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Peaceful Civility After Civil Unrest: The Cases of South Africa and Morocco

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I. Theoretical Position (author: Philippe-Joseph Salazar)

Morocco and South Africa, at either tip on the Africa continent, have more than a hazard of geography in common. Both countries have recently gone through similar processes of restoring civil peace, and, in that process, of re-enforcing, even re-establishing, democracy. What matters here is, precisely, how peace is being talked about in the media, in particular with regard to the main instrument for that process, truth and reconciliation commissions. In both countries a commission was entrusted with supplementing politics with a near legal recognition of past violence, and with inventing new forms either of pardon or atonement or amnesty, in sum: of peaceful civility. In the well-documented South African case,¹ a non-judicial process was carried out, in parallel with a constitutional-making process. In the Moroccan case, a non-judicial process, partly modelled (in terms of what I would call its extrinsic characteristics) on the previous one,

¹ See Erik Doxtader and Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. The Fundamental Documents*. Cape Town, New Africa/David Philip, 2007.

was implemented, in anticipation of a profound renovation of social institutions. The first commission was propelled by a political need, made explicit by all parties, to re-found a nation emerging from what was not named a ‘civil war’. The latter was installed by royal command, making explicit a change of prudential government, away from a tyranny and a rebellion not named as coeval agents of civil strife, a move in which some you see at work the rationalist political tradition of Ibn Khaldun.² The former founds its self-conscious idiom in Pauline theology,³ and the concept of repentance. The latter in the duty of care placed upon a Muslim monarch, descendant from the Prophet, to repair injuries. This concept is called *ijtihad* in contemporary Moroccan politics, defined as the moral imperative placed on the monarch to help his nation interpret the Quran in ways that bring justice and peace within a modern, largely secular international, context.⁴ An option confirmed by the resilience of Moroccan polity to Islamist invasiveness.

As a matter of fact, the difference between the two legal instruments is not what matters, but how, in the aftermath of their application, both countries engaged in talks, or talking about peace, civil peace.

Oddly, their twin situation goes against the grain of realism. Indeed, they seem to contradict Carl Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’, namely, his proposal that, if we are to find a definite criterion for ‘the political’ it must be its irreducibility to culture and economy and ethics.⁵

Indeed, with regard to this irreducibility, passage to peace in both countries has been ascribed to cultural properties (natural kindness of the Black population, innate devotion to the Cherifian institution, in short what Pareto calls residues, instincts phrased into rhetorically acceptable abstractions that acquire a seemingly natural evidence.⁶ Passage to peace has also been attributed to economic necessities, namely sanctions in South Africa or the need of an economic take-off (now on its way) in Morocco (again,

² On Khaldunism in Islamic political thought, and with specific reference to Morocco, see Abdallah Laroui, *Islam et modernité*, Casablanca/Beyrouth, Centre culturel arabe, 2001.

³ Namely in the sermons of Nobel Peace Prize, and Anglican cleric, Desmond Tutu (see Doxtader and Salazar, *op. cit.*, par 1).

⁴ A particular application of *ijtihad* is the full accession of women to politics, see Houria Alami M’Chichi, *Genre et politique au Maroc*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2002.

⁵ Carl Schmitt, *La notion de politique* [*Das Begriff des Politischen*, 1932], French translation by M. L. Steinhäuser, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1972.

⁶ Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale* [1916], French translation, Pierre Boven (ed.), Genève, Droz, 1968, § 1071.

Pareto would say that the recourse to Economy is, this time, a derivation, or the recourse to a sophism similar to that of ‘Solidarity’, by which individual pursuits of self-reward are termed as essential to the common good; the neat transformation of revolutionaries into being billionaires is proof enough that the Economy, like Solidarity,⁷ help us experimentally derive practical actions from induced meta-physical beliefs). Passage to peace has also been attached to ethics, as if ethics need not been explicated and extricated from a confusion between the two forms of ethos rhetorical theory knows must be always set apart: ethics as *êthos* and ethics as *ethos*. Indeed, *ethos* (ἔθος) denotes the uses and abuses of a given community, whereas *êthos* (ἦθος) denotes the individual temperament, our psychological disposition. Unknowingly, we use ‘ethics’ without reflecting on the operation Aristotle sets up in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (II, 1103a 17-34), whereby he makes *êthos* the outcome of *ethos*, with the result that virtue becomes a technique, acquired by training and repetition of the right moves.⁸ In that light peace may be the product of ethics, but not the one the media would refer to, let us call it lame goodness.

