

**“WAR, ARMY AND PEACEKEEPING ARGUMENTS: SOUTH
AFRICA A PEACE LOVING COUNTRY THAT HAS TO BE WAR
READY”**

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ABSTRACT

This research paper takes an interest in war, army and peacekeeping arguments that have been made in South Africa. Through this investigation, this paper indicates that South Africa seems to be committed to peacekeeping operations in Africa. However even though South Africa comes across as a peace loving country, they still seem to make arguments directly or indirectly that indicate that they have to be war ready.

INTRODUCTION

This research paper researches war, army and peacekeeping arguments that have been made in South Africa. The purpose of this research is to indicate that although South Africa is a peace loving country, they still believe that they have to be war ready. To do this, this paper has decided to make the use of four sections. The reason for the use of these sections in particular, was because they had the most potential to reveal the arguments which this paper was looking for. These sections include the procurement debate, arguments made by the South African army on peacekeeping, the Minister of Defence's arguments on the South African National Defence Force and the peacekeeping operations in Africa and the last section includes arguments made by the South African army on their army recruitment plans, which are orientated around these peacekeeping operations.

Through these sections this paper believes that it will be able to fulfill its purpose of indicating that South Africa is a peace loving country however they also believe that they have to be war ready.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

SECTION 1

THE PROCUREMENT DEBATE

Background

In 1994 the South African Parliament resolved that the South African Defence Force (SANDF) should be called into being. As a result of this, the Strategic Defence Procurement was due for contracting in December 1999. This was a major expenditure decision. Debates revolved around this Defence package in terms of the need to equip the SANDF to such an extent when South Africa has no enemies. Secondly there were debates as to how this decision came into being. This paper reports on the procurement debate through the use of an article entitled background notes: Press statement on the Strategic Defence Procurement Package. This press statement was issued by the ministers of Defence, Finance, Public Enterprises and Trade and Industry.

Research Methodology

In investigating the procurement debate, this paper made the use of the internet; this was particularly through the use of the Google search engine (www.google.com). Through typing search phrases such as “The SANDF procurement debate” and “The Defence procurement Defence” the investigation gained some momentum and direction. It was here that there was a direct link to the government website which focused specifically on this subject matter. This refers to the article which was mentioned above. This article on the Press statement on the Strategic Defence Procurement package, through its justification of how this package came into being answers many of the questions revolving around this topic. Other websites such as www.news24.com and the Mail and Guardian website (www.mg.co.za) through the use of the same search phrases were not as helpful.

The justification of the Strategic Defence Procurement Package.

- The Strategic Defence Procurement was authorized for contracting in December 1999. There were debates as to how this decision came into being. The Minister of Defence, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Enterprises and Trade and Industry tried to justify this decision through this press statement. These ministers who have released this press statement seem to have focused much of their energy in defending the integrity of the government when it comes to this debate. The reason for this was that by questioning the decision of this package... the media was also questioning the integrity of the government.
- This press statement starts off by stating that the decision was carefully considered and thoroughly researched and analyzed. In addition to this that the decision was taken with consideration of the competing needs of the government's funds. There was also an effort made to balance the competing claims on the funds including the necessity of building an effective Defense over the next decade.

The article entitled "Background notes: Press statement on the Strategic Procurement Package" then states the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Auditor General also took upon themselves to look into the allegations of impropriety where this decision was concerned. Here the government cooperated fully and they thank SCOPA and the Auditor General for acknowledging that there was no impropriety in this process. The article thus emphasizes that the government has constitutional obligations and that they will need the support of the parties involved in order to remain transparent. There is an emphasis on the fact that for the government this is done in order to show that government cannot violate standard procedure

In terms of the integrity of the government, this press statement goes on to add that the government is prepared to make very detailed representations to

SCOPA in the future as this is the only way to correct misperceptions. It is at this point that the press statement indicates the confidence of that the government has in the process. They state that they have full confidence in the various departments, Ministers and cabinet. It is for this reason that they are confident that the deal is sound and that it was conducted correctly.

To defend the integrity of the government even further the press statement elaborates on the background of the decision. According to the article entitled “Background notes: Press statement on the Strategic Procurement Package” much preparation went into the decision to procure a wide range of equipment for the SANDF.

The Defence Review pointed out the need for equipment for a number of arms of service for the SANDF in order for it to retain an effective Defence capability. Without this the main arms of the SANDF would have been structurally impaired

Even though there are those who were against this idea of South Africa having a Defence capacity, this is not supported by the Defence Review of government policy. In fact such capacity is a constitutional matter. Another argument that was raised against this was the alarming budget which was needed to buy this equipment. This is why the government took budget reforms which ensures the correct expenditure of funds. This is where the National Industrialization Participation Program (NIPP) played an important role.

It was here that a report was made. It reported on the risks of the deal on a number of dimensions and it reported on the affordability of the deal. The report was made by the Minister of finance with the assistance of the other departments. However the decision and the report was made in light of some comments by SCOPA, this means that SCOPA monitored the entire process.

The above report took into account the need of the equipment in order to fuel the Defence capacity of the SANDF. However the budget was not sufficient as it was on a medium scale. Here the NIPP was believed to have played two roles. Firstly it was supposed to be an investment promotion device and secondly it was suppose to bring about job creation. However SCOPA and the Auditor General stated that a course of action cannot be made on public perceptions. Therefore when accounting to SCOPA or the Auditor General the ministers who recommended a particular course to the Cabinet had to be judged on what they had decided. According to this article, this background also places an emphasis on the procedure of the procurement in order to defend the integrity of the government and its officials and to avoid the misperceptions by the media.

As stated by the article entitled “Background notes: Press statement on the Strategic Procurement Package” the government made further defences towards their integrity by also providing a special review by the auditor general in this press statement as well as a comment on the Standing Committee on Public Accounts.

It seems that the special review by the Auditor General was used in order to argue against any queries that many might still have had in terms of the government’s integrity. This belief stems from the comment made in this press statement. The government stated that on a matter such as this it would not be correct for the review to be left in its present form as it does not do justice to a very complex process and in so doing calls into question certain processes without being able to fully justify this. This is why they elaborated on the process through the use of the special review by the Auditor General. This was then further supplemented by the comment on the Strategic committee on Public accounts. Here this press statement focuses on the thoroughness of the government in calculating the costs for this deal. They do this by highlighting the error made by SCOPA that the government had information about the possible escalation of the costs and they did not disclose this fact. They corrected SCOPA

by stating that the government had calculated the costs taking all the risks into account. This includes the chances of the rand's value depreciating over the years and this is how they came to the amount of 30.3 billion rand for this deal. To further prove their thoroughness there is also a budgeted amount of 43.3 billion rand. This amount is budgeted on the chances of a different trajectory of the rand as compared to the 30.3 billion rand.

Through all of the above the government argues that the deal was not decided internally but that it went through the right procedures and in arguing in this manner, they seem to be defending their integrity.

Conclusions:

- From the above we can deduce that the Strategic Defence procurement was a very contentious issue. The debates questioned the need for such a deal and how it came about. It is clear that the alarming budget for this deal was the cause for this debate. The only way that these questions could be answered was by the government themselves.
- As it has been stated above, the government took a very defensive stance in justifying the need for this deal.
- In rhetoric terms it seems that the purpose of this press statement was to defend the government's ethos. By them not being able to justify how and why they came to the decision of a Strategic Defence Procurement their integrity as a government and their ethos would be negatively affected
- In justifying the Strategic Procurement Package the government made the use of logical arguments (logos). That is to say that they relied heavily on the procedure that has to be followed in order to approve the Procurement of this deal
- By relying on this procedure, the government made the use of factual evidence and examples which many may not have been aware of in order to make strong

arguments. This is an example of the use of logos in the inductive form from the government.

- In addition to this the government's transparency as well as their willingness to cooperate with SCOPA during the investigations there were also gestures from the government that supported their ethos and integrity in that they were indicating that they had nothing to hide and that the procedure of the procurement was indeed legitimate.

- The manner in which the government also volunteered information such as the special review by the Auditor General also helped them to become more transparent. In another way this could be an emotional appeal which gets the audience to think that if they were hiding something, they would not volunteer information. This causes the audience to feel guilty about misjudging the government. This could therefore be the use of pathos from the government.

- The final appeal by the government in the section of The Standing Committee on Public Accounts which illustrates that the government did thorough research taking all the risks into account in terms of the budget could also be construed as an emotional appeal in the same way that was shown above. Through the use of examples it shows the thoroughness and the extent that the government went through in order to come up to those projected totals. However like most of the arguments in this article this argument makes the use of logos in the inductive form. This is also done in order to protect the ethos and the integrity of the government.

SECTION 2

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY'S VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING

Background

With the implementation of the Defence Procurement Strategy, it seems that the South African army had their own opinions in terms of this Defence procurement and peace operations. According to the South African army, their future was related to the future of the defence establishment. For this reason they believed that it was necessary to stimulate thought and debate to ensure that the military was in a good position to deal with any challenges that they may be confronted with in the future. It seems that where this was concerned, peacekeeping debates were very important.

Research Methodology

Once again through the use of the Google search engine (www.google.com) this paper was able to find the relevant material on the South African army. By searching under the phrases "SA army and peacekeeping" and "SA army debate on peacekeeping and peacekeeping arguments by the SA army", Google directed this paper to two very important articles. These articles expressed the opinions of the South African army and its members on peacekeeping and the implementation of the defence strategies. Other search engines and websites such as the Mail and Guardian website (www.mg.co.za) and www.news24.com expressed what peacekeeping operations were about, however they did not directly express the opinions of the South African army on peacekeeping. That is to say although they had information on the subject matter, they did not provide the information that this part of the paper was looking for.

The South African army's opinions on the defence strategy and peacekeeping

- According to the article entitled "The South African Army-Future and forecast" the South African army argues that the South African defence community is related to and shaped by the development of defence in the international arena. They focus on three international developments that have affected the roles and mission of the armed forces including their redefinition in general. These are insecurity, regional security and peace operations.
- In terms of insecurity the army argues that this is caused by poverty. It believes that by trying to resolve poverty within the country through political and economic strategies such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) this, will assist in matters of insecurity. They believe even though the military is involved in this matter, it can not resolve matters of insecurity alone. The poverty and lack of development in the country has to be attended to first
- Where regional security is concerned the South African army states that the specter of arms race and military build up has caused regional security in regions through out the world. They believe that the only way to resolve this is by having a commitment to regional development priorities for example through the creation of regional development alliances.
- In terms of the focus of their opinions on peacekeeping, which is the focus of this paper, they believe this plays a pivotal role in the new world order. They state that the collective maintenance of peace has become a key activity in international cooperation. The South African army states that since South Africa is a leader in its region and in the continent, it supports these peacekeeping operations. However they state that this will take place on a multilateral bases and that they will take into account the costs and consequences of these peace operations.

- The article entitled “SA army undertaking peace operations, needs re-equipping asserts chief” adds to the above notion of the South African army taking part and supporting peacekeeping operations. It states that last year the Chief of the South African army Solly Shonke stated that the South African army needs to be re-equipped in its totality in order to take part in these peace operations. However he stated that the way that this was going to be done was going to depend on the budget that they were given. However he also emphasized that whatever they do has to be in line with government policies.
- The Chief affirmed that the environment has changed. He made reference to the troops who were currently deployed on peacekeeping operations in Sudan and the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC). He stated that these initially were not combat deployments but operational ones, as a result combat was not foreseen when the re-equipment projects were first conceived.
- In addition to this he emphasized that peacekeeping operations can include fighting. He made reference to the 30 of April where 28 United Nations troops were killed in hostile fire in the DRC. This was added by the death of a Napa lease peace keeper in a hostile battle on the 28 of May.
- The Chief argued that peacekeeping can be dangerous and in order to do it with minimum risks, the 3000 South African troops who are deployed on such operations need to be well equipped. But the problem was that much of South Africa’s equipment was designed over 30 years ago.
- In terms of these peacekeeping operations, the article entitled “The South African Army-Future and Forecast” added that South Africa should also make the use of the international contacts that they are building in order to further train their troops. This they state can be done through joint maneuvers and training, training exchanges and international visits. This article states that through this training the troops will be more equipped for these peacekeeping operations.
- The Chief of the South African army in the article entitled “SA army undertaking peace operations, needs re-equipping asserts chief”

added to this idea of further training the troops by elaborating on the vision 2020 of the South African army which will specifically train troops for two divisions. These divisions would play three different types of roles in combat situations. The first one would play a core combat role, the second one being a peace keeping role and the third one would play both peacekeeping and combat roles. The chief stated that this vision is still in discussion and it would hopefully be implemented by the year 2020

Conclusion:

- From the above we can deduce that the South African army is in full support of the peace keeping operations that South Africa is embarking in.
- From a rhetorical perspective it seems that the South African army first makes the use of epideictic speech in trying to celebrate the notion of peacekeeping. They do this by emphasizing the fact that peacekeeping operations have to be pursued collectively. That is to say that there has to be commitments from other armies from other countries were these operations are concerned.
- However at the same time the South African army also enhances its ethos as an army in a dominant country in Africa by stating that they have to lead by example in terms of these peace keeping operations
- This is where the Chief of the South African army makes the use of logos in order to bring about rational arguments in terms of the South African army leading by example in these peacekeeping operations.
- The Chief makes the use of logos in the deductive form in that he makes a probable argument in terms of the equipment that the army will need in order to be able to take part in these peacekeeping operations effectively.
- Where this equipment is concerned the Chief makes a plea in terms of the importance of getting new equipment. He does this by making it clear that peacekeeping operations usually include very dangerous combat. He thus makes the use of logos in the inductive form by referring to an example of the fact that the equipment that the army was using was over 30 years old, which was not in the best interest of the troops. Secondly he makes use of examples of troops

who have lost their lives while in peacekeeping operations and by doing this he emphasizes the fact that they need the best equipment possible in order to minimize the risks and casualties in combat. Through these arguments he also appeals to the emotions of his audience (the use of ethos), he gets his audience to think and to believe that it is in the best interest of the troops to get new equipment.

