and family and seeing to the satisfaction of her husband's desires".[13] I would suggest that the main reason why this tension is present is because of two areas of disagreement brought up by African feminists in order to disregard Western feminist thought. In area one — there are the challenges concerning how to interact with men in both the public and private sphere. In area two — there are the challenges African women face regarding how to preserve the cultural authenticity of their public and private spaces within national borders and as part of a continuously influential and invasive global community. Consequently, the lines have been drawn as to who gets to be identified as an African woman and who gets to be the example for African feminism. This leads to a process of silencing that takes place within the discourse, which is in part fuelled by class and racial differences.

There is no doubt that African feminism is largely made up of the responses of middle-class educated black women who are taking action upon

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11 O. Ogunyemi, "Womanism: The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in English", *Signs*, 11, 1 (1985): 64-80.

12 G.Mikell, "African Feminism: Toward a New Politics of Representation", *Feminist Studies*, 21 (1995).

13 Amina Mama, "'Women' Studies and Studies of Women in Africa during the 1990s"(1995), http://www.gwsafrica.org/knowledge/index.html, accessed September 2009.

the claims set up by middle-class white women. Yet those who are uneducated, poor and in the majority serve the function of highlighting the differences between African and Western feminism. This suggests that African Feminist methodology and theory is also as questionable as Western Feminism's interpretation of African experiences. Mohanty explains it as thus, "similar arguments pertaining to questions of methods of analysis can be made in terms of middle-class, urban African and Asian scholars producing scholarship on or about their rural or working-class sisters which assumes their own middle-class culture as the norm, and codifies peasant and working-class histories and cultures as 'Other'".[14]

A problem of membership

There is an ideal that centers on the necessity of constructing and maintaining a movement for African women, which is reflective and supportive of the diversity within this population. It is important to recognize the tremendous heterogeneity that operates within the boundaries of the term 'African woman', however, up till this point, this still does not include white women who define themselves as being of African decent. This also raises questions about who has the platform to speak about African feminism, and why they have been granted that access? If, as the research has shown women involved in creating the base for this discourse are, primarily those who contribute to African literature and academia, can they be interpreted as being better champions for the identity than women who have low levels of literacy, and limited access to academia? Also, how can African men (including white African men) contribute to the discourse without being identified as an abnormality who has decided to go against his 'natural' male state by supporting women's rights and causes and weakening the advantages of patriarchy?

Both Western and African feminist literature in varying degrees silence men and protect a certain way of thinking about men in Africa. I'd be negligent if I did not challenge the notion of 'patriarchy', and to be fair, men have long been whipped into silence by the word and its implications. Patriarchy and how it is practiced presents many problems for the African woman. Many theorists have used the term "patriarchy" in African contexts to refer to the organisation of social life and institutional structures in which men have ultimate control over most aspects of women's lives and actions. For instance, men have access to and benefit from women's labor more than the reverse. Historically, the sexual division of labor was organised in such a way that women were (and still are) the primary caregivers, and were responsible for the bulk of food cultivation and/or processing. Women therefore played central, but socially subordinate roles in African society,

[14] Mohanty, *Feminist Review*, 61-88.

resulting in their being denied access to institutions that were gendered a male preserve, such as academia. As for theorists critical of patriarchy, they put on the table an issue of agency, where women — both now and in the past — play pivotal roles that facilitate patriarchal economic and political dominance. The questions are: do African men want to contribute to the understanding of African feminism, or are they in their feminist closet? Could it be that the men that African feminists so wish to protect from Western feminists, have also been silenced by their own women?

White women in Africa

It can be argued that the chief challenge for African feminists is to sustain their authenticity as Africans against white Western Feminism. If they identify themselves as feminists they run the risk of being automatically linked to white feminist ideology, justifiably so or not. Along with this, those studying them from the outside, like rhetoricians can view the African Feminist as trying to imitate white feminists. The fact that race is the cornerstone of many arguments about what distinguishes African from Western Feminism leads to resistance from the 'accused'. White women in Africa have contributed to the debate in their own way, and although their arguments have been acknowledged, they have been received and interpreted in a singular fashion — they are simply regarded as a reinforcement of mainstream white Western Feminism. A lack of response from both black women and men through literature and research is apparent and this lack of acknowledgement can be interpreted as a silencing of another voice. This suggests that white women are trying to create new positions as feminists in Africa and secondly, more at the heart of the matter, they are trying to move from the intellectual margins of African academy to a point of validation. Amanda Gouws says, "criticizing the person instead of the argument stifles debate and does not enhance the feminist praxis of enabling other women to speak in their own voices; neither can it raise the consciousness of women who are guilty of racist, patronising, imperialist practices".[15]

It would seem from this position that black African feminists are accused of focusing their debate on individuals rather than ideology. She also says that African feminists give the impression that "White women should not speak for black women; neither should men speak for women". Yet, if the research meets the requirements of academic rigor, "white women should be able to speak about the experiences of black women, or black women can speak about the experiences of white women and men can speak about the experiences of women. But this should not occur at the expense of self-presentation".[16] Researchers in fields studying societies, gender studies and

[15] A. Gouws, "The Angry Divide*", Agenda Feminist Media Women and Difference*, 19 (1993): 67-70.
[16] Gouws, *Agenda,* 68.

feminism are faced with the critical question of what entitles one to be an expert, or to study a subject if you have no legitimate claim to that reality?

I would like to conclude my analysis of African feminism by suggesting that although this discourse has legitimate support and claims it cannot speak for all who identify themselves as African women or men. Western feminism used certain rhetoric to persuade western women in order to support the feminist movement. However, if African feminism argues that it is inherently a separate epistemology from Western feminism, they still have a long way to go before they convince middle class African women of all races.

Issues and attitudes are always changing, and if African Feminism is to continue to rise as a discourse by holding on to old ideas of identity and accessibility, I fear that it may stagnate and remain in literature and the halls of academia rather than in new popular, dynamic African culture where it should be nurtured. What African feminists must realize is that their movement cannot be formed in a vacuum, they will need to acknowledge the "other", which consists of women from other races, and men. The reality is that the African feminist movement is not privy to the rhetorical techniques used by Western feminism. When Western Feminism began it did not have to recognise the pervasive effects of globalisation or the "other" as much as African feminism must do.

Rhetoric and feminism: the possibilities of women and beyond

Cheryl Glenn

> *Our past is seeded in our present and is trying to become our future.*
> *— Adrienne Rich*[1]

I've spent a good deal of my career emphasising the contributions of women to the rhetorical tradition, but — like the feminist project itself — my research agenda has moved beyond its primary work of recovering female rhetorical figures. Through the years, I've worked on the intentional inequalities of rhetorical education, the rhetorical power of "others" and rhetorical displays that are delivered in "other" ways (silence and listening, to be sure), and the epistemic power of identity. These scholarly projects have sparked my curiosity as to the ways feminist rhetorical practices now extend into and challenge research methods, rhetorical theories, and pedagogies. This research trajectory is the subject of this essay.

1. Where are the women?

> *The words are purposes. / The words are maps. / I came to see the damage that was done / and the treasures that prevail.*
> *— Adrienne Rich*[2]

Rhetoric always inscribes the relation of language and power at a particular moment, indicating who may speak (or who may or must remain silent), who may listen (or who is listened to), and what can be said (or must remain unspoken). Every one of us knows how rhetoric works: we gauge the situation, our audience, our social rank. Only if we think someone will listen to us (i.e., if we have an audience) will we move our language — or our silence — forward as appropriately as we can toward our intended goal. If we're not successful, we rethink how we should have proceeded given our purpose, our audience, and our rank.

Yet despite our inherent rhetorical know-how and our formal rhetorical training (neither of which is genetically limited to the Y chromosome), rhetorical history has, for the most part, represented public, political, aristocratic males. Traditional histories of rhetoric are Kenneth Burke's "terministic screens",[3] reflecting our institutional focus on the discursively powerful, while deflecting the rhetorical contributions of

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[1] Adrienne Rich, *Arts of the Possible: Essays and Conversations* (New York: Norton, 2001): 149.

[2] Adrienne Rich, *The Fact of a Doorframe: Poems Selected and New 1950-1984* (New York: Norton, 1984): 163.

[3] Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes Toward History*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1984); *Language as Symbolic Action*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

everyone else. These rhetorical histories have been written from a position of alleged ideological neutrality and gender-neutral epistemology, illusions available only to those who already espouse dominant ideology.

Only in the last twenty years or so has much mention been given to all the "others" who have practiced persuasive discourse all along. The biggest group of "others" has been women, of course, who have been *gendered* invisible and silent. (I decouple gender from genitalia and relate it instead to the "primary way of signifying relations of power").[4] In terms of Anne Phillips's "politics of presence"[5] and Nancy Fraser's "politics of recognition",[6] then, women have been mostly absent from or unrecognized in rhetorical histories and theories. And yet despite the upsurge of scholarship to the contrary, women's status as rhetors and rhetoricians still remains provisional.

My work has long been rooted in the belief that surely some others (women, the silenced, the ignored and discounted) can legitimately be regarded as creative participants in Western intellectual life and, therefore, as suitable objects of scholarly inquiry. So in a move that can be defined as "strategic positivism" (echoing Spivak),[7] I began the research necessary for writing a history of rhetoric inclusive of women, a regendered rhetoric, if you will. Although I was pointing to a different set of subjects (women, rather than men) for historical inquiry and admitting the interestedness of my historiographic project, I couldn't completely abandon the "fact" of a male-only rhetorical tradition until I had responsibly accumulated enough evidence — through historically deep and wide research — to support a new "fact": women had, indeed, participated in the rhetorical tradition. Knowing that historical "facts" are socially constructed, historically contingent, and theory bound doesn't make them any less useful — this knowledge simply helps us understand history and history writing as human activities.

The reception of my early work was met mostly with excitement — but there was also a measure of disbelief. To wit, when I first argued that Aspasia had taught Pericles how to deliver persuasive speeches in fifth-century BCE Athens, I was reminded that I hadn't found any of her primary texts, so she couldn't be a rhetorician. (That we've never had any of Socrates' primary texts seemed to be beside the point). When I wrote about Hortensia's successful argument before the Roman triumvirs in 42 BCE, which resulted in the reduction of taxes women were to submit, I was told that Hortensia could not be a rhetor because she'd spoken publicly, politically, and persuasively only one time. (No such charge has ever been leveled at American oratorical hero Patrick Henry, of "Give me liberty or give me death" fame). When I

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[4] Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990): 12.
[5] Anne Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[6] Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age", *New Left Review* 212 (1995): 68-93.
[7] Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography", in *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1987): 197-221.

described the rhetorical power of Margery Kempe's fourteenth-century autobiography (the earliest extant autobiography written in English), I was told that she composed it when she was suffering from postpartum depression, was crazy, and, therefore, could not be a rhetorician. (Being crazy and being a rhetorician were mutually exclusive categories for Kempe but not for Nietzche). And when I described the powerful public manipulation of England's Queen Elizabeth I, I was reminded that her rhetorical display couldn't count because she was queen.

That last admonition should have been my biggest hint of what I was up against: those unwilling to re-think the rhetorical tradition had decided long ago that it was a male-only tradition of mastery and dominance. Only when I rethought the grammar of rhetoric (the definition for each of its basic terms) was I able to answer my mostly well-meaning critics and write women into the history of rhetoric. If self-conscious, persuasive language use (i.e., rhetoric) could circulate in the private sphere as well as in the public sphere, then women could be rhetors. If collaboration, invitation, and dialogue could be considered persuasive techniques, then women could be rhetoricians. If so, then many female voices — from Sappho and Aspasia to Margery Kempe and Queen Elizabeth I — could responsibly be written into the tradition, on the same grounds that men had been. Women could be moved from positions of silence and invisibility to the positions of rhetorical voice and presence they now inhabit.

Although it's still difficult to write women (or anyone, for that matter) into rhetorical history, doing so is no longer considered to be out of the question. Since my initial feminist historiographic project, women have entered rhetorical territory in impressive numbers. Their rhetorical practices are regularly recuperated by scholars rereading primary and secondary sources, reconsidering their cultural contexts, and listening to the long-silent voices of these rhetorically savvy women.

2. Silence and silencing

> *The silences, the empty spaces . . . tell us as much as the content, once we learn to watch for what is left out, for the unspoken.*
> *— Adrienne Rich*[8]

At every turn of *Rhetoric Retold*,[9] I faced the central problem of the collective feminist historiographic project: silence and silencing. Of course, much of the past remains irrevocably silenced: gestures, conversations, and original manuscripts can never be recaptured. Silence and silencing still greet us in every library, every archive, every text. Yet as I knitted together material that

[8] Adrienne Rich, *Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985* (New York: Norton, 1986): 3.
[9] Cheryl Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through The Renaissance* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1997).

brought a number of historical women into rhetorical history, I came to appreciate the rhetorical value of silence, for *Rhetoric Retold*[10] provided me a venue for piercing the gendered silences that speak through women *and* men. I first became aware of the paradoxical rhetorical properties of silence (its powers and limitations) when I studied the rhetorical display of Anne Askew, an aristocratic English woman who, in 1546 CE, was arrested on grounds of radical Protestantism, publicly interrogated, brutally tortured, judged by a jury, and burned at the stake. Through it all, Askew demonstrates how compelling the delivery of silence can be. She refused to speak about anything but her Protestant faith, refused to share the names of any other members of her sect, and revealed no concealed information besides her extraordinary mastery of Scripture: "God has given me the gift of knowledge, but not of utterance. And Solomon says, that a woman of few words is a gift of God, Proverbs 19".

Askew's delivery harkens to silence as an under-understood rhetorical strategy, particularly because her silence was not persuasive in terms of the traditional interactional goal of rhetoric, that of prevailing over her auditors. The delivery of silence doesn't always achieve that goal, and even when it does, it isn't always recognized as doing so. Little wonder, then, silence has been gendered a lamentable essence of femininity: of weakness, passivity, stupidity, obedience. On the other hand, "speaking out" has long been gendered the signal of masculinity: of strength, liberation, authority, especially given the Western tendency to overvalue the spoken word (except, of course, in the case of the idealised male — the powerful tightlipped hero as portrayed by Clint Eastwood, Morgan Freeman, and Javier Bardem). Yet despite these cultural codes (perhaps because I was reading them *as codes*), I began to imagine silence as a rhetoric, as a constellation of symbolic strategies that — like spoken language — serves many functions. And I began work on *Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence.*[13]

Unspoken relies on traditional library and archival research as well as two naturalistic studies, one of which I conducted with academics. Although the accounts of these academics only *partially* represent the findings of the overall project, their moving narratives of gendered silence and silencing illustrate the *power* of silence and the *powerlessness* of being silenced.

Academics often *consciously* exert silence-as-control, as power. One of my interviews included a senior female professor, who was serving on a department committee with an opinionated new assistant professor, whom the senior professor describes as having "no sense of the shared enterprise". When I asked the senior professor why she didn't try to enlighten the assistant professor, she explained that the assertions of the assistant professor are "repeatedly met with silence because anyone who talks to her knows that there's no point in trying to exchange views if... you are opposed.

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[10] Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold*.

[13] Cheryl Glenn, *Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004).

Often her wrong-headed views are met with silence... because they are so appallingly ignorant. For instance, at one meeting, she said, "Why shouldn't we just hire our own PhDs who don't get jobs"".

Naturally, there's another side to the story. When I interviewed the younger professor, she told me about that same committee (not knowing that anyone else had spoken to me about it), confiding that her suggestions were usually met with silence. She found the silence puzzling, insulting — and even threatening, given that she was untenured. In response to that silence, she felt silenced.

This brief example demonstrates how silence can be used strategically, without the kind of spoken, one-to-one confrontation that can be witnessed by others or regretted later. Thus, when willfully employed, the delivery of silence can be powerful, can help maintain control, especially when the profound human need to communicate with words is not met. And for the assistant professor, the silent response to her language disciplined her into silence, indicating that silence would be the safest position for her to inhabit, for whatever she said might be used against her.

Throughout my many interviews with them, every academic remembered the use of silence long after the disciplining silence itself was suspended.

The recovery of women and the recuperation of silence are just two ways that the feminist historiographic rhetorical project has resisted and transformed the field of rhetoric. In the next section, I consider an expanded realm of feminist rhetorical studies.