My own, personal view, is that both commissions were Machiavellian. Whether this assertion is borne by analysis is something I shall leave open until further research.

However, events in South Africa and Morocco have shown, rather convincingly, that these are instances are marks of the Schmittian irreducible, and, in the same move, they provide the oddest examples of what the theorist of *Herrschaft* names ‘the political’. I summon here Schmitt for, quite simply, his theory of ‘the political’ excludes, as we know, peace as a political horizon, in short: perpetual peace would end politics.

Indeed, the commissions set up in South Africa and Morocco evince that ‘the political’ may also be instrumented, I would rather say ‘instructed’, by instances whereby the object is not the art of discriminating between friends and enemies, as Schmitt would have it, but, precisely, of annulling such a distinction. Or, to be even more accurate, their effect is to turn that discrimination, the nurture of civil war, into a positive recognition of what supersedes them, democracy. This oddity feeds, in turn, civil discourse, a public set of rhetorical artefacts, that often stress politics are being in essence reconciliatory. This essentiality of politics as non-conflictual conflict is a perception often perpetuated by common places that carry, unreflectively, how the commissions worked in the first place: we find narratives of unveiling, *alētheia* in the Heideggerian sense; we see respect for the commonality of public acknowledgement of wrongs; and for public acts of repairing or restoration. This is the lore of the new ceremonial rhetoric of peace that supplements and

⁷ *Ibid.*, § 1557.

⁸ For practical reasons, refer to entry « Morale », *Dictionnaire européen des philosophies*, Barbara Cassin (ed.), Paris, Seuil-Le Robert, 2004, p. 821.

deports public critique. In addition, these received ideas are maintained alive by the media as they respond to the common citizen's confused notion that if the principle of politics is agonistic and politicians must show 'command' that they know how to play with it (principle as *principium*, command as in *arkhē*), the finality of politics is by contrast conciliatory (the *telos*, or *finis*, of politics is peace, conciliation, not war). Lastly, they are used by government to gloss over dissent in the representative public sphere where policy, the seemingly logico-deductive application of rational choices to governing, displaces politics and, in this very case, the new assertion of 'the political' by the two commissions under scrutiny.

I would venture to say that the effect of reconciliation, taken together with the rhetorical artefacts put out by the media concerning its aftermath, gives an unexpected illustration of the tension between the three key concepts of politics, policy, and 'the political'. Politics is what government does, policy is what government says it does, the political is what people believe government should do, the critical choice as it were – namely, in this case, to further, 'to promote' peace, as the South African constitutional common place indicates, that is to move along the movement initiated by the commissions, and to make the furtherance of that temporal *moment* of authentic *politeia* a matter of general policy – I would like here to recall how Heidegger defines 'moment' as an *Augenblick*, the 'instant' of eye-opening authenticity.⁹

The South African and Moroccan commissions do provide such instants of authentic politics – and quite rightly one commission, the Moroccan one, was termed in French an *Instance* –, moments of 'the political', inasmuch as these commissions, as rhetorical events, provide the put-into-presence of enemies, their 'instantiation'. This is probably not what Schmitt has in mind in trying to arrive at a criterion for domination.

However, as I have said elsewhere, their work (hearings, depositions, civil liturgies) arrested time and effected politics as presence. The past, the violent past, was summoned in the presence of victims and perpetrators or in that of the Public. That summoning took place through the means of narratives, in short accounts of, both as retelling and accounting, that acted as disclosure of violence (a key term of the South African idiom) and a dis-closure of peace (here the concept carries the Heideggerian sense of opening onto the *Mitandersein*).¹⁰ This putting-into-presence of politics is, to go

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper & Row, 1962, paragraph 68. I use the French translation by Emmanuel Martineau (*Être et temps*, Paris, Authentica, 1985).