- This idea of having the troops' best interest at heart during peacekeeping operations also enhances the ethos and integrity of the Chief and the South African army as a whole because they seem to be concerned about the well being of the troops above everything else. This notion is supported by the suggestions made by the South African army to utilize international connections in order to train the troops even further in order to prepare them to a great extent for these peacekeeping operations.

SECTION 3

DEFENCE MINISTER LEKOTA ON PEACEKEEPING

Background

Since 2004 the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota has been heavily involved in debates about the peacekeeping operations in Africa that the SANDF has been part of. He has often used his budget speeches from 2004 up until 2007 to mention the importance of these peacekeeping operations and what they entail. It seems that each year Minister Lekota builds on what he has said in order to accentuate how important it is for the government to support and invest in the SANDF and the peacekeeping operations that it is part of. This paper investigates this in more detail

Research Methodology

In researching Minister Lekota's opinions and arguments on the peacekeeping operations that the SANDF is part of this paper relied heavily on the speeches that the Minister has delivered in the past. These were mainly his budget speeches. In order to have access to these speeches, this paper made the use of the government website (www.gov.org.za) as well as the Google search engine (www.google.com) which led this investigation to news websites which often had the original speeches or a brief of the speeches delivered by the Minister, an example of such a website is www.buanews.gov.za. Finding these speeches through these websites was not a strenuous process. Often by typing search phrases such as "Lekota on peacekeeping" or "Lekota debates about peacekeeping" there would be a direct link to the speeches.

Defence Minister Lekota's opinions and arguments on peacekeeping

As mentioned earlier, in order to fully appreciate and understand Lekota's opinions and arguments about peacekeeping, this paper investigates the speeches he has delivered on this topic since 2004 up until 2007.

- It seems that every year Lekota builds up momentum in his speeches. He does this by arguing consistently and progressively about the SANDF's involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa.

- In 2004 Lekota laid the foundation. He basically argued that peacekeeping operations were very important in Africa and that the SANDF was playing a profound role in these operations.

- Lekota did this by stating that in the past there were debates about the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, however no-one knew that the SANDF would be a shining example in peacekeeping operations

- He went on to explain what peacekeeping entails by distinguishing it from war or combat operations. He stated that since they were different it was essential that the troops' training was based on international law, respect for human life and human rights. In addition to this he added that the training would provide security support to role players, logistical support like secure communications, medical services for the wounded and sick combatants, it will also provide engineering expertise for the rebuilding of the country. Finally he stated that the training would also focus on post conflict resolution.

- He closed his arguments on peacekeeping by stating that the role of the SANDF even though they have excelled in these peacekeeping operations, has been a learning process. He mentions that a lot was learned in Lesotho, DRC and Burundi by the SANDF and this has broadened their understanding of peacekeeping.

- Having laid this foundation of peacekeeping, in 2005 Lekota build on this foundation by encouraging the SANDF and armies from other countries to step up the levels of contribution to peacekeeping operations
- He basically envisioned this being done in two ways. Firstly through post conflict resolution, the examples of this that he referred to included the building of roads, railways, towns, libraries, banks, and hospitals.
- This is where we see Lekota like the Chief of the South African army arguing that the SANDF needs to invest buying new equipment. Here Lekota made reference to the Airbus Military A400m Programme. He emphasized the fact that this is not a combat aircraft but a large transport one. He also added merit to his argument by stating that this aircraft would primarily benefit South Africa however at the same time it would benefit Africa as a continent.
- Lekota's second suggestion of stepping up the levels of contribution to peacekeeping operations included the retaining of their troops. This was also mentioned by the Chief of the South African army. Lekota stated that Genral Romeo Dallarie's observation on peacekeeping in Rwanda informed him that the key to successful peacekeeping was to provide multidisciplinary training for the Officer Corps. For this reason Lekota argues that there should be more investment in training the SANDF peacekeepers. He emphasized that this training would give these troops military skills, as well as conflict resolution, negotiation and humanitarian skills.
- Lekota proudly and confidently stated that other countries could also be expected to make the same types of commitments because seven countries of the SADC including South Africa had ratified the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.
- It is through the above argument that Lekota appeals for support in terms of the budget for the DOD in order to carry out the vision of the government
- However Lekota does mention that his audience needs to bear in mind that even though the SANDF is structured towards peacekeeping it is still structured to the core force doctrine which enables them if necessary to deal with conventional threats when necessary. He highlighted that peacekeeping had not detracted from this. He closed his argument by stating that the SANDF does not

consist of peacekeepers entirely, but they have a body of men whose skills lie in peacekeeping and combat operations. In order to maintain this however he stated that there needs to be more investment in the military training of these men.

- Through his speeches in 2006 and 2007 it seems that Lekota has presented more arguments as to why there should be more investment in the SANDF and the peacekeeping operations that it is involved in.

- In 2006 Lekota stated that Africa has been torn apart by outsiders for its resources. Thus he stated that there is international conflict over the shortage of resources and minerals. Lekota thus emphasized that the reason why there has been a focus on peacekeeping from the South African government is that stability and peace are the foundations of sustainable development.

- He referred to the DRC who have only recently entered a role of peace after years of war. He alluded to the fact that now they will be able to start enjoying the benefits of this. He specifically referred to the importance of the DRC's democratic elections in terms of development. He stated that the SANDF was in the forefront of this. He also stated that the SAAF has been transporting election material to the DRC. This they have done through a period of 14 days which included flying night and day to the DRC.

- Lekota stated that this was because they were using ageing aircrafts. He gladly confirmed that with the purchase of the new giant A400M Military transport airbuses in future such processes will be handled a lot easier. He highlighted that this aircraft could also be used to transport technology which would also be important in terms of the development of the DRC.

- Lekota made his audience aware of the fact that South Africa's equipment requirements for peace missions range from small items to heavy military equipment such as armed vehicles. The reason for this he stated is because the African defence environment has become more complex. For this reason there has been a need to broaden the scope of security operations such as war theatre and force projection which will need this type of equipment.

- In 2007 Lekota carried on from the above argument. He did this by re-emphasizing the role of the SANDF in peacekeeping operations and what exactly the troops have to deal with in these peacekeeping operations.
- Lekota stated that in peacekeeping operations the troops have to stop the fighting which is taking place in that specific area and they have to redirect the energies of people into reconstruction activities
- Lekota stresses that the above are the most important roles that the troops have to play in peacekeeping operations, however there were other roles. He highlighted that in order to play all of these roles, the troops would need resources and equipment.
- Lekota names five of these resources which are needed by the SANDF. Here infrastructure in terms of repair and the maintenance of equipment is the number one priority. The other resources include the revitalization of the reserve force, the upgrading of their information technology (IT), the modernization of the army and the operationalization of the defense review update.

Conclusion:

- From the above we can gather that the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota is in full support of the peacekeeping operations in Africa that the SANDF is part of. Through his speeches he elaborates on the importance of these operations and how important it is for the SANDF to get full support from the government in order for these troops to be able to take part in these operations to the best of their abilities.
- In term of rhetoric it seems that Lekota makes similar arguments to those made by the Chief of the South African army. Their similarities lie in their belief to invest on the equipment of the SANDF and the training of the troops for these peacekeeping operations. However the Chief makes the use of pathos in order to make this argument. He basically argues that better equipment and the re-training of these troops is in the best interest of the troops in these peacekeeping

operations. In other words they could reduce the number of casualties and risks in these operations

- Lekota on the other hand argues that better equipment will make the troops on these operations more efficient which will have an impact on their service delivery.

- To do this Lekota makes the use of very formal arguments. Firstly he starts off by uplifting the ethos of the SANDF by stating that they have been in the forefront of the peacekeeping operations in Africa.

- Through the years he indirectly argues that this ethos needs to be maintained by the SANDF by making sure that the troops perform at the highest level possible. Here he makes use of the arguments of providing the troops with up to date equipment as well as re-training them

- He makes these arguments through the use of logical arguments (logos). Here he makes the use of both inductive speech and deductive speech. He makes the use of inductive speech by stating examples of the benefits that can be obtained by improving the equipment of the SANDF as well as re-training the troops. Here his examples revolved around the successful maintenance of peace.

- His deductive arguments illustrated the probable benefits of new equipment for example Lekota pointed out that the purchase of the A400m aircraft would benefit South Africa and Africa as a whole in the future. The fact that Lekota's argument for the purchase of this aircraft was also future looking (deliberative) also added to the merit of the argument. In other words it highlighted the expediency (usefulness) of purchasing the aircraft.

- Through the above, it is clear that the arguments made in Lekota's speeches were researched thoroughly and they were delivered very formally. This is mostly because he was delivering the speech to a well educated audience. The high quality of arguments made by Lekota in these speeches also add to his ethos as a Minister. They highlight the fact that he is a competent leader who is worthy of his title as a Minister.

SECTION 4

SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY RECRUITMENT

Background

In recent times the South African army has focused a lot of their energy in trying to recruit new soldiers. However they have been struggling as far as these recruitment plans are concerned. At the moment it seems that the army has ageing soldiers who cannot handle the conditions that they are exposed to during their peacekeeping operations, which seems to be the army's main priority. For this reason the army has focused on recruiting young soldiers who would be able to handle the conditions of these peacekeeping missions, which would lead to them being more efficient in these peacekeeping operations.

Research Methodology.

In researching the South African army's recruitment plans, this paper made the use of the Google search engine (www.google.com). Through the use of search phrases such as "South African army recruitment policy," "SANDF recruitment" and "military recruitment" the process gained in momentum. The Google search engine had links to websites which focused on the South African army's recruitment plans, what was even more helpful was the fact that these recruitment plans seemed to be mostly based on the peacekeeping operations which the army is involved in. The reason why this was so helpful is that these peacekeeping operations are the crux of the investigations of this paper as a whole.

The South African army discusses its recruitment plans.

- According to an article entitled “Moves Afoot Rejuvenate South African army” the South African army needs to be rejuvenated. It seems that the reason for the need of rejuvenation in the South African army stems from the fact that they need to be able to execute its mandate in Africa (peacekeeping operations). In order to be able to do this, it seems that the army needs to recruit young and fit soldiers who will be able to cope with the conditions in these peacekeeping operations.
- These conditions seem to include climatic conditions, conditions with a lack of infrastructure and a general lack of development. It seems that since the duration of the operations can last up to six months in these conditions, there is a need for young, fit soldiers who are motivated to the cause of bringing peace to the African continent
- However the Chief of the South African army stressed the fact that the army will not just be taking any young people into the army, instead there would be a focus on getting the “right people”. In other words young people who did not just see the South African army as an employment opportunity. The Chief also stated that they were looking to make 3000 new recruits by 2008 and 7000 by 2009. He stressed that the need for these numbers stem from the need of more boots on the ground in these peacekeeping operations. He also added that in order to have these numbers the South African army would need more money
- The above argument was taken further by this article by stating that the army’s operational commitments have grown and that it has been at the back of the queue for equipment renewal and capital investment and more priority has been placed to the Air Force and the Navy. The main argument here was that the South African army has the potential to play a key role in peacekeeping operations, and that if we as Africans are serious about peace, then we need to build the necessary capacity for the army to do so.

- From this the article makes another important argument. It comments on the army's communication efforts in terms of recruitment. Basically it states that the communication of the army is poor. It states that there are calls being made through the press urging the "right people" to join the army, as well as a few advertisements on news paper's and the odd recruitment drive at a few schools. This article argues that this will at best recruit a few people who will be job and career seekers, which the army is trying to avoid.
- The suggestion which this article produces is for the army to explain what it really means to be in the army and to create career opportunities in the army for young and adventurous boys and girls irrespective of race.
- In addition to this, this article stresses the fact that the South African soldiers in Africa are doing a good job. However we are only exposed to bad publicity where they are concerned. The change that needs to be made here is that there should be more of an emphasis on giving these soldiers credit for their good. This will restore a sense of pride in being part of the army. This in turn will recruit the "right people" into the army.
- An example of this would be the way the South African Air Force (SAAF) recruits individual into their department. According to the article entitled "Recruitment-Joining the Force" the SAAF is very specific about the type of individuals they recruit into their department. Applicants are assessed according to their Matric results, there is an interviewing process, and they have to write psychometric tests. It seems that the reason for this is to recruit the best individuals as possible in order for them to be able to cope ion the different careers which are provided by this Department. The reason why this paper has decided to make use of the SAAF is because it seems to have clearly specified the career opportunities which it has available with in its Department, which is why it has been able to recruit the "right people" in the past.
- It is possible that if the South African army used the above approach as stated by the article entitled "Moves Afoot Rejuvenate South African army" the army would be able to recruit the "right people". This would perhaps avoid drastic

measures such as youth conscription as stated by the article entitled “SA youth faces call-ups again.”

- So far there seems to be good suggestions in order to deal with the army’s recruitment issues. However the article entitled “Moves Afoot Rejuvenate South African army” states that in order for these to be successful the army there needs to be a lot of attention focused on the bad image of the army which is caused by their ageing equipment, the under spending on maintenance and training and the skewed rank and age profile. The above, according to this article causes people to lose interest in the South African army.

- The article adds that the same can be said about the issue of affirmative action, because it causes young white males to lose interest in the army as well. This has a huge affect on the representativeness of the army which is very important.