3. Feminist rhetorical possibilities

> *We stream / into the unfinished / the unbegun / the possible.*
> *— Adrienne Rich*[15]

When I wrote *Rhetoric Retold,*[16] feminist rhetorical historiography was just taking root, in a past that now seems like a bygone era, a time when all the rhetors were men, rhetoric was a masculinised field, and our *only* project was the recovery and recuperation of women's contributions to rhetorical history and practice. Given the explosion of recuperative feminist work since, studying the rhetorical accomplishments of women is no longer exceptional; rather, it's the norm, whether the woman under analysis is Aspasia, Diotima, Julian of Norwich, Kathy Acker, Gloria Anzaldúa, Ida B. Wells, Victoria Earle Matthews, Anna Julia Cooper, Zitkala ša, Sarah Winnemucca, whether she's on the platform, at her desk, on stage, or in the parlor. Without the foundation that feminist *recovery* work provided, I'm not convinced that we feminist

[15] Adrienne Rich, "Phantasia for Elvira Shatayev" in *The Dream of a Common Language: Poems 1974-1977* (New York: Norton, 1978): 5.
[16] Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold.*

historiographers could have begun dreaming of a new field, our field of dreams, where rhetorical appreciation takes into consideration the place, ethnicity, culture, class, ability, movements, and orientation of human beings throughout time.

In this section, I'll identify *five prominent features* on our field of dreams, a field in which feminist rhetoricians are moving steadily beyond a *sole* focus on women's rhetorical contributions. These I mention are not the *only* features, nor are the feminist rhetorical researchers I cite the *only* researchers, but, together, they are generating feminist rhetorical scholarship that moves us "beyond women".

Perhaps foremost is the feminist historiographic move to consider identities as epistemic resources, our own as well as others'. Twenty-five years ago, we began with our identities as women, recognizing the power and politics of our own individual location: how "a place on the map is also a place in history" within which we are "created and [are] trying to create".[17] Given the limitations of the white feminists who universalised their personal experience and fixated on the overriding primacy of *gender* oppression, painful controversies among all activist women resulted in a vigorous interrogation of identity politics. This interrogation led to a recognition of *multiple interlocking* oppressions as well as to concerted efforts to bring greater representation and inclusivity to rhetorical studies. After all, identity is created in the presence of complex others, largely through speech and action, but also through skin, which "mediates the most important transactions of our lives", particularly "our relationships with others".[18]

This turn toward identity politics writ large has led feminist historiographers to join the research efforts already underway that help to bring greater representation and inclusivity to rhetorical studies. Feminist scholarship on African American, Chinese, Native American, and Mexican-American rhetorics as well as on global rhetorical issues signifies just a few of the many ongoing recovery projects that are anchored in feminism and identity studies. Thus, through the double lens of feminism and rhetoric, scholars recognize identities of *all* kinds as epistemic resources that can be tapped for their knowledge-generating potential.

Secondly, in addition to extending feminist rhetorical interests into identity studies, our field of dreams is also redefining *rhetorical display*, moving into other realms and dimensions of delivery, from the spatial and architectural to the emotional, spiritual, and chronological. (Among noteworthy scholarship is Giuliana Bruno's *Atlas of Emotion*,[19] which offers a fantastic voyage into these realms). In addition, while coediting *Silence and Listening as Rhetorical Arts*,[20] Krista Ratcliffe and I were astonished to learn

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[17] Rich, *Blood, Bread, and Poetry,* 212.

[18] Nina Jablonski, *Skin: A Natural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

[19] Giuliana Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film* (New York: Verso, 2002).

[20] Cheryl Glenn and Krista Ratcliff, *Silence and Listening as Rhetorical Arts* (Carbondale: Southern

all the new ways feminist rhetoricians are articulating methods for theorising, historicising, analysing, and teaching silence and listening as rhetorical delivery.

Third, in addition to widening our understanding of *who* and *what* can be defined as rhetorical, feminist rhetoricians are intervening in research methods, methodologies, and epistemologies. Thus, our research has moved beyond text-based studies to tap the rich potential of person-based studies, fostering opportunities for even *deeper* transformations and *broader* invitations into the field. Now feminist rhetoricians are routinely paying especial attention to issues of Burkean "trained incapacities" as well as to those positions of alleged objectivity that have conditioned and constrained our research. In terms of traditional library and archival research, two new books are certain to invigorate our practices: *Working in the Archives: Practical Research Methods for Rhetoric and Composition* by Alexis Ramsey, Wendy Sharer, Barbara L'Eplattenier, and Lisa Mastrangelo[21] and *Rhetorica in Motion: Feminist Rhetorical Methods and Methodologies* by Eileen Schell and K. J. Rawson.[22] In brief, both collections call for recovery and gender critique at the same time that they expand the definition of library and archival research to include whatever materials illuminate the project (from student essays and diaries to newspapers and photographs).

As we sharpen our focus on more traditional research methods, we're also interrogating the epistemological and ethical implications of naturalistic studies, ethnography, and interviews. Peter Mortensen and Gesa Kirsch's *Ethics and Representation in Qualitative Studies of Literacy*, and Beverly Moss's *A Community Text Arises*;[23] Brenda Brueggemann's *Lend Me Your Ear;*[24] and Michelle Ballif, Diane Davis, and Roxanne Mountford's *Women's Ways of Making It in Rhetoric and Composition*[25] all exemplify the evolution of feminist rhetorical research methods. Heidi McKee and Jim Porter's "Rhetorica Online: Feminist Research Practices in Cyberspace"[26] illustrates yet another key tenet of feminist rhetorical research, that of considering the agency of the participants whose writing is being studied and whose actions

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Illinois University Press, 2011).

[21] Alexis Ramsey, Wendy Sharer, Barbara L'Eplattenier, and Lisa S. Mastrangelo, eds., *Working in the Archives: Practical Research Methods for Rhetoric and Composition* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010).

[22] Eileen Schell and K. J. Rawson, eds., *Rhetorica in Motion: Feminist Rhetorical Methods & Methodologies* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).

[23] Peter Mortensen and Gesa Kirsch, eds., *Ethics and Representation in Qualitative Studies of Literacy* (Urbana, Illinois: National Council of Teachers, 1993); Beverly J. Moss, *A Community Text Arises* (Hampton, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2002).

[24] Brenda Brueggemann, *Lend Me Your Ear,* (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1999).

[25] Michelle Ballif, Diane Davis and Roxanne Mountford, *Women's Ways of Making It* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

[26] Heidi A. McKee and James E. Porter, "Rhetorica Online: Feminist Research Practices in Cyberspace", in *Rhetorica in motion: feminist rhetorical methods & methodologies* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2010): 168.

are being observed. In all of this scholarship, we researchers acknowledge the locations of *ourselves* in research and writing: we recognize our own self-interest, realize how that interest might affect others, and resolve to participate in a reciprocal cross-boundary exchange, in which we talk *with* and listen *to* others. Still, as Gayle Letherby[27] admonishes, we must remember that the production of knowledge is a dialectic loaded in favor of the researcher herself, no matter how hard we try to do just the opposite.

The transformative feminist engagement with rhetorical theory accounts for the *fourth* feature on our field of dreams. The scholarship of Sonja Foss, Karen Foss, Cindy Griffin,[28] Sally Miller Gearheart,[29] and Starhawk,[30] for instance, has helped move the interactional goal of rhetoric from *only* persuasion (whether conquest, conversion, or advice) to one of *shared* understanding, attended by invitation, productive reception, and collaboration. Other feminist rhetoricians are also making contributions to the paradigm shift, including Ellen Gorsevski, who offers practices for "peaceful persuasion" and "nonviolent rhetoric",[31] echoing Gearhart's belief that "any intent to persuade is an act of violence".[32] What all of these feminist rhetorical scholars hold in common is the belief that many people (especially women) have trouble engaging in traditional rhetoric because of its inherent patriarchal bias (based on strategy, agonism, competition, and power-over), which embodies the "experiences and concerns of the white male as standard".[33]

In response, Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin offer their theory of "invitational rhetoric", which they define as "an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, immanent value, and self-determination".[34] They demonstrate invitational rhetoric by juxtaposing the rhetorical theory of feminist writer and activist Starhawk with that of one of the most influential rhetoricians of our time, Kenneth Burke. Using Gearhart's method of "re-sourcement", which communicates rhetors' differences without damaging the connection between them, Foss and Griffin[35] place Starhawk's and Burke's rhetorics alongside each other, not

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[27] Gayle Letherby, *Feminist Research in Theory and Practice,* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003).

[28] Sonja Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for Invitational Rhetoric", *Communication Monographs* 62 (1995): 1-18; "A Feminist Perspective on Rhetorical Theory: Toward a Clarification of Boundaries", *Western Journal of Communication* 56 (1992): 330-49; "The Womanization of Rhetoric", *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 2 (1979): 195-201.

[29] Sally Miller Gearhart, "Sally Miller Gearhart", *Readings in Feminist Rhetorical Theory,* ed. Karen A. Foss, Sonja K. Foss, and Cindy L. Griffin (Long Grove, Ilinois: Waveland Press, 2004): 239-70.

[30] Starhawk, *Truth or Dare* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987).

[31] Ellen Gorsevski, *Peaceful Persuasion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).

[32] Gearhart, *Readings in Feminist Rhetorical Theory,* 239-70.

[33] Foss, *Western Journal of Communication*, 330-49.

[34] Foss, *Communication Monographs,* 5.

[35] Foss, *Communication Monographs,* 1-18.

exactly as Burke does with his "perspective by incongruity",[36] but rather as reflection and negotiation. Thus the authors offer Starhawk's rhetoric of "inherent worth", "power-with", and "empowered action"[37] in dialectical tension with Burke's theories of hierarchy and power-over, ideas that have long dominated the discipline of rhetoric. With their theories of invitational rhetoric, re-sourcement, enfoldment, and power-with, these scholars have worked to align feminist goals with rhetorical goals, goals that require us to consider rhetoric from a completely different point of view. And as Paula Moya reminds us, "Unless we have access to alternative perspectives… we risk being arrested in the process of our intellectual and moral growth".[38]

Finally, a return to rhetoric's roots constitutes the *fifth* feminist feature on our field of dreams. After all, rhetoric has always been a teaching-mentoring tradition, the pedagogical pursuit of good (i.e., artful and ethical) speaking, writing, and being, which took root in Socrates' teaching and mentoring of Phaedrus. Traditionally, the teacher/mentor role has indicated a master-apprentice model, one too often reflecting upon the glories of the teacher/mentor and the teleological promise of the student/mentee. The feminist intervention into teaching and mentoring points to a different model — that of a *mutually* supportive and *generative* relationship put into the service of sustaining friendships, professional diversity, scholarly responsibility, ethical action, and the shaping of the *next* generation of teachers and mentors. As Adrienne Rich reminds us, it's folks like us — intellectuals, writers, *teachers and mentors* — who must make and write our future through the "sheer power of a collective imagining of change and a sense of collective hope".[39]

4. Toward a transformed, inclusionary rhetoric

> *What's realistic fantasy? — call it hope.*
> *— Adrienne Rich*[40]

The stubborn facts to which all rhetoricians seem to hold fast is that rhetoric should *do* something, that rhetorical inquiry should make a *difference* in the world. And although agency is a contested term, always contingent, it can be adopted strategically (in yet another echo of Spivak),[41] as well as rigorously, to rewrite rhetorical history and theory, to represent and include more users and uses of rhetoric, to represent ethically and accurately the dominant and

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[36] Burke, *Attitudes* 308ff.
[37] Starhawk, *Truth or Dare*.
[38] Paula Moya, *Learning from Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 131.
[39] Rich, *Arts of the Possible,* 167.
[40] Adrienne Rich, "Letters Censored, Shredded, Returned to Sender, or Judged Unfit to Send" in *Telephone Ringing in the Labyrinth: Poems 2004-2006* (New York: Norton, 2007): 65-70 (66).
[41] Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography", in *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1987): 197-221.

marginalised alike, to prepare the *next* generation of rhetorically empowered scholars, teachers, and citizens — but most of all, to envision a dynamic, generative, rhetorical future that we all want to share. In other words, we can use our agency to build our field of dreams.

Unveiling a feminine subjectivity in a men's world or shaping our own? *An aporetic experience*

Nicole Dewandre

1. Climbing the stairs of a woman's self consciousness

1.1 From the gender-blind educated young woman to claiming equality

"*The weight, the pace, the stride of a man's mind are too unlike her own for her to lift anything substantial from him successfully*": as an educated girl from an uneducated man, it took me 40 years to catch the power of this sentence of Virginia Woolf in *A Room of One's Own.*[1] Until then, I strived to build myself as a "naïve educated woman", confident that the claim for equality was the alpha and the omega of a woman's existence. As many other women, I was a good performer in the school and academic environments. I got university degrees in applied physics engineering, in operations research and in economics. I started my professional career in a successful way, as what I can now describe as an archetype of a woman in the denial mode. I was a true "*parvenue*" as remarkably analysed by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin in "Conformism*, Housekeeping, and the Attack of the Blob: The Origins of Hannah Arendt's concept of the Social*".[2] In this superb text, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin builds on the analysis of Hannah Arendt of the pariah/parvenu divide as applied to the Jews' situation in the XIXth century in her biography of Rahel Varnhagen and subverts it to show how it applies to the man/woman divide.

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin identifies three components to the price paid by a pariah to become and succeed as a *parvenu* :

1. "However well he may fool society, the parvenu must live with the one observer whom he cannot fully fool: himself".
2. "One must deny a part of oneself, establish a permanent division within oneself, declare war on oneself, become a 'battlefield'".
3. "The loss of reality. No more can he afford a stable sense of his own self, can the parvenu independently assess what is real".

This describes perfectly what occurred to me and the reasons why I recognized myself as a *parvenue* in a men's world: lack of internal coherence and loss of reality, in total opposition with the produced appearance of an assertive professional woman, wife and mother.

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[1] Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (Penguin Group, 1945). Later referred to as ROO.

[2] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "Conformism, Housekeeping, and the Attack of the Blob: The Origins of Hannah Arendt's concept of the Social", *Feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt*, Bonnir Honig, ed. (USA: The Pennsylviana State University Press, 1995).

Reading Virginia Woolf, and her wonderful analogy of the looking-glasses,[3] I realised that despite my academic background and the full exercise of the formal liberties that were available to me, as a woman in the European Union in this late 20th century, this looking-glasses' analogy was still making a lot of sense. Things were tricky because different streams were interconnected: at the beginning of my career, I could not isolate the age variable from the gender's one; seeking recognition, I could not isolate it from the game of seduction. But reading this essay of Virginia Woolf made it crystal clear that I was not a free woman, but rather an educated looking-glass, having put her education and intelligence in performing at her best, …as a looking-glass! And each little trial to get away from this was severely punished through humiliation or indifference, both from men and women around me. Hence, on the basis of the past feminist struggles articulated on the claim for equality, I had access to civil and political rights, education and employment, but, despite all this *acquis*, and even as a consequence of it, I only managed to outperform...as a looking-glass!

1.2 Reclaiming feminine specificity

It could have stayed like this for years. Being a performing looking-glass is quite efficient and opens some doors, as gatekeepers are keen to be appreciated and granted for opening doors. "*M-A-D[4] is the filter through which we're pressed to see ourselves — if we don't, we won't get published, sold or exhibited — I blame none of us for not challenging it except not challenging it may drive us mad*". And indeed, there is no other reason to move from this apparently coherent systemic posture of alienation, "...except *not challenging it may drive us mad*; except that it is *at the price of any stable or integrated sense of oneself: one cannot afford to know, yet, one cannot afford to forget*", as put by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin.

From there, my worldview collapsed.

It took me a while to be receptive to Luce Irigaray's work, because of my early suspicion to essentialism. As a "young" feminist, I understood the trap of essentialism and the reasons for not embarking on this route. I measured the need to be cautious with the risks associated to the handling of the supposed differences based on sex, and I recognised that in the past, when these differences were put forward, it has never been at the advantage of women. But, on the other hand, expanding equality considerations beyond their remit, i.e. turning thoughts and rhetoric of differences into a taboo, is equally a mental trap for women and leaves totally open this playing field to our brothers. Isn't it ironic to let men confiscate our own right to define ourselves, by internalising the interdiction to give us a name and a status and by preventing us to think about what it is to be a woman, or even to recognise

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[3] "*Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size"* : Woolf, ROO, 37.

[4] From Honor Moore. M-A-Dness is Male Approval Desire. Cited by Mary Daly in *Gyn/Ecology*: 68.

and even define femininity in our own terms? The claim for equality, although efficient as a political strategy, acts as a trap for building a feminine subjectivity. Words are indeed slippery and thinking is inherently dangerous, as pointed by Hannah Arendt. This is why we need to think collectively, share doubts in inclusive and confident environments and explore inner visions to test if they make sense for others. This is exactly what I am doing here: searching for an environment where fragile ideas can be tested in confidence.