¹⁰ On this precise point, refer to the rich analysis by Daniel M. Gross, on Heidegger's seminar of Summer 1924 on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in his Introduction to *Heidegger and Rhetoric*, Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, Albany, SUNY, 2005, pp. 1-45

back now to the concept of *politeia*, properly defined as the ‘constitution’ where power is common in view of the common good, as it effectuates *isonomia*, that is : the instauration of *politeia* as the acknowledgement of equality in the law and as the law of politics, politics thus being the promotion or furtherance of mere human nature (namely: the ability to argue, to deliberate, to speak up). One striking example of the authenticity of such *isonomia* is the concept of ‘even-handedness’ developed by the South African commission in regard of their treatment of perpetrators’ and victims’ accounts, as it secured dis-closure (in a Heideggerian sense) of the hidden past of which the only ‘un-concealment’ was its violence. Similarly, there exist a body of reflection, in Morocco, first on the concept of liberty, or *hurriya*, and of its linkage to a form of *isonomia*,¹¹ and secondly, regarding freedom of expression, on a Spinozean critique of the injunction held by the tradition of Ibn Rush according to which deliberation operates necessarily by concealment as it works at two levels , one for the masses, one for the clerical elite.¹²

To elaborate on what I have proposed elsewhere, if the commission are moments of authentic politics, in the sense of constitutive *politeia* that puts into presence the agents of *isonomia*, and stages its concept, it affords us to reflect on a Hegelian *Aufhebung* concerning violence, peace, and the treatment of peace: violence is relieved by peace, while peace changes denotation; it refers not to a state of affairs but to an enduring presence, astride, as I have said, policy, politics and ‘the political’. You would recall that *peace*, *paix*, *pax*, if we trace back its etymology, is defined by absence of, not by presence of : peace it is that which ensues from the signing of a covenant that arrests war; it signifies a state or *stasis* of affairs that requires a rhetorical gesture of, says the etymon, a ‘fastening together’, an explicit act of complicity.¹³ Hence the conundrum of the press and the peace: how can you report on an absence?

The commissions of Morocco and South Africa were, and this has gone largely unnoticed, peace treaties, not in the narrow sense that warring parties signed a covenant (that may or may not hold, in the realm of politics *stricto sensu*, in the calculus of ‘what next’), but in the Schmittian sense tempered by disclosure of presence. They represented the extensive, authentic sense that they either brought about people within the covenant (South Africa) or re-doubled the extant covenant by bringing the victims as people

¹¹ See Laroui, *op. cit.*

¹² See Slim Laghmani, *Islam, le pensable et le possible*, Casablanca, Le Fennec, 2005.

¹³ Etymology: pact: *pacisci* "to covenant, to agree, make a treaty," from proto-Indo-European base **pag-* "fix, join"; and peace: "freedom from civil disorder," from Anglo-Norm. *pes*, from O.Fr. *pais* (11c., Fr. *paix*), from L. *pacem* (nom. *pax*) "treaty of peace, tranquility, absence of war" (cf. Prov. *patz*, Sp. *paz*, It. *pace*), from PIE **pak-* "fasten," related to *pacisci* "to covenant or agree"; details excerpted from www.etymonline.com

together (Morocco). Explicitly rhetorical in their protocols of hearings and reparings, the commissions provoked an *Aufhebung* of civil violence into peace, but peace as something else than a mere political constitution – peace as a telling together. Specifically, the fundamental tension in the South African republic and the Cherifian monarchy, between the force of reconciliation and that of sovereign constitutional invention, may it be representative or auto-cratic, has survived the passage to organized democracy, either the prolonged authority of the commission (in the South African case) or that of royal, prudential, initiative (in the Moroccan case).¹⁴ In this sense they actualize the fastening they are supposed to be: they remain binding not to politics or policy but to ‘the political’.