Conclusion:

- At this point of investigating the recruitment of the South African army, it seems that the army is specifically interested in recruiting young individuals. The army seems to have mentioned that the main reason for this is that they will be able to cope a lot better than older individuals in the conditions of the peacekeeping operations in Africa.

- In terms of rhetoric, once again the arguments which are made by these articles make the use of ethos and pathos.

- The use of ethos is the same as in the other sections of this paper. The article entitled “Moves Afoot Rejuvenate South African army” in this section also argues that the South African army or SANDF is superior to most other armies. This argument uplifts the ethos of the army. Then it is at this point that the above article argues that this is a reason for more investment in the army in terms of equipment, and because of the fact that they have been at the back of the queue where this is concerned with priorities falling to the likes of the Air Force and the Navy. This argument makes the use of pathos, it basically makes the audience aware of the injustice which has been done to the South African army.

- The suggestions for the improvement of the recruitment for the army makes the use of logos in the inductive form. They make logical arguments which are supplemented by the use of examples of where the army has gone wrong in terms of recruitment and where they could improve. This is very effective because it is very difficult to argue against logical example of ones faults
- However what is interesting is the fact that through this discussion of the recruitment of soldiers for the army there is no mention of the type of training that these new soldiers will have to go through or what they should expect to face in these peacekeeping operations. For example as we have seen in the duration of this paper, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the South African army has mentioned on many occasions that soldiers will have to be trained at high levels which include military and combat training because peacekeeping operations involve fighting. This could be an effort in keeping the ethos of these peacekeeping operations. By possible recruits being made aware of the dangers of these operations immediately could possibly demotivate them. However by making them aware of the dangers when they were already excited about being in the army, would not demotivate them as easily.

FINAL CONCLUSION.

- Through this paper, it has become quite evident that South Africa portrays itself as a country which is very dedicated to the peacekeeping operations in Africa. For this reason, we can assume that it is a peace loving country. However having said that, it seems through their arguments about peace there is some underlying factor that cannot be ignored.

- This underlying factor is that through their arguments it seems that although South Africa is a peace loving country, they also seem to believe that they have to be war ready. In other words they have to be ready for combat.

- The above is expressed in all of the four sections in this paper. Each of the sections in this paper makes an emphasis on the fact that the SANDF or the South African army needs new equipment or that more money needs to be invested in these departments so that they can purchase the correct equipment.

- The desperate need for the correct equipment in these departments can be construed as a sign that it is dangerous for these troops to go to the peace operations without the adequate material. Therefore they have to be ready for any unexpected action at all times. In other words even though these departments are from a peace loving country they also have to be ready for war.

- Another indication that these departments believe that they have to be ready for war is the need to retrain the troops. It has been revealed in this paper by the Chief of the South African army that these troops have to be retrained in order for them to be ready for combat as well as these peacekeeping operations. This is an indication that even though peacekeeping operations are important to the country, they have to be war ready.

- In addition to the above is Minister Lakota's plea to have young or the right people being recruited in the army. He states that the reason for this is that they will be able to cope better in the weather conditions during these peacekeeping operations. Another reason for him wanting to recruit young people could be that they would cope better in the combat situations in the operations. So by

recruiting young people, not only would they be ready for these peacekeeping operations, but they would also be ready for combat or war situations as well.

- Finally the biggest indication that South Africa is a peace loving county that has to be war ready is the statement made by Minister Lekota when he stated that even though South Africa is committed to these peacekeeping operations in Africa, they are still committed to the core force doctrine which enables them to deal with unconventional threats. Here what the Minister is suggesting is that South Africa is and they have to be war ready even though they are committed to these peacekeeping operations.

- This is why throughout this paper it is quite clear that in his arguments Minister Lekota keeps building on his past arguments. In doing this he is forward looking. For example when he argues about purchasing peacekeeping equipment, he also highlights the other roles that these equipment could play in the SANDF...such as combat or war roles. Such arguments indicate that South Africa has to be war ready.

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SECTION 1
Procurement debate articles

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Background notes: Press statement on the Strategic Defence Procurement Package

Press statement issued by the Ministers of Defence, Finance, Public Enterprises and Trade and Industry

12 January 2001

Introduction

The Strategic Defence Procurement authorised for contracting in December 1999 was a major expenditure decision and marked the end of a complex four stage process of policy formulation, management and evaluation of proposals, negotiation and decision making. Between February 1996 and April 1998 a comprehensive process was carried out to determine the kind of Defence force we needed and how it should be equipped. The Defence Review was tabled and approved in Parliament in April 1998. This had the support of all Parties. The Government understood that this would be a difficult and, for some, a contentious decision. We respect the fact that there are many who are opposed to defence purchases and have accordingly lobbied very actively against the deal. Such debate is in the nature of our new democracy. This was a carefully considered and thoroughly researched and analysed decision. The decision was made in the interests of maintaining an effective and modern defence capability. This policy decision was taken in the full cognisance of the competing needs of our funds and every effort was made to balance the competing claims on our funds, including the necessity of building an effective defence capacity over the next decade. It is the duty and prerogative of government to make such policy decisions.

It is also fundamental to our democracy that the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Auditor General took it upon themselves to look into allegations of impropriety and what, if proven would amount to criminal activity. Accordingly, the Government and the relevant departments have cooperated fully with these enquiries. We thank both the Auditor General and SCOPA for acknowledging this cooperation. There have been occasions where departments have sought clarity from SCOPA as to how commercially or

military sensitive information would be dealt with and we would regard it as irresponsible to have done otherwise. Since government has legislative and contractual obligations to meet we will need the cooperation of all parties to comply with these obligations and allow transparency. Government cannot be expected to violate standard procedures.

The Government does have clear reservations on certain procedural matters and on the published outcome of both the Auditor General's Special Review and the Fourteenth Report of SCOPA. A brief outline of these reservations is provided in the body of this statement. However, at no time have these reservations constituted refusal to work with Constitutional structures or to hinder the process of transparency. It is in the national interest that any form of delict be uncovered. It is equally imperative that due process is adhered to and that the integrity of our institutions is not needlessly called into question.

Subsequent to both reports representatives of the offices of Judge Heath, the Auditor General, the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the Public Protector have had controlled access to all relevant documents. The documents have, however, remained in the custody of the Department of Defence.

Government is prepared to make very detailed representations to SCOPA in the ongoing work envisaged for that committee. This would allow us to correct basic misperceptions. The government is quite confident of the integrity of the Departments, Ministers and the Cabinet. We are also confident that the deal is sound and that the process was conducted correctly. Accordingly, the Cabinet has made it quite clear that the relevant Ministers must personally make representations. We reiterate our support for processes to uncover any criminal conduct or to highlight and address inappropriate expenditure on programs and administrative inadequacies in government.

In the light of continued ill informed and unfounded speculation and assertion in the public domain that is clearly prejudicial to the perceived integrity of this government we are choosing to deal with certain matters at this stage. In doing this we are in no way pre-empting further enquiry or our own right to provide detailed information to any such enquiry. However, it is our view that unjustified attacks on the integrity of government must be defended and that the processes of redress and the issues to be dealt with must be accurately defined.

Accordingly, we wish to provide essential background information as to the nature of the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages and then to comment on certain findings which we believe are misleading in the absence of the more detailed context of this very large and complex set of contracts. Our purpose is to redress what has become an unwarranted set of speculations based on very preliminary and not necessarily correct or accurate assessments.

The decision to undertake a Strategic Defence Procurement

Much preparation went into the decision to procure a wide range of equipment for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The equipment needs were detailed in the Defence Review as approved by Parliament in 1998. The Defence Review pointed to the need to provide strategic equipment for a

number of arms of service of the SANDF if we wanted to retain an effective defence capability. Without this replenishment of the main arms of service of our SANDF, its operational capabilities would have been structurally impaired. Whilst there maybe those who are opposed to the idea of South Africa having a defence capacity this is not supported by the Defence Review or by government policy. Such capacity is a Constitutional matter.

In the light of the developmental challenges facing us, the Government is acutely conscious of the various competing calls on our limited resources. This is why we have undertaken massive fiscal and budgetary reform to ensure prudent expenditure of limited resources. All departments have to prepare three-year medium-term expenditure programs. A procurement of this nature with expenditures spread over more than a decade meant a specific budgeting process and Cabinet adopted a three phased decision making process for the Strategic Procurement.

It is important to point out that the decision to consolidate all the systems into a single Strategic Procurement package was in itself a major step in creating transparency in the whole process. The procurement process has been explicitly set out and was not merged into annual budgets of the Defence department or opaque funds as was the case in the past. The acquisition process is also dealt with in Chapter 13 of the Defence Review.

The magnitude of the expenditure would have macroeconomic effects and also budgetary allocation effects for all departments. The Cabinet therefore decided to move forward in a particular way that allowed us to establish the implications of the deal in all its aspects as accurately as it is possible to do with long term contractual expenditure.

The agreement on the need for the purchase of strategic equipment on the basis of the Defence Review and Government's policy of maintaining a defence capability at an effective level was subject to certain constraints in regard to the affordability of the packages. This immediately led to downscaling of the full acquisition proposals in and around the Defence Review.

The process was unique for South African defence procurement for a number of reasons. The process was conducted in an open and transparent manner unlike decades of previous purchases. The deal represented a strategic package rather than piecemeal procurement and a systematic process of Industrial Participation obligations was developed in line with the National Industrial Participation Program (NIPP) adopted by Cabinet in April 1997. The latter is applied to all public sector procurements where the imported content will exceed \$10 million.

The NIPP for this procurement had a direct component relating to defence equipment, where the objective was to assist the South African defence industry, and a non-defence component where the objective was to facilitate investment and technology and skill transfer into South Africa's manufacturing sector. In both these programs black economic empowerment is an objective as it is in all government economic policy.

This approach meant that in all decisions there would be four national government departments involved. Finance (National Treasury) dealt with

budgetary implications, financial affordability and macro fiscal and economic implications. Trade and Industry dealt with the non-defence (and in part defence industrial participation) and assisted with certain economic implications. The Department of Public Enterprises dealt with aspects relating to state owned corporations. The Department of Defence dealt with the technical defence requirements, defence industrial participation and the specific budget of the Defence vote. There were also four independent evaluation groups, each with a mandate and scoring system comprised of unique value systems for assessment.

A committee of the Ministers of these departments was chaired by the Deputy President (and later as President) and it decided on and prepared the final recommendations to Cabinet. It is important to note that this critical level of decision making was not able to input into either the Auditor General's Special Review or make representation to SCOPA and it is why Cabinet is insistent that it have the right to deal with many inaccurate assessments.

It is apparent from the unique nature of this process that any corruption in the awarding of the prime contractors and many major subsystems would have to have infiltrated central departments and Ministers of the South African government. The deal was structured in this manner precisely to reduce the prospects or even incentive for corruption as they would have no prospect of influencing the deal. We will return to this matter in commenting on the Review and the Report of SCOPA.

The next milestone decision made by Cabinet was to conduct further negotiations with the short listed bidders. The decision was based on a recommendation made by the Committee of Ministers set out above. Again the relevance of this will be addressed in the specific comments that follow. Once again the negotiators had a mandate to address affordability questions. It was also decided to appoint a Chief Negotiator to coordinate the negotiations and report to the President and the Ministers. The appointment of Jayendra Naidoo into this position was a further step in ensuring that the Government objectives would be met. This was a unique and quite conscious aspect of the process. In the light of endless unsubstantiated and outlandish accusations being made by unknown sources we were wise to take these precautions.

After extensive negotiations involving the technical structure of the equipment, industrial obligation requirements and the financing of the deal a final report was prepared. The report dealt with a wide range of matters. Of decisive importance was a report on an assessment of the economic, fiscal and financial impacts of the packages. In particular it assessed the risk across a number of dimensions and the final affordability of the deal in the light of the intense negotiations conducted. This was done by the Department of Finance with the assistance of other government departments, external economists and a local university. This report and the various options available was presented to the Ministerial Committee and circulation was tightly controlled. It is unlikely that any previous expenditure by government has been so thoroughly analysed.

It is important to explain this decision in the light of some of the comments of SCOPA. The Committee of Ministers sitting with the President had to weigh the need to meet the objective of retaining a defence capacity, which meant that a critical mass of equipment was needed. Yet we could not destabilise the Medium-Term Expenditure Program and existing allocations to other departments or the basic budget framework. In particular risk was assessed over the critical early years of the contract. To achieve this balance further adjustments were made to the final contracted authorisations and a fail-safe option was developed to allow for tranches of equipment to be purchased. This does make the final contracts complex.

The NIPP can never be used to justify the decision to purchase. It arises only when that decision has been taken. A study of the publicly available program makes this apparent. Accordingly, the NIPP was not and could not be decisive in the final procurement decision. The NIPP played two roles. The first was that it has been an effective investment promotion device and therefore will assist with job creation. Secondly it was used in a number of the exercises to assess economic risks such as balance of payments effects and the growth impact. Government accepts that there were many proponents of the deal, and others, who sought to justify the deal on the basis of the so-called NIPP offsets. There was continuous media comment around the potential investment and job creation aspects of the deal. However, when accounting to SCOPA or the Auditor General the Ministers who made the decision to recommend a particular course to Cabinet must be judged on what they decided on rather than on public perceptions of what their decision was.

The purpose of providing this background is that it allows us to deal with what we regard as inaccurate assessments in the two reports and it is these assessments that are fuelling further reckless and unsubstantiated speculation and accusation.

The special review by the Auditor-General

A review is by its nature a preliminary and less than complete audit. Accordingly, both findings and assessment should be expressed with caution. The Government believes that on a matter such as this it would not be correct for the review to be left in its present form as it does not do justice to a very complex process and in so doing calls into question certain processes without being able to fully justify this. We wish to illustrate this by a few brief comments. We refer here to the Key Findings as numbered in the Review.