If reading Virginia Woolf made me discover that I was not mad when feeling the split of my Self, reading Luce Irigaray's *Etre Deux* provided me with the keys to understand why I had the feeling of being a stranger to this world: I internalised the posture of the other, *as seen from the men's perspective*. In *Etre Deux*, Luce Irigaray sets out very clearly the polarity of how men and women tend to engage in relationships: women privilege relationship between subjects, where the other remains a "*Tu*", a mystery in the sense that there is room for his own alterity to himself in the relationship; for men, the other is approached as an object, as something to master, to dominate, to possess, to crack. In the men's perspective, heavily irrigated by the quest for control, understanding the other or knowing it is somehow to reduce it to a machine that could be reproduced, to see it from the point of view of its creator. Understanding means being able to duplicate or predict. This must be why the discovery of general laws seems to be so exciting to a man's mind, and also why necessity is loaded with this ontological supremacy over contingency, as unveiled by Hannah Arendt in the *Thinking* part of her *Life of the Mind*.

To date, as a thinking woman, and thanks to all these women's thinkers before and around me, after having been blind to the gender issue, I have been able to go as far as touching with my mind the fact that the world is the signature, or the secretion, of the men's approach to otherness, as put forward by Luce Irigaray in *Etre Deux*. This approach to otherness underlies scientific knowledge as a quest for stealing the secrets of nature, nations as a deceptive quest for identity, and moral principles to mitigate and counterbalance this compulsive way to instrumentalise the other. In this world's view, women play an important role of looking-glass and caretaker: but this role is assigned to them. So to speak, this recognition of the world as a man's world in which women are assigned a place is a key that allows coming to terms with the puzzle of feeling a stranger to this world.

The power of Hannah Arendt political thought is obviously due to the fact that she analysed the political game from an outsider perspective. She applies Woolf's advice "*to give [our] brothers neither the white feather of cowardice nor the red feather of courage, but no feather at all; to shut the bright eyes that rain influence, or let those eyes look elsewhere when war is discussed*"... Woolf and Arendt both produce a thought that allows acquiring selfconsciousness about the role we are asked to play in this men's world, and its consequent strangeness for us.

1.3 Falling short of performativity

However, this falls short of shaping the world at our image. When visiting the exhibition "*Elles*"[5] in Beaubourg, Paris, I felt to what extent the women's artistic expression provided me with a skin. For the first time, I experienced the pleasure of a public space — this exhibition — where I was directly addressed, and not indirectly, i.e. as if I was a Man,[6] or a woman-as-seen-by-a-man. I draw from this that we, women, need other women's thoughts, deeds and expressions in order to experience an inscription in a world which resembles us, i.e. in which we do not feel alien, which can be seen as the fruit of our genius.

From there, we wonder: "Is there a common ground where men and women's perspectives can meet?" I fully acknowledge the *Etre Deux*'s developments of how women engage in relationships and how they deal with otherness, but I can't escape from experiencing this aspiration as something unreal. Can I — could we — by the force of redescription, make our own vision of the world a reality? Or are we bound, by realism, to cope with this men-centred vision? Is there a choice, and if yes, what is the most efficient strategy?

To come back to the vision of relationship, I wonder: can I engage in a relation on the feminine's mode, i.e. based on intersubjectivity bearing with the fact that the other subject takes me as an object? Can I be *indifferent* to the status that he gives me and stay firmly anchored in my own subjectivity, on my vision of me as a subject and the other as another subject, when this other is denying the subject's status to me? Can we imagine that there is a device, a sort of mental transponder that allows overcoming this essential difference in the way we engage in relationships? Or is all our energy dedicated to both complying and resisting to occupying our assigned place? Now that I realised to what extent our common world is a men's world, I wish I could get out of it and opt for a women's world, in the same way that one can choose to get out of a room to enter another one, but there is only one world ...unless the power of redescription is such that it can create other worlds. Can it?

2. The pressing need for a world's redescription by women's minds

This calls to shifting from a deconstructive attitude to a mode of redescription. Isn't there a window of opportunity for doing so, in these moments where I feel that the public space is in danger of collapse?

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[5]http://www.centrepompidou.fr/Pompidou/Manifs.nsf/AllExpositions/44638F832F0AFABFC12575290030CF0D?OpenDocument&sessionM=2.2.1&L=1

[6] This refers to the French way of writing *Homme* with a capital H to include both men and women.

2.1 Confidence in the — invisible — hand or blindness?

The Shoah and the recourse by the US to the nuclear bomb in Japan are two events which dramatically unveiled the fact that technology was axiologically neutral and could be badly used, to say the least (the little girl inside me considers this as so obvious that she wonders why so many great men feel the need to repeat this again and again). Later in the 20th century, concerns regarding the availability of resources became more and more pregnant, firstly regarding oil with the first oil crisis in the 70's. Waking up from the illusion of the endless pursuit of progress, we realised that the earth itself is the limit, ...well before the sky! The idea that economic growth in itself was not only unsustainable but also meaningless as an exclusive political objective gained more and more acceptance. Let's remember the resonance given to the famous sentence of André Malraux: "*Le 21ème siècle sera religieux ou ne sera pas*", which expresses the fact that economic goals in themselves do not suffice to shape the public space. In the meantime, the USSR collapsed and the capitalist system lost its challenger, and with this collapse, a profound side effect: the systematic and radical suspicion of any policy approach based on planning and regulation. Capitalism, based on the invisible hand's principle, defeated communism, based on planification. In a Darwinian perspective, this supposedly demonstrated the superiority of the invisible hand over planification. This have reinstated liberty — understood in its childish meaning as *laissez-faire* or "no limit, no constraint" — as a false divinity in our societies, a degenerated understanding of progress. This reactivated a dynamic of denial of *phronesis* as one of the basic virtues. In a subtle way, under the cover of the economic science, we shifted from the confidence in Mill's invisible hand to a blind faith in the market forces. But blindness and invisibility are to be distinguished …and action, in its Arendtian meaning, cannot be confined to economic goals.

2.2 Climate change as the signature of the need for phronesis

It is in this polarised context, characterised both by the end of confidence in progress and by the collapse of communism, with the corollary of the suspicion against any form of planification, that the climate change issue gained momentum. The threat of climate change seems to be the only *point d'appui* from which our development mode can be questioned. It is the only perspective from which the blind faith in the market forces can be challenged. Climate change comes *à point nommé* to introduce the notion of limits and measures in the political discourse. The problem is that the rhetoric of climate change is structured around what can be called "catastrophism". Catastrophism aims at mobilising through fear, thereby being totally incompatible with nurturing a public space and inducing wisdom, phronesis and love of the world. I feel deeply uncomfortable with the catastrophist attitude and can only conjecture that it may be useful, if it ever is, to men's minds. I could not express it better than Virginia Woolf in *A Room of One's Own*:

> "It was absurd to blame any class or any sex, as a whole. … They too, the patriarchs, the professors, had endless difficulties, terrible drawbacks to contend with. … True, they had money and power, but only at the cost of harbouring in their breasts an eagle, a vulture, for ever tearing the liver out and plucking the lungs — the instinct for possession, the rage for acquisition which drives them to desire other people's fields and goods perpetually; to make frontiers and flags; battleships and poison gas; to offer up their own lives and their children's lives. … These are unpleasant instincts to harbour, I reflected. ... And, as I realized these drawbacks, by degrees, fear and bitterness modified themselves into pity and toleration;..".

Hence, yes, catastrophism is only understandable to me if I consider that it is not aimed at me, but tailored by men for their own minds and hearts. Catastrophism is not part of the solution but instead an additional hurdle preventing the sense of the future to emerge. It needs to be circumvented and counterbalanced with positive visions. It is my intuition and my hope that women thoughts and voices could be main contributors in providing these positive visions and shaping the path between catastrophism and denial.

3. Risks associated with performative feminism and women's liberty of thought

Virginia Woolf goes on:

> "...and then in a year or two, pity and toleration went, and the greatest release of all came, which is freedom to think of things in themselves".

This is exactly where I'd like to stand, but when I try to engage on this path, I feel something she did not mention, and which is: "danger"! As if these own feminine thoughts were dangerous in that, apart from being meaningful for us women, they would be totally inefficient to contain "*the unpleasant instincts they [the men] harbour*", and even counterproductive in that they would unleash these instincts, in a way that could impact us women in a dramatic way.

It is interesting to note how Hannah Arendt is going close to these danger zones, for example, in her way to approach the banality of evil. When the whole tradition of moral philosophy tries to identify the nature or the roots of the evil and the bad, with — I suppose — the hope of eradicating it once and for all, she takes a radically different posture: for her, it is hopeless to try to eradicate the evil forever. It can only be contained, and it is indeed contained in most circumstances. The best way she found to qualify evil, is

not the presence of some characteristics, apart from its *banality*, but the *absence* of thought. This way to think provoked scandal. Similarly, Virginia Woolf provoked scandal when she wrote in1938 in *Three Guineas*, this book she wrote to answer a man's question posed to her: "*How, in your opinion are we to prevent war?"*:

> "The words are the same as yours; the claim is the same as yours. The daughters of educated men who were called, to their resentment, 'feminists' were in fact the advance guard of your own movement. They were fighting the same enemy that you are fighting and for the same reasons. They were fighting the tyranny of the patriarchal state as you are fighting the tyranny of the Facist state".[7]

In these two instances, both Arendt and Woolf touched a very sensitive zone. I conjecture that this could be because thinking that way took away yardsticks that fulfil a critical function for helping men dealing with "*the unpleasant instincts they harbour*", as if it could be interpreted as encouraging the evil. We know that this was not at all the intention of Hannah Arendt. Her condemnation of the Shoah has been unequivocal, but she has put it in the register of the judgment, and not in the register of knowledge. No knowledge will ever guarantee mankind against evil: this seems to me both corroborated by facts and a basic wisdom, and it cuts short this desperate quest that seems to be pursued by so many men to render the good necessary, and make the bad impossible. Saying that may be seen by men as a provocation. "You consider this quest stupid? Let me show you the consequences of not pursuing it!" Hence, we may consider that for men it is needed to pursue this quest to deal with *the unpleasant instincts they harbour*, while for women it makes no sense.

4. Amor mundi: Frailty of human affairs and robustness of the earth

The more I think about these things, the more I realise how high the price paid for coping with masculinity, at the expense of my own subjectivity. Maybe, I am too close to the looking-glass experience, maybe I am still too wounded by my trials to think as a woman. I need time and protected space among women — and those men who can think with us and not against us- to cultivate ideas and visions and have them grown and robust enough to get a chance to be heard and seen out there.

My fragile intuition is that seeking certainties and guarantees beyond what is certain and what can be guaranteed leads more surely to the precipitation of what is to be avoided than to the expected security. It is not without irony that Arendt qualified human affairs as inherently fragile. She

[7] Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (USA: A Harbinger Book, 1938).

described politics in the very terms applying to women's thoughts and visions of the world. Her vision of politics is about coping with the frailty of human affairs, being able to face the void, endorsing full responsibility for the civilisation that we have inherited and that we transmit to our children, and abstaining "*to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us*".[8] The co-existence of frailty and confidence in her vision of the world resonates with the matriarchal figure of the earth, as opposed to the patriarchal figure of God. And it is from this very nexus of frailty and confidence that one can nurture the positive visions that are so badly needed to regenerate the sense of the future.

[8] Hannah Arendt, *Between past and future, the crisis in education* (USA: Viking Press, 1961).

Gender and the South African beauty industry, through the eyes of a young, black marketer.

Themba Ratsibe

1.

I would like to start off by posing the following question… "What is gender?" According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations[1] gender are the relations between men and women both from a perceptual and a material understanding. They go on to highlight that gender is not determined biologically, instead it is determined by the characteristics that both women and men have, and these are constructed socially. The misconception in the past, it would seem, is that we have often misunderstood gender dynamics to be the upliftment of women over men or as a type of feminism some might say. In my opinion, based on my understanding on the above definition of gender, gender is the empire from which other subsidiaries such as masculinity, femininity and sexuality are derived.

There were two fundamental chapters in my upbringing that have epitomised gender for me. The first one being the fact that I went to an all-boys' school. The second one being the rights of passage to becoming a man that I went through, by going to an initiation school, as my ethnic profile is Xhosa and this is a big part of the Xhosa culture. The interesting thing about both these experiences is they both had and still have a big emphasis on what it means to be a man, this mainly focused on how one should and shouldn't act as a man and a lot of this always had strong hints of ethos. This included being encouraged to take pride in being a man and doing certain things to always appear of good nature, gentlemanly and manly (masculine). In both these experiences these included things such as respect, upholding the name of the school or clan, being a bread winner and being the head of the house and a leader. On top of this, the Xhosa culture included things such as being able to use the learnings you learned through story telling in the initiation school, back in society. In my experience if someone did not comply with what was deemed to be manly, their ethos was considered compromised and sometimes they were viewed as being the complete opposite of what a man is, that of being womanly or feminine. These characteristics epitomise the stereotypical understanding of what it means to be a man or a woman. Men are understood to be aggressive and competitive (masculine) and women are understood to be passive, cooperative and expressive (feminine) as explained by Stets and Burke.[2]

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[1] http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5608e/y5608e01.htm

[2] Jan. E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, "Femininity/Masculinity", in *Encyclopedia of Sociology* 2nd ed., eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and Rhonda JV Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 2000): 997-1005.

2.

The above chapter highlights my upbringing and my exposure to gender dynamics through the years, this crafted the way I understood or was meant to understand what it means to be a man or to be masculine and what it means to be feminine. Currently I am a young black male working as a marketer in the beauty industry in South Africa. This is obviously regarded as feminine as beauty has female connotations such as expression, emotion and nurturing. The question I'm often asked because of my profession is "Why are you in your current profession? That profession is best suited for women". The general impression is that my job is reserved for women or men who are either feminine in nature or who are homosexual by sexual orientation (in the case of men). Since I am in this profession the question I pose to myself, which is sometimes an inner conflict is, "Does my profession make me less of a man?" This question I will answer at the end of this paper after I have unpacked the challenges I have faced so far in this industry, as these challenges bring a lot of perspective to this question.

What I have discovered about the South African beauty industry so far as a young black man is that the difficulties in this industry transcend gender and sexual orientation. In fact the difficulties in this industry more often than not stem from the fact that one is judged at face value based on sex, gender, race or background. In terms of sex, as mentioned before in this paper, beauty is understood to be something that is best understood and embodied by women. This is the reason why the industry is dominated by women. In fact unlike what I had experienced in the past in terms of gender where men were the aggressors and held the power in society, in the beauty industry women hold the power. They are perceived to understand beauty because they grew up with an interest in beauty thereby keeping themselves beautiful, unlike men who are stereotypically believed to have grown up with an interest in cars and sport. However there are two rhetorical arguments I have always posed on the matter and they both take the form of *logos* in the inductive form through the logical nature of the arguments. My first argument is that as men and women we have different talents. Men are naturally better than women in some things and vice versa. So although women may have a good understanding of beauty, one may find that men are better at putting things into perspective. For example in my experience in this industry I have often found my colleagues who are women and are feminine have the best ideas in terms of innovation of beauty and what it means to be beautiful, but the idea does not always take into account the long terms affects of its implementation. Questions such as "How is it going to work?", "Who will implement it?", "When?", "How?" and "Why?" are often asked by men. So at the end of the day the innovations for beauty may often be initiated by women, but sometimes men play the critical role of putting the ideas into perspective in order to make them work. This is what Eckes[3] refers

[3] George Eckes, *Six Sigma Team Dynamics. The elusive key to project success* (USA: Wiley, 2003): 2.

to as team dynamics (the ability to take the contributions from different members of a team in order to make that team more productive). Secondly, since women are perceived to epitomise beauty and looking beautiful, the question that needs to be asked is "Who do they want to look beautiful for?" More often than not, the answer to this question will be "Men!" Since this is the case, I would say that the opinion of men in terms of what they regard to be beautiful where women are concerned, should be regarded as critical to those working in this industry. Based on these two arguments alone, I believe that men should be given recognition in terms of the value that they add to the beauty industry. Currently men are believed to add value only where a beauty product is being created for men specifically. The double standard here however is that women's opinions of male products are always held in high regard, as there is a higher percentage of women who buy beauty products for their spouses as opposed to men buying these products for their spouses.

Similar observations can be made with regards to gender in this industry. Those who are feminine, whether they are male or female are regarded to be more in line with the women's way of understanding beauty and their opinions within this industry will be held almost in the same light as those of women. However, those who are more masculine resemble men and their understanding of beauty and therefore their opinions, although they may be valid, are often only found to be convincing after these opinions or ideas have been justified and proven to be worthwhile. These types of battles are common in this industry and many believe that these are the only type of battles one would face being a young black male marketing beauty products. However, as mentioned before in this paper, there are other battles that one faces almost on a daily bases, the biggest one in my opinion being race.