Once the present is past, the moment of reconciliation has become something of an absent presence, a moment under erasure, which can only be recaptured through its erratic presence in the media, as in-authenticity. The media, in this manner, operate as surrogate agents of common places, handling as it were, the residues and derivations of the *Aufhebung* I have just described – theirs is residual rhetoric insofar as the media perpetuate the appearances of the interplay and display of the *politeia* brought into presence through accounts and telling of acts of violence subsumed as a constitution of peace, the covenant of words in *Mitandersein*. They replay the words of consensus and reconciliation, they play up what is called *ubuntu* in Africa.

Indeed, public elaboration on *ubuntu*, that is presented as an African conceptual *hapax legomenon*, is a case in point: in disagreement with a popular and media and political attachment to the gnostic function of *ubuntu*, the concept ensconced in *ubuntu* is not ethnically-bound: we can see it formalized in several other instances, such as the Aristotelian position that being may be a relation (although the category of substance cannot be that of relation),¹⁵ such as the politico-theological *sobornost*’ in Russian (соборность),¹⁶ and, of course, in Heideggerian *Mitandersein* (as defining the Greeks

¹⁴ Famously the new Family Code is presented, in its epideictic Preamble, as the conscious *Kreuzung* between the heroic and prudential *ijtihad* and the works of the High Royal Solicitude, that is as a crossroads of general jurisprudential effort to promote a well-guided polity and the monarch’s personal prudence as “Amir Al Mouminine”, leader of the believers (*Le nouveau Code de la Famille*, Casablanca, Publications de la Revue Marocaine de Droit des Affaires et des Entreprises, 1st ed., 2004, p. 10-11).

¹⁵ Aristotle, “...if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence”, *Categories*, 8a 30, translation by E.M. Edghill, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 13.

¹⁶ I refer here to the Berdiaev, Bulgakov and Soloviev. In 1989 semiologist V. V. Ivanov harangued the last Soviet Supreme on that theme.

being political); they all are equivalent elaborations. In the media, *ubuntu* is such a rhetorical derivation. Ultimately it is delineated by the Aristotelian notion of prudence, or *phronêsis*, defined in the *Politics* as the exercise of collective deliberation by the Many who “become something in the nature of a single person”.¹⁷ If I emphasize the point here, it is merely to highlight something often obfuscated when *ubuntu* is hailed as a panacea for all ills: prudence by togetherness, which creates a common knowledge, requires a calculus of acts obtainable, as pointed out in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁸ It is also to recall how this compact of concepts exists, as it were, within the concept of peace as a *fastening together*, a covenant of extra-ordinary political import.

In brief, ‘the political’ of reconciliation, that which instructed peace, is now subsumed under the politics of peace talk. The political in them being lost, or displaced, the reproduction of common places regarding peace after civil or near civil war assumes what in rhetoric we call *pseudos*, that is the iterative presence of arguments made for (self-)deception. Here is what Barbara Cassin, the French philosopher of rhetoric says about the functioning of *pseudos* in public discourse (my translation):

“Objective *pseudos*: the Sophist names that which does not exist, what seems to be, or the appearances of being. Subjective *pseudos*, or lying: the Sophist names what is false with deceit in view; (s)he uses all discursive resources made available by her(his) lucrative trade, at once linguistic (the use of interchangeable terms), logical (fallacies) and rational (factoring in others’ inaptitude to strategize, or their plain ineptitude)”.¹⁹

Strikingly, in the South African and Moroccan cases, the media, in the time after the authentic *moment* of peace, have proven to meet the brief of the Sophistic treatment of peace. The press, in both instances, became vehicles of politics or policy, and not of ‘the political.’ This took several facets – from ceremonial deference to key players, as well as un-ceremonial attacks, including on Desmond Tutu in South Africa. I would propose that the press as it cannot report on an absence, it must report on its simulacra.

The research conducted by my two assistants supports this analysis. The second part of this presentation must be read as a descriptive analysis of simulacra. A third part, being the data themselves, is retrievable on www.rhetoricafrika.org.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1281b1-6.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b8-11.

¹⁹ Barbara Cassin, *L’Effet sophistique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1995, p. 474.