3.1. It is not clear to Government what is meant by the overall independence of the role players. We raise this since it would appear as if the review ignored the complexity of the process and the different levels of decision making. In particular the role of the Committee of Ministers is not taken into account. It is very hard for us to see how we could have put in more safeguards and we look forward to the further contact with the Auditor-General to clarify this matter.

3.2. The matter of the LIFT program and the so - called uncosted option attracts a great deal of attention. The mistaken inference is made that the Armaments Acquisition Council made the decision on this matter. This is not correct. On the basis of their deliberations a number of options and

considerations were placed before the committee of Ministers. In effect the bids had thrown up two groups of possibilities in regard to the links between trainers, advanced trainers and advanced fighters. This meant a number of permutations were possible and were presented to the Committee of Ministers. This is not an uncommon situation. The Committee of Ministers considered the permutations and all four Ministers expressed views that emanated from their areas of responsibility. After considerable consideration and taking many factors into account and respecting the bidding parameters the decision was to go for the Hawk-Gripen option. The Cabinet is clear that this is a correct process and that no undue influence could have been exercised given that very different considerations influenced different Ministers in their views and that the decision was reached after detailed consultation. It should also be pointed out that the unsuccessful bidders themselves have not invoked any action to question the decision. If the conduct had been improper it is within their rights to do so.

It is our view that the Auditor-General may not have been adequately exposed to the high-level decision-making process and is dealing with various aspects of the evaluation mechanisms. Accordingly, the inferences are based on incomplete information.

3.3. The Auditor-General is entitled to his opinion as to the adequacy of the performance guarantees. However, we would wish to make four points and then express our own opinion. The first is that the standard performance guarantee is set at 5% in the NIPP and we were able to negotiate above this in certain cases. Secondly, the level is in-line with or exceeds international norms. Thirdly, a higher performance bond may have the effect of providing a greater incentive to build it into the price, and fourthly the prime contractor has to assume the liability for the guarantee but it is a consortium that provides the NIP obligations. The performance guarantee should not be measured against the size of the NIP but against the loss the prime contractor may take if the NIP is not fulfilled. When this is done it is clear that there is a very powerful incentive for the main contractor to work with us to achieve success. We believe that we are entirely within international practice and as indicated above the Auditor-General is incorrect when he sees the counter-trade aspects of the deal as a major objective of the deal. This is not correct, rather than counter-trade aspects are an important achievable consequence of the Strategic Procurement.

3.4. The Auditor General has not correctly dealt with the matter of a first order value system as this policy was not adopted and he will need to hold further discussions with the Ministry of Defence to clarify this matter.

3.5. It is our contention that the Auditor General has not understood the intricacies of the acquisition process and that further discussion is needed. This relates to the matters of staff target and staff requirement approvals. The differences in past and present procurements have to be taken into account.

3.6. It is quite clear that in a major equipment purchase where reliability of performance is mission-critical that the Department of Defence must be able to hold one contractor liable for performance and delivery. Accordingly, it is clear

policy not to become involved in negotiations with individual subcontractors. This matter is clearly set out in the documentation. This is standard procedure in all major contracts. We can only assume that the Auditor-General's Office did not spend enough time on the particular case cited. This is not a matter for government but is a matter for the contractors and they are quite certain that the company concerned was not going to be their supplier.

3.7. It is correct that the additional support and analysis used in this deal is not standard procedure for procurement. We added further processes of assessment and analysis and had to make special provisions to procure these services. The Committee of Ministers considered the methods used and considered them to be fair and reasonable in achieving even greater clarity on the deal. Nothing improper was being carried out in this process.

3.8. The unusual nature of this deal has been explained and the steps taken by Cabinet to budget for it and arrive at the affordability of the deal have been set out above. We would therefore take the view that the process has not been fully understood by the Auditor-General's Office.

It is apparent from the above remarks that the government would take issue with the conclusion drawn by the Auditor-General as we believe that the Review has not been able to do full justice to the issues at hand.

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts

Many of the points of concern in this report echo those dealt with by the Auditor General. It is the government view that the SCOPA was not able to go beyond the Auditor General in their work. It is also government's view that the Committee would have benefited from a more comprehensive presentation of this very complex deal. A prime responsibility of SCOPA is to ensure that once government has taken a decision that that decision results in value for money in the expenditure of state resources. To establish this requires an immense amount of work in a deal as complex as this. It is also a matter of regret that the Committee did not use the offer of Ministers to appear or even to have called them in the first place.

Accordingly, it seems to us that they had no first hand account of how the actual decisions were taken. They were exposed instead to a major component of the process, which was the making of recommendations to the Ministers, rather than the actual decisions the Ministers took. This consequently resulted in a number of misunderstandings.

A major point raised by SCOPA is the assertion that the Cabinet had information on the possible cost escalation of the deal and did not disclose this fact. This is exceedingly misleading. SCOPA commends the National Treasury for the work done on affordability of the packages. As is apparent from that work the immensely complex range of risks was fully investigated and analysed, and taken into account by the Committee of Ministers. These risks included the risk of Rand depreciation over the life of the contract, the risk of interest rate increases for economic measures unrelated to the contract and the risk of non-performance of contractors in relation to their NIP commitments. The lower figure of 30.3 billion Rand is in real 1999 prices ie. it is adjusted for expected inflation over the life of the contract and includes also the cost

escalations built into the contract. Since the contracts are denominated in foreign currency this figure is the real Rand value of the package at the time of signing, based also on the prevailing Rand exchange rate at the time.

Government was naturally aware that the Rand will fluctuate against foreign currencies during the life of the contract and this issue was fully addressed in its risk analysis of the October 1999 Cabinet decision. In the risk analysis various scenarios of the Rand's trajectory were used and their cost impact examined. It would have been totally arbitrary to have identified any one of these scenarios as reflecting the Rand cost of the package, as opposed to the cost of R30,3 billion, calculated at the then prevailing exchange rate.

The figure of R43, 8 billion is calculated on the basis of a different trajectory for the Rand than the R30,3 billion, and thus the two amounts don't represent the same basis for measuring the package and cannot be directly compared. It should also be noted that similar considerations regarding exchange rate fluctuation affect all Government and private financial commitments denominated in foreign currencies including foreign debt and imports of goods and services. The risks here are indeed unusual because of the length of the contract, and this was taken full account of in the decision by cabinet.

Government has in place mechanisms to monitor exchange rate changes and other economic movements, which might pose risks to the defense package and all other government financial commitments, and to address problems should they arise.

The Committee is correct in needing to examine the cost build up of the aircraft as this is clearly their function. This is a very onerous task and government will continue to help and supply the necessary information.

The NIP issues have been canvassed in response to the Auditor-General's Review. Clearly the estimates of jobs are projections. The NIP program will spread out over a number of years and regular reports will be given to allow us to assess the success of this program.

Statements are made that are difficult to respond to in regard to the quality of the contracts. The Committee will have to be more specific in this regard. In the absence of specifics the point seems unwarranted.

Government wishes to express its very strong reservations on the statement made on prime contractors. In the light of how decisions were made in this matter the only inference that can be made is that the improper influence could only be decisive if it held sway where the Ministers made the decision.

Government rejects this and in the light of the massive amount of information available regards this as a careless statement that government must be allowed to dispel entirely.

Another matter raised is that of subcontractors. It should be pointed out that the Procurement does not deal with subcontractors. This has to be the contractual obligation of the prime contractor as it is they who must deliver reliable equipment and undertake the performance and delivery obligations. This is standard practice in major contracts. To insist that Government must be held to account for minor subcontracts is to misunderstand procurement. The prime

contractors are major international corporations and we are confident that they would ensure the quality of the subcontractors and this is their responsibility

SECTION 2
Army on peacekeeping operation articles

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The South African Army - Future and Forecasts

By Ronnie Kasrils

Deputy Minister of Defence, South African Government of National Unity

[Published in African Security Review Vol 4 No 1 1995](#)

INTRODUCTION

The period in which we as South Africans find ourselves can best be described as revolutionary and, as such, thoughts and strategies must be adapted to the challenges posed by this period. The future of the SA Army is integrally related to the future of both the transition process in general and the defence establishments in particular. It is therefore important to stimulate thought and debate to ensure that the military is positioned correctly to deal with all the challenges by which it can be confronted.

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Development within the defence community is inseparably related to development in the international arena. The end of the Cold War is an obvious example of the extent to which a realignment of military thinking has taken place in international quarters. More recently three international developments have implications for the redefinition of the roles and mission of the armed forces and their restructuring in general:

Firstly, it is imperative to recognise that the root causes of insecurity encompass a range of non-military factors. Poverty, lack of development and facilities provide the environment within which conflict can thrive. The successful resolution of insecurity, therefore, involves a range of measures, amongst them those of a political, economic, diplomatic and military nature. Although the military component is important in this equation, it cannot, in itself, resolve insecurity. The successful resolution of insecurity in our country, therefore, is interwoven with the success of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

Secondly, the importance of regional security measures in resolving regional security questions needs to be recognised. The spectre of the arms race and

military build-up can, and has, caused considerable insecurity and conflict in regions throughout the world. Avoiding this type of conflict involves a commitment to regional development priorities, the creation of regional security alliances, joint commitment to disarmament and the initiation of measures to build confidence and security.

The last development is the pivotal role of peace operations in the new world order. Collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace has emerged as a key activity in international co-operation. As a leader in both the region and on the continent, South Africa can be expected to become involved in supporting peace operations. Such participation, however, should always be on a multilateral basis and should take cognisance of the costs and consequences of such operations.

The South African defence community and the SA Army should also take advantage of the wide range of international contacts that are being established and re-established at present. Joint manoeuvres and training, training exchanges and international visits are obviously positive opportunities. South Africa can learn much from the international community, particularly in such areas as peace operations, equal opportunities, civil-military relations and defence management within a democratic dispensation. These comparative experiences should be internalised to our advantage in the future.

CHALLENGES ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT

The future of the SA Army will, to no small extent, be determined by a range of dynamic challenges occurring on the domestic front. These are, amongst others, the creation of a Ministry of Defence, the integration process and the role of the SA Army in guaranteeing the success of the present transition process.

The success of any democratic transition is largely determined by the stability of civil-military relations. It is necessary, therefore, to

- ensure effective political control over the armed forces *via* a Ministry of Defence;
- ensure that defence management uses the combination of civilian and military skills at its disposal; and
- provide for the development of the armed forces in accordance with their professional brief.

To this end it has been proposed that a Ministry of Defence be established according to the following criteria:

- The creation of a portfolio for a Secretary of Defence responsible for the formulation of defence policy and the administration of the Department of

Defence. The Secretary will be the Minister's primary civilian advisor on defence matters. The Secretary will have equal status to the Chief of the National Defence Force.

- The maintenance of the present position of Chief of the National Defence Force. The Chief of the National Defence Force will remain the commander of the SANDF and will be responsible for its maintenance and deployment. He /she will be the Minister's primary military advisor.
- The provision of a guarantee that the Ministry is vested with supervisory and guiding powers with regard to the defence community.

The success of the creation of a Ministry of Defence will be determined by the following variables:

- The accurate and effective allocation of responsibilities to both the Secretary and the Chief of the National Defence Force. Military strategy and doctrine, for instance, remain the prerogative of the Defence Force. Financial accountability and defence policy remain the responsibility of the Secretary.
- Ensuring continued co-operation and co-ordination between the military and the civilian components of the Department of Defence.
- The ensurance that activities of both the military and the civilian components of the Department of Defence remain subordinate to and guided by the political guidelines of the Ministry.
- The ensurance that the Ministry is always subordinate and accountable to Parliament. Civilian control is vested not in the Department of Defence, but in Parliament.

DEFENCE FORCE INTEGRATION

The success of the integration process remains the major challenge facing the SA Army in the next three years. The integration process is primarily a phenomenon within the ground forces and the extent to which this process is successfully managed by the Army will determine the success of the integration process in general. It is necessary for the integration process to succeed since

- Failure to integrate the different armed forces will result in the creation of a Defence Force and an army characterised by mistrust, disloyalty, politicisation, and an "us and them" scenario.
- Failure to integrate the armed forces successfully, will result in the creation of a Defence Force and an army characterised by inadequate levels of discipline and morale. This will severely affect the combat

readiness of the armed forces, an irreplaceable component of military professionalism.

- Failure by the Army to complete the integration process will result in a situation where the Army will be unable to accomplish its primary and secondary missions. This will lead to a considerable loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.

RATIONALISATION

Despite the importance of a successful integration process, it is imperative, within the next three to five years, to create a Defence Force and Army wherein the force levels are appropriate to the roles and mission of the armed forces. Rationalisation will be necessary, therefore, to achieve a balanced Defence Force and will have to encompass the following:

- as far as possible, rationalisation should not affect the operational and professional capabilities of the Defence Force;
- rationalisation should be perceived to be a fair process in the eyes of the personnel affected;
- provision should be made for rationalised personnel, either in the form of demobilisation packages or skills-training *via* the Service Corps;
- rationalisation should be handled with compassion and humanity; and
- an attempt should be made to retain the skills and leadership qualities of rationalised personnel within the part-time forces.

TRANSITION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The sub-continent as a whole is, at present, in a process of transition. This fluidity is a product of the region's history and the levels of social, political and economic dislocation that have been experienced. In demographic terms it manifests itself in the high incidence of refugee dislocation and illegal immigration into South Africa. A consequence of this southwards migration is the range of problems experienced with arms and drugs smuggling and related criminal activities.