Siegel and Swanson[4] define race as a group where persons inside the group and outside the group decided to single out physical characteristics (based on fact or perception) to form an identity for that particular group, in most cases people are grouped according to the colour of their skins, as the colour of their skins is their identity that could separate them from other groups. Unlike in most cases, for the purposes of this paper, my mention of race is not negative. My reasoning for this is that in my experience racial tensions in the South African beauty industry are not imposed with malicious intent or prejudice, but rather imposed as a result of not understanding the other race (according to Siegel and Swanson, not understanding the other group). Through working in this industry what has become very clear is the segregation within beauty in South Africa, in terms of product offer. In a nutshell, there are products that target white consumers and there are products that target black consumers. At the end of the day the logic is that white marketers should target white consumers and black marketers should

[4] Jacob S. Siegel and David A. Sawnson, *The methods and material of Demography* (USA: Academic Press, 2004): 6.

target black consumers, because presumably each of them can relate very well with that consumer (based on race). Surprisingly the opinions of black marketers on how to target black consumers are challenged from time to time, in the same way that the opinions of men in similar situations are challenged as mentioned earlier in this paper. What is most interesting about this is that these challenges often come from white marketers who wouldn't necessarily have the insight into the lives of black consumers that black marketers would have. Here I would like to make an argument through the use of *pathos*. As a black individual who has fortunately been greatly exposed to African and Western culture (through my upbringing), I can say that black people and white people are for the most part very different. Black people in South Africa are emotional beings and this could stem from the harsh conditions that were forced upon them during the apartheid era. As a result of this, I believe the best way to communicate with black people is by striking an emotional chord. For example, use words that have meaning to them and for them alone because this gives them a sense of ownership and entitlement. It's not good enough to take the Western approach of using a black model to communicate to black people but with the communication in English, when this happens black consumers as the audience feel that they have been compromised. These are the types of insights that black marketers will have almost instinctively.

White people (Western culture) on the other hand are very logical in their approach; everything is calculated and done by the book. More often than not if it's not done by the book or it doesn't look a certain way, it will be challenged. This is very interesting; especially since a lot of Westernised corporates employees (not just in the beauty industry) pride themselves in "thinking out of the box", "taking the initiative" and being "spontaneous". If you ask me, I believe that a lot of these corporate employees use this as a type of "window dressing" to uphold their ethos by appearing to be open minded and non-discriminatory, which is not always true. In the beauty industry this misleads black marketers into thinking that they have carte blanche in their approaches to beauty, which is not always true either.

I believe there are three reasons why the approaches of black marketers to beauty are often challenged. The first reason is that black marketer's approaches to beauty often look different to the Western ideology of beauty. This intertwines with my second reason, that being the fact that beauty as we know it today is a Western ideal and white people or marketers believe that they know it best. The third reason in my opinion also stems from an educational point of view. It's only in recent times that we see young, black, educated individuals, in the past only white people had the education, so what we often find in the beauty industry today is that the ideas of black marketers are sometimes challenged and researched thoroughly because there is an element of doubt with regard to the underlying thought process of these ideas.

From the above you can see the racial struggles for a black marketer within the beauty industry in South Africa, but what is interesting to note is

that these racial struggles are not necessarily comprised of malicious intent or prejudice but rather from a lack of understanding of the "other" and from being unable to relate to the "other".

In my opinion we often under-estimate the power of one being able to relate to one another in any industry. In the case of the beauty industry, where as stated before, most of the marketers and their superiors happen to be white females and males, I have noticed that one's ability to relate to these people is crucial. For example, being black and male there are certain traits that are instilled within you from a young age and some of these as mentioned previously you learn as you grow older (in my case, my rights of passage into manhood). These include things such as respect your elders, shaking an elder's or your superior's hand with one hand supporting the other hand as a sign of respect, not calling your elders or superiors by their first name, being polite, being humble and speaking only when you have something valuable to say. In the corporate world or in my case the beauty industry, I have had to learn to leave these outside of my working environment every day. This is a constant battle, as I have to always remind myself during the course of the day that I'm operating in a different space where the definition of things such as respect and other behaviours are totally different. As a result of such battles and inner conflicts, I have noticed that black individuals in this industry take a lot longer to progress than white individuals. This once again is basically due to the lack of understanding of the "other" (of the black individual about the white individual). Below we explore this in more detail.

I believe that the beauty industry in terms of its environment and ideals, is best suited for white individuals. My reasoning for this is that they are able to relate and identify with this environment. For example, the beauty industry is surrounded by key words such as beauty, glamour, class, style and the ability for one to be visible. Since white people are more likely to be able to relate to this type of environment, they fit in, "look the part" and progress in the industry (because it is perceived that they are knowledgeable where beauty is concerned). On the other hand you find that some of the black marketers, depending on their upbringing are the total opposite. They struggle to fit in, don't "look the part", therefore they are deemed to be less knowledgeable where beauty is concerned and as a result it takes them slightly longer to progress in the industry. I've had a situation where one of my colleagues changed her perception of me after she found out what school I went to (a recognised white boys' school). All of a sudden she had a more positive opinion of me, I believe that this was due to the fact that she could now relate to me in some way, as I now "looked the part" and she perceived me to be more knowledgeable in my profession, even though I was the same person and I had the same knowledge that I always had. She gave me a source of power that I didn't earn through the scope of my work. This happens a lot in this industry and it is a pity that, in these cases most of the time it is the black marketers who get the short-end of the stick.

3.

So far in this paper I have highlighted the difficulties I have faced in the beauty industry. By now you should be able to deduce that by fitting a certain profile or "looking the part" (possibly based on sex, gender or race), you increase your chances of success in this industry. This reminds me of other industries or institutions in South Africa. One that comes to mind is the South African army and the lack of recognised women in this institution. At this point I would like to reflect on my work on war and peacekeeping arguments made by the army. In this paper it was clear that the South African army has been struggling in terms of their recruitment. Between 2008 and 2009 the army was struggling because a lot of their soldiers were old and they needed 3000 new recruits, however, there seemed to be a reluctance to recruit women for the army. The Chief of the South African army made arguments in support of the army's recruitment procedures, by stating that the army would recruit the best people possible, this included people who did not just see the army as an employment opportunity. Those reading this statement made by the Chief got the sense that he was taking a responsible and logical stance. However I would argue that his argument is strategically delivered in order to protect the ethos of the South African army and his own ethos as the Chief of the army. I'm sure we can all deduce why there is a lack of women in the army. This is because the army is understood to be an institution that serves as the protectors of the nation, to be part of this institution means staring danger in the face at times and this is perceived to be best suited for men because they are masculine in nature, this is similar to the way that beauty is perceived to be best suited for women because they are emotional and nurturers by nature.

Similar observations to those made of the army can be made of the institutions of Science in South Africa. According to www.news24.com,[5] the government has been trying to encourage young women in South Africa to study Science as far back as 2005, where the Minister of Education Naledi Pandor made the argument that 41 percent of permanent academic staff members in Universities and Technicons were made up of females. Pandor emphasised that this figure marked "glass ceiling" inequalities because even though women made up to 50 percent of the staff at lecturer level and below, only 17 percent of professors were females.

The above argument from the Minister is a strong one as it is substantially backed up by statistics and figures. My problem with her argument is that nothing much has changed five years down the line, which leads me to believe that she (like other Ministers) use the platform that they have in the media to make public statements about critical issues, thereby appearing to take a matter seriously and in doing so protecting their ethos as

[5] http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/We-need-women-in-science-20050118

well as that of their departments. For me, it is clear that the reason why there is very little change is because Science has always been an industry that has been dominated by white males, because in Western ideals men were the "brains" and the bread winners while women looked after the home. In other words, similar to my experiences in the beauty industry, women do not fit the profile of this industry and therefore their chances of being successful are less than those who do fit this profile.

Conclusion

This paper has taken you through the difficulties I have faced as a black marketer in the South African beauty industry which is clearly dominated by white females. In this paper I have highlighted my background which has had an emphasis on what it means to be a man and the power that a man is supposed to have while I was growing up, this clearly had a rippling effect on the challenges and my understanding of my new working environment, as most of the beliefs in my new working environment contradicted those I have grown up with. The question I had posed to myself earlier in this paper was "Am I less of a man because I work as a young, black, marketer in the beauty industry in South Africa?" My answer is that even though I have had to conform to the new order of things because I work in an industry that requires one to be feminine instead of masculine at times and an industry where women are more powerful than men in most cases, this doesn't make me any less of a man. As I have mentioned in this paper, this is because I am still able to uphold my manhood in this industry in the ways that matter the most. These include being able to rise above all the difficulties of this beauty industry, to take all the opportunities it has given me and to be able to earn a living from it and to provide for my family. Growing up both at school and in the Xhosa culture one's ability to overcome times of difficulty and the ability to provide for one's loved ones was always and will probably always be viewed as masculine and manly. This is what I proudly tell those who question my manhood because of my profession. Having said that, I would advise women in similar situations, such as women in Science and the military to take the same approach, because I believe their ability to persevere in male dominated industries such as these is a true reflection of the strong women that they are.

Women writers' use of metaphor as gender rhetoric in discourse on HIV/AIDS and sex-related issues: The case of *Totanga Patsva (We start afresh*) by Zimbabwe Women Writers

Zifikile Gambahaya, Jairos Kangira and Pedzisayi Mashiri

1. Introduction[1]

This chapter, in the broad sense, deals with the relationship between language use and culture. Specifically, the chapter examines the type of language or linguistic expressions that a group of Zimbabwe women writers use in relation to HIV/AIDS and sex-related issues in their Shona short stories in the anthology *Totanga Patsva (We start afresh).*[2] The women writers in this anthology do not refer to HIV/AIDS and sex-related issues directly, but do so using metaphors to a large extent and similes, euphemisms and proverbs, to a less extent, hence this study's focus on metaphors. It is apparent from the language the women writers use in the short stories that Shona culture promotes indirectness.[3]

Culture is everything that "one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members".[4] We argue that cultural norms and conventions render some words taboo, thereby making it imperative for the women writers to use metaphors in their stories. The word 'taboo' is derived from the Tongan word *tabu* which means something that is forbidden or to be avoided,[5] hence we talk of linguistic avoidance. According to Mashiri, Mawomo and Tom, "[t]he Shona people consider matters relating to sex, death, illness or other misfortune as taboo or unspeakable".[6] In other words, Shona, like all languages,[7] has tabooed words and the communicators have to find words from their linguistic repertoire to replace the tabooed words. Before analysing specific instances of use of

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[1] A previous version of this paper appeared in *Nawa Journal of Language and Communication,* 1, 1 (2007).

[2] Zimbabwe Women Writers, *Totanga Patsva* (Harare: Zimbabwe Women Writers, 2006).

[3] P. Mashiri, K. Mawomo and P. Tom, "Naming the Pandemic and Ethical Foundations of Vocabulary", *Zambezia* 27, 1 (2002): 221-233.

[4] W. H. Goodenough, "Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics", in *Language and Cultural Description,* C. O. Frake ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980): 167-173.

[5] F. O. Aysis, *An Introduction to the Study of African Culture,* 2nd ed. (London: Heinemann, 1972): 91.

[6] Mashiri, Mawomo and Tom, *Zambezia*, 221.

[7] Hans Hendrich Hock, *Principles of Historical Linguistics* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991).

metaphor to express experiences with HIV/AIDS in selected short stories in *Totanga Patsva*, it is necessary to provide brief descriptions of key terms such as metaphor, rhetoric and rhetorical situation.

1.1 Metaphor

According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary a metaphor is defined as "the use of a word or phrase to indicate something different (though related in some way) to the literal meaning. Metaphors are used as the substitution of direct words which would have been regarded as disrespectful, offensive or taboo by a cultural group".[8] In other words, metaphors are the vehicles of indirectness, they are used to talk about things in a roundabout manner;[9] and thus "the reader has to consciously do something to discover its meaning",[10] since it is a "covert comparison".[11] According to Eckert and MacConnell-Ginet "a linguistic metaphor uses language from one field — (for example the sport of baseball — to talk about another different field — for example (hetero) sexual relations".[12] As already stated above, in Shona society, as is the case with other African societies in general, sex is a tabooed subject. Hence, speakers tend to use existing metaphors or create new ones where they are not readily available.

What is important to note is that the use of metaphors by members of a particular society presumes shared social knowledge of the language functions and norms[13] among members of that community. This means that the speakers of a language must acquire communicative competence[14] or "culturally appropriate communicative competence"[15] which enables them to perform all linguistic functions meaningfully. Since culture censors them through linguistic avoidance, people use metaphors, among other reasons, to avoid the loss of 'face'.[16] Hence, from a speech act point of view, expressing one's experiences with HIV/AIDS or sex directly, both in spoken and written discourse is considered a face-threatening act.[17] That the use of metaphors in

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[8] A. S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 780.

[9] R. Wardhaugh, *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics* (New York: Blackwell, 1986).

[10] J. C. Pongweni, *Figurative language in Shona discourse: A study of the Analogical Imagination* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1989).

[11] G. N. Leech, *Linguistic Guide to English Poetry* (London: Longman, 1969): 30.

[12] P. Eckert and S. MacConnell-Ginet, *Language and Gender* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 213.

[13] D. H. Hymes, "On Communicative Competence" in *Sociolinguistics: Selected readings,* ed. J. B. Pride and J. Holmes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

[14] Hymes, *Sociolinguistics*.

[15] F. Moto, "Towards a Study of the Lexicon of Sex and HIV/AID", *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13, 3 (2004): 342-362.

[16] K. Allan and K. Burridge, *Euphemism and Dyshemism: Language used in Shield and Weapon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[17] P. Brown and S. C. Levison, *Politeness: Universals in Language Usage* (Cambridge:

sex-related discourse is not unique to Shona society is clear from Eckert and MacConnell-Ginet, who commend that "sex and gender are widely available as metaphorical vehicles or source domains, not only for speakers of English but also for speakers of many other languages".[18]

1.2 Rhetoric

Although the term 'rhetoric' is usually associated with politicians, it is found in every sphere of life. For this reason, this study refers to the ways of speaking about HIV/AIDS and sex by women writers in *Totanga Patsva* as gender rhetoric. Rhetoric is defined for the purpose of this study, as the art of persuasive communication in a given situation. In other words, rhetoric refers to the use of language in communicating a theme or an idea in an effort to convince an audience. The major purpose of rhetoric is to convince people to act or think in the same way the communicator wants them to do. Each of the stories under study is rhetorical in its own way as it demonstrates generally, that promiscuity is the major source of HIV/AIDS and consequently of individual or group anguish and agony.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to delve into the details pertaining to the three types of rhetoric namely deliberative, epideictic and forensic rhetoric. We use the term rhetoric in its more generic sense in this chapter. However, it is necessary to give a brief background of the origin of rhetoric. Literature traces the origin of rhetoric as an art to the first century BC in ancient Greece. Rhetoric was then popularised by the Sophists or rhetoric teachers like Protagorous and Georgias in the fifth century BC. Ancient philosophers like Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle followed this period of the Sophists. These challenged the teachings of their predecessors and developed their own approaches to rhetoric. Whereas for Plato sophists do not care for the truth of an argument but only how they might appear to win it, according to Aristotle rhetoric is the "art of finding in any given case the available means of persuasion".[19] Aristotle described rhetoric as comprising three sources of persuasion, namely, *ethos* (the character of the speaker), *logos* (argumentation) and *pathos* (the emotions of the audience). In the analysed stories, each writer presents a *logos* through weaving her story and in that story the writer attempts to persuade the readers by appealing to both the *ethos* and *pathos* of the reader. This is done also by using the characters of the personae and their emotions in the stories.

The voices of the women writers in the stories in *Totanga Patsva* are not sentimental. The metaphors the women writers used depict the dangers of HIV/AIDS, the squashed hopes and the pain brought mainly by infidelity. In short, the women use metaphors to warn people and to transmit vital

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Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[18] Eckert and MacConnell-Ginet, *Language and Gender*, 215.

[19] E. Garver, *Rhetoric. Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Vol. 8* (London: Routledge, 1998): 307.

information about the AIDS pandemic. These metaphors seem to have a rhetorical impact on the reader as they appeal to the reader's *pathos* in various ways.

1.3 Rhetorical Situation

Since rhetoric is used in a particular situation, it is important to understand the rhetorical situation in which the women writers generated their short stories. According to Bitzer in Medhurst, a rhetorical situation is "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigency which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigency".[20]

In this case, the rhetorical situation in which the women writers found themselves comprises mainly the prevalence of the AIDS pandemic, infidelity and a culture that discourages the use of direct Shona words when talking about sex, a culture that results in self-censorship in talking about both AIDS and sex. In a largely patriarchal society the women writers' use of metaphors may also be explained by the fact that they may not want to be labelled as wayward. They do not want to lose their dignity and respect by using direct words on sex-related issues and therefore end up using metaphoric language which society considers as being more 'dignified' language than directness.