II. Descriptive Analysis

SECTION 1 : Morocco's peaceful icons (author: Lindiwe Mazibuko)

Background

The Moroccan press put forward arguments of 'exceptionality' in the presentation of news stories about the country; arguments which position Morocco, and Moroccan culture, society, and politics as having reached or as rapidly approaching the objective of moderation, innovation, and socio-political reform when compared to other Arab states and the rest of the countries on the African continent, in a peaceful, peace-searching manner. The grounds for the presentation of this exceptionality usually take the form of epidictic moments in the press – celebrating the country's leaders (the monarch, King Mohammed VI, in particular) their vision and progressive reforms, and the manner in which these have helped to solidify Morocco's identity as the most liberal, the most democratic, indeed the most 'civilised' ie peaceful, Muslim state in the Arab world.

This argument is one which has similarly been presented in the South African press in the past in reference, for example, to South Africa's peaceful democratic transition, the 1994 elections, and the mounting in December 1995 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a means of exposing and coming to terms with the atrocities of Apartheid. As such, this analysis takes into consideration instances when arguments of Moroccan exceptionality and for its replication in other emerging democracies on the continent run parallel with similar contentions about South Africa.

In addition to looking at the instances in which this argument is presented in the press, we have also looked at the forms that it takes; the kind of picture that the media paint of Morocco today that makes it seem exceptional amongst African and Islamic states. Most often this is a depiction of a society that effortlessly combines the western customs and culture of the former colonial power – France - with moderate Islamic religiosity; a combination which is most often taken to be evidence of Moroccan 'civilisation' and superiority as compared to other Arab and African states in the region, a claim matched by an analogous claim by South Africa in relation to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.

Research Methodology

Since the brief restricted the collection of source material to news stories in the Moroccan press, our method of data collection consisted primarily of keyword searches on the websites of Anglo- and Francophone Moroccan newspapers and news agencies with online portals, as well as regular searches for general news stories about Morocco on the Google news search engine <http://news.google.fr> so as to be able to identify the similarities and differences between the ways in which their narratives are presented by different news agencies.

We identified 2 key subjects under discussion in the Moroccan press: *Canonizing HM Mohammed VI as a peaceful ruler*, *General Election 2007*, *Driss Benzekri & the Justice and Equity Commission*. The press often seemed to feed into the idea of Morocco as an exceptional African and Islamic nation, exceptionally peaceful. We searched for online coverage of these issues on Morocco's news websites. In order to keep the report current, we chose to limit the data collection for these subjects to news reports from 2007, with the exception of *Driss Benzekri & the Justice and Equity Commission*, the conclusive 'peaks' of which were respectively reached in February 2004, with the unanimous passing of the former bill in parliament, and January 2007, when the final report concerning the latter was presented to HM King Mohammed VI.

Our primary news sources were the Maghreb Arabe Presse news agency website <http://www.map.ma/eng>, and the websites for the following Moroccan newspapers and magazines: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb <http://www.lematin.ma>, La Gazette du Maroc <http://www.lagazettedumaroc.com>, Maroc Hebdo International <http://www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/>, L'Economiste <http://www.leconomiste.com/>, L'Opinion <http://www.lopinion.ma>, and La Nouvelle Tribune <http://www.lanouvelletribune.com>, and I occasionally referred to others such as Magharebia <http://www.magharebia.com>, Aujourd'hui Le Maroc <http://www.aujourd'hui.ma/>, Al Bayane <http://www.albayane.ma>, and Liberation <http://www.liberation-press.ma>.

Analysis summary

Mohammed VI as peaceful ruler

While it is to be expected that Morocco's status as a parliamentary constitutional monarchy would grant its sovereign, as the head of government, a fair amount of executive authority, it is only on examination of the discourse in the press concerning the activities of the king that the full extent of his involvement in governing the kingdom becomes clear. One also notices how in the same manner in which Nelson Mandela was uncritically celebrated in the South African media, and indeed throughout the world, as the single person responsible for bringing peaceful democratic transition to South Africa, so too Mohammed VI is fêted for being the bearer of peace, democracy and prosperity to Morocco.