The SA Army, at present, has the exclusive responsibility for landward border protection. Whilst the Ministry of Defence acknowledges that the successful resolution of regional problems lies primarily in the political, diplomatic and economic spheres, it is still responsible for the monitoring and protection of the country's borders. The consequences of an unchecked migration into South Africa could be disastrous. These include:

- an additional burden on both the job market and the State's social service system;
- competition over scarce resources in those areas immediately affected by the influx, particularly Northern and Eastern Transvaal; and
- an increase in the incidence of arms smuggling and related activities with grievous consequences for social and political stability within South Africa.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN SECURITY SERVICES

President Mandela has, on numerous occasions, expressed his appreciation for the role played by the SA Army in both the pre- and post-election period, especially in assisting the South African Police Services in maintaining internal stability. This is a critical arena within which the Army is presently active, although there are reservations about the extent to which it should involve itself in this arena. This is mainly the result of the extensive but unavoidable budget cuts required from the SA Army.

THE SANDF AND THE RDP

Undoubtedly the SANDF and the SA Army can play a valuable role in the RDP. The utilisation of the State's resources to render support to the RDP is essential in this regard. Yet, a distinction must be drawn between the inherent collateral utility of the armed forces and its potential collateral utility. The inherent collateral utility of the SANDF, and any modern defence force, lies in:

- the skills it provides in a wide range of areas, for instance mechanical, technical and artisan skills;
- the leadership qualities it develops amongst its members; and
- the sense of discipline it instills in its members.

The potential skills relevant to the RDP may include the following:

- The use of the SANDF's skills in socio-economic upgrading, amongst others, medical, engineering and construction skills.
- The use of the Service Corps to train personnel in a wide range of skills prior to their reintroduction to the economy.

CONCLUSION

The SA Army finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it has a moral and political responsibility as dictated by the Interim Constitution to provide for the defence of the country. This responsibility cannot be evaded. On

the other hand, it also has an ongoing responsibility for internal stability and border protection. To shirk this would be catastrophic. South Africa will be called upon to play a role in peace operations. To do this it requires appropriate armed forces that are modern and technologically sophisticated. It will also be called upon to participate actively in the RDP.

These arenas outlined above require funds in order to be executed. Budget cuts not only affect the long term capabilities of the Defence Force, but also the short term capacity of the SANDF to accomplish its functions. The value of the armed forces in a developing democracy needs to be appreciated fully. To ensure that decisions are balanced with regard to the future of the armed forces, as many stakeholders as possible should be involved in a comprehensive defence review - the Defence Force, Parliament, the parliamentary defence committees, the public and the arms industry.

1. Keynote address, conference on *The SA Army - Futures and Forecasts*, jointly presented by the Institute for Defence Policy, the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA in co-operation with the South African Army on Tuesday, 8 November 1994, at the Senate Hall, Theo Van Wijk Building, UNISA, Pretoria.

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SA army, undertaking peacekeeping operations, needs re-equipping, asserts chief

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By: [Keith Campbell](#)

Published: 23 Jun 06 - 0:00

The South African Army (SA Army) is hoping that it will be able to re-equip itself in the coming years.

"The army needs to be re-equipped in its totality," asserts Chief of the SA Army Lt-Gen Solly Shoke.

"But determining how to do so will depend on the budgets we are given," he cautions.

"And whatever we do must be in line with government priorities and support government policies," he affirms.

The army has had, in fact, some 35 re-equipment projects under consideration, including Project Hoefyster ('Horseshoe') for a new family of armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) to replace the now nearly 30-year-old Ratel family, and Project Vistula for new army trucks to replace the Samil range.

All these projects are, however, under review.

"They are under review because we have to check the relevancy of the projects – are they still relevant to the current situation, or are they outdated?" queries Shoke.

The environment has changed; South African troops are currently deployed on

peacekeeping or peace support operations in Burundi, the Comores, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in Sudan (Darfur).

These are not combat deployments, but operational deployments, and they were not foreseen when many of these re-equipment projects were first conceived.

Nor should it be forgotten that peacekeeping operations can involve fighting – up to April 30 this year, no fewer than 28 United Nations peacekeeping troops in the DRC had been killed by hostile fire.

On May 28, this figure was increased by the death of a Nepalese peacekeeper in battle with rebel militia. Indeed, UN forces in the DRC have engaged in combat operations in support of the DRC government, including air strikes by helicopter gunships attached to the UN.

Peacekeeping can be dangerous, and to do it with minimum risk of casualties requires that the troops deployed on such missions – and South Africa now has more than 3 000 deployed – be well equipped. But much of the SA Army's equipment was designed 30 years ago.

“What is most important for us are command and control systems – this area is critical because of our forces being increasingly deployed elsewhere in Africa,” states Shoke.

“It is absolutely essential that these systems be designed in South Africa, if not South African-made,” he stresses.

“With regard to Project Hoefyster, we are still awaiting the report from the project team; again, we have to look at the relevancy to the current environment,” he adds.

The original plan was to acquire 264 AIFVs.

“We also still operate the Casspir mine-protected armoured personnel carriers (APCs), which are very valuable and important for peacekeeping missions, but we need to replace them as well.” Earlier this year the SA Army released a document entitled ‘Vision 2020’, which proposes the future direction of the army for the next 14 years.

Among many other things, Vision 2020 suggests an army composed of two divisions – a mechanised division equipped with AIFVs, battle tanks, and self-propelled artillery that would be the core combat force; and a motorised division equipped with new-generation mine-protected APCs, armoured cars, and towed artillery, that would carry out peacekeeping missions – a parachute and special forces brigade (for both combat and peacekeeping missions); and a “works regiment” that would train and employ artisans to maintain the SA Army's base

infrastructure at home and help peacekeeping abroad by reconstructing conflict-damaged infrastructure in post-war situations.

“Vision 2020 is still a discussion document,” cautions Shoke, “so it is not settled that the army will have two divisions; it all depends on what is practical and affordable.”

Edited by: [Keith Campbell](#)

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SECTION 3
Minister Lekota on peacekeeping articles

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***BUDGET VOTE BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE MOSIUOA LEKOTA, MP,
National Assembly, Cape Town
8 June 2004***

When in 1994, Parliament resolved that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) should be called into being, and simultaneously set out defence policy in the White Paper and Defence Review, it would have been difficult for us to foresee the very intense and broad involvement of the SANDF in the stabilisation of our sub-continent and continent.

Most debates at that time, even around the Strategic Defence Packages, were about why we needed to equip the SANDF when there were no enemies about to attack us. Very few could predict the vital role the SANDF would play in peace support operations in the continent of Africa.

With hindsight we are now in a position to say our nation was wise to have taken the decisions it did. The SANDF has been the pivotal instrument of stability in Africa south of the Sahara. The Peacekeeping Mission to Burundi is a shining example. Today, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) has become a United Nations mission (ONUB) whose mandate is "to support Burundi's efforts to re-establish sustainable peace". This is due to the pioneering role of the SANDF, and later in collaboration with Mozambique and Ethiopia, creating the conditions for the United Nations to take over.

A defence force engaged in peacekeeping operates entirely differently from a defence force at war. Peacekeeping strives to achieve sustainable peace. Subsequently its actions are premised on supporting key role players to move forward out of a conflict situation. Thus its training will be based on, among other things, international law and respect for human life and human rights. It will provide security support to role players if necessary; it will provide logistical support like secure communications, medical services for wounded and sick combatants; it will provide engineering expertise for the rebuilding of the country. It will even be involved in post-conflict resolution to ensure that combatants are demobilised effectively, that they have disarmed and that they are re-integrated into society.

10 years ago we resolved that our posture would be a defensive one and we started the transformation of the defence function in that direction in April 1994.

Ten years down the line, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review will now be reviewed. To date these two fundamental documents have guided

the transformation of the defence function. The foundation on which they were based remains sound. But there are certain aspects, which need to be revisited and adjusted.

The world has changed since 1994, and whilst we still cannot identify any serious threats to our territorial sovereignty, we still face the demons of poverty and hunger. These remain the biggest threats to our security and stability as a nation. The political imperatives, which guided us in 1994, have altered, and our structures, our training and our modus operandi must be adjusted and fine-tuned to align ourselves with our role on the African continent.

The Defence Review, which was the result of a wide consultative process, did not adequately foresee the extent of the peacekeeping role assigned to us in support of our diplomatic initiatives. It is envisaged that certain changes will be made with regard to the internal workings of the Department to meet these adjustments and to enhance the ability of the Department to be able to carry out its function effectively.

The whole of the top structure of the Department will participate in this review process. Regular updates on the progress of this review will be discussed at the Council on Defence to enable the Minister and Deputy Minister to give strategic direction to the process.

We aim to complete the review of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review by the end of this year. This is a crucial exercise and will drive the last phase of the transformation of the defence department.

We have outlined a strategic direction for the work of the Ministry, the Defence Secretary and the C SANDF for the next 5 years, accompanied by a 1-year plan, which concentrates, on specific actions and outcomes of the Department of Defence.

With the Deputy Minister of Defence, we have decided that he will drive the completion of the transformation exercise in the DOD. He will talk to that in this debate, with regard to the issues of Representivity, the Reserve Force, the Service Corps and the Veterans.

At the core of the transformation of the Defence Function is the Defence Secretariat. Located within the Department of Defence, it is responsible for the formulation of all aspects of defence policy, the proper accounting for defence expenditure and it provides a crucial resource for the Minister to enable him or her to give political leadership to the defence function.

Whilst the Defence Secretariat is mainly civilian in composition it must work together with uniformed personnel in order to draw upon the military expertise housed within the SANDF. Civil oversight of the defence function, that is

oversight by the elected representatives of the people, is a central tenet of a democratic state. Defence, like any other function, must account to Parliament.

The Defence Secretariat was re-introduced in 1994 as a result of the negotiations. Its existence is ensured by the Constitution, and we are now endeavouring to enable it to play its decisive role.

We are in the process of re-enforcing and enhancing the capacity of the Defence Secretariat. Our aim is to so hone the performance of the Defence Secretariat that it will better complement the work of the SANDF. In this regard we are collaborating with the Department of Public Service and Administration and the Public Service Commission.

We have begun to lay the foundations for success by intensifying co-ordination between the offices of the Chief of the SANDF and the Defence Secretary. To this end we are streamlining our strategic forums and decision-making structures within the Department.

With the collective commitment of the Ministry, the Defence Secretariat, and the Chief of the South African National Defence Force I am confident that we will successfully achieve our goal.

The area of defence procurement has been the subject of much debate over the last period. As I have previously reported, the Department has adopted all the recommendations of the Joint Investigation into the Strategic Packages. But we are taking other measures in addition to those recommended by the Auditor General, the Public Protector and the National Prosecuting Authority.

Firstly, we will complete the transformation of Armscor during this period. Its role and responsibilities primarily as a procurement agency must be vividly distinct from Denel, the manufacturing arm of the state sector. Any blurring of the functions between these two entities will be eliminated. I have already had preliminary discussions with the Minister of Public Enterprises (under whom Denel falls). We are at one that there must be close co-ordination between our two Departments.

I have instructed that we review Armscor's internal administrative and operations activities to see how they match up to the process started by the Cameron Commission. It is important that the whole Armscor family conducts itself to standards of which this country can be proud. We do not subscribe to the perception that the arms industry is one that is shady and riddled with corrupt practices. Democratic South Africa has constantly endeavoured to carry out its defence business transparently. And we will be at the forefront of the fight to maintain clean practices in relation to the defence industry at home and abroad.

The White Paper on Defence Related Industries, which outlines policy, needs

now to be reviewed. One of the challenges will be to successfully involve and ensure the participation of all role players in the industry and civil society including faith-based organisations. This will result in a comprehensive rather than a fragmented approach. We must guarantee ongoing work in research and development without which we will not be able to maintain our leading position in this sphere.

Our approach must be informed by the need to increase our greater collaboration among the nations of the South.

Our role in peacekeeping has itself been a learning process. The recommendations made by Brahimi on behalf of the UN, still have to be implemented and tested against our experience. It is important now for us to widen our vision of what peacekeeping actually involves. This we can do on the basis of our experience in Lesotho, DRC, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Without wanting to detract from academic analysis, our own experiences in Burundi and the DRC, and in a limited way in Ethiopia and Eritrea emphasise that we have to be much more sensitive to a case by case analysis of each situation.

Policy frameworks can only be broad. The tactics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement have to be developed on the ground. We have now the actual accumulated experience from which we can draw up our recommendations and proposals. Training for peacekeeping, can now be based on our own life experience. What is more, we are now in the fortunate position of being part of an international network whose purpose is to share experience and exchange ideas. This interaction between officers and troops from within the Continent and beyond is part of our adjustment to and participation in the global environment.

One of the lessons we have learnt in Burundi is that it is not sufficient to bring combatants into a cantonment area, disarm and register them. Beyond that, they have to see a future for themselves wherein they can maintain their families and be part of the development and construction of a peaceful society. They have to have somewhere to go and something to do after they have laid down their arms. We refer to this as sustainable peacekeeping.

Disarmament and demobilisation were successful in Mozambique because each combatant was given a sack of seed, a hoe, and a piece of land. A defence force does not have the resources or the skills to re-integrate combatants back into society.

Sustainable peacekeeping must be driven by the host Government who must take the lead within a conglomerate of local NGOs and international development organisations. The dynamic interaction between the political and the military processes is therefore ongoing.

The creation of the African Union and its sub- structures place a heavy burden of

responsibility on the security organs of our country. Not least, the DOD, which is playing an important role in the design and architecture of the Africa Standby Force.

From August this year, South Africa will be chairing the SADC Organ on Peace and Security. We hope to bring together the defence collective of our region to establish sound structures from which we can operate. Our collective experiences must be pooled to further stabilise our region and protect it from internal conflict and ensuing disarray. We are increasingly involved in the security structures of the region.