The stories in *Totanga Patsva* were written by women from different socio-economic backgrounds, from the simple rural woman to the modern urban woman. The importance of the rhetorical situation or context in the meaning interpretation of metaphors confirm what Richards observes when he says that "…any part of discourse, in the last resort, does what it does only because the other of surrounding, uttered or unuttered discourse, are what they are".[21] This means that both the urban and rural women share and are influenced by the same cultural milieu.

2. Selected Metaphors in *Totanga Patsva*

In this section we identify some of the common Shona words that the women writers used in the stories to connote sex and HIV/AIDS. The literal meanings of these words are also given to demonstrate how the metaphor is related to the words, as already has been established.

2.1 Verbs used to connote sex

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[20] M. J. Medhurst, *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996): 20.

[21] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936): 10.

Word	**Meaning**
kujuruja	to harvest (termites)
kudziura	to open
kudya	to eat
kupakwa	to be forced to eat
kupona	to survive
kuseva	to dip morsel in relish/soup
kunonga joy	to enjoy
kuwanza	to have many (sexual partners)
kupinda nedzakawanda	to do many (dirty) things
kufara	to be happy
kufarana	to be happy with each other (reciprocal)
kuti hande	to say let's go (and have sex)

2.2 Nouns used to name HIV/AIDS

Noun	**Meaning**
majuru	termites
mbonje	scar
masvosve	ants
nyuchi dzegonera	wild bees
zviriko izvi/zvemazuva ano izvozvi	contemporary issues
tsvina	faeces/dirt
rutsva	veld fire
ngwena	crocodile

2.3 Verbs used to name HIV/AIDS

Verb	**Meaning**
kuroyiwa	to have been bewitched
kurohwa nematsotsi	to have been attacked by thieves
kurwara nguva ndefu	to have been ill for a long time
kurwara nguva pfupi	to have been ill for a short time
kubayiwa nepfumo	to have been stabbed by a spear
kuruma	to bite

Similarly, Eckert and MacConnell-Ginet discuss English metaphors that depict sexual related actions and feelings, some of which we list below:

> "…scored; …screw; …bang; …steamy; …sex; …burning up; …hunger; …appetites; …devour; …taste; …eat; …good as honey; …flavour; …she burns; …she roasts; …look at that oven; …She is cold".[22]

[22] Eckert and MacConnell-Ginet, *Language and Gender*, 220-224.

3 Functional analysis of the metaphors

This section presents analyses of the metaphors that women writers use in their stories. We shall begin by giving a detailed analysis of the metaphors in Shirley Gumbodete's story "Ndofireyi senge ndini ndakajuruja" (Why should I die as if I am the one who brought the Aids virus?) as we consider this to be a model of how metaphors are used in talking about sex and AIDS in this anthology. This story is unique in that metaphorical language is used appropriately from the beginning to the end. This is probably why the editor of the anthology made it the first story of the anthology. After this we attempt to group similar metaphors and related terms.

3.1 Model

In the story "Ndofireyi senge Ndini Ndakajuruja" the author uses the metaphors *kujuruja* "to harvest" (termites), *tidye* "let's eat" and *kupakwa* "to be forced to eat", all the three connoting the act of having (unprotected) sex. Termites are harvested by pushing a thin reed in and out of a termite hole. The termites swarm the reed resulting in a catch. In this story, the reed (not mentioned but understood from the verb — *juruja*) which symbolises a penis that is inserted and moved in and out of *kujuruja* (sexual intercourse) of the termites hole (the vagina) and gets infected by *majuru* (HIV virus). That the horrific experience resulting from contracting the HIV virus can be compared with the pain inflicted by termite bites is clear in Chimhundu's definition of a termite in his monolingual Shona dictionary *Duramazwi guru reChiShona*: "Juru kachinanairwa kakada kuita sesvosve, kane musoro mutsvuku nenyanga dzakatesva dzinoruma…"[23] (A termite is a crawling insect similar to an ant. It has a red head with sharp teeth that it uses for biting…).

The writer talks of Kurauone (the husband of the wife in the story) having arrived at an anthill to harvest *majuru* (*wasvika pachuru kunojuruja majururu*) meaning that Kuraoune has visited his mistress (*nhonho*) in order to have sex with her. The description of how Kurauone contracts the HIV virus is vividly put across metaphorically as follows:

> *nhonho yake aiwana iripo ndiye dziure nhonho iya otanga kujuruja majuru ake*
> (Lit. "He finds his hole and he opens the hole and begins to harvest his termites").
> "He begins to have sex with his mistress".
>
> *gaba rake tubu razara*
> (Lit. "He fills his tin with termites").
> "He is now infected with the HIV virus".

The way Kurauone demands to have sex with his wife back home

[23] H. Chimhundu, ed., *Duramazwi Guru ReChiShona* (Harare: College Press, 2001): 415.

shows the vulnerability of women. He says to his wife, "*Iwe Mazviitireni, huya tidye majuru*" (Lit. "Mazviitireni, let's eat the termites" meaning "Let's have sex"). Knowing the promiscuous behaviour of her husband Mazviitireni refuses to have sex with him arguing that it is not safe for her to do so:

> "*Handidye majuru ako ini? ...Ndofireyi senge ndini ndakaenda kunojuruja*?"
> (Lit. "I don't want to eat your termites. Why should I die as if I am the one who went to harvest them?")
> "I don't want to have sex with you. Why should I die as if I am the one who brought the AIDS virus?"

The author gives us a picture where the husband insists on having sex with his wife despite the wife's strong refusal as shown below:

> Husband: *"Ndati uya tidye majuru"*
> (Lit. "I said let's eat the termites").
> "We will have sex no matter what comes".
>
> Wife: "*Maiwe, maiwe ndofireyi senge ndini ndakajuruja*"
> (Lit. "Why should I die as if I am the one who went to collect the termites?"
> "Why should I die as if I am the one who brought the AIDS virus?"

The wife is finally raped (*Mukadzi opakwa majuru* literally meaning "the husband forces the wife to eat the termites"). The author illustrates the gravity of the matter by saying that the woman is raped everyday:

> *Zuva nezuva majuru ongodyiswa.*
> (Lit. "Every day the wife is forced to eat the termites").
> "The wife is raped/(forced to have sex) every day".

When the Kurauone falls ill and his wife suggests that he goes for AIDS testing he refuses, saying all that is women's talk gotten from their social clubs. The writer uses a Shona proverb *rega zvipore akaonekwa nembonje pahuma* ("Experience is the best teacher"), to indicate that Kurauone refuses to go for AIDS testing because he knows that he is likely to test positive. The author dramatises Kurauone's deteriorating health when she says:

> *Majuru akati, "Unopenga, isu tinongoruma chete".*
> (Lit. "The termites continued biting Kurauone").
> Kurauone's health continued to deteriorate.

When Kurauone dies, his grandfather Mandizadza mourns saying:

> *Ndakakutaurira Kurauone kuti gumbo mumba gumbo panze zvinouraya*:
> (Lit. "I told you Kurauone that having one leg in the house and the other outside is dangerous").
> "Kurauone, I told you that promiscuity kills".

Promiscuity is implied in the proverb *gumbo mumba gumbo panze* which literally means "one leg in the house and the other leg outside". It is important also to note the meaning of the name of Kurauone's grandfather, *Mandizadza* which literally means "you have spread (AIDS) to me". It is the wife's voice heard in the name, complaining that she has contracted AIDS because of her husband's promiscuity. Even the name Mazviitireni (you have done this to fix me) speaks volumes. The author deliberately uses this name to depict a woman who is saying "you (my husband) have deliberately infected me with the deadly disease".

At the end of the story the wife also dies complaining *Ndofireyi senge ndini ndakajuruja*? "Why I should I die as if I am the one who brought the AIDS virus?" The author uses this rhetorical question to illustrate that the wife in this story is innocent; she is a victim of circumstances.

Two related issues derive from the discourse in this story. First, the writer portrays the painful reality that married women often become victims of AIDS from their promiscuous husbands as well as victims of marital rape. In the absence of legal instruments that protect women against marital rape innocent women continue being casualties of a socio-cultural system that socialises women to be loyal, faithful and obedient to their husbands. Second, it is clear from the story that the asymmetrical power relations between husband and wife makes it difficult for the later to convince the former to go for an AIDS test. The woman is therefore depicted as helpless. Hence, the image of a helpless woman ravaged by AIDS "has potential to reinforce the erroneous belief that women are passive actors in the national efforts to fight AIDS".[24]

3.2 Quenching sexual hunger

In the story, "Mukore Uno here?" (Not in this time) Chateuka satirises Shona men who still want to practice the *kugara nhaka* custom (wife inheritance after the death of a brother) in spite of the risks posed by AIDS. In most Shona communities a man (married or not married) can inherit the wife of his deceased older brother. However, it is not uncommon for a woman to experience sexual advances or harassment from any of her husband's brothers during her husband's illness, especially where the illness is prolonged and terminal. Such advances are often instigated under the pretext of protecting the brother's marriage by fulfilling his conjugal obligations on his behalf or discouraging the sexually deprived wife from sleeping with an outsider. The concept of *kugara nhaka* is based on the same reasons, often expressed in various ways. Gundani says "This form of marriage was also meant to maintain family stability in terms of the movement of the estate, as well as the purity of the clan. Shona marriage was meant to ensure that the

[24] M.T. Vambe and A. Mawadza "Images of Black Women in Popular Songs and Some Poems on AIDS in Post-Independent Zimbabwe" in *Orality and Cultural identities in Zimbabwe*, ed. M.T. Vambe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 2001): 57-72.

bereaved wife would remain loyal to the family into which she had been married".[25]

HIV/AIDS has forced most Zimbabwean families to abandon the *nhaka* custom and many gender or women activist organisations actively sensitise society in general and women in particular, of risks posed by the custom. Chateuka portrays a man who despite the knowledge that his older brother is dying from AIDS makes sexual advances towards his wife in the name of *kumuponesa* (satisfying her sexual needs on behalf of his ailing brother). Hence the statement:

> *mukoma arwara kwenguva refu saka muri kupona nei?*
> (Lit. "My brother has been ill for a long time, so how do you survive?")
> My brother has been ill for a long time so how do you satisfy your physiological needs?[26]

In Shona idiomatic speech and slang, sexual intercourse is portrayed as consumption. The man is often depicted as the doer, '*anodya*' (one who eats) and the woman is the one who is 'done' (*anodyiwa*). Chimhundu says "the language is so structured that activities relating to courtship, marriage and sex are described in the expressions in which the men are the subjects who 'Do' and the women are the objects who are 'Done'".[27] The man's subject role is reflected in the manner in which he is able to satisfy (*kuponesa*) his wife sexually.

Because of the embarrassing nature of a sexual advance, especially towards a sick brother's wife, the metaphor *kupona* serves to save both the speaker and the listener's face. The metaphor serves two functions. One, it denigrates the patriarchal attitude of using cultural practices to control and manipulate the sexual behaviour of women. Two, it caricatures men who perpetuate practices that promote the spread of HIV, since the one who is making sexual advances could be married already. Hence, the 'inheritor' exposes not only himself, but his own wife and any unborn children as his ailing brother's wife would most likely be infected also.

Elizabeth Zembeni uses the expression *kurarama* (to survive) implying sexual satisfaction, in the story "Murume zvaafa", ndorarama sei? (Since my husband has died, how do I satisfy my physiological needs?) The female character asks a rhetorical question:

> Zvino murume zvaafa, ndorarama sei, nhai Mwari?
> (Lit. "Since my husband has died, how do I survive, God?")
> Who will satisfy my sexual needs since my husband is dead, God?

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[25] P. Gundani, "Continuity and change in the Zimbabwean religio-cultural landscape in the era of HIV/AIDS" in *Zimbabwe: The past is the future: Rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis,* ed. D. Harold-Barry (Harare: Weaver Press, 2004): 86-105.

[26] Zimbabwe Women Writers, *Totanga Patsva,* 17.

[27] Chimundu, *Duramazwi Guru ReChiShona,* 5.

The author addresses the emotional challenges women face after losing their husbands to AIDS or AIDS related diseases. The challenge often involves the need to satisfy sexual needs and to avoid getting infected or infecting someone else, especially in the context of a generally negative attitude towards use of condoms among Zimbabwean men. The use of *kurarama* or *kupona,* both referring to satisfying sexual needs, is appropriate in the contexts since the characters in the stories cannot directly put across their concerns as Shona culture does not expect women to overtly express their sexual feelings.

3.3 Happiness and sex discourse

The universality of the concept of happiness is striking in women sex discourse in this short story anthology. Georgina Samhu in "Tete Teresa" (Aunt Teresa) alludes to *kufara* "to be happy" when she uses the term *kudya nyika rutivi* literally meaning "to enjoy earthly pleasures". The female character in the story uses this metaphor to mean that she was very happy and had many sexual partners before she contracted the AIDS virus. Similarly, Resi Mafongoya in "Angave Ani?" (Who can it be?) uses the word *kufara* to describe having sex. She seems to be gender sensitive as she makes her character use the term in a manner that portrays the reciprocity in the act of having sex. This is demonstrated in the following:

tofarana zvedu tiri vaviri
(Lit. "The two of us enjoying each other".)
"Then we would have sex".

Carona Chikwereveshe in "Zvakatanga nekupindwa nechando" (The illness started with me feeling very cold) also uses the same metaphor when the female character in the story reminiscences about her sexual relations. The character recollects:

Kufara ndakambofara hangu veduwe
(Lit. "I was very happy").
I had many sexual partners/I was promiscuous.

The use of colloquial language is in some cases effective depending on the communicative context. In the story "Pfira mate pasi" (Stop being promiscuous), Beauty Savala uses some colloquial metaphors to describe having many sexual partners and enjoying herself. A typical example is when the female persona talks of *kunonga joy sechakata* (lit. "to enjoy like picking *chakata* (juicy wild fruit), meaning "enjoying oneself with many sexual partners". We are given a picture of one who becomes happy upon finding the juicy *chakata* fruits in the forest (of sexual partners) and who begins to enjoy eating them.

The terms *kufara* and *kunonga joy* have positive lexical meaning but negative connotative meaning. While the lexical meaning refers to the conceptual reference of an item, the connotative meaning is "the semantic

content a linguistic expression may have of all those connotations which an individual language user may attach to it".[28] When *kufara* or *joy,* are used in the context of promiscuity to refer to moral perversion and uncontrolled self-destructive happiness, they index the speaker's desire to mitigate the pain caused by the consequences of the destructive behaviour. The use of such slang expressions as *kunonga joy* reflects the general tendency of Zimbabweans, especially in the early eighties, to laugh off HIV when the discovery of the new virus was announced. During that time, says Gundani, "rumours of the disease neither disturbed the regular revellers who patronised the trendy night clubs of Zimbabwe's towns, the popular beerhalls and shebeens that infest the 'locations' in the urban centres and growth points in rural areas".[29]

3.4 'Eating' sexually

In section 3.1.1 we showed how Gumbodete effectively uses the metaphor *dya* "eat" to describe the act of having sex. In this section we return to the same metaphor and its related senses, citing how they have been used by other writers in the anthology. Moto observes that, "the physiological and psychological need to have sex has at times been compared to the body's requirements to be replenished with food from time to time".[30] Elen Chiramba in "Dzinoruma" (They bite) captures how men usually describe women they consider to be very good sexual partners because of their physical build or shape. They use the metaphor *dya,* "eat", as if they are describing a sumptuous meal: Consider this example from Chiramba:

> *Inga vamwe vanodya havo shamwari*
> (Lit. "Surely some men eat (good food), my friend").
> Some men really enjoy having sex (with such a good woman).

Such remarks as *Inga vamwe vanodya havo* are common in male Shona sex discourse and they are usually unsolicited street remarks which, more often than not, are offensive.

Ruby Magosvongwe employs some cynical humour in her story "Chaita Musoro Uteme" (What has caused the headache). She likens having casual sex to having only one morsel of sadza[31] 'dipped' in a plate of relish. Although she does not mention the word sadza in her story, the word *kuseva* ('to dip') collocates with sadza and refers to the act of eating, at least from the Shona culture. Her main male character cannot believe that the only one time he had casual sex could have been the cause of the illness he now suffers or believes he suffers from. He complains to himself:

> *ndakaseva kamwe chete*
> (Lit. "I dipped (the sadza morsel in the relish) only once").

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[28] Leech, *Linguistic Guide to English Poetry* , 12.
[29] Gundani, *Zimbabwe: The past is the future,* 87.
[30] Moto, *Nordic Journal of African Studies,* 16.
[31] Maize porridge cooked until stiff and wieldy [Editor's note].