The death of his father, King Hassan II in 1999 is treated as an historical watershed in the media, and in much the same way that the start of the South African democratic transition is often dated back to Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1992, Mohammed VI's accession to the throne is accepted as the beginning of Morocco's transition into an model of stability, economic growth, religious moderation - in short, 'civilisation' - in the Maghreb region; one who's example many believe ought to be replicated in the rest of the Arab world.

The celebration on 30 July 2007 of the 8th anniversary of the king's accession to the throne constituted a great epideictic moment in the Moroccan public discourse, as reflected by the reports in the local press, one which was primarily concerned with a retrospective look at the monarch's achievements during his reign - amongst them the revision of the *Code de la famille*, the launching of the *Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER)* and the innovative plan to tackle poverty and degradation, *l'Initiative nationale pour le développement humain (INDH)*.

Much time was also spent reporting on the messages of congratulations that poured in from leaders in the west, most notably from US President George W. Bush, and France's Nicolas Sarkozy – both of whom focused in their congratulations to the king on praising his foreign policy initiatives. Morocco's position on the Western Sahara dispute was commended, as was his dedication to tackling terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the region. The focus by the press on this commentary constituted a manifestation of Morocco's reliance on political validation from western countries, rather than from other Arab states or indeed those on the African continent.

Many column inches were dedicated to lengthy analyses of the king's political successes to date, as the positive effects of his policy implementations over the past 8 years were checked off one by one. Not much was said of the contribution made by Prime Minister Driss Jettou to this process, nor that of the king's senior ministers; parliament itself was often portrayed simply as the king's means of endorsing his policy proposals prior to implementing them.

Indeed, the epithets used in reference to the king during this period of celebration – '*talentueux inventeur*', '*grand Roi bâtisseur et développeur*', '*Roi des pauvres*', '*Souverain visionnaire*', '*le social Souverain*' – all contributed to the impression that Morocco is ruled by a 'philosopher king'; one could even argue, a 'benevolent dictator'.

Driss Benzekri and the Justice & Equity Commission:

In much the same way that Desmond Tutu was interpreted by the South African and international press as being the country's moral and spiritual leader, and the arbiter of reconciliation and peace during his tenure as Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation commission, not only because of his religious affiliations, but also because of his contribution to the struggle against apartheid, so too Driss Benzekri's clashes with the former government of Morocco, and subsequent 17-year detention for heading up Ilal Amam, '*une organisation marxiste-léniniste*' in the 1970s lent him the moral gravitas necessary to validate his heading up the Justice and Equity Commission, a truth commission tasked with investigating instances of torture, arbitrary detention, and other atrocities and human rights violations committed against the Moroccan people during the Black Years - *les années de plomb* - following independence in 1956 up to 1999.

Benzekri's death in May 2007 transformed him into an icon of peace and reconciliation in Morocco, and precipitated in the media an epideictic celebration of his life and his achievements, as well as of the virtues and value of the truth commission for the consolidation of democracy in Morocco.

What distinguishes the IER from the process undergone by South Africans during the TRC hearings and from the experiences of others in truth commissions set up in recently democratised states throughout the world, is the absence of revolution to mark the end of the period of tyrannical rule - whose human rights violations the commission seeks to expose - and the birth of a new order. As such, the IER has come under regular criticism in the press for the restrictions placed upon its scope of investigation – the ban on investigations into human rights abuses committed following Mohammed VI's accession to the throne in 1999, and its inability to prosecute or reveal the identities of human rights abusers are examples - and as such the commission appears widely to be regarded as little more than a ceremonial, symbolic exercise.

SECTION 2 : Archbishop Tutu: Christian faith in public deliberation in the media to further promote civil peace and deliberation (author: Themba Ratsibe)

Background

In studying how Archbishop Tutu has used the Christian faith in public deliberation in the South African media to affirm the furtherance of national reconciliation by a continuing peaceful civility, we found that there was one consistent debate where this was concerned. The debate centered on whether or not Archbishop Tutu is a politician or a man of god. We have taken a keen interest in this debate more particularly how Archbishop Tutu has used certain rhetoric techniques in this debate. We have divided findings into two categories. The first category is the stance that Archbishop Tutu takes on this debate and the image he portrays to the media and the public in general. The second category looks at how the media and others have viewed Archbishop Tutu as a peacemaker, or a troublemaker.