Linked to the normalisation of life in conflict situations are the destruction of redundant weapons and the elimination of anti personnel landmines. This will be high on our agenda in the coming period. In this regard we welcome Namibia's offer of collaboration given their facilities for the destruction of small arms.

To this end too we will take full part in the vigorous initiatives by SADC to reconstruct Angola.

The African Common Defence and Security Policy is key to the successful functioning of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This will be formulated through a consultation process among the defence formations on the Continent. It must relate to the specific conditions we face because the causes for conflict on our continent are complex. In many cases they are structural and stem from social and economic deprivation. They also include agents and interests originating outside our continent. Our experience in Burundi has shown that the regulations governing United Nations military intervention in the form of peacekeeping need to be reviewed in order to make them more flexible.

By adopting an approach, which emphasises the creation of conditions conducive to the signing of peace agreements, we have shown that conditions for peace can be created. In certain conditions there is a process that must precede the implementation of Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter.

Furthermore the genocide experience in Rwanda and present developments in the DRC further underline the need to review the UN system in peace support operations. Surely, the concept of human security would seem to dictate that UN peace support forces must be so mandated as to be able to intervene in the face of threat or danger to civilian life in their presence.

To mandate neutrality in such circumstances will make humankind accomplices in human tragedy similar to the Rwandan genocide by omission or neglect of duty.

In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide and the lessons of hindsight humankind must rise to the responsibilities of our time. Through political partnerships within

our own region, on our continent and even beyond with developing countries of the South, we must develop a common view and approach in order to meet the requirements and provide the resources to manage conflict.

Most important, with resources must go along the political will to contain human tragedies for the sake of future generations!

The DOD will rise to this challenge.

I thank you.

***BUDGET VOTE BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE, MOSIUOA LEKOTA, MP,
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CAPE TOWN***

8 April 2005

Africa is a vast continent, with a huge diversity of religions, languages and cultures – more than found on any other continent. Despite this, the experience of different forms of colonialism built in the aftermath of slavery and the slave trade forged the different nations of Africa into a common drive for independence and self determination. This was concretised through the Organisation of African Unity, later to become the African Union. Top on the agenda for the African leadership today is the recognition that development and subsequent prosperity will only materialise if Africa achieves peace and stability.

The status of the Peace and Security Committee (PSC) of the African Union reflects the importance and commitment placed on peace and stability for the continent to develop and fulfil its potential. Thus the issue of peacekeeping is catapulted to the top of the agenda of each and every African country for it has become part of the drive for independence and sovereignty.

The conflicts in the horn of Africa in the 80s and early 90s, the disintegration of Somalia, the internal tensions in Ethiopia and Eritrea, problems in West Africa in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and finally the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 shocked Africa and the world into recognising the urgency of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. For the countries of our continent the only response is committing ourselves to the eradication of such conflict and ensuring they never happen again.

One of the most important lessons we have learnt from the bloody events in Rwanda, was that the peacekeepers in Rwanda, were inadequate and incapable to stop the genocide. General Henry Anyidoho, Former Deputy Commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda has written:

"Failure started from the onset because of a wrong assessment of the situation and improper synchronisation of troops and equipment to task – especially when signs of danger were looming"

He goes on:

"Of what use were a bunch of soldiers with blue helmets to a community that was badly in need of food, medicine, shelter, clothing, hospitals and schools for their children? The government that was established immediately after the civil war had no resources for the administration of the country. All offices and ministries had been looted. Banks did not exist. The presence of troops under these circumstances gave the population a sense of security, but when they saw no concrete efforts in repairing the ruins of war, the Rwandese began to question the usefulness of the peacekeepers."

It is clear therefore that peacekeeping entails a great deal more than sending in a few soldiers to staff roadblocks.

I make bold to say that South Africa and other African nations should therefore make ready to step up the content and levels of their contribution to peace support operations. The thrust of NEPAD is that Africa must take responsibility for itself. The countries of Africa, together, through the continental and regional structures, must and will, take the lead in solving their problems.

We understand that conflict arises out of a scarcity of resources but quite often also out of manipulation of situations in our countries by external players whose priority is not the welfare of Africa. Recently there has been doubt cast on the correctness of our decision to acquire new strategic air lift. This criticism fails to take account of the fact that one of the main constraint on Africa resolving conflict and benefiting from its own natural resources is the absence of a developed infrastructure. This myopic approach is blind to the fact that moving across the African continent is still highly problematic and exorbitantly expensive that it is easier to connect via Europe than directly from one African country to another.

But our experience in dealing with disaster management and peacekeeping has highlighted these problems with urgency difficult to ignore. Similarly the obligations of post conflict reconstruction and development such as building roads, railways, towns, schools, hospitals, libraries, banks and stock exchanges, will require the transportation of heavy construction equipment like forklift trucks and cranes. Only if these can be transported from point to point can this continent start to realistically plan its development. A strategic airlift capacity is therefore indispensable in the absence of a functioning infrastructure. Whilst the primary beneficiary of the Airbus Military A400M programme is South Africa, the secondary beneficiary is the continent of Africa as a whole.

This aircraft is essentially a transport aircraft. It is not a war or combat plane. It is not armed to engage in battle. In the immediate and medium term it will transport troops, heavy construction equipment, large amounts of food and grain or pharmaceuticals and medical personnel. Given our national and

continental objectives, in the long term it is more available for developmental work than any other purpose. Our participation in the A400M programme will stimulate our technology industry and place our continent among the leaders of the global aerospace industry.

Linked to capacity in peacekeeping is the quality of training of peacekeepers. In this regard it is instructive to recall General Romeo Dallaire's observation on peacekeeping in Rwanda for he has observed:

"patient negotiations (are) required of peacekeepers ...where building a relationship of trust and cooperation with the local population was just as important as setting up roadblocks to check for smuggled weapons".

When I met with him during his recent visit here, he said the key to successful peacekeeping was to provide multi disciplinary training for our officer corps.

All our efforts should be put into the comprehensive training of our peacekeepers. The training will give our soldiers military skills but must also include conflict resolution, negotiation and humanitarian actions.

International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict has been part of our peacekeeping training for a number of years now. Peacekeepers must understand what it is they are doing, so that the people with whom they come into contact, are treated with respect and dignity. This is an area in which considerable resources will have to be deployed.

At present, we have 1,262 peacekeepers in Burundi, and 1400 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Military Observers and military liaison officers, who have specific tasks and are part of peacekeeping efforts, are present in Liberia (3), Sudan (257), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (7),

We are resolved to monitor our peacekeeping successes so that we know what we are doing right. Simultaneously, we are monitoring our problems and difficulties.

There are too many challenges for us to discuss on this occasion. They range from the lack of cooking and ablution facilities for men and women, absence of fixed and moveable accommodation, to long lines of logistical support, all of which have made our peacekeeping missions very problematic.

One of the complex difficulties we have encountered is that of working with the armed forces of other countries. Differences in background, culture and language, raise the need to consider the possibilities of peacekeeping training in theatre. Another area that needs to be looked at is the provision of legal

services and legal support on the ground. Wherever the SANDF are deployed, legal expertise needs to be provided. This would cover a basic level, right up to a more sophisticated and well versed and learned level. In addition, continued monitoring of the appropriateness of the UN mandate needs to be carried out.

It is with pride that I can inform the House that 7 countries of SADC (including South Africa) have ratified the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. It reflects the commitment of the countries of our region to ensure peace and stability in this region. We will continue to move together, as a collective, in sustaining this peace, in developing our region, and in contributing to peace and stability on the continent. The existence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact binds us into a SADC community of nations and defines our collective border.

As part of our collective effort, the SADC region is now completing its work on an early warning centre which should be operational in 2006

With regard to the Africa Standby Force the SADC region commenced staffing a multinational planning team in Gaborone in February which will assist the day-to-day management of the SADC Brigade activities and will monitor readiness.

It is anticipated that by the 30 June 2005 the SADC Brigade will be structured and ready to participate in peace missions as ordered by the AU.

Madam Speaker,

The Department of Defence continues with its programme of internal transformation. Part of this process has entailed a number of changes.

I would like to take this opportunity to announce that since my budget speech last year, General Shoke has become Chief of the South Africa Army, Admiral Mudimu has become Chief of the South African Navy, General Gagiano has become Chief of the South African Air Force, General Binda has become Chief of Joint Support, General Matanzima has become Chief Corporate Services and General Ramlakan has become Chief Director Strategic Plan. We are confident that they understand and embrace our transformation agenda and constitute the best team to take us forward.

I would like to extend my warm and deep thanks to all those officers, General Beukes, Admiral Retief, General Remano and Rev Quiba who have retired in the last year and who served our country with such loyalty.

In 1994, when we embarked on the Defence White Paper and Defence Review, peacekeeping did not feature significantly. Our efforts were concentrated on transforming the defence function from an offensive posture to a defensive one. This required a massive overhaul and transformation of the

Department of Defence, with which we are still involved to this day. But there is now a need to prioritise peace missions and give peacekeeping its correct place in the roles and functions of the SANDF.

The President referred, in his State of the Nation Address, to our troops as "midwives of peace, stability and prosperity". The SANDF is a visible and tangible instrument of our foreign policy, the principles of NEPAD and the African Renaissance.

We have thus embarked on a Review of the Defence Review and White Paper to bring into alignment our new priorities. But a number of challenges have been thrown up in this process which needs to be considered and confronted.

Our force design needs to be of an appropriate size and composition. We are painfully aware of the demands on the national budget.

But if we are to carry out the tasks assigned to us by the Government, we have to fashion a suitable force design. The Force Design suggested in the White Paper and Defence Review was based on the tasks of maintaining our defence capabilities and our support for the police. This now needs to be adjusted.

The SANDF remains structured according to the core force doctrine which will enable us, if necessary, to ratchet up our capabilities to meet conventional threats if and when necessary.

The adjustment of our major training to peacekeeping does not detract from the core force concept. We are not creating an SANDF of peacekeepers. But we are training a professional body of men and women, schooled in the arts of defence, who can use their skills in peacekeeping roles and post conflict reconstruction and development.

Some of our efforts must now focus on the transformation of our training. This review must encompass the syllabi and different methods of training. Attention must also be given to our military training institutions, which need to be properly equipped, maintained and in many cases renovated.

We have been decreasing our involvement in internal security for some years now. As the South African Police Service streamlines and professionalises, they are taking over more and more of the security functions for which they are trained. This is as it should be in a normal democratic society. The armed forces should not be involved in routine police security work. The process of phasing out the Commandos is proceeding according to schedule. And I can assure this house that the SANDF will not withdraw from any area until there is a proper plan and capacity to enable the SAPS to take over that work.

This work also includes making an accurate assessment of the requirements

for a Reserve Force. As a result of the work being done on the Defence Review and White Paper, the Reserve Force is now getting clearer direction and can be fashioned into a Force that meets our requirements. We have already started deploying the Reserve Force in our peacekeeping missions. But the rejuvenation of the Reserve Force will be necessary for further deployment. At present the Reserve Force stands at 9,519.

As part of the Strategic Defence Packages, we are acquiring sophisticated and advanced technical expertise. A clear defence technology strategy needs to be created encompassing all facets of the work needed to use, maintain and support this equipment. This strategy will determine the work of Armscor and the rest of the defence and defence related industries.

Both Minister Erwin of Public Enterprises and myself are working jointly to guide the process of rationalising and streamlining Denel and Armscor. Both entities must complete their transformation to be able to meet our defence requirements.

Central to the concept of Defence in a Democracy is civil oversight. Despite difficulties, we must understand that effective civil oversight and the smooth operation between the SANDF and the Defence Secretariat takes time and requires patience, tolerance and constant interaction. We continue to strive to enhance, strengthen and capacitate the Defence Secretariat to enable it to perform its tasks effectively.

I am glad to announce that the Civic Education Board is being reviewed in terms of size and effective functioning. It is an important component of civil oversight and in the proper preparation of members of the SANDF in equipping them for their deployment.

I am saddened though, to place on record the untimely death of Dr Rocky Williams whose departure will impact on this work and who will be sorely missed.

If the Department of Defence delivers all the outputs specified in its strategic business plan, it will, in co-operation with other State Departments, achieve effective defence for a democratic South Africa.

As the Plan says:

"This outcome enhances national, regional, and global security through the existence of defence capabilities that are balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced".

In conclusion, it is our duty to rise to the complex challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. We have to navigate through uncharted waters. The review and re-

casting of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review will be our compass through these troubled seas, to the calm waters of peace and stability on our continent.

I thank you.

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Budget vote 2006

Cape Town - South Africa has prioritised peacekeeping in Africa because stability and peace are the foundation for sustainable development, Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota said today at the Africa Aerospace and Defence 2006 (AAD 2006) exposition.

"South Africa is spending so much time and effort on peacekeeping because peace and stability are the foundation for sustainable development," he told the assembled business executives and military personnel participating in the largest arms fair in Africa.

Flexibility, mobility and reach are the watchwords of South Africa's defence and broader peacekeeping strategy, the minister said.

He used his opening address to the assembled business executives and military figures to expand on South Africa's overall defence and defence-procurement strategies in the context of peacekeeping and conflict resolution operations on the continent, which are receiving high priority from the government.

This is in line with the change in South Africa's defence posture from offensive to defensive with the onset of democracy.

This entails peacekeeping operations in Africa, which have extended beyond the traditional notion of "defence", now requiring the involvement of other government departments as well, the minister said.

"It's not the South African National Defence Force that's involved in peace missions, it's the people of South Africa represented by nearly every government department," Mr Lekota said, adding that South Africa's approach was now captured in a new draft paper on Peace Missions.