I had casual sex only once.

and

kamwe chete ndiko kangandibayise nepfumo rerufu here?
(Lit. "Is it true that doing it only once can bring death?")
Is it true/fair that having casual sex only once can make me contract the deadly AIDS disease?

The persona here is concerned about the frequency of having casual sex and to him having done it only once (*kuseva kamwe*) does not justify the punishment of contracting (*kundibayisa* "to have me stabbed") the AIDS virus (*pfumo rerufu* "spear of death"). To him this is unfair because he knows *varidzi vetsoro* (lit. "the experts of the game"), the promiscuous, who most probably are not ill. It is the comparison that the character makes of oneself and *varidzi vetsoro* that brings about the cynical humour in this story.

Magosvongwe goes on to use the metaphor *rutsva* "bush fire" to describe AIDS as in *kupunyuka murutsva* (lit. "to escape narrowly from a bushfire"), "having a close shave" and *handichateyizve mariva murutsva* (lit. "I will never set mouse traps in the bushfire"), "I will never have casual sex again". She also draws the reader's attention to the deadliness of AIDS by referring to AIDS as *ngwena,* "crocodile":

.Munoti kutakura ngwena huida
(Lit. "No one likes carrying a crocodile").
No one likes having AIDS.

The polysemous nature of *dya,* "eat", is also found in "Hamburamakaka" (A huge man) by Beauty Savala. Describing how the two lovers in the story spent one night together, Savala writes:

Vakadya rudo rwavo kusvika kwaedza
(Lit. "They ate their love until the morning").
They had sex until morning.

When the male character dies of AIDS, the author uses the metaphor a*kati sarai mudye* (lit. "he bade them farewell") meaning "he died". This is a more polite way of saying someone died among the Shona.

In "Munhu Munhu" (Do not be fooled by outward appearance) by Ennet Ndhlovu, the metaphor *dya* also pertains as it is used in the following sentence:

Ainge (Petros) adya muchero wepakati akakoromora mukoko une nyuchi dzegonera
(Lit. "He had eaten the forbidden fruit and had disturbed wildly stinging bees from their hive".
He had had unprotected sex and had contracted the AIDS virus.

By using the phrase *muchero wepakati* 'the forbidden fruit" the author alludes to the biblical story of Adam and Eve. The intended message is that it is morally wrong to "eat" the forbidden fruit, especially when one ends

up in danger by contracting AIDS (*nyuchi dzegonera*). The effectiveness of using the metaphor *nyuchi dzegonera* (wildly stinging bees) to refer to HIV/AIDS cannot be questioned. The expression shows the devouring and inexorable nature of AIDS. Ndhlovu goes on to describe how the HIV virus was destroying Petros from within. In the following examples the author shows that outward appearance may not immediately show that someone is infected with AIDS:

> *guyu kutsvukira kunze mukati muzere masvosve*
> (Lit. "a ripe and attractive fig but with ants inside")
> Outward appearance (in this case Petros') did not show that he had AIDS.

The metaphor used here of an attractive *guyu* "fig", which has *masvosve* "ants", gives a vivid picture of how people may be fooled by the good and inviting outward appearance of sexual partners without realising that they have AIDS. In reality ants do eat and damage figs from inside even though this image is used to describe how the AIDS virus destroyed the infected from within. The author emphasises this point by further noting:

> *masvosve mukati meguyu anga achifenga mukati mose*
> (Lit. "Ants had been damaging the fig from inside").
> The AIDS virus has been destroying his immunity.

To illustrate that most people usually remain silent about their HIV status, Ndhlovu uses a common metaphor in Shona which is in the form of a proverb. It goes like this:

> *chinoziva ivhu kuti mwana wembeva anorwara*
> (Lit. "It's the soil which knows that the child of the mouse is ill".
> "It is an individual who knows his/her own secret". (In this case, Pestros knew that he was HIV positive, but never told anyone.)

The use of the metaphor 'small house' in this story gives the impression that it is becoming more accepted in Shona discourse to denote a man's mistress or secret sexual partner. The use of the term 'small house' whose associative meaning differs from its lexical meaning is a way of legitimising promiscuity and accepting HIV as inevitable. The attitude to take the problem of HIV/AIDS casually is also evident in the several cynical jokes about the disease that abound among the urbanised ghetto people in Zimbabwe.[32]

3.5 Muck

One of the favourite metaphors that Shona speakers use to describe bad things is *ndove* "muck". Hornby defines muck as "excrement of farm animals, especially used for fertilising" usually used to refer to "dirt, filth or something

[32] Gundani, *Zimbabwe: The past is the future,* 88.

disgusting".[33] In the story "Dzinoruma" (It pains) Ellen Chiramba uses the metaphor *ndove* to refer to AIDS in *hupenyu hwave mundove* which literally means "My life is stuck in muck". The picture of the persona's "life being stuck in muck" is likely to conscientise the reader to the dangers of promiscuity. Related to this metaphor, we find Dream Sithole referring to prostitution contrastively as *basa* "job" and *tsvina* "faeces" in her story "Chakandidya" (That which caused my suffering). The first metaphor lessens the gravity of prostitution and is in line with the gender sensitive use of the euphemism "sex worker" when referring to a prostitute in English. Sithole's female character remarks:

> *Basa riya randaiiita raindibhadhara zvokuti ndakanga ndisingafungi kana zvokutsvaka rimwe basa*
> (Lit. "The job I was doing was so well paying that I did not think of looking for another job").
> Prostitution paid me so well that I did not think of another job.

The second metaphor *tsvina* "faeces" is the antithesis of the first metaphor *basa* "job". This is brought out clearly when the same character regrets what she used to do and says she would not repeat her mistakes (*tsvina* "faeces") if she was given a second chance in life. She bemoans:

> *kana zvainzi upenyu hunodzokorodzwa ndanga ndisingaiti tsvina yakadai.*
> (Lit. "I would not play with faeces if I had a chance for another life").
> I would not be promiscuous if had another chance to live again.

There is a close similarity between *ndove* and *tsvina* in the ways they are used in these two stories.

3.6 Other indirect terms of maintaining face

This section deals with other forms of indirect language that is used in the stories for the sake of maintaining politeness. As already noted in some stories, Chateuka does not directly call the pandemic by its name. She uses a number of metaphors which are in line with the generality of the findings of this study. She notes that people often use the following terms when talking about the disease:

> *varwara kwenguva ndefu kana pfupi*
> (Lit. "He/she has been ill for a long or short time").
> He/She is suffering from AIDS.

or

> *ndizvo zviriko izvi*
> (Lit. "current issues").
> AIDS

or

[33] Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,* 813.

Akaroyiwa
(Lit. "He/she was bewitched").
He is suffering from AIDS.

or

akarohwa nematsotsi
(Lit. "He/She was beaten by thieves").
He/She is suffering from AIDS.

The metaphor *chiredzo* "hook" brings about the non-selective behaviours of both men and women who have many sexual partners. This is clearly demonstrated in "Hazviitwe zviya vasikana" (Never do it) by Synodia Mufukari. The female persona in this story says:

Ini ndainge chiredzo chaingoda chero zvayo hove mudziva
(Lit. "I was like a hook which could catch any kind of fish").
I slept with many sexual partners/I was promiscuous.

Further still, Mufukari's persona does not want to say directly that she had been promiscuous in her life, but uses the metaphor *kupinda nedzakawandawanda* literally "to have been involved in many bad dealings". This metaphor is another shade of the common Shona metaphor *kupinda-pinda* which means "having many sexual partners". Having many sexual partners is what Carona Chikwereveshe in *Zvakatanga nekupindwa nechando* colloquially refers to as having "maregular customers", a term borrowed from Zimbabwean English for Business Purposes. She says about the many sexual partners:

*vakange ave ma*regular customers
(Lit. "They had become my regular customers").
They were now my regular sexual partners.

So when she contracts the disease she cannot tell who of the "*ma*regular customers" had passed it on to her. Thus, she pays the price for being promiscuous. Promiscuity is also referred to as *kuwanza* "having many sexual partners" by Beauty Savala in "Pfira mate pasi" (Stop being promiscuous) in which she also warns people to stop having many sexual partners *(zvekuwanza pfira mate pasi*).

When people say *hande* or *handei* in Shona, they mean "Let's go". The word *hande* is used metaphorically in this story to mean "Let's have sex". The female persona here describes how, after contracting AIDS, she no longer attracted sexual partners as no man wanted to go out with her:

hapana akamboda kuti hande
(Lit. "No one asked me to go with him").
I did not attract sexual clients.

Samhu also uses the word *pereka* "to give" to refer to the willingness with which the female character gave herself to her sexual partner when she says:

Ndakapereka feya-feya pasina kondomu
(Lit. "I gave him without a condom").
I had sex without using a condom.

The term *pereka feya-feya* (to give herself freely/abundantly) gives a picture of a person who does not have much concern about the consequences of what she is doing. To show that the situation she had created for herself was irreversible, the author describes it as *chakabaya chikatyokera* and *hakuna munamato seri kweguva* which both mean that "Once one gets the HIV virus, she cannot change her status". The author uses two proverbs metaphorically to send the message that AIDS is incurable.

Sarudzai Ndamba in "Goremucheche" (One who does not accept the she/he is old) warns readers about the deadly disease by using a proverb c*hisi hachiyeri musi wacharimwa,* which means here "AIDS symptoms do not show promptly". In other words, the author is sending the message that people should not be fooled by outward appearance. In this story, the author also uses the common phrase *kuita flu* "to have flu" to refer to AIDS.

Different metaphors are used to refer to promiscuity or insatiable sexual appetite among the Shona. One such metaphor which Chiramba uses to describe Thomas' promiscuous behaviour in the story is *akatemerwa chitemo chaicho*. *Kutemerwa chitemo chaicho* suggests that Thomas' sexual desire is abnormal; it appears to have been an induced desire, like someone who has taken an aphrodisiac. He goes beyond what is culturally accepted as normal as far as sexual desire is concerned.

Pelagia Kaseke in "Tikaramba takadaro, tinokunda" (We shall conquer the effects of the pandemic if remain resolute) uses the word *moto* "fire" to connote AIDS. In her narrative of how she contracted the disease, the female character in the story remarks:

Ndainge ndazvisikira moto muziso
(Lit. "I had put fire in my eyes").
I had caused trouble for myself.

Describing how promiscuous her sexual partner was, the female character gives the reader a picture of a male dog. She says:

Kana imbwa hono hayaidaro
(Lit. "Even a male dog did not behave like that").
He was very promiscuous.

To lessen the gravity of the reality of testing HIV positive, the female character accepts her fate using the metaphor *denga rainge randiseka*, literally meaning "the heavens had mocked me". She seems to suggest that

there is nothing she would have done because it had been allowed to happen by some power beyond her control, probably by God. And when she and her husband try to come to terms with the disease, they blame each other, *kunakuriranany**o**ka mhenyu*, literally meaning "to throw a live snake at each other". The use of other ailments or diseases to refer to AIDS is common in order to maintain face. We see Sharai Ndlovu in "Ndinokurangarira" (I remember you) using *marariya* "malaria" to refer to AIDS in *kurwara nemarariya* "to suffer from malaria". Eresia Hwede describes the AIDS pandemic as *mhindo* "pitch darkness" in her story titled "Mhindo, mhindo, mhindo" (Aids pandemic). This is not normal darkness, but that kind of darkness that is associated with heavy cloud cover. The repetition of *mhindo* throughout the story is used to reinforce the seriousness of the disease. *Mhindo* frightens at night and no one wants to walk in it. So does AIDS. She also refers to the disease as *zvemazuva ano izvozvi* "contemporary issues", now a common term used in Shona discourse related to HIV/AIDS.

4. Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that Shona culture places restrictions on direct communication in matters concerning AIDS and sex because such direct communication is considered as taboo. This has been done through exploring different metaphors and other idiomatic expressions that women writers use in writing about AIDS and sex in different stories on the two subjects.

It is clear from the discourse women use in the stories that existing metaphors and new ones have been used to communicate rhetorical messages on AIDS and sex. Both categories of metaphors have been largely drawn from the linguistic repertoire of the Shona people, thereby making it easy to interpret meaning. In other words, these indirect linguistic devices or figurative expressions do make sense because of the communicative competence speakers of the Shona language share. In sum, the study confirms the symmetrical relationship between language and culture.

The contexts in which the metaphors are used in the short stories make it easy for Shona speakers to decipher the meanings. The discussion presented in this article has also offered insights into attitudes towards HIV/AIDS and sex and the implications of cultural values, beliefs and customs and gender asymmetry on HIV/AIDS prevalence and prevention in Zimbabwe.

Rhetoric and gender mainstreaming in South African Justice

Bridget Kwinda

> "As long as women are bound by poverty and as long as they are looked down upon, human rights will lack substance. As long as outmoded ways of thinking prevent women from making a meaningful contribution to society, progress will be slow. As long as the nation refuses to acknowledge the equal role of more than half of itself, it is doomed to failure".[1]

The South African 'miracle' and the new democratic State was applauded by the International Community and came into being burdened with a variety of inequalities and imbalances which it had to overcome in order to achieve the entrenchment and consolidation of democracy. Women realized they had to promptly find their voice and carve out an identity at the dawn of the new democratic political order. Since most African nations have thanked women for their participation in liberation[2] and promptly sent them back to the kitchen, South African women have had to work hard to actualise the promises made by the male leaders of the democracy movement. Indeed, they have continued to redefine[3] leadership, feminism and power on their own terms and in their own cultural contexts. First, they are fighting *alongside* their male counterparts[4] to gain freedom and democracy for their nation. Second, they are struggling *against* their male counterparts to gain acceptance and equality and to challenge the restrictive conditions of patriarchy. The presence, identity, and the loud voice that women created for themselves, allowed them to win recognition within the process of the transition to democracy. This power led to the development of a multiparty coalition[5] focused on securing a place for gender equality in the national constitution and ensured the pursuit of affirmative-action measures in the recruitment of women for national office. This paper examines the issue of gender mainstreaming in a three-fold manner, firstly; the professionals in the justice profession, legal practitioners such as attorneys and women on the bench, are gender quota's being met and do these women have successful satisfying careers. Secondly, the paper looks at women and their engagement with the justice system. Thirdly the paper will examine the role of the regulatory, advisory, and monitory and watch dog bodies which preside over

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[1] Speech by Nelson Mandela on SA Women's Day, Pretoria, 9 August 1996: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1996/sp0809.html

[2] H.E. Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance* (USA: University of Illinois Press, 2005): 27.

[3] Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament,* 27.

[4] Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament,* 27.

[5] Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament,* 32.

the Justice system. These three angles will be explored by unpacking the concept of voice, active voice, passive voice, the voice of women within the justice system, and the voice of women engaging the system. The issue of how women's advocacy groups use the persuasive tools of political nostalgia and collective memory to champion their cause will also be explored. The paper will examine the issue of Rhetorical Performances and the Burkean concept of ordinary and pure persuasion. Finally the paper will briefly touch on the architecture of the Constitutional Court building known as Constitutional hill and the issue of visual rhetoric.

Voice, political nostalgia, collective memory, ordinary & pure persuasion: professional women within the justice system

The recognition of anti-gender discrimination legislation in any new political dispensation should be firstly evident in the influence women have on the election legislation. However, Britton states that the first piece of legislation that women showcased their influence in South Africa was on the Constitution.[6] South Africa's Constitution has one of the broadest and most inclusive anti-discrimination clauses in the world. Their voice echoes loud throughout the Constitution. The justice system, in a democracy can be viewed as a body that provides a voice to members of society deemed voiceless, thus it becomes imperative to explore if those operating within the system have a voice.

According to the National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report[7] conducted in 2008, women constitute forty percent of the Attorney's in private practice. However, only thirty-two point two percent (32.2%) of the equity partners and thirty-six point nine percent (36.9%) of the salaried partners are women. On the other hand more than half of the Senior Associates and Associates are women. Similarly, more than ninety percent (90%) of attorneys' practices are owned by either men only or women only. Two thirds, sixty-seven percent (67%) are owned by men only and only twenty four percent (24%) by women. In the nine percent (9%) of firms with male and female ownership, men hold on average sixty percent (60%) of the shares. The report was also able to identify that female lawyers do not practice in the more lucrative fields of law. The report was unable to explore why this is so. The report was able to bring to light that there are a significant number of women in the private sector in the justice system; however, there

[6] Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament,* 40.

[7] Frederico Freschi, *"*Post apartheid Publics and the Politics of Ornament: Nationalism, Identity, and the Rhetoric of Community in the Decorative Program of the New Constitutional Court*", National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report* (South Africa: Law Society of South Africa, 17 September 2008): vii.

is an attrition of these women from the profession. The women who are practicing in the public sector, being state prosecutors, attorneys from the Legal Aid Board, and the Judiciary, still continue to be under-represented. Within the Magistracy[8] the situation is even direr at the senior echelon and particularly at the regional and superior court levels. These professionals are prevented from having successful and fulfilling careers by budget shortages which affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal process.