Research Methodology

In order to collect material on how Archbishop Tutu used the Christian faith in public deliberation we searched sites that include www.mg.co.za (weekly *Mail & Guardian* website) and premier online news provider www.news24.com . This method was very effective, except we found that the articles in *Mail & Guardian* website were not as useful as the ones on www.news24.com. For this reason, we found that searching through the archives under www.news24.com was more helpful.

Analysis summary

Archbishop Tutu's stance in the debate and the image he portrays

- In an article entitled "Bishop Tutu's Hopes and Fears", Archbishop Tutu discussed some of the country's political issues and he emphasized the fact that he is not a politician.

- Archbishop Tutu said: "My paradigm comes from the Scriptures". He added that the government cannot tell him what to preach and that he has to follow biblical paradigms.

-In addition to this, in a recent article "Voice of the day: Desmond Tutu" Archbishop Tutu also said: For many of us it is not our politics that makes us to say and do what we do in opposition to apartheid and in working for a new South Africa. It is precisely our relationship with god..." This emphasized his point that he is not a politician, but a man of god

- The article entitled "Tutu takes a swipe at BEE elite" stated Archbishop showed concern towards the fact that a small group of the elite were exploiting the governments Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy. He was quoted as stating that "At the moment many, too many of our people live in grueling, demeaning, dehumanizing poverty". This article could have been understood as Archbishop Tutu taking a politicians approach to the argument. However it is believed that his argument indicated that Archbishop Tutu is concerned about the well being of the South African public and this is what the bible would expect of him.

The media's perception of Archbishop Tutu in public deliberation

- The media has viewed Archbishop Tutu as a politician because he is always involved in political disputes. One article entitled "Tutu avoids lapdog label" has labeled him as a ruling party lapdog because of his praises of the government.

- Archbishop Tutu has argued against this stating that he is not a politician because politicians have the reputation of being dishonest and corrupt. This he stated has caused a general mistrust of political activity or politicians

- It seems that whenever the media has been adamant that Archbishop Tutu is a politician more than a man of god he has been consistent in using his Christian orientated image to argue against this

- It has been reported recently in an article entitled "Church backs Tutu over Zuma" that Archbishop Tutu was involved in the debate centered around whether Jacob Zuma was a viable candidate to run for president in the next presidential election, taking his recent

history into account. By doing this, Tutu was giving the media more reason to label him as being a politician.

- In this debate Archbishop Tutu was quoted as saying the following about Jacob Zuma who is now a pastor: "I pray that someone will be able to counsel him that the most dignified, most selfless thing, the best thing he could do for a land he loves deeply is to declare his decision not to take further part in the succession race of his party."

- He also stated that although he liked Jacob Zuma he could not condone his sexual behaviour or his failure to stop his supporters from vilifying his accuser during his rape trial.

- It was also in this report that Tutu hailed heroes who struggled in apartheid for goodness and justice to the media.

- The media has stated that this is another example of Archbishop Tutu getting involved in political disputes and therefore he is a politician.

- Even though Archbishop Tutu has been able to earn a reputation of goodness over the years, the media has still persisted in labeling him a politician. A recent article has even hinted that he is in fact a hypocrite. The article was titled "Desmond Tutu- a devious hypocritical serpent?"

- The article has quoted some of Archbishop Tutu's statements over the years and it has presented arguments stating why these are hypocritical, therefore hinting that archbishop Tutu is hypocrite. This article argues against Archbishop Tutu's argument that he is not a politician.

- In the radio interview with Rachel Kohn Archbishop Tutu stated that he is not a politician, that his actions stemmed from his understanding of the Christian faith and that he is constrained by the imperatives of the gospel. However this article indicates that his actions a lot of the time contradict the bible.