"Our continent of Africa has been torn apart by the greed of outside role players to access its considerable mineral wealth and natural resources. In the wake of this devastation, there is internal conflict over shortage of resources," he added.

One case in point is the resource-rich Democratic Republic of Congo, which, with the determined assistance of the United Nations and several other countries including South Africa, has only recently entered a period of relative peace after years of war.

Mr Lekota, providing the AAD 2006 participants some information on South Africa's possible equipment requirements, said that the South African Air Force (SAAF) found, on its numerous missions to the DRC transporting election-related material and other support, that, for example, the Boeing 747 proved more useful than the Russian-made carrier the Antonov 24 because the former had a wider mouth on its cargo hold, making it easier to load freight pallets.

In the first round of elections in the DRC recently, the SAAF transported 4 732 freight pallets loaded with 1 921 tons of election material to South Africa's northern neighbour, requiring 67 flights, to three hubs in the DRC and then the 14 centres from where material was distributed to 53 000 voting stations in the massive country, which is the size of western Europe.

This, said the defence minister, involved 14 days of flying, day and night, to the DRC, which has now begun the second phase of its elections, after an initial one failed to secure an overall winner.

This process is supported again by South Africa, which will be flying in a further 1 250 tons of election material on 58 flights.

The aircraft used for these flights are mostly South Africa's largest carrier, the ageing Hercules C130, as well as Boeing 747s and Antonovs, with the new, giant A400M military transport airbuses being purchased from EADS yet to be delivered to South Africa.

South Africa's acquisition policy - such as the recent orders of the military Airbus A400M - should be linked to technology transfer, the minister said, adding that the A400M programme has linked this to its role in the global supply chain and future growth of its aerospace industry.

Bearing in mind also the threat presented by climate change and global warming, the minister added that, technologically, "we must support all efforts to reduce the global impact of emissions and energy consumption within the aerospace industry".

South Africa's equipment requirements for peace missions range from small items to heavy military equipment, such as the Mamba armoured vehicles, are being determined by conditions on the ground, said Mr Lekota.

"Based on the existing political and threat environment, the African "defence" environment has become more complex, necessitating a broader scope of security operations. These include total war theatre and force projection at the one end of the spectrum, to search-and-rescue and environmental protection on the other end," he said.

"Clearly the frequency of operations in terms of peacekeeping, humanitarian

assistance and logistic-related missions are increasing and will dominate the future SANDF's operational role, resulting in requirements for different products and services," Mr Lekota added. - BuaNews

<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07032717151001.htm>

Downloaded on the 06 September 2007 at 01:21am

Defence budget speech tabled by Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, Minister of Defence

27 March 2007

Madam Speaker
Ministers present
Members of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Defence
Secretary for Defence
Senior officials
Officials
Generals
Admirals
Members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)

May I draw the attention of the House, to our 12 women generals present here today!

SANDF is in demand everywhere

Introduction

This year's budget speech takes place against the backdrop of the most diverse deployment of the SANDF troops since the birth of our democracy. As we speak, the sons and daughters of our nation are staffing missions in theatres of conflict in Africa and beyond.

They willingly face risks and dangers of varying degrees in order to advance national, continental and universal objectives of building a peaceful future for humankind.

Our troops are guardians of peace in Ethiopia Eritrea, they nurture burgeoning democracies of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ensured free and fair elections in the Comoros, Madagascar and Lesotho. Alongside sister African forces they monitor and enforce compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in the sweltering heat of the Darfur in the Sudan, they are providing much needed support to the Central African Republic in repulsing waves of attacks by northern rebels intent on overthrowing a democratically

elected government. As we speak they are supporting the Nepalese government in the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration processes preparatory for elections.

The SANDF is the mainstay of most of these operations.

Not only has it distinguished itself in these areas but alongside the work our nation is doing on the diplomatic front, it is contributing in no small measure to the rising profile of our country. Indeed its performance is not only acknowledged in all these countries but the SANDF is now in demand everywhere.

For this we must raise our hats in salute of the troops and leaders of the SANDF. The best of the youth of our country who serve without compulsion but out of love and loyalty to their people.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeepers who are placed into conflict areas must provide security and protection for the civilian population. They must first and foremost stop the ongoing fighting. They must then be able to re-direct the energies of the people into reconstruction activities. They must be able to pursue integrated approaches to repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees, the internally displaced, ex-combatants and their families, paying particular attention to women and children victims of violence. They must plan and implement comprehensive and well-blended disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programmes as a basis for consolidating safety and security.

South Africa's approach to security: Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Central to making our interventions sustainable and in line with the principles of SSR, we have to ensure that the thinking of the leaders of new democracies is directed towards respect and loyalty for their Constitution.

Peacekeeping interventions do not end with elections. The alarming number of conflict prone countries underscores the need for a broader approach to conflict prevention, one that avoids an artificial divide between pre-conflict, crisis and post conflict. It also indicates the need for an appropriate mix of political, security, humanitarian and developmental responses. Securing a just sustainable peace in a conflict prone situation means building strong transparent states with professional, civilian led military and police. It means developing a democratic framework that tolerates diversity. It means building an open civil society that promotes democratic governance and personal security. And it means instilling in all state institutions but especially the security forces, a culture of democracy rooted in respect for the rule of law and individual rights and dignity.

The concept SSR encompasses democratic oversight, civil society, defence reform, intelligence and security services, border management, policing, justice, prisons and private security companies. The object of SSR is to create a secure and safe environment for the affected state and its population through the re-establishment of the architecture and structure of the State. Its inclusive nature includes all sectors of the security cluster. The activities in the security cluster are based on the concept of human security as stipulated and defined in the African Union's (AUs) peace and security committee's mandate, the Common African Defence and Security Policy.

Whilst the concept of SSR encompasses the transformation and stabilisation of the whole of the security sector, on our continent it deals predominantly with defence institutions. It is a political process and to be successful it must be participatory. It must involve local ownership and because it has to pay attention to non-State actors and security and justice institutions, its approach must encompass the whole of government. But it is more than governance, it is also about operational effectiveness. In other words when the strengthening of new democracies becomes a priority, the security organs of the state must be transformed and secured.

We are the main implementation arm of foreign policy

Defence policy is classically regarded as a subset of foreign policy. Our approach is that defence is politics by other means. In the current period the Defence Force must be seen as an instrument of politics. Defence strategy therefore is the art and science of employing the defence forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy. The Department of Defence will continue to contribute to African unity by focusing in on our common political objectives. This will require a lot of political work to ensure that other African countries understand unity as we do both at the level of political leadership and at the level of military leadership.

We continue to increase our diplomatic defence missions abroad. We now have defence representation in 31 countries, 17 of which are in Africa.

It requires careful calculation to place people in strategic positions.

Changed strategic environment

The appearance of non-state actors in different shapes and forms, including private security firms and private military companies needs to be reckoned with.

Private military/security companies are able to intervene in conflicts tilting the balance of power in favour of their paymasters. They have the potential to undermine legitimate, constitutional democracies. Whilst "terrorism" has been identified by the "developed world" as the biggest threat, we maintain that

poverty and underdevelopment are the biggest threats to democracies in the developing world because it exposes our people to manipulation by those of wealthier countries. Competition for 'scarce' resources is another source of insecurity across the continent.

It is in this context that we can understand the situation in Somalia.

Transformation of defence industry

Very early in our new democracy, it was determined by the Executive that the defence industry was a strategic asset. Motivated by the desire to be self reliant, the government directed that all efforts should be made to retain as many of our strategic capabilities as possible. We remain committed to our Defence Related Industries as a result.

Our strategic capabilities are weighed against our threat analysis and our national security plans.

Consequently we encourage and are in support of all those initiatives which are intended to re-structure our defence related industries such that most of the home grown industries survive far into the future. When it comes to acquisition therefore, we will prioritise commodities which are either domestically developed or those in which South African industries have a stake. The South African defence industry is now under the microscope with a view to its growth and development. Emphasis is being placed on an integrated approach to the transformation of the defence industry. It is a key industry in the South African economy and all role players must participate in this transformation. This includes of course, various government departments, the defence industry itself and the private sector.

The Minister of Public Enterprises and I, working in consultation with the Minister of Science and Technology, set up several working groups to rationalise Armscor and Denel. The recommendations of the workgroups are now in the final stages of discussion. Denel, under the political direction of Minister Erwin has been re-structured and re-organised. Armscor, under the political direction of the Minister of Defence is being streamlined as an acquisition division of the Department of Defence. The research agencies and divisions of both Denel and Armscor, will reside in a new body called the Defence Evaluation and Research Institute (DERI).

Department of Defence (DoD) has to respond to these challenges. We have done extremely well this year. Despite all the problems, we were ready!

Republic of South Africa is currently the 10th largest contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Our list of accomplishments is impressive.

Apart from what I have already said at the opening of my speech, the SANDF is also deployed in Mozambique providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief due to the floods. We have yet another contingent in Mozambique to support efforts after the explosion at their ammunitions dump.

Until December 2006, 49 members of the SANDF were deployed in support of the implementation of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process in the Ivory Coast. Our involvement contributed to the successful negotiations which have taken place there in recent months.

Last but not least, we have responded to a request from the World Cricket Cup to provide assistance with security in the West Indies.

The SANDF is in demand everywhere.

South African Development Community (SADC) Brigade

The Africa Standby Force was conceived by the African Union (AU) as a rapid reaction force. It is composed of five regional brigades. The SADC Brigade is being launched in August this year in Tanzania. It will have all the features of a rapid reaction force. It is very important that all the countries of our region participate in developing and sustaining peace and stability on the continent. The participation by all SADC member countries must increase interoperability and commonality. This in turn will strengthen our capacity to meet our challenges, whatever they may be. We must put in place a system or a process by which all requests from the AU or from wherever else are processed at the SADC level so that the SADC Brigade can be deployed rather than troops of individual countries.

Administrative processes

It has been very distressing for the leadership of the Ministry and the Department that once more we received a qualified audit in the financial year 2005/06. The slight improvement shown from the previous year does not provide much comfort. At this point, I do want to say the Department has already tabled impressive corrective measures before a committee of Parliament. The ministerial work session also scrutinised the situation last week and charted a way forward to eliminate the main source of the problem leading to this qualified audit.

I'm now in a position to say that I feel confident that very soon this qualified audit will be history.

Ministerial priorities

The priorities I have set out for the forthcoming financial year are as follows:

1. Infrastructure

Many DoD facilities are in urgent need of renovation. This is the result of insufficient resources allocated for repair and maintenance. We will be creating a 'works brigade' ensuring an in house capacity to attend to all our facilities.

In addition, we will be drawing up a master plan to deal with our infrastructure. This plan will include priorities, costs and the development of a phased approach.

2. Revitalisation of the reserve force

Progress continues to be made with the transformation and revitalisation of the reserve force so that it can fulfil its primary role of providing the majority of the conventional landward capability of the SANDF, whilst at the same time supplementing the peace support missions conducted by the regular force.

On any one day, the equivalents of two and a half battalions of reserves are deployed on external operations, on our borders, in guarding key installations and on administrative duties.

The initiative to revitalise the army conventional reserve, the largest component of the SANDF reserve force has resulted in a strength of some 11 000 members of whom 66% are from previously disadvantaged backgrounds, representing a 20% improvement over the past three years.

3. Information Technology (IT)

Like all other government Department we are working with National Treasury on the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS).

This will greatly facilitate our administrative processes and upgrade our level of accountability.

4. The modernisation of the army

The modernisation of the air force and South Africa Navy (SA Navy) is well under way. It is now the turn of the SA Army to be modernised. This shall be our main focus in the incoming period. This will take place sequentially and in phases. First off is the necessity to align army vision 2015 with our medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) priorities.

5. Operationalisation of the defence review update

The defence update provides a cogent argument on the levels of defence required to respond to the strategic environment and the requirements posed by the foreign and security policy of this government to meet the three strategic

defence objectives of defending the republic, promoting regional and continental security, supporting our people and continually improving defence capabilities.

Conclusion

I have devoted most of this budget speech to issues relating to the primary mandate of the SANDF.

This must not create the impression that we have divested ourselves from the secondary tasks of providing support to other departments.

On the contrary, we are forever seized with discharging our responsibilities in this regard:

(a) We continuously maintain capabilities and are ready to provide all of the necessary support to the Department of Provincial and Local Government whenever disasters occasion at home and in the region. It is in this light that our involvement in Mozambique recently has to be seen.

(b) We are similarly forever available to respond to any invitations from the South African Police Services (SAPS) whenever called upon to do so. And on a daily basis we are involved with SAPS in the battle against crime. And this is particularly top priority in this year when government has declared crime a priority task.

(c) The rest of government departments are equally welcome to call on our support whenever the need arises.

My thanks to the Deputy Minister who has shared the burden of work with me this year.

I would like to thank the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the SANDF who are co-chairs of the Plenary Defence Staff Council.

My thanks also to the team in the defence secretariat, the generals and admirals and all the men and women of the SANDF.

Last but not least, to my team in the Ministry.

I thank you!

Issued by: Ministry of Defence
27 March 2007

SECTION 4
Articles on South African army recruitment articles

http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=5&slink_id=4979&link_type=12&slink_type=5&tmpl_id=3#top

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18 September 2007: Moves Afoot to Rejuvenate South African Army

Louis Oelofse, Sapa, Pretoria, Sep 6: Efforts to rejuvenate the South African Army will see 3000 new recruits being taken in next year, with the figure shooting up to 7000 in 2009, it was announced on Thursday. "We need a young and fit group of soldiers," army chief General Solly Shoke told reporters in Pretoria. Shoke said the army would also be focusing more on getting the "right people". "We are not going to recruit people that see this merely as an employment opportunity, but take those who see it as a calling," he said. The army, which makes up the majority of defence-force deployments in peacekeeping operations, is already over-stretched. It foresees that it will increasingly be used in non-military and peacekeeping operations. This means more "boots on the ground". "If the task of the army is to increase, we must [get] more money and people to do it," Shoke said.