The National Survey on Attorney's brings to light that Women working within the Justice system do not have a voice. The attrition of women in the profession is as a result of the lack of gender mainstreaming and of avenues allowing their voices to be heard. Those who successfully enter the profession face additional obstacles with regard to finding sufficiently challenging and rewarding work, not only to sustain their practices, but to help them grow financially and professionally.[9] Bodies such as the Law Society of South Africa, the various provincial Law Societies located in each province, the South African Law Reform Commission and the Chapter Nine Institutions such as the Commission on Gender Equality, whose mandate is to transform, empower, regulate, and ensure development within the profession often operate in isolation from each other. A synergy needs to be created, facilitated, monitored and evaluated between the above mentioned institutions in order to ensure that gender mainstreaming indeed takes places.

The voice of South African women in the justice system can be categorised into two forms, the active voice and the passive voice. Through both forms, women's advocacy positions are constantly clear and persuasive. Advocacy groups make use of political nostalgia and collective memory to evoke emotions by referring to the Women of 1956, who challenged the previous regime by demonstrating against pass laws by organizing a peaceful march to the seat of administration at the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Collective memory is by definition partial and material in its communication and demarcation of the past. Collective memory is pieced together like a mosaic with some memories having greater or lesser resonance than others.[10] Those memories moreover have material consequence as they are expressed by narratives and embodied in particular individuals or objectives. This use of political nostalgia is persuasive, as the memory of the women of 1956 is a shared and collective memory, which evokes a sense of patriotism.

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[8] Mr. Andries Nel, South African Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, address during the debate on budget vote 23: Justice and Constitutional Development, National Council of Provinces, Cape Town, 25 May 2010: www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/10052812051002.htm

[9] Mrs. P. Mlambo–Ngcuka, Deputy President of South Africa, speech delivered at a Gala Dinner for the Launch of a Training Programme for Aspirant Women Judges, Johannesburg, 16 August 2007: www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07081717151002.htm

[10] Shawn J. and Trevor Parry-Giles, "Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia, and the Rhetorical Presidency: Bill Clinton's Commemoration of the March on Washington", *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 86, 4(2000): 418.

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Advocacy groups also ensure that their public deliberation and texts used utilized the ethos carried by the slogan "*Wathinta' Abafazi, wathint' imbokodo"* loosely translated as "*you strike a woman you strike a rock*". The use of this phrase was carefully thought out, owing to the symbolism of the *imbokodo*, a grinding stone used to grind and crush mealies. The slogan is a powerful collective memory, as it symbolised a turning point for women and how they viewed their role in the liberation struggle. The active voice, echoed loudly with the elections in 1994, the Interim Constitution in 1995, the Beijing Declaration in 1995, the Constitution in 1999 and the Gender Policy Statement in 1999. The advocacy positions were clear and persuasive. The active voice of women in the public sector in the justice system is loud within the lower courts whereby there is a significant number of women as State Prosecutors, Legal Aid Attorney's, and Magistrates. The passive voice is found mainly in the private sector of the justice system where women form a significant group but their voices do not echo loudly enough.

The regulatory bodies, the Law Society South Africa, the various provincial Law Societies located in each province, the South African Law Reform Commission and the Chapter Nine Institutions such as the Commission on Gender Equality, the South African Women in Law Association, for professionals within the justice system can be viewed as rhetorical interventions. The paper will explore the concept of rhetorical interventions by applying the Burke notion of ordinary and pure persuasion. Burke's definition of persuasion and rhetoric was broad, he believed that whenever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric, and wherever there is Meaning, there is persuasion.

If Burke's definition of rhetoric and persuasion is applied, it can be stated that the gender mainstreaming agenda in the South African Justice system utilizes the ordinary and pure persuasion categories of persuasion as rhetorical tools through the regulatory bodies found in the profession. The Law Society for example, is the mother body of all provincial law societies with which all attorneys, whether in the private or public sector are registered. It seeks to empower Attorneys through training and professional development and to ensure that the profession is ethical and competent. Yet this entity falls short of protecting women from pursuing succeful satisfying carreers, by ensuring that there is not a continued attrition of women in the profession, and that women's salary packages are equal and on a par with their male counterparts'. The South African Women in Law Association seeks to achieve empowerment and gender equality for women in the legal profession and to ensure that and that the work they conduct is rewarding, yet within the Judiciary women still continue to be in the minority. The Commission on Gender Equality aims to expose gender discrimination in

[11] Parry-Giles, *QJS,* 418.

society, yet it has received great criticism for its lack of clear objectives, on setting achievable timeframes and for its lack of visibility on advocacy issues affecting women. This paper argues that the presence of the above mentioned bodies serves as rhetorical interventions which are both ordinary persuasion and pure persuasion in their presence in the justice system. According to Burke,[12] ordinary and pure persuasions are not categories by which to distinguish or evaluate specific rhetorical acts, they are coexisting dimensions of a rhetorical act that are simultaneously available to its users. According to Burke, both forms of persuasion are different and coexist in any rhetoric act. The above mentioned regulatory bodies are acts; created to provide a sense of security and they are persuasive in their presence as entities. Their presence is ordinary persuasion, owing to the fact that it denotes the goal-oriented, symbolic pursuit of extra-textual achievements, advantages or correctives.[13] These entities as legislative frameworks for gender equality are pure persuasion, this based on the fact that pure persuasion is present as a motivational ingredient in any rhetoric, no matter how intensely advantage-seeking such rhetoric may be.[14] The above mentioned regulatory bodies provide a false sense of security with no real tangible achievements.

Women and their engagement with the justice system

Women are constantly engaging with the justice system, and thus the justice system has to be conducive to women as a category of people who engage the system often as a vulnerable group. This vulnerability is evident when women engage the system through courts under these categories; firstly as applicants of maintenance seeking to fulfill their nurturing role by seeking maintenance for their children and themselves and as applicants in divorce proceedings. Secondly, through legislation, namely through the Domestic Violations Act 116 of 1998, which they utilise to attain protection from abusive partners, and also through the Sexual Offences Bill as complainants in regional and high courts, which also allows them to seek protection from abuse or as victims or perpetrators of crime. Women are hindered from engaging with the justice system effectively and efficiently owing to the following factors; firstly the courts: a significantly high percentage of women utilise the services of the family courts and lower courts. These courts need to be user friendly, efficient, well resourced, well staffed with translators and geographically accessible to all communities. Often these courts have massive backlogs, are slow, dockets get lost causing more delays, and the budget they receive is not sufficient for the courts to be adequately resourced. (These are the courts that handle maintenance and divorce matters which largely affect

[12] Kathryn M. and Clark D. Olsen, "Beyond Strategy: A Reader-Centered Analysis of Irony's Dual Persuasive Uses", *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90, 1 (2004): 22-52, [27].
[13] Olsen, *QJS,* 27.
[14] Olsen, *QJS,* 27.

women). In the rural areas local courts only handle criminal matters and family courts which handle maintenance and divorce matters are located in nearby cities and women have to travel long distances to access them. Often when women engage with the justice system and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ & CD) they are powerless, are seeking a voice and are vulnerable. This is especially so for services such as maintenance, domestic violence, sexual offences and divorce. Often during cases involving these matters women are voiceless and the state is their voice.

The legal process which takes place becomes a series of performances of acts of ordinary and pure persuasion. The courts and the justice system becomes the principle dancer in a performance whereby the women engaging in the system are the audience. The courts and the system seek to provide a persuasive performance, seeking to provide the audience, the women with the finale of achieving a voice through the attainment of justice. According to Burke, persuasion includes all mean-making via symbols, whether communicated to others or practiced for oneself.[15]
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development needs to ensure that it brings about institutional changes for entrenching gender equality and it needs to streamline the Justice system in order to ensure that services affecting women are easily accessible, these would be: maintenance, domestic violence, sexual offences and divorce matters.[16]

The Constitutional Court building – a visual rhetoric

The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters, it has the power to adjudicate disputes between organs of state concerning the constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of state or that may decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution or any parliamentary or provincial bill.[17] Thus its building and its location symbolise South Africa's new identity, and is a beacon of hope for the people. It is of paramount importance to explore the ideas and thinking behind the architecture of the building. Locally and internationally, Constitutional hill, as it has come to be known, has been hailed as a symbol of the human-rights culture that informs South Africa's democratic Constitution — effectively a remarkable feat of architectural daring and hope. The architecture of the building itself had to embody the country's history and

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[15] Olsen, *QJS,* 26.
[16] P. Parenzee P, *Investigating the Implications of ten years of Democracy for Women: The Role of the Department of Justice and Constitutional*, (South Africa: Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), 2004): 8: www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=542, Pdf accessed 05.08.2010.
[17] D. Burger, *South African Year Book*, (South Africa: National Democratic Convention (NADECO), 2006/7): 388: www.nadeco.org/.../Executive%20Summary%20of%20The%20 Justice%20System.doc, Pdf. accessed 05.08.2010.

future.[18]

Academics have argued that one is able to learn much about a political regime by observing closely what it builds.[19] With this link in mind, (we) can gain insight into a political regime's ideological agenda by scrutinizing how it *decorates* what it builds. Thus the decorative features as well, had to reflect the ideology of the new regime. The significant aspect of its symbolic function is conveyed entirely through its decorative program, which in turn is driven by the need to establish a visual rhetoric of a "community", united in its diversity. [20]

Although the decorative aspect of the building was highly significant, it was important that the building was not imposing or intimidating to the ordinary South African on the street. In the words of Constitutional Judge Albie Sachs: "it was important from the outset that the court should be gentle rather than imposing; inviting rather than forbidding; entrancing rather than monumental; human rather than austere; a building of the highest ideal for the humblest of persons".[21] Finally the Constitutional Court had to be a structure that symbolises the notion of redemptive over repressive justice (that is, the privileging of the rights of the individual over those of the state), and be at the heart of South Africa's democratic constitution.[22]

Conclusion

This paper began by looking at the issue of voice, collective memory, political nostalgia, and ordinary and pure persuasion by exploring the justice system, and gender mainstreaming. This was achieved by firstly exploring whether women legal professionals (attorneys and others on the bench) have successful and satisfying careers and whether or not gender quota's are being met. Secondly, the paper looked at women and their engagement with the justice system. Thirdly the paper will examined the role of the regulator, advisory, monitory and watch dog bodies which preside over the justice system. These regulatory bodies were examined in order to deduce if they are indeed performing their role. The paper proceeded to look at how women engage the Justice system and the services which affect them. The paper also explored the issue of rhetorical performances by looking at the court system and how women engage the courts. The paper came to a close by focusing on visual rhetoric by looking at the architecture of the Constitutional Court building and the thinking behind this beacon of hope of the South African people.

[18] Freschi, *National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report*.
[19] Freschi, *National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report*.
[20] Freschi, *National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report*.
[21] Freschi, *National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report*.
[22] Freschi, *National Survey of the Attorney's Profession Final Report*.

Rhetorical situations in everyday discourse

Gerard A. Hauser and Jens Elmelund Kjeldsen

1.

Whatever else rhetoric has involved, it has always been understood as situated discourse. Its specificity to circumstances, available audiences, and cultural norms has distinguished a rhetorical understanding of human communication from others. In current times, the ancient recognition of rhetoric's situatedness was given fresh and theoretically significant expression by Lloyd Bitzer's landmark essay, "The Rhetorical Situation".[11] Appearing as the lead article in volume 1, number 1 of *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, it inaugurated a new chapter in the history of rhetoric and its revived dialogue with philosophy. Bitzer's essay has received considerable scholarly attention[2] and its place as one of the most important papers of 20th-century rhetorical theory stands secure. Most of the scholarly commentary has enriched our understanding of rhetoric as situated, even in those cases where its historical importance seems to escape the immediacy of the circumstances in which it was uttered, such as Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" or Sir Winston Churchill's "Blood, Sweat, and Tears Speech", by focusing on its defining terms: exigence, audience, and constraints. In this paper we hope to continue the article's tradition of bringing fresh insight by considering situatedness in the context of everyday discourse and the implications this has for rhetorical agency. Our starting point is an observation Bitzer makes in passing: the reference to Bronislaw Malinowski's study of Trobriand Islanders.

At the beginning of the article, Bitzer points to the famous essay by Malinowski[3] that appeared as a supplement to Ogden and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning*, citing the passage in which Malinowski describes exchanges among the men in the fishing canoe — commands, technical expressions and explanations that serve to harmonise behavior among the fishermen. Bitzer considers the Trobrianders' use of language to be

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[1] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 1-14.

[2] See Barbara Biesecker, "Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of Difference", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 22 (1989): 100-30; Scott Consigney, "Rhetoric and its Situations", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 7 (1974): 175-86; John H. Patton, "Causation and Creativity in Rhetorical situations: Distinctions and Implications", *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65 (1979): 36-54; Richard E. Vatz, "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 6 (1973): 154-62 for a sample. See also Lloyd Bitzer, "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective", in *Rhetoric in Transition*, ed. E. E. White (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981): 21-38.

[3] Bronislaw Malinowski, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages", in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 8th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1946): 196-236.

illustrative of a particular discourse that "comes into existence because of some specific condition or situation that invites utterance".[4] Malinowski's "statements about primitive language and the 'context of situation' provide for us a preliminary model of rhetorical situation".[5] Finally, after drawing attention to the situation as "dictating" the sorts of observations, verbal and physical responses, and constrained utterance of the fishermen, he concludes:

> "Traditional theories of rhetoric have dealt, of course, not with the sorts of primitive utterances described by Malinowski ... but with larger units of speech, which come more readily under the guidance of artistic principle and method. The difference between oratory and primitive utterance, however, is not a difference in function; the clear instances of rhetorical discourse and the fishermen's utterances are similarly functional and similarly situational".[6]

In this context, Bitzer suggests we regard rhetorical situations as similar in kind:

> "Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion of the situational activity, and by means of its participation with the situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character".[7]

Bitzer's reference to Malinowski's account of Trobriander language and the islanders' performative uses of words suggests other thinkers in the 1930s who started to see language use in non-formal terms. The turmoil following WW I and during the Great Depression exposed the inability of rhetoric's theoretical orthodoxy to offer a satisfactory account for social influence, which is basic to a rhetorical view of language. The work of I. A. Richards[8] and his collaboration with C. K. Ogden[9] that develop an account of meaning as contextual and organic, Kenneth Burke's[10] development of a dramatistic perspective in which the forms of symbol using patterns are considered enactments of social joining, and M. M. Bakhtin's theory of the

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[4] Bitzer, *Philosophy & Rhetoric,* 4.
[5] Bitzer, *Philosophy & Rhetoric,* 4-5.
[6] Bitzer, *Philosophy & Rhetoric,* 5.
[7] Bitzer, *Philosophy & Rhetoric,* 6.
[8] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, reprinted 1965).
[9] Ogden, *The Meaning of Meaning.*
[10] Kenneth Burke, *Counter-Statement*, 2nd ed. (Los Altos, California: Hermes Press, 1953); *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Change*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); *Attitudes Toward History*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

inherent critique emergent from the clash of centripetal and centrifugal forces in language use add up to a paradigm shift in what counts as rhetorical.[11] Prior to that time, rhetoric was understood as an art of producing an effective speech or essay. Doubtless the chaos of the 1930s encouraged a more linguistically and sociologically sensitive turn that focused on the relationship between language and the circumstances contributing to that decade's social discord. Discord situates meaning in a consideration of how human symbolic practices influence social practices and how rhetorical performance is itself a social practice.

Looking through the rearview mirror of the rhetorical tradition as it was challenged and steered in a new direction during the early part of the 20th century, their enterprise reflects a fascination with extending rhetoric beyond the discourse found in formal texts, formal strategies of identification, and the production of speeches and essays. These thinkers urged greater attention be paid to less formal symbolic inducements. Their radically new ways of thinking about human symbolic activity beyond the podium implied examining discourse of the streets where micropractices of moment-by-moment interactions contribute not only to the organic character of a culture but become a significant source of rhetorically salient meaning and influence.

2.

From a perspective that positions human symbolic processes as the domain of rhetoric, it is hard to exclude the rhetoric of the everyday — a *vernacular rhetoric* of interaction within a discourse community that depends on local knowledge, concerns, meanings, modes of arguments, value schemes, logics, traditions, and the like shared among ordinary people who neither act in any official civic capacity nor have an elite status that provides entrée to established power. This is rhetoric rooted in lived experience. Our concern is with how this rhetoric is linked to the rhetorical situation.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines *vernacular* as referring to "domestic, native, indigenous". It lists the primary meaning of *vernacular* as "of a language or dialect: That is naturally spoken by the people of a particular country or district: native, indigenous". This sense of the vernacular points to the aboriginal language used by the people of a country or district. It emphasizes its character as the non-official language of the working class, peasants, certain ethnicities, and the marginalised — the indigenous general populous — that they use, along with other indigenous symbolic forms, in their everyday communicative exchanges. It is their symbolic resource for inventing the quotidian. Vernacular language, in this sense, is distinctive because it stands apart from official languages used for

[11] M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

public transactions within power relations, as occurs in commerce, education, governance, law, and the professions.