- The article makes use of many examples of when Archbishop Tutu has contradicted himself. I have decided to report on two of these examples.

-The first one is his support for homosexual relationships in the past, even though it is against the will of god.

- The second one is the statement that Archbishop Tutu has made about the community helping god to bring about his will on earth. For example feeding the hungry. Then he stated that now god wants peace on earth. Hinting that we should help god achieve this. The article then quotes from the bible that in Matt 10:34 Jesus said: " Do not think I

came to bring peace on earth; I did not come to bring peace on earth, but a sword. This quote makes Archbishop Tutu's argument to be contradictory.

- By showing us that Archbishop Tutu is a hypocrite the article attacks his good character that he has gained by being a man of the church (archbishop). It thus creates a better opportunity of him being labeled a politician.

Conclusion

It seems that archbishop Tutu has used the Christian faith and the good character that one attains by being a man of the church in order to build on his good character (ethos) and further the idea of peaceful civility.

- When Archbishop Tutu stated that his actions originate from the Scriptures, here he was building on his good character (his ethos). He was communicating to the media and the public that he is a man who only believes in the bible and that he will only act according to the bible. This builds his good character because anyone who lives for god is seen to be a good man with moral values.

- The same can be concluded when he was quoted saying that "For many of us it is not our politics that makes us to say and do what we do in opposition to apartheid and in working for a new South Africa. It is precisely our relationship with god..." Here again Archbishop Tutu is using the Christian faith in order to build his ethos, in the same way he did above.

- When Archbishop Tutu argued against the B.E.E policy and by doing so showing a concern for the poverty stricken people in the country, he was also building on his ethos. The reason for this is that as a Bishop and a man of the church he is expected to show concern for others. However this is usually a concern to those close to him or his congregation. By showing a public interest for the well being of others all over the country, he is making the South African public believe in his good character.

- In reference to his stance of not being a politician, he has stated that this was also because politicians have a reputation of being dishonest and corrupt, and this causes the public not to trust them. In terms of rhetoric, it seems that this is the use of logos (an argument which is conveyed by the speaker) by Archbishop Tutu. The reason why this can be viewed as logos is because Archbishop Tutu is basically arguing that he is not a politician because politicians uphold an image of corruption and dishonesty. Since he is a man of god or the church, he does not possess these qualities and therefore he is not a politician. This can also be the use of ethos because he is using his good character of being a man of god to argue against the label of being a politician

- In the contentious article where Archbishop Tutu was quoted as saying the following about demoted Vice-President Jacob Zuma "I pray that someone will be able to counsel him that the most dignified, most selfless thing, the best thing he could do for a land he loves deeply is to declare his decision not to take further part in the succession race of his party." In addition to this stating that he could not condone Jacob Zuma's sexual behaviour and hailing those who fought for justice and goodness in apartheid, all of the above can be understood as an attempt to build on his ethos.

- By constantly using words like pray and goodness, he builds on his good character (his ethos) because he is associating himself with the church. This is also emphasized by him publicly not condoning Zuma's sexual behaviour.

-This was similar to the way he hailed those who fought for justice and goodness in apartheid. By emphasizing justice and goodness, he is also building on his character of being a man of the church who only supports all that is good in the world.

- It seems that Archbishop Tutu has had this stance for many years now. In a radio interview on Truth and transition with Rachel Kohn in 1999 Archbishop Tutu also relied on the church and the good image he has because he is a man of the church in order to answer questions during the interview.

-Archbishop Tutu has publicly built on his ethos using the Christian faith to such an extent that others have tried to question it.

- An article entitled "Tell us your sex past, Tutu" has illustrated how certain members of the ANC have taken offence to Tutu's statement against Jacob Zuma. They Stated that he (Archbishop Tutu) is not needed in political disputes. - - They also emphasized that he thinks that he is higher than the court that cleared Jacob Zuma off his rape charges and that he thinks that he has a higher moral base than others. These comments could be understood as attempts to deconstruct Archbishop Tutu's ethos as peace-man and reconciliator.

Data for both sections available on www.rhetoricafrica.org