Comment

There can be little doubt that the SA Army needs to be rejuvenated if it is to meet the challenges that it faces in the execution of its mandate in Africa. Recent years have seen the increasing deployment of South African soldiers in peacekeeping operations in Africa in conditions that unquestionably do require fit and motivated young soldiers. Peace missions in Africa occur in areas characterised by extreme climatic conditions, lack of infrastructure and general underdevelopment. Deployments are up to 6 months in duration and troops have to operate in difficult terrain and face harsh weather and austere living conditions. This certainly calls for "young and fit soldiers" who are motivated to serve the cause of bringing peace to Africa. Yes the SA Army needs "the right people" to fulfil its important role in Africa and at home.

The post-1994 political compromise that led to the creation of the South African National Defence Force, was driven by two central imperatives: the need to integrate former enemies from both sides of the struggle for democracy, and the need to build an Army representative of the demographics of South Africa. Unfortunately one of the results of this politically successful compromise is that the Army has suffered the consequences of a skewed rank/age profile. Integration resulted in the bloating of the Army's establishment with lower ranking soldiers of age, most of whom had few qualifications and little chance of ever achieving promotion.

This has created a situation where only about 50% of the troops that should be deployable on operations are in fact fit to be deployed. The African military operational environment is not particularly friendly to a 35-year old private who is, for example, required to carry his or her own supplies on a three day foot patrol.

Army deployments into Africa are consistently at three times the level envisaged in defence policy as approved in the 1996 White Paper and 1998 Defence Review. The Army's conventional reserve has dwindled due to lack of incentives, investment and training and the territorial reserve, the Commandos, has been closed down due to a misunderstanding of the fundamental function of territorial forces. The incorrect perception that the Commandos exist only for peace-time policing functions and serve only the interests of a minority white rural community resulted in the disbandment of one of the critical means of feeding the Army with the "right people".

At the same time that the SA Army's operational commitments have grown, its reserves have been all but destroyed and it has been at the back of the queue for equipment renewal and capital investment, with priority having been given to the Air Force and the Navy in the strategic defence acquisition process.

The SA Army, more than any other military force on our continent, has the potential to play a leading role in peacemaking and peace enforcement in Africa. If we Africans wish to determine our own future, we need to build the necessary capacity to enable us to do so. But the rejuvenation of the SA Army will not come about without major effort. Current efforts - which seem to boil down to periodic calls at press conferences for the "right people" to join the Army, the occasional newspaper advertisement, and recruitment drives at a few schools - will, at best, provide a trickle of new recruits (most of whom will be 'job' and not 'career' seekers). What is needed is for the SA Army to communicate to South Africa's youth the true meaning of a military career and for the SA Army to create attractive career opportunities for young and adventurous people, irrespective of race and gender.

Current communication from the South African Department of Defence is poor to say the least. Our young soldiers are deployed all over Africa in peace missions and, by all accounts, are doing a great job. Yet we read only of the legal procedures against a few transgressors, while the South African political and military leadership fail to inform us of the often impressive achievements of the majority our young men and women who are serving our nation's interests around Africa. These soldiers should be given the credit that they deserve. If the Army wishes to attract the "right people", then far more needs to be done in order to make South African proud of its soldiers.

It is a truism that young men and women seek employment where there are attractive career opportunities. Currently the image of the SA Army is not good due to ageing equipment, under-spending on maintenance and training and the currently skewed rank and age profile. Since approving the White Paper on Defence in 1996 government has done little to meet its responsibilities towards the Army. The White Paper states that "The government will request from Parliament sufficient funds to enable the SANDF to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently". Yet unprecedented growth in the Army's responsibilities around Africa (and even in places like far-flung Nepal) has not been matched by adequate funding. Since 1996 the increased personnel costs of the integration-bloated SANDF together with the strategic defence acquisitions for the Air Force and Navy have eaten into the SANDF's operating budget in a way that has particularly affected the SA Army. This has forced the Army to cut back on such essentials as general maintenance, training and recruiting. General Shoke is thus correct in stating, "If the task of the army is to increase, we must [get] more money and people to do it".

Another issue that has hampered the attractiveness of the Army as a career is the issue of affirmative action. Many reports are published in the media of white officers and other ranks who are replaced and superseded and who land up with no chance of further promotion or a meaningful career. This has had the effect that young white males are not entering the Army, thereby skewing its racial representativeness. This is unfortunate as racial equity is important for the Army to be truly representative of the people of South Africa, a fundamental requirement of any 'national' army.

The role of the SA Army in Africa is bound to increase as the African peace and security architecture develops and the African Standby Force becomes more of a reality. To meet these demands, the SA Army will most certainly need young, fit and highly motivated soldiers. The rejuvenation of the Army is therefore essential and needs to be supported by all.

<http://www.saairforce.co.za/recruitment>

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RECRUITMENT - JOINING THE FORCE

For more information, please contact the
SAAF Recruitment Office:

SA Air Force Headquarters
Air Command
(Directorate Human Resource Services)
Recruitment Office
Private Bag X199
Pretoria
0001

Fax: (012) 312 2138
Phone: (012) 312 2148 / 2609
Department of Defence Career website: www.careers.mil.za

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Pilot / Navigator
- Application form (PDF 375kb)
Other Careers
- Information brochure (PDF 278kb)
Other Careers
- Application form (PDF 1.69mb)
Download the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader

Selection Criteria

M-Count

The M-count (matriculation score count) is a method used by tertiary training institutions to determine a students academic suitability for further education in study directions offered by these institutions. The M- count can be determined by using the following formula(s):

The formula for the **Universities of Pretoria** and **Free State**, Technikon Pretoria and SA Military Health. Training Formation is as follows:

Symbol	HG	SG
A	5	4
B	4	3
C	3	2
D	2	1
E	1	0

Using the above formula, a candidate with 4 C's on Higher Grade (HG) and 2 D's on Standard Grade (SG), will have a total score of 14.

The formula for **Medunsa** is:

Symbol	HG	SG
A	8	6
B	7	5
C	6	4
D	5	3
E	4	2
F	3	1

The content of this section is for general information purposes only. This website does not actively recruit on behalf of the SAAF / SANDF and all applicants are encouraged to contact the relevant Recruitment office directly.

So, you've decided that you'd like to join the SAAF?

Personnel are the most important resource that the SAAF whose success is largely dependent on the extent to which its members are developed and utilised. The airforce considers it essential to recruit young volunteers who are prepared to serve in the air force for a limited period of time or to remain in a life long appointment.

The SAAF offers a number of varied and exciting careers, both in the air and on the ground. What would you like to do?

- [Aircrew - Pilot or Navigator](#)
- [Aircrew - Other](#)
- [Air Space Control](#)
- [Aviation Maintenance](#)
- [Engineering / Apprenticeship](#)

- [General Maintenance](#)
- [Support](#)

General Entry Requirements

There is a general entry requirement for joining the air force as everyone must be fit to serve in a military environment. Each mustering in the SAAF, also known as occupational class in the public service and trade in the technical environment of civil aviation, has requirements for specific educational qualifications, additional personal attributes and a willingness to serve under the working conditions of that mustering.

The minimum general entry requirements are that you must be:

- **A South African Citizen**
- **Preferably single**
- **Not younger than 18 years at the time of joining**
- **Comply with medical fitness requirements**
- **English as a school subject**
- **Have a minimum of standard 8 / level 10 educational qualification.**
- **Preferably not area-bound**
- **Be recommended by a selection board.**

Selection Process

Applications complying with the minimum requirements will be subjected to further screening. Candidates identified will then be invited to partake in a selection process.

The selection process entails the following:

Psychometric evaluation:

The aim is to assess the candidates aptitude and potential to develop in the position that was applied for. The nature of these tests will depend on the position applied for.

Selection Board (formal interview):

A Selection Board will be conducted in order to assess the applicants interest in the position applied for, as well as his or her interest in the Defence Force in general. The interview will also focus on self- confidence, leadership potential and communication skills.

Medical Evaluation:

A comprehensive medical evaluation will be conducted by appointed military medical practitioners in order to assess the applicants medical history and current medical status. All applicants must be declared fit for military training before commencement.

Criminal Records:

Fingerprints of applicants will be sent to the Criminal Record Bureau for verification . Records of convictions will be evaluated based on the severity thereof and how recently the offence(s) occurred.

Offer of Employment

Successful applicants will receive an offer of employment. Candidates who are not successful will be informed by correspondence. It is unfortunate that not all applicants who are recommended for training will receive an offer of employment due to the large amount of applications received.

Military Skills Development (MSD) Programme

The MSD programme is a two-year voluntary service system. Recruits are required to sign up for a period of two years, during which they will receive military training and further functional training. Further functional training includes a wide variety of options varying from specialised musterings such as engineering to general support musterings such as material support clerks.

The MSD system allows the member to adapt to the military way of life. Towards the end of the second year, (unless otherwise indicated) the member will be given the opportunity to indicate whether he or she would like to extend the contract or leave the Air Force. An extension of the contract will mainly depend on the member's performance over the two years and the availability of posts in the relevant functional field.

Members who do not extend their two year service contract, will serve in the Reserve Force (part-time) after completion of the initial two-year period.

Basic Military Training

Basic Military Training is compulsory to all uniform personnel of the SA National Defence Force and is presented at the Air Force Gymnasium in Valhalla, Pretoria, over a period of approximately 13 weeks.

The following subjects will, amongst others, be presented during the training period: Drill, Military law, Military ceremonies, Buddy aid Physical training and Soldiership.

Serving in the air force is far more than just having a job, it is a way of life.

Serving in the air force means more than just having a job. When not on duty, your behaviour has also to be beyond reproach as civil society looks up to you. You have to set an example at all times. Volunteers are required to pledge that they will uphold a strict Code of Conduct.

What you do constitutes a vocation when you serve in the air force. You invest most of your time in the air force and in a real sense you become identified with

the air force. Your whole personality development is associated with what you do and how you do it.

Viewing your work as a vocation, of which the ultimate function is the preservation of a worthwhile way of life for all the inhabitants of South Africa, permits you to find meaningfulness and a sense of accomplishment.

Serving in the air force requires particular psychological and physical attributes and the intellectual potential for developing the unique competencies required in the air force. Not everybody has these attributes and it is a selected few who will qualify for appointment in the air force.

Individuals who join the airforce are required to have certain basic attributes, while each mustering (or occupational class) include additional attribute requirements. For example, electricians must not be colour blind, as they have to identify wiring in circuits by colour codes. Exclusion from one mustering does not disqualify you from being considered for another.

The SAAF needs all-rounders who will be able to accept the responsibility of leadership. Leadership in the air force is split between officers and other ranks. The officer is required to make considered judgements and warrant officers and non-commissioned officers lead and motivate their subordinates. They form the backbone of the air force and support the officers.

As a junior NCO and junior officer you function at a level in the air force where you are responsible to do what is required of you.

At the same time you are required to develop as an officer or NCO, and you are given the opportunity to undertake new tasks in addition to your normal tasks for which you were trained.

Ability depends on yourself; you either have it or not, -and in both instances you can improve yourself if you are prepared to develop yourself and make full use of the learning opportunities provided. At an early stage in your career it is essential to gain experience in the work place, for this provides the credibility needed to earn respect in senior positions.

Experience is gained through optimum exposure to a variety of situations. It is not gained overnight. You develop more rapidly at an early age when you are still in a formative phase. Later it becomes more difficult to adapt to the military way of life.

http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=223037&area=%2farchives%2farchives_online_edition%2f

Downloaded on the 07 September 2007 at 12:14am

SA's youth face call-ups again

OWN CORRESPONDENT, Cape Town | Monday

DEFENCE Minister Mosiuoa Lekota and defence force chief General Sphiwe Nyanda have confirmed that the government is considering reintroducing some form of conscription. Speaking at a briefing for media and diplomats at Parliament, they said current members of the South African National Defence Force were not "getting any younger", and ways to replace them had to be found. Nyanda said he would soon be making specific proposals in this regard to Lekota. Referring to the integration process of the former statutory and non-statutory forces into the SANDF, Lekota said this would formally end with the promulgation of the Integration Intake Process Bill, to be tabled during this session of Parliament. Lekota reiterated that South Africa was willing to participate in international and regional peacekeeping missions, and said the country was ready to support peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo. South African personnel are currently undergoing peacekeeping training in a number of countries.

http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?from=rss_South%20Africa&set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=nw20070802172057285C754732

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SA to send more troops to Sudan

South Africa will "seriously consider" sending more soldiers to Sudan as part of the new African Union-United Nations Peacekeeping force, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said on Thursday.

"We will give very serious consideration, I hope, I'm sure positive consideration to increase our presence within the hybrid force," Pahad said.

Just less than 600 SA National Defence Force soldiers and just over 100 SA Police Service officers were part of the current AU Mission in Sudan.

On Tuesday the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to establish the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Unamid).

The force shall consist of 19 555 military personnel, and a civilian component including up to 3 772 police personnel and 19 police units of up to 140 personnel each.

The command and control structures for the hybrid operation will be provided by the UN, but under an agreement with the Sudanese government the force must have a predominantly "African character."

This means that offers from African troop and police contributing countries will be considered first. - Sapa

LIST OF WEBSITES

Arranged in alphabetical order:

1. www.buanews.gov.za
2. www.engineeringnews.co.za
3. www.info.gov.za
4. www.intoil.co.za
5. www.issafrica.org
6. www.mg.co.za
7. www.pmg.org.za
8. www.saairforce.co.za