Because it is the local language spoken and understood by those who are not among the power elite and who often lack the opportunity, even if they possess the skills, to speak on their own behalf in official forums, its very utterance performs a critique of power. Insisting on the distinction between the official and the vernacular allows us to give serious attention to the actual communication practices of the oppressed and the richly inventive ways in which they use rhetorical resources and rhetorical mechanisms to achieve their liberatory aims.[12]

The vernacular discourse of ordinary people is important because it has *pragmatic* value. It is essential to coordinating social action. More fundamentally, vernacular rhetoric is important for the salience it bears to its users' *identity* as a community, whether they are neighbors, a class, or any other significant grouping. And significantly, even though not the discourse of power and officialdom, it nonetheless adheres to the fundamental rhetorical demand for *propriety*. Neighbors, for instance, communicate a shared understanding of their neighborhood by how they maintain their property. Their neat lawns, colorful flowerbeds, trimmed shrubberies, and domiciles with well-maintained exteriors create a vernacular landscape that utters their shared identity as neighbors. It also expresses demands of propriety: good neighbors maintain their property; it is inappropriate not to do so.

In much the same way, vernacular exchanges more generally indicate bonds of affiliation; they speak a legible and intelligible rhetoric of shared values and solidarity. Adherence to the demands of propriety produces a surplus of symbolic value or symbolic capital that governs the community's life. In volume 2 of *The Practice of Everyday Life*,[13] Michel de Certeau and his collaborators' study of a working class neighborhood in Lyon exemplifies the place of symbolic capital in the neighbors' construction of their self-understanding. How residents of the neighborhood presented themselves, spoke to one another, referenced shared exemplars of social knowledge, in short how they participated in the social field, allowed them entry to the community and freedom to circulate in its network of relationships without necessarily having mastered them all. They also reflect the vernacular as a domain of power.

Propriety within vernacular rhetoric often manifests in a discourse that implicitly critiques outsiders, usually official power. Bakhtin explains that this critique is accomplished through the capacity of language to question and interrogate the symbolic practices of the other. These

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[12] See Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop, "The Critique of Vernacular Discourse", *Communication Monographs* 62 (1993): 19-46.

[13] Michel de Certeau, Luce Giard and Pierre Mayol, *The Practice of Everyday Life, vol. 2*: *Living and Cooking*, revised edition, ed. Luce Giard, trans. Timothy J. Tomasik (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

interrogations are responses to the moment-by-moment exigencies calling for expression that reflects their understanding of the problems confronting their group, their differences with those who are in power, and resistance — often in vernacular expression and practice — to those in power. References to class differences play out situationally through double meanings, innuendo, speaking by indirection, intonation, hack phrases, commonplace utterances, puns, parody, and other ways of dislocating conventional meaning to interrogate the outsider. By rubbing against the outsider's taken-for-granted meanings the vernacular opens a space for the emergence of other meanings hidden in the taken-for-granted.

Situatedness raises questions of relationship and how these relationships embody power. Rhetorical situations of the everyday, in which vernacular rhetoric plays a central role, are themselves characteristically constituted moment-by-moment as contestive sites in which groups bonded by relationships of class and identity vie for ownership of societal imperfections through competing definitions of the controlling exigence. That there was an international banking meltdown in the Fall of 2008 is a fact, whether to define it as problem of sustaining credit or protecting middle class savings and investments was, and perhaps remains, open to debate. That the debate was dominated by elite voices educated in the language of banking and finance eliminated considerable segments of national publics who suffered the consequences of actions by others who spoke these elite languages of power. The rowdy dissent in the United States that populated town hall meetings of Congressional representatives with their constituencies during the summer of 2009 were a manifestation of citizens engaged in the vernacular discourse of contesting the actions by those who represented them.

In addition to power, the situatedness of vernacular rhetoric draws attention to rhetorical agency. Most generally, rhetorical agency is manifest in a language that gives voice and performs action. Traditionally it has been associated with official rhetoric in the form of orations, essays, and the like, and frames agency in terms of the actor. Vernacular rhetoric calls attention to more structural features that surpass the specific agent and provide a discourse through which agency is constituted. Along lines set for by Karlyn Campbell,[14] we may say that rhetorical agency viewed through vernacular rhetoric is *communal* in awakening consciousness of shared identity and participation in collectivity, involves each member of society as a *point of articulation* who invents his or her agential capacity moment-by- moment through everyday exchanges, is *multi-modal and performative* whereby agency is realized through the performance of these forms, is *emergent*, and is *mutable* and therefore subject to change.

[14] Karlyn Campbell, "Agency: Promiscuous and Protean", *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 2 (2005): 1-19.

More fundamentally, however, vernacular rhetoric points to rhetorical agency as resting on a capacity not only to speak but also to be heard. Without capacity to speak a language that requires your expression be taken seriously, voice is relatively meaningless in terms of mediating change, of resolving the exigence that defines a situation as rhetorical. Seen from the vantage point of official discourse and the individual rhetor as engaged in a performance of rhetorical power, the rhetoric of the everyday displays weak agential force. It does not speak a language that commands attention in official public spheres. It is a weak sense of agency that exercises free speech as an act that is open to all as the endowment that accompanies citizenship in a free society. Moreover, its constitutive power is weak in that it minimally forms the rhetor as a speaking or rhetorical subject. One can be tolerated as a subject entitled to free speech yet totally disregarded.

Because vernacular rhetoric does not cast rhetorical agency in terms of the individual rhetor, it stresses structural conditions that underlie power. The voices of ordinary citizens are not usually found in official forums, and their role in public discourse is often limited because of structural constraints. The vernacular provides a language with which to speak of everyday experience and give it meaning. It keeps community alive through moment-by-moment expression that asserts membership and caring in a community capable of responding. Vernacular rhetoric reminds us that our communal lives constitute a mobile and uncertain rhetorical situation born of the social realities that face the need for its remedy by those who speak a common language. Rhetorical agency requires the union of these elements in a discursive act.

Vernacular rhetoric constitutes agency at ground level in that it forms the capacity of those who are not in power to critique power and to do so in a language that can be heard. Vernacular rhetoric highlights the collective character of agency by shifting attention from the privileged voice of the orator to the collective voice of the citizenry. Rhetoric insists on addressing another, whom Bitzer says has the capacity to mediate change, or in other words to act. The address is fitting to the exigence insofar as it addresses those who are capable of mediating change in a way that calls on them to intercede. Certainly this is the case in the moment-by-moment interactions that constitute the ongoing dialogue in which issues are framed, agency is defined and exercised, and contests to alter the human world are performed. Sometimes, as in the vernaculars of indigenous peoples, situational considerations magnify what has been naturalised through a rhetoric that clarifies the violence done to them. The controversies spurred by the plans of building hydroelectric power stations in Norwegian Sámi areas during the 1970's, illustrate our point.

3.

The indigenous Sami people inhabit Sámpi, which is the northern part of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Samis have traditionally plied a variety of livelihoods, but are mostly known for their semi-nomadic reindeer

herding, which is legally reserved for Sami people in both Sweden and Norway. The population consists of 80,000-135,000 people of which 70-80 percent is found in Norway. During the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, Norwegian authorities enacted a process of Norwegisation. Schools were instructed not to use the Sámi language and the Samis were required to learn Norwegian. Forced relocation of Samis was carried out and they were neither awarded legal rights nor political or cultural recognition.

Questions of Sámi rights to land and water were brought to national attention when the Sámi together with environmentalists vehemently protested against plans to build power stations in regions they inhabited. They argued it would ruin the local natural environment and destroy the livelihood of the Sámi. Previous to these events Sámi rhetoric had very limited agential force within Norwegian publics. In the decade long rhetorical situation concerning the power stations, one could not have expected the Samis to exert rhetorical agency or to be heard.

This changed, we suggest, because the rhetorical situation merged with two more overriding circumstances, enabling a rhetoric drawing on the vernacular to gain agency. First, a general change in views occurred about nature and humans. Second, the visual media's ability to display the vernacular and the dramatic characteristics of the Samis and their case came into play. Before the controversy the rhetoric of the Sámi lacked power or agency. The vernacular Sámi discourse was detached from public deliberations; discourse of ecology and rights of indigenous people had limited appeal. However, with the environmentalism emergent at the beginning of the 70's, Sámi vernacular fused with the political discourse of the environmentalists and the new rhetoric of ecology. Samis, environmentalists and new radical groups shared common ground in their resistance of consumption and unlimited industrial growth. Emerging as a common voice, this leftist movement, known as "Populism", represented an alternative to modernisation and social democratic technocracy.

A telling encounter between the people and the technocracy of the authorities, the vernacular and the formal, occurred at a meeting in the village of Masi after the national parliament (*Stortinget*) in August 1970 planned to dam the village in order to build the Alta hydroelectric plant. Arriving at the local school, the chairman of the Standing Committee on Local Government, Kristoffer Rein, was met by demonstrating Samis with posters. On his way in, Hans G. Øvregård, the chairman of both the Kautokeino Social Democratic Party and the Sami organisation Samiid Særvii, approached him. In Sami, Øvregård read a resolution stating that damming would be a crime. "This is the most colorful experience of our journey", Rein responded, when Øvregård handed him the resolution.[15]

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[15] Magnar Mikkelsen, *Masi Norge* (Oslo: Cappelen, 1971): 135ff. Our descriptions of the events at the school also draws upon Magnar Mikkelsen, *Elva skal leve* (Oslo: Cappelen, 1980) and Anders Johansen and Jens E. Kjeldsen, *Virksomme ord* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005): 597-606.

In the school gymnasium Rein gave the floor to head engineer Kåre Kummeneje. Dressed in a dark suit he gave a formal and technical briefing lasting for more than one hour. His briefing was not translated into Sámi and took more than 70 percent of the time at the meeting. The school must have appeared as a foreign country to the locals. Their language was Sámi, the meeting was in Norwegian. Two hundred people were squeezed together in a room with blazing lights, running tape recorders, rolling television cameras, and sound equipment swinging back and forth. The many pictures in print and television from the event must have given the impression that the people of Masi really had a chance to plead their cause. The truth is they hardly spoke for more than 10 minutes in total. Most of the Samis felt intimidated and only a few uttered their sentiments.

The Samis were unfamiliar with the formal rhetorical style that carried agency in bureaucratic and political situations. Their everyday language appeared not to satisfy norms of propriety in such circumstances. The philosopher, writer, farmer and activist Sigmund Kvaløy, who participated in several of the demonstrations and campaigns, wrote about the ordinary people:

> "...living in remote places across the country, who have grown up in an environment ... that makes them inhibited when they are to plead their case. When they arrive in [the capital] Oslo to present their case, and have to go to the Ministry of Industry, they feel completely mute. ... That's why we for half a year before the campaign deliberately practiced ourselves in argumentation and in the facts of the building of the power stations; and in taking the floor and stand up to speak in assemblies without manuscript".[16]

The committed Samis improved their ability in formal rhetoric of presenting, writing texts, organising meetings and doing speeches. This contributed to the preservation of Masi in 1973. However, when the government in 1978 approved new plans to build a power station in Alta-Kautokeino, a vernacular infused rhetoric of agitation and demonstration made a bigger impact. A famous picture of the internationally renowned philosopher Arne Næss illustrates this. Næss could have used his training as a philosopher, logician and argumentation theorist to formally argue against the building of a hydroelectric power plant in Mardøla in 1970. Instead he sat down and chained himself to the mountain together with other activists. A press photo showing two police officers carrying the friendly smiling professor away became famous in Norway and was published around the world.

It was this kind of civil disobedience that attracted national attention in the late 70's. The so-called People's movement campaigned with legal

[16] Mikkelsen, *Masi Norge*, 99-100. Our translation from the Norwegian.

means: giving speeches and creating slide presentations, sending out information sheets. This kind of formal rhetoric complemented activist rhetoric such as the Sámi hunger strike outside the Parliament. Dressed in traditional costumes, demonstrators raised their Sámi tents and declared a hunger strike. Media attention was enormous. More people gathered; singing, handing out information and giving speeches. In spite of the effort, the building of the power station began in 1981. More than 1000 demonstrators tried to physically stop lorries and machinery by chaining themselves together. The authorities now transported 600 police officers to Alta. Using cutting torches they released the demonstrators and ended their fight against the power plant.

The following trials against demonstrators elucidate the encounter between the vernacular and the formal. Visually the Samis signaled difference through their traditional costumes; verbally by necessitating translations between Sami and Norwegian; a circumstance that clearly irritated the Attorney General, Andreas Cappelen, during his testimony.[17]

The efforts of the Samis and the environmentalists at first stopped the building of the power station in Alta-Kautokeino, although it eventually was built. In a sense, the rhetoric of the Sámi people and the environmentalists had failed; nonetheless this rhetoric earned the Sámi people much needed attention and sympathy. It gave them a hitherto unheard voice. One battle was lost, but an indigenous people won recognition and legal rights. This success was achieved rhetorically by taking possession of formal rhetorical capabilities and combining them with a vernacular infused rhetoric of agitation and demonstration.

The rhetoric of opposition in the 10-year controversy was not only performed through formal speeches and letters addressed directly at officials and state institutions, but also through discourse indirectly addressed at public opinion through symbolic actions, visual manifestations and organisational work. The demonstrations, the civil disobedience, and the hunger strike were a mode of vernacular infused rhetoric of indirection. The new attention to the conditions of the indigenous Sámi people, the lasting change in the Norwegian view on the Sámis and the acknowledgement of legal rights for an indigenous group, can be properly understood only if we pay attention to both the formal and the vernacular aspects of the discourse. Furthermore, it only makes rhetorical sense if we understand it situationally, not only as discrete singular situations in Bitzer's traditional sense, but also as changed circumstances in currents of thoughts, institutional constraints

[17] Edgeir Benum, *Overflod og fremtidsfrykt. Aschehougs Norges historie* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1988): 40. The events in the 10-year controversy are described in Mikkelsen (1971, 1980); Georg Parman, *Kampen om Alta* (Oslo: Dreyer, 1980); Kari Heitmann, *Alta-saken og Altaværingene: Social identitet og politisk konflikt* (Oslo: University of Oslo, 1984) and in Øystein Dalland, *Altakrønike* (Karasjok: Davvi Girjo o.s., 1994).

and in communication technology. Without press photos and television the impact would have been limited.

Conclusion

The concept of the rhetorical situation has been understood and used as it pertains to the emergence and resolution of issues and controversies that play out as pubic problems addressed in official public spheres. Broadening the lens to include vernacular discourse as rhetorically situated has implications for both.

The rhetorical situation provides a ground for understanding vernacular discourse as rhetorical. It provides the conceptual base for considering its contextual constraints, its audiences, its rules of exclusion, and for providing added precision to an account of how moment-by-moment interactions contest for power.

The vernacular, in turn, throws light on the rhetorical situation as open to multiple and often competing interpretations based on relationships of groups and community. Beneath the surface of even mundane exchanges, there is always a contest over power to define the situation, control its issues, and frame its interplay with official rhetoric.

Bitzer's original formulation focuses on situatedness as rhetoric's ground, with the situation having a life cycle that emerges, matures, decays and dies. The vernacular opens to some relations as having careers that redefine contexts, such as an indigenous people corporally marking rhetorical situations with imperfections that are always in need of remedy by chaining themselves together to protest the seizure of their land. Sometimes, the exigence is to sustain the rhetorical situation, as in the case of indigenous peoples who attempt to define the rhetorical situation's career as an ongoing negotiation in order to avoid an alternative that often is their cultural, if not literal, extinction.

Finally, including vernacular rhetoric in considerations of rhetorical situations invites attention to the interaction between official and formal public arguments and vernacular exchanges they elicit and at times unwittingly encourage. Here, as above, questions of agency are always being raised and answered in everyday exchanges that engage the multiple reciprocities of time and context.

In these reflections, we have attempted to be true to the purpose of Bitzer's article as setting forth the conditions of possibility for rhetoric. Its nuanced and supple formulation allows extending its range to those exchanges that are not on the glory road to public acclaim, but are threads weaving through the tapestry of an active society. And by extension, although "The Rhetorical Situation" was not intended to provide a foundation for explaining how an active society functions, through the lens of vernacular rhetoric, at least, it contributes to that end.